Agenda Item 791

Appendices A-F

Agenda Item 791

Appendix A Publicity and promotion campaign details

In planning publicity around this consultation we have followed our own policies and referred to the Cabinet Office's "Consultation principles: guidance"

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/consultation-principles-guidance

Of particular note the Cabinet Office states:

"consultation should be 'digital by default', but other forms should be used where these are needed to reach the groups affected by a policy"

"Policy makers should be able to demonstrate that they have considered who needs to be consulted and ensure that the consultation captures the full range of stakeholders affected. In particular, if the policy will affect hard to reach or vulnerable groups, policy makers should take the necessary actions to engage effectively with these groups. Information should be disseminated and presented in a way likely to be accessible and useful to the stakeholders with a substantial interest in the subject matter. The choice of the form of consultation will largely depend on: the issues under consideration, who needs to be consulted, and the available time and resources."

Communications strategy

Aims:

- To raise awareness of the consultation and the issues we are seeking views on
- To encourage people and organisations to take part
- To increase public understanding about the fire and rescue service

Information has been made readily available and in a range of formats to make it accessible to different audiences. Interaction with members of the public has been encouraged through channels such as social media and the traditional media.

Hard to reach groups

We recognise that "hard to reach" groups are exactly that – and additional effort is needed to ensure we capture their views. Therefore public forums were held in Hove, Hastings and Uckfield with the independent research organisation inviting a cross section of the community. Additionally we have approached organisations which represent distinct demographics or groups and encouraged them to take part in the consultation as well as spread the word. For example we made direct contact with groups which represent the elderly these include:

- Age Concern: Brighton, Hove and Portslade (ACBHP)
- Brighton & Hove City Council
- Care for the Carers
- CareLink Plus, Brighton and Hove City Council
- East Sussex County Council
- East Sussex Strategic Partnership
- National Association of Retired Firefighters
- The Carers Centre
- Brighton & Hove Community and Voluntary Sector Forum (CVSF)
- Age Concern UK
- Brighton and Hove Pensioners' Forum

- Gay Elderly Mens Society (GEMS)
- Age UK
- Lewes District Local Strategic Partnership (LSP)
- Polegate Community Association
- Sensory Impairment Service, E.Sussex Social Services
- Saga

Availability of information

All publicity has highlighted that paper copies of the consultation are available by post as well as online. A leaflet and a postcard were created to promote the consultation.

Direct contact/roadshows

Four "Changing the Service – shaping our future" road shows were held in mid-March and early April in Eastbourne, Uckfield, Brighton and Hastings. A fifth – planned for Battle was curtailed but on the same date, Gary Walsh, Deputy Chief Fire Officer spoke at a well-attended public meeting and promoted the consultation.

The purpose of the road shows was three-fold:

- We wanted to inform members of the public, through direct face to face communication, about the consultation and how to take part in it
- We wanted to give members of the public an opportunity to ask questions about the proposals rather than read about it in the media.
- We also wanted to offer reassurance that the Service is accessible and ready to respond to emergencies

950 leaflets and 524 postcards were provided to those who engaged with staff at the roadshows, with some members of the public taking copies for friends and relatives. Overall we engaged with more than 1200 individuals and handed out just under 180 paper consultations to those who did not have internet access to complete the online survey. This greatly exceeded our targets and we reached more members of the public with the facts than we would have at traditionally attended public meetings.

Organisations

We contacted communications teams within key organisations, asking them to help promote the consultation. This resulted in East Sussex County Council adding information onto its Intranet, Age UK sending it out to contacts and a link to our website being put onto the Brighton & Hove City Council consultations portal.

In the final week before the end of the consultation, we checked which organisations had already responded and contacted a number of key stakeholders to ensure they were aware of the consultation and remind them of the deadline. A number of organisations confirmed it was unlikely that they would take part – others responded immediately:

- Office of the Sussex Police & Crime Commissioner
- Sussex Police
- Hastings Local Strategic Partnership
- South East Coast Ambulance Service NHS Trust

- Sussex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust
- Brighton and Hove City Council
- Hastings Borough Council
- West Sussex FRS (County Council)
- Kent FRS
- Surrey FRS (County Council)
- East Sussex Strategic Partnership
- Eastbourne Borough Council
- Lewes District Council
- Wealden District Council
- Age Concern UK
- East Sussex Disability Association
- Centre for Independent Living for East Sussex
- Age Concern: Brighton, Hove and Portslade
- 3VA
- Brighton Federation of Small Businesses
- Action in Rural Sussex
- East Sussex Federation of Small Businesses
- Care for the Carers
- Hastings Voluntary Action
- The Carers Centre
- The Disabilities Trust
- Mind Brighton
- East Sussex Hospitals NHS Trust
- Black and Minority Ethnic Community (BMECP)

Libraries

East Sussex County Council and Brighton and Hove Council – which run the libraries – were emailed at the start of the consultation. Hard copies of the consultation have been sent out to all libraries along with emails explaining the purpose of the document. Additionally the communications team in all Councils were contacted and asked to help publicise the consultation.

Website

The website has four videos: one from the CFO explaining the context of the savings, one which explains the proposals, one which explains how we assess risk and one which explains the types of emergencies and calls we attend. We also provided a link to the leaflet, the postcard, a statement from the Chairman and information on a rise in Council tax as well as the consultation document and the online survey. As of the 28th April, we had in excess of 2567 hits on the website with peaks following the roadshows.

Media

A press campaign resulted in coverage in the Brighton Argus, the Hastings/Rye/Battle Observer group and the Eastbourne Herald among others. We also achieved broadcast coverage on BBC South East Today, BBC Radio Sussex, Sovereign Radio and Meridian. These stations – particularly BBC Radio Sussex – have an older listenership which is significant due to our duty to reach different population groups. Additionally there has been publicity from campaigners highlighting the consultation with has further spread the word. A reminder press release was sent out from ESFRS 19 March 2014.

While we have tried to gain as much free publicity in the press as possible, we have also taken out adverts in local newspapers to increase publicity in the final weeks. We have paid £1,700 for adverts in The Argus and the Observers/Sussex Express series.

Social media promotion

We have used social media to make direct contact with organisations and to promote to our followers. On 11 April 2014, direct messages were sent to the following accounts

Account	Audience
@mumsnetEastSussex	Mothers
@AgeUKESussex	Older people
@welovehastings	Community network
@care4thecarers	Carers support network
@RyeBonfire	Bonfire organisations
@MindBrighton	Mental health support network
@LGBTWF	LGBT network
@PoliceLGBT	LGBT network
@HoveBiz	Business network
@SafetyNetBTN	Web safety network
@KSSairambulance	Charity
@TheFedOnline	Disability support network
@COTCharity	Disability support network
@SussexSRP	Road safety
@EastbourneCSP	Partnership
@SaferEastSx	Partnership
@SaferWealden	Partnership
@Safer_Rother	Partnership

We posted on the following accounts.

Account	Audience
@BMEWF	Black and minority ethnic network
@BattleChamber	Battle Chamber of Commerce
@HACC1066	Hastings Chamber of Commerce
@BrightonChamber	Brighton Chamber of Commerce
@VolunteeringBH	Volunteers in Brighton
@StonewallUK	LGBT
@BrakeCharity	Road safety

@SCYMCA	YMCA – youth
@BHT_Sussex	Homelessness support group
@ESDAEastSussex	Disability support network
@RuralSussex	Rural support network

Activities which were ruled out due to cost

A decision was made to make this as cost effective as possible while ensuring awareness of the consultation. This is in line with the Code of Recommended Practice on Local Authority Publicity which states "Publicity by local authorities should:-

- be lawful
- be cost effective
- be objective
- be even-handed
- be appropriate
- have regard to equality and diversity
- be issued with care during periods of heightened sensitivity

Employing a mailing house to send out simple A4 letters would cost around £500 per 1000. There are 342,303 households in East Sussex and Brighton and Hove. It would therefore cost in excess of £170,000 to send a letter to each of them. Costs would increase substantially if we were to print and send the whole consultation document to £3000 per 1000; this would have cost over £1m.

Further roadshows/events were not deemed cost effective due in part to the staff time it takes to organise and staff them as well as associated costs such as venue fees, expenses and travel costs.

Appendix B Media Log

Date	Outlet	Format	Headline
Feb			
	7 ITV Meridian	ΤV	NA
	7 BBC South East	ΤV	NA
	7 BBC Sussex	Radio	NA
	7 Heart FM	Radio	NA
	7 Brighton and Hove Argus	Web	Sussex fire stations could lose engines and firefighters in £1.7m cuts plan
	8 Brighton and Hove Argus	Print	Cutting fire jobs "puts lives at risk"
	8 Brighton and Hove Argus	Web	Firefighters warn proposed cuts will put "lives at risk"
	14 Sovereign/Arrow FM Radio group	Radio	NA
	14 Hastings & St Leonards Observer	Print	20 firefighter jobs at risk in service cutback
	16 Eastbourne Herald	Web	Cut jobs and we will be playing with fire?
	18 Eastbourne Herald	Print	Council Tax Rise by Fire Authority
	21 Rye Observer	Print	Save Battle Fire Station
March			
	14 Rye Observer (Bexhill)	Print	A vital component of the fire and rescue service under threat
	14 Battle Observer	Print	A vital component of the fire and rescue service under threat
	14 Hastings and St Leonards Observer	Print	A vital component of the fire and rescue service under threat
	14 Bexhill on Sea Observer	Print	A vital component of the fire and rescue service under threat
	14 Rye and Battle Observer	Print	Meeting over fire station's future
	14 Battle Observer	Print	Fire Service - budget should reflect your needs
	21 Rye and Battle Observer	Print	Misleading fire call out figures criticised
	22 Brighton and Hove Argus	Print	Fire safety first
	22 Brighton and Hove Argus	Web	Revamping fire station could cost lives
	22 Brighton and Hove Argus	Print	"Lives are being put at risk"
	28 Battle Observer	Print	Fire station public meeting
	30 Uckfield FM website	Web	East Sussex Fire and Rescue Service Public Information Day
	30 Uckfield FM website		Fire service changes ? have your say
April			
	4 Sussex Express	Print	East Sussex Fire and Rescue Service Public Information Day
	4 Hastings and St Leonards Observer	Print	Fire Chief invited to cutback talks
	4 Rye and Battle Observer	Web	Up to one hundred people expected at fire station march
	4 Rye and Battle Observer	Web	Make your views on plans known
	4 Rye and Battle Observer	Print	Save our fire station
	4 Rye and Battle Observer	Print	Make your views on plans known
	7 BBC Sussex	Radio	NA
	7 BBC website	Web	'Lives at risk' over fire changes
	7 UK Wired news	Web	'Lives at risk' over fire changes
	8 Rye and Battle Observer	Web	Save Battle Fire Station march
	25 Battle Observer	Print	Hundreds sign to help save Battle fire station
	25 Rye Observer (Hastings	Print	Hundreds sign to help save Battle fire station
	25 Hastings and St Leonards Observer	Print	Hundreds sign to help save Battle fire station
	27 Rye and Battle Observer	Web	Hundreds sign to help save Battle fire station
May			
	2 Rye and Battle Observer	Print	Observer readers say no to fire service cuts
	6 Brighton and Hove Argus	Print	Fire Service consultation
Interviev	ws given by the CFO on 7th Feb		
	BBC Sussex		
	Meridian		
	Hastings Observer		
	Sovereign FM		
	The Argus		
	Uckfield FM		
	Heart FM		

Appendix C Full ORS Report





Changing the Service – Shaping our Future

Report of Public, Stakeholder and Staff Consultation for East Sussex Fire and Rescue Service

May 2014

ORS, The Strand, Swansea, SA1 1AF 01792 535300 www.ors.org.uk



As with all our studies, findings from this research are subject to Opinion Research Services' Standard Terms and Conditions of Contract Any press release or publication of the findings of this research requires the advance approval of ORS. Such approval will only be refused on the grounds of inaccuracy or misrepresentation

© Copyright May 2014

Contents

Acknowledgements	1
Project Overview	5
Opinion Research Services	ô
The Commission	ô
Online and Paper Survey	ô
Deliberative Research: Public Forums	Э
Deliberative Research: Stakeholder and Staff Forums1	C
The Report1	1
Consultation Findings: Online and Paper Questionnaire12	2
Introduction1	2
Phase Two Proposals	2
Phase Three Proposals	5
Consultation Findings: Public, Stakeholder and Staff Forums)
Introduction	C
Main Findings	C
Proposal 1: The City	C
Proposals 2a and 2b: Battle and Hastings	5
Proposal 3: Day Crewed Plus	C
Other Issues	5
Overall Balance of Opinion for 3 Options4	3
Proposal 1: The City	3
Proposals 2a and 2b: Battle and Hastings4	3
Proposal 3: Day Crewed Plus	Э

Acknowledgements

Opinion Research Services (ORS) is pleased to have worked with East Sussex Fire and Rescue Service (ESFRS) on the consultation reported here.

We are grateful to the members of the public, stakeholders and staff who took part in the forums. They were patient in listening to background information before entering positively into the spirit of open discussions. They engaged with the Service, with the issues under consideration and with each other in discussing their ideas readily.

We thank ESFRS for commissioning the project as part of its programme of consultation. We particularly thank the members of staff who attended the sessions to listen to the public's views. Such meetings benefit considerably from the readiness of ESFRS staff to answer participants' questions fully and frankly.

At all stages of the project, ORS' status as an independent organisation engaging with the public as objectively as possible was recognised and respected. We are grateful for the trust, and we hope this report will contribute usefully to thinking about ESFRS's future service planning at a time of serious financial constraints.

The ORS Project Team

Project Design and Management

Dale Hall

Kelly Lock

Ciara Small

Fieldwork Management

Leanne Hurlow

Forum Facilitators

Dale Hall

Kelly Lock

Report Authors

Kelly Lock

Ciara Small

Project Overview

Opinion Research Services

- ^{1.} Opinion Research Services (ORS) is a generic social research company that works mainly for the public sector to conduct important applied research in the areas of health, housing, local government, police and fire and rescue services across the UK. The company was established in 1988 and has worked extensively with UK fire and rescue services (FRSs) since 1998. In 2004 it was appointed by the Fire Services Consultation Association (FSCA) as the sole approved provider of research and consultation services, under the terms of a National Framework Agreement. The same framework contract was retendered in 2009 and ORS was reappointed once more as the sole approved provider.
- ^{2.} While working with FRSs across the UK, ORS has specialised in designing, implementing and reporting employee, stakeholder and public consultation programmes for a wide range of integrated risk management plans (IRMPs) in many cases covering controversial and sensitive issues. In addition, ORS has extensive experience of statutory consultations on education, health and housing and many other issues, including budgetary consultations.

The Commission

^{3.} On the basis of our long-standing experience with the UK fire and rescue service, ORS was commissioned by East Sussex Fire and Rescue Service (ESFRS) to conduct a consultation process to review the proposals in its *Changing our Service – Shaping our Future* document. The consultation comprised:

Developing, implementing and reporting an online and paper questionnaire

Designing informative presentation material suitable for use in deliberative forums (in collaboration with ESFRS)

Recruiting, facilitating and reporting three forums with randomly selected members of the public

Facilitating two stakeholder forums and two uniformed staff forums.

Online and Paper Survey

^{4.} The Consultation Document included simple, user friendly and informal consultation questions, with an ORS Freepost envelope for ease of return. As well as the main questions, detailed respondent-profiling information was requested. The consultation documents were widely distributed and the questions were available to complete on-line.

^{5.} The online survey was available to complete from the 17th of February 2014 until the 28th of April 2014. The survey was available to residents, representatives from business, public and voluntary organisations and East Sussex Fire and Rescue Service (ESFRS) employees. 655 surveys were completed during this period (612 online responses and 43 paper questionnaires).

Respondent Profiles

⁶ The gender split was uneven, with 60% male and 40% female respondents. There was more of a balanced split with the age groups (16 to 34 (18%), 35 to 44 (20%), 45 to 54 (24%) and 55 and over (37%)). The tables below show the profile characteristics of respondents to the survey.

Gender	Number of respondents (unweighted count)	% of respondents (unweighted valid)
Male	302	60
Female	202	40
Not Known	151	-
Total	655	100

Figure 1: Gender - All Respondents

Figure 2: Age - All Respondents

Age	Number of respondents (unweighted count)	% of respondents (unweighted valid)
16-34	94	18
35-44	104	20
45-54	125	24
55+	190	37
Not Known	142	-
Total	655	100

Figure 3: Disability - All Respondents

Disability	Number of respondents (unweighted count)	% of respondents (unweighted valid)
Yes	73	15
No	416	85
Not Known	166	-
Total	655	100

Responses from organisations

- ^{7.} Most responses to the consultation questionnaire were from residents of East Sussex or Brighton and Hove (408) and members of East Sussex Fire and Rescue Service (41), but there were also responses from local organisations and businesses.
- ⁸ Of the 655 responses received, a total of 37 responses were representing the views of organisations. Figure 4 details those organisations that submitted responses. It is worth noting that further responses were received from partner Local Health Boards or their associated

Community Health Councils, but these offered no detail as to who within those organisations had submitted them.

Figure 4: Summary of organisations responding to the questionnaire (who gave their details) – 37 responses

A Plant Battle Mount Street residents group **Bodiam Parish Council Brightling Parish Council Catsfield Parish Council Crowhurst Parish Council** Dapper W East Sussex County Council Eastbourne Borough Council **Ewhurst Parish Council** Fairlight Parish Council Fernley Park Residents Association **Guestling Parish Council** Hastings and St Leonards seniors' forum **Hastings Direct Keighron Fencing Ltd** Lewes District Council London Fire Brigade **MM** Enterprises **Rother District Council Rural partnership** South East Coast Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust South Water Community Centre/senior citizens forum Sussex Police. Swift Cars. University of Brighton.

Duplicate and Co-ordinated Responses

- ^{9.} Online questionnaires have to be open and accessible to all while minimising the possibility of multiple completions (by the same people) that distort the analysis. Therefore, while making it easy to complete the survey online, ORS monitors the IP addresses through which surveys are completed. On this occasion, the monitoring showed that there were 6 IPs which each generated more than one response.
- ^{10.} A total of 36 completed questionnaires were submitted from an IP registered to London Grid for Learning Trust which provides services to many schools in London; however, as a major service provider in the area, and a provider of public Internet access points, it is not surprising that many submissions originated from this network. These responses provided a range of different views and ORS therefore consider it appropriate that all of the submissions are individually counted in our analysis.
- ^{11.} The remaining five IPs generated a total of 66 completed questionnaires. After careful study of these responses, in which we looked at cookies and date stamps, as well as the nature of the answers; none were considered to be identical responses or appeared to be attempting to skew the results. So (given that more than one person at an IP address might want to complete the questionnaire) we have not excluded any online submissions.

Interpretation of the Data

- ^{12.} Where percentages do not sum to 100, this may be due to computer rounding, the exclusion of "don't know" categories, or multiple answers.
- ^{13.} Graphics are used extensively in this report to make it as user friendly as possible. The pie charts and other graphics show the proportions (percentages) of residents making relevant responses. Where possible, the colours of the charts have been standardised with a 'traffic light' system in which:

Green shades represent positive responses

Beige and purple/blue shades represent neither positive nor negative responses

Red shades represent negative responses

The bolder shades are used to highlight responses at the 'extremes', for example, very satisfied or very dissatisfied.

Deliberative Research: Public Forums

- ^{14.} The forums reported here took place in March 2014 and were designed to inform and 'engage' the participants both with the issues and with ESFRS by using a 'deliberative' approach to encourage members of the public to reflect in depth about the fire and rescue service, while both receiving and questioning background information and discussing service delivery and budgetary issues in detail. The meetings lasted for 2.5 hours.
- ^{15.} In total, there were 45 diverse participants at the sessions. The dates of the meetings and attendance level by members of the public were as follows:

AREA	TIME AND DATE	NUMBER OF ATTENDEES
Battle and Hastings Forum	6:30pm – 9:00pm Wednesday 19 th March 2014	17
Brighton and Hove Forum	6:30pm – 9:00pm Thursday 20 th March 2014	12
Uckfield Forum	6:30pm – 9:00pm Thursday 20 th March 2014	16

^{16.} The attendance target for the forums was 12-15 participants, so the recruitment programme was successful. Some participants had attended previous forums and had been re-invited by ORS, and the remainder were new attendees: the latter were recruited by random-digit telephone dialling from ORS' Social Research Call Centre. Having been initially contacted by phone, all participants were then written to - to confirm the invitation and the arrangements; and those who agreed to come then received telephone or written reminders shortly before each meeting. Such recruitment by telephone is an effective way of ensuring that the participants are independent and broadly representative of the wider community. The method is certainly the fairest and most

inclusive way of recruiting participants – for every household with a telephone is included in the random selection, including unlisted numbers and Telephone Preference Service subscribers (who are excluded from marketing calls, but not from genuine research calls); and the telephone is the most effective way of ensuring that all the participants are independent of each other.

^{17.} Overall, participants were a broad cross-section of residents from the local areas and, as standard good practice, were recompensed for their time and efforts in travelling and taking part.

	OVERALL	
Gender	Male: 25	
	Female: 20	
Age	18-34: 10	
	35-54: 17	
	55+: 18	
Social Grade	AB: 14	
	C1: 18	
	C2: 6	
	DE: 7	
Ethnicity	1 BME	
LLTI	7 with Long-term Limiting Illness	

^{18.} In recruitment, care was taken to ensure that no potential participants were disqualified or disadvantaged by disabilities or any other factors, and the venues at which the forums met were readily accessible. People's special needs were all taken into account in the recruitment and at the venues. The random telephone recruitment process was monitored to ensure social diversity in terms of a wide range of criteria – including, for example: area of residence; gender; age; ethnicity; social grade; and disability/long-term limiting illness (LLTI).

Deliberative Research: Stakeholder and Staff Forums

- ^{19.} ESFRS undertook a conscientious and large-scale programme of invitations and reminders to stakeholders and staff in the Battle/Hastings and Brighton and Hove areas.
- ^{20.} Eight people attended the Battle/Hastings stakeholder forum and three attended the one in the City and though numbers were lower than desired, two full and considered discussions were had. Attendance at the two staff forums was higher: 26 firefighters (from Battle, Bohemia Road [Hastings], The Ridge [Hastings] and Eastbourne) attended the first and over 30 firefighters from across the City attended the second.

The Interview Framework

^{21.} ORS worked in collaboration with ESFRS to agree a suitable agenda and informative stimulus material for the meeting, which covered all of the following topics:

ESFRS's staff and financial resources The distribution of emergency cover resources ESFRS's incident profile and numbers The reality of reducing risk The role of prevention, protection and response Budget reductions ESFRS's proposals in relation to: The City; Battle and Hastings; and Day Crewing Plus.

^{22.} The discussions were prompted by a presentation devised by ORS and ESFRS to inform and encourage debate and participants were encouraged to ask any questions they wished throughout the discussions prior to being invited to make up their minds on the issues.

Qualitative Research

^{23.} Although, like all other forms of qualitative consultation, forums cannot be certified as statistically representative samples of public opinion, the three meetings reported here gave diverse members of the public, stakeholders and ESFRS staff the opportunity to comment in detail on ESFRS' proposals. Because the recruitment was inclusive and participants were diverse, we are satisfied that the outcomes of the meetings (as reported below) are broadly indicative of how informed opinion would incline on the basis of similar discussions. In summary, the outcomes reported here are reliable as examples of the reflections and opinions of diverse informed people reacting to the issues under consideration.

The Report

^{24.} This report concisely reviews the sentiments and judgements of participants on ESFRS's proposals. Verbatim quotations are used, in indented italics, not because we agree or disagree with them – but for their vividness in capturing recurrent points of views. ORS does not endorse the opinions in question, but seeks only to portray them accurately and clearly. While quotations are used, the report is obviously not a verbatim transcript of the sessions, but an interpretative summary of the issues raised by participants in free-ranging discussions.

Consultation Findings: Online and Paper Questionnaire

Introduction

^{25.} This section reports the findings from the online and paper questionnaire.

Phase Two Proposals

^{26.} Cuts in Government funding mean that ESFRS need to save £7.1 million over the next five years. ESFRS are already implementing changes to achieve this, but need to do more. The 'status quo' is not an option: ESFRS have to make some changes if they are to balance the books. Respondents were asked to consider various proposals.

Proposal 1: The City

PROPOSAL 1

Due to the reduction in the number of incidents over the last decade there is currently an overprovision of emergency resources in the City of Brighton and Hove, with most of the city centre being reachable by five fire engines within eight minutes – whereas most serious fires require two or three fire engines to attend. After a careful review, East Sussex Fire and Rescue Service has concluded that it could reduce its city-based resources by one fire engine without increasing risk and while maintaining current performance standards in which two or three city-based fire engines attend serious incidents within eight minutes across almost the entire city area. Of course, these fire engines would continue to be supported by others in Newhaven, Lewes and Shoreham, as standard good practice.

Our analysis shows that removing one fire engine from Preston Circus or Hove would not increase risk and our attendance standards would still be met. The analysis shows a marginal advantage in removing a fire engine from Hove rather than from Preston Circus, but the difference is very small.

^{27.} As shown in Figure 5 overleaf, just under two fifths (38%) of respondents agreed with ESFRS's proposal to remove a fire engine from the City. However, just over half (51%) disagreed.




Figure 5: Extent to which respondents agree or disagree with the proposal to remove a fire engine from the City

Base: All Respondents (643)

- ^{28.} Respondents who disagreed with the proposal to remove a fire engine from the City were asked to explain why and what they would do instead since 'doing nothing' is not viable.
- ^{29.} A number of respondents questioned whether it would affect resilience, increase risk and compromise safety:

Although the total number of calls may have dropped, there are times when all the pumps in the city are busy and we are stretched. Hove are often across the border to assist West Sussex in Shoreham, plus an incident in a high rise can easily use up all the city resources on one call. Taking a pump for either Hove or Preston Circus would have a knock on effect to surrounding stations

Densely populated areas and many high rises, you cannot put lives at risk - or make cutbacks with appliances and manpower - make cutbacks elsewhere such as uniform wastage etc.

Fire spreads quickly and kills, this will put more lives and businesses at risk!

I disagree because it may increase risk, not now, but in the near future and may lead to devastating consequences. Cuts should be made elsewhere like if fire stations, buildings don't get used much, hire it out to people who may need to use it

If you take another fire engine out of Brighton and Hove, you will affect resilience. You may also limit your options for effective and safe intervention at high rise incidents. There is also a number of businesses and local premises with a high life risk and the benefits for a quick and weighty attack will overwhelmingly out-weigh any small financial saving, considering what could go wrong

Resilience would be lost and fire appliances would have to travel further to get to an incident and reduce cover in the area they came from.

^{30.} Some respondents put forward suggestions such as reducing senior officers or their pay:

According to the press, the Service has far too many senior officers who earn five times what firemen earn, why not remove these before jeopardising the public?

Cover should not be reduced anywhere. Trim the fat from senior officers and HQ and their pay, not front line workers

Cut back on Principal Officers; ESFRS has many as the Scottish Fire Service. Reduce boroughs and Borough Commanders from 6 to 3. Carry out a full management restructuring; this will protect the frontline services that appear to be being targeted by senior officers

Cut back room staff, senior officers bloated wages, get rid of executive cars, reduce the number of officers, no cuts from the front line

Cut higher earners wages and spend less on other projects

Cut pay salaries for people higher up sitting in the office making decisions that affect people's lives.

^{31.} Others thought that support staff should be reduced:

Taking fire engines away is putting people's lives at risk. Surely cutting support staff i.e. cleaners, drivers and hydrant men? Surely firefighters can do hydrants like they used to?

Cut costs from HQ such as Marketing, Comms, HR. All we need are fire stations, firefighters and fire engines. Increase council tax

With a growing population it is erroneous to reduce front line services which will need to be reinstated in the future to safely provide effective fire and rescue cover. Savings can be made by reducing the number of middle management roles and support staff roles.

^{32.} Some respondents also put forward different crewing options:

Look at different crewing options - double jumping ALP or introduction of smaller appliances

Reducing front line services is not the only way to meet budget restrictions. However, if this is the only option then looking at dual crewing the ALP with a smaller fast response vehicle with 4x4 capability would provide further enhancement to the City without losing posts

Change the crewing duty system at Hove to Wholetime and Retained thereby making the second pump Retained

I disagree as it would affect the community within the city with Brighton having the most calls. I would maybe change one of the Wholetime stations to a Day Crewed, such as Roedean or Hove

It would put enormous amount of work on the initial pump turning up. Why not consider a Retained pump or Day Crew to man a second pump?

Perhaps a change to crew numbers, given that appliances and firefighters are always required, even if you say calls are lower?

Possibly consider the way fire engines are crewed to save money. Consider reducing the amount of managers as it is clear they will be managing fewer front line firefighters in the future. Reducing the amount of fire engines works in theory, but during the recent and continued bad weather the fire service was stretched with large amounts of crews being paid overtime to help deal with the floods.

^{33.} Sharing services with other FRSs and/or emergency services was suggested as a possible option for ESFRS:

Consider combining the call centre operations with West Sussex

Cut administration costs and stores i.e. share purchase with other brigades

Cut support staff, amalgamate with West Sussex to cut senior support management, greater buying power for uniform, goods, and central training

Cut officers and merge with other fire or police services. Charge for wasted call outs and lift breakdowns

Has the Fire Service looked into sharing fire chiefs instead of removing firefighters from our city. I would rather the number of firefighters and fire engines remained the same

I am absolutely disgusted that cutting a fire appliance is even being proposed. Given the top heavy nature of the ESFRS management structure, coupled with the list of just how much money has been, and still is being wasted by ESFRS (such as equipment that is unproven, unused and/or unfit for purpose, property costs etc.), I would firstly suggest perhaps a regionalisation of senior management, more like Scotland

I do not think that proper account has been taken of using the Scottish Fire Service amalgamation model. It claims savings of £1.7 million over 15 years. Why have you not presented a South East regional analysis as an alternative? What external scrutiny by the Chief Inspector of the Fire Service has occurred?

Merge with another Fire Authority and save the £7 million by removing unnecessary management rather than fire crew. You should cut from the top down and not from the bottom up!

^{34.} Some respondents suggested charging for services, while others felt Council Tax should be increased:

Look at other ways to improve funding i.e. charging for some of the services provided, for example, road traffic accidents, and non-fire related services

The Service should also look at generating income by offering a wider range of commercial training to private businesses

Charge for wasted call outs and lift breakdowns

Brighton and Hove seems to be getting bigger as there seems to be more people relocating down here from London. It does concern me that reducing the amount of engines will have a potential safety issue to people who may need this service. I appreciate that something needs to be done and I would not object to an increase in what is paid to the Fire Authority from what I pay in council tax

Raise council tax a few pence; that should pay for all these pointless cuts. Sooner or later it will all go horribly wrong then who will be to blame? How about the Chief Fire Officer for corporate manslaughter?

^{35.} A number of respondents also thought that more funding is needed from Central Government:

I disagree with any cuts to frontline services because it puts lives at risk. Don't assume the Government will say no to more funding - ask them

I disagree with any cuts to frontline services. I believe the Service should just go back to the core business of being an emergency service having a fully trained workforce to deal with not only fires but other incidents like major flooding which is on the increase. Basically having the resources to answer 999 calls. You say incidents have gone down to the excellent fire preventative work firefighters do, if you cut those resources all that work is undone and people in the community change all the time and the incidents will rise. The Fire Authority should challenge Central Government first before proposing cuts and ask for more money. The Chief has already said it will be a resounding no but he has not even asked

I would like the Chief to stand up to the Government and actually tell them that the cuts being handed down are unsustainable and any closures or removal of fire engines will put lives at risk!

^{36.} Finally, using the reserve fund was considered appropriate by some:


Use of reserves, streamlining and sharing of IT, human resources, workshops, senior management with other fire services. Amalgamation with other FRSs to achieve real long term savings

Use the money in the emergency fund instead. £8 million I believe and merge with another Fire Authority to save on management costs. In other words, cut from the top down first, not the bottom up!

I would fund the shortfall in budget from the 'reserve fund' where £10-11.5 million pounds is sitting unused. The £7.1 million pounds required could easily be met and still leave a substantial pot for contingencies. Please bear in mind the forthcoming elections could completely change the situation.

37. If the change does go ahead, 3 in 10 respondents (30%) would recommend removing a fire engine from Hove Fire Station, while around a fifth (21%) would recommend removing a fire engine from Preston Circus Fire Station. However, almost half of respondents thought that ESFRS should not remove either engine.

Figure 6: Whether respondents would recommend removing a fire engine from Hove Fire Station or Preston Circus Fire Station



Base: All Respondents (492)

Proposals 2a and 2b: Battle and Hastings


^{38.} 52% of respondents agreed with option 2a (as described below); only 33% disagreed.

OPTION 2a

Battle fire station is crewed by wholetime firefighters who work predominantly on weekdays only, from 9am to 6pm. At night time and at weekends the station is predominantly covered by wholetime and retained fire fighters who are on call. The proposal is to improve emergency cover by crewing Battle fire station with wholetime fire fighters on both weekdays and during the day at weekends, with retained cover outside those hours.

This option would provide quicker support into the Hastings area and allow the removal of the retained fire engine from The Ridge Fire Station. Due to the low numbers of calls it attends, removing the retained fire engine from The Ridge would not increase risk.

Figure 7: Extent to which respondents agree or disagree with Option 2a



Base: All Respondents (587)

- ^{39.} Respondents who disagreed with **option 2a** were asked to explain why and what they would do instead since 'doing nothing' is not viable.
- ^{40.} A number of respondents again suggested senior management reductions:

Again, cuts from the front line. Surely senior officers can afford to buy their cars and any company mileage can be done in pool cars

Again, cutting frontline services with no mention of cutting senior management positions. This is just not value for money

Cut back on principal officers, ESFRS has many as the Scottish Fire Service. Reduce boroughs and Borough Commanders from 6 to 3. Carry out a full management restructuring; this will protect the frontline services that appear to be being targeted by senior officers.

^{41.} Sharing of services was also mentioned again as an option for ESFRS:

You are asking people to say that their fire cover in Battle is more important than those in Hastings. Can you not share a headquarters building with the police or ambulance service or sell the current headquarters and get something smaller?

Fight the cuts; stop the Government destroying our public services. Create a regional fire service which will get rid of most of the overpaid public services employees at the top, one training centre, one team of HR.

^{42.} Several respondents noted that the removal of the retained fire engine from The Ridge Fire Station could increase risk:

Although the engine at The Ridge attends few calls I disagree that its removal would not increase risk. I also feel that its removal would not achieve any significant savings. Improving the whole time readiness of other stations is welcomed, and would improve public and firefighter safety, but this should not be at the expense of the engine based at The Ridge

As a Hastings resident in the east of the town, I cannot support the removal of a Retained fire engine from The Ridge. This would potentially put lives at risk

I agree with the Battle part of it, but not the removal of a fire engine from The Ridge. Would it not be easier to remove one engine from Bohemia fire station where they have more rather than attack a small village fire station that is needed? The town needs more than one fire station

I believe that The Ridge Retained fire engine provides important cover for the town. Also, I feel it is better to make Battle a Retained station as that way you still keep the same number of appliances, but Battle would be crewed by Retained firefighters. Furthermore, Hastings is a bigger area with more risks so it's better to have The Ridge fire engine as it's closer. ^{43.} Some respondents thought that removing the retained fire engine from The Ridge Fire Station would have a negative impact on Battle Fire Station:

Battle Fire Station serves a very wide area of remote outlying villages and also major roads

Battle Fire Station should not be closed. Other services should be re-examined

Battle has a large area to cover and already provides a Wholetime element of cover at weekends. Utilising this to cover The Ridge would furthermore reduce cover in Battle due to increased response into Hastings

These options seem to be geared more to Battle giving Hastings support than to the needs of the Battle area. Have discussions with the Battle personnel as they have knowledge and experience of the rural situation rather than working with statistics overall.

^{44.} Other respondents suggested that further savings could be achieved by making Battle a RDS fire station (i.e. option 2b):

Battle has very low call numbers to its station ground. It should be fully RDS; removing fire appliances would reduce the overall fire cover in the Hastings area. This would also reduce the amount of Wholetime firefighter posts. Removing RDS appliances saves very little money

Better option is to downgrade Battle to RDS station as the risk profile does not warrant a Wholetime crew

If Battle receives a low number of calls now, what's the point in making it fully Wholetime? Some Retained stations in Sussex receive more callouts than Battle. I would say turn Battle fully Retained and focus your money elsewhere

If you are doing that proposal you are saving £14,000 pounds for the year, if you remove the Day Crewed station in Battle and make it RDS fully, you will save £200,000 a year. Do not make decisions for political reasons; do what is right for East Sussex.

^{45.} More than a quarter of respondents (29%) agreed with **option 2b** (as described below); almost three fifths (56%) disagreed.


OPTION 2b

An alternative option for the Battle/Hastings area would be to keep both the wholetime and retained fire engines at The Ridge Fire Station, while changing Battle into a retained-only station.

Making Battle a retained-only station would reduce daytime cover in Battle and the north-east of the County – but, due to Battle's low number of incidents, it would not increase risk and current performance standards could be maintained if Battle became a retained station.

Changing the Service – Shaping our Future Consultation 2014 Report for East Sussex Fire and Rescue Service





Base: All Respondents (574)

- ^{46.} Respondents who disagreed with option 2b were asked to explain why and what they would do instead since 'doing nothing' is not viable.
- ^{47.} Again, some respondents expressed concern about changing Battle from a Day Crewed to a RDS fire station:

As Battle is a technical rescue station, any reduction in working times would impact upon the standard of their training, potentially resulting in dangerous working practices and putting firefighters and the public at risk

Battle already struggles to provide cover utilising its Retained crews so this would put more times when no cover in Battle would be available. The specialist appliances at Battle would no longer give support

Battle covers a large area of East Sussex where the fire and rescue cover would be greatly lowered by taking away immediate cover by a Wholetime crew

Battle has the technical rescue unit (one of only two in ESFRS), a rope rescue unit (both of these are manned by a specially trained team), provides vital back up and cover to Hastings and all over the county, they are close to the A21 which frequently sees very serious accidents which Battle are often first on the scene too. If Battle is downgraded, this will cost lives

Battle is a very busy station and any reduction in services would be dangerous

Battle is an important station as it covers areas of Rother to the north and east of Battle. Having just a Retained station would put many more lives at risk due to increased time for engines to get to the area from Hastings if there were a major incident. The north eastern area of Rother is poorly served with so many services; the Fire Service is a major requirement for such a rural area. Battle Fire Station should continue to be manned

Battle serves homes in the countryside surrounding the town along with the dangerous A21; it would be madness to reduce the service from there. Hastings has a growing

population; it would be equally as mad to reduce the service there. I would increase support to both stations.

^{48.} Many respondents re-iterated their previous points in relation to:

Cutting/restructuring senior management and support staff


Sharing resources with other FRS's and other emergency services

More government funding needed

Concerns about increased risk and a lack of resilience.

^{49.} Overall, more than half of respondents (53%) thought that option 2a is the better option for service delivery, while just over a quarter (27%) thought that option 2b is the better option. Just over a fifth stated that neither option is suitable.

Figure 9: Given the evidence, would you say Option 2a or Option 2b is the better option for service delivery?



Base: All Respondents (502)

Proposal 3: Day Crewed Plus

^{50.} Almost half (47%) of respondents agreed with the proposal to introduce the "Day Crewed Plus" duty system at Roedean and The Ridge Fire Stations; almost 3 in 10 respondents (29%) disagreed.


PROPOSAL 3

It is proposed that the "Day Crewed Plus" duty system should be introduced at Roedean and The Ridge Fire Stations. These stations are currently staffed 24 hours a day by firefighters on site and this would not change for the new system.

At most "Day-crewed" fire stations, the wholetime firefighters go home during the evenings and overnight, but live within five minutes of the station and are on-call from their homes. At "Daycrewed Plus" stations, during their duty periods the wholetime firefighters remain at the station during the evenings and overnight in comfortable accommodation provided by ESFRS – so they can respond immediately to night-time emergency incidents, as they do now. Response times are therefore unchanged. The firefighters may have visitors/family members staying with them in their accommodation and they receive an on-call bonus for being available on site.

This change allows a reduction of several posts whilst not affecting attendance to calls.

Figure 10: Extent to which respondents agree or disagree with the proposal to introduce the "Day Crewed Plus" duty system at Roedean and The Ridge Fire Stations



Base: All Respondents (548)

^{51.} Respondents who disagreed with proposal 3 were asked to explain why and what they would do instead since 'doing nothing' is not viable.

^{52.} Many respondents expressed concerns about the effects that the proposed "Day Crewed Plus" duty system would have on family life:

This would mean the loss of around 24 firefighter posts and an increased pressure for those who work the Day Crewed Plus system. It is far from family friendly and would impact on female firefighters the hardest

To keep firefighters on their station for this amount of time is not a family friendly system. What about their children...do they not see their parents for 4 days?! Firefighters would be burnt out with this system which pays less than the minimum wage per hour!

This sounds like a terrible way to crew fire engines. How can you keep staff on site for so long especially if they don't want to work this system? As for family friendly that is a joke; it sounds like living in a prison with your family getting visiting rights. Use these stations as satellite stations to the other nearest station. The crews can collect the fire engine there and spend the shift at the satellite station. You can then run those pumps at reduced crewing i.e. four not five. Not as big a saving but less outlay and the firefighters can still have a life

This proposal is not family friendly and the service should not be expecting its employees to live under 'hostel' conditions when the tried and tested system has worked perfectly well for a very long time. The service should not be moving backwards in time just to please their political puppeteers

The Day Crewed option allows staff to have a family life outside of the fire brigade. Having visitors to stay is not the same as being able to put your children to bed. If they are called out on a long overnight shift, who takes over for the next one or do they always work one day on one off? Seems a bit harsh. I don't know enough about the ways of the brigade to answer, however, I want to be assured that people still find the job attractive and not at a cost to family life. I wouldn't want my husband absent three or four nights a week. And I want my family safe...that refreshed firefighters are available any time not having to work through endlessly

If family stay with them, that would mean changes to accommodation and that means more money to make the changes. The last thing you need is lots of children running around when the call goes out!

Extra expense in providing accommodation for family members, with extra pay in bonuses. Just how many hours each week are these crews expected to be at the station? I was under the impression the EU have a stipulation on how many hours a week people should work and that is no more than 48

Day Crewed Plus is so anti-social, how can you expect someone to live in a box room for 4 days straight and not crack? What family is going to want to bring their children to a motel to see their mum or dad as they are away from family life for 4 days? The Retained system has worked for years and many pumps these days are rarely off the run. The firefighters will be working 96 hours as opposed to 48 and I know they won't be getting their pay doubled.

^{53.} Some respondents also questioned the costs of the proposed duty system:

A Victorian shift system would see undue strain placed on home life. The increase in pension payments will have to be found by the employer, can you afford this?

The increase in wages would outweigh the benefits trying to be gained

To what extent will this save money and how many crew would be reduced following the change of duty system allowing for accommodation cost?

You do not explain the cost implications of the new living arrangements. If a firefighter is happy to be on station for 4 straight days without being able to leave, whilst seeing their pay reduced to near minimum wage, that is up to them. My concern would be with forcing people into this position. Someone like myself just starting a family would not be able to work this system. Have enough firefighters expressed an interest in this system? And are the full facts available to them? Does the Fire Authority know how much this is really going to cost? Are they aware that all the proposed savings for the combined control centres have already been lost through poor management and decision making? This is an outrageous proposal until all the facts are present.

^{54.} Others expressed concerns that the long hours will affect firefighters' performance:

Although the persons would be available, I have serious concerns regarding people being essentially at their place of work for so long. In a profession which requires instant decisions with limited information I fear that being on duty for extended periods would affect performance

Creation of 96-hour shifts would affect family life and lead to fatigued firefighters

Cutting frontline posts and reducing standards of employment can only lower morale and reduce the quality and safety of the service

I have issues relating to the legalities of working such a large amount of hours on the trot. Whilst there maybe periods of quiet, there is also the possibility of a busy night period coupled with working in the day that could result in firefighters working while being dangerously fatigued.

^{55.} Again, a number of respondents suggested the following:

Cutting/restructuring senior management and support staff

Increasing council tax

Asking Central Government for more funding.

Phase Three Proposals

The Phase 3 Options are for further review and investigation in order to achieve further savings from 2015/16 onwards. Details of these reviews are yet to be confirmed and any proposed changes arising from them will be carefully considered by the Fire Authority during 2014/15.

Do you have any comments about the phase 3 Options summarised in the table below or any suggestions of other means to achieve the savings required?

Review 1	Undertake a Full Review of Retained Establishment and Duty System and payments
Review 2	Commence the purchase of two Aerial Rescue Pumps for Hastings and the City of Brighton and Hove
Review 3	Revisit the results of the Rural Review with focus on the future of some retained stations
Review 4	Investigate the introduction of smaller appliances
Review 5	Review the Technical Rescue Unit capability and usage
Review 6	Review the number of Flexible Duty System (FDS) Management Posts through the introduction of Retained Support Managers at Watch Manager Level
Review 7	Consider demand-led rostering to better match resource levels to demand throughout the day and night
Review 8	Carry out a full review of the Schools Education programme
Review 9	Review the current policy for call challenge and attending calls and, consider the appropriateness of recovering costs from the owner or operator of the premises/locations where the number of false alarm calls is high
Review 10	Investigate the benefits of the provision of a new Day Crewed Plus Fire Station in the Uckfield area and the impact on Crowborough Fire Station becoming a Retained Station.
Review 11	Investigate the benefits of the provision of a new Day Crewed Plus Fire Station in Lewes and removing the retained appliance at Lewes
Review 12	Review the provision of offshore Maritime Response
Review 13	Review the provision of Large Animal Rescue Capability to Kent Fire and Rescue Service

^{56.} Some respondents commented on the Phase 3 Options outlined in the table on the previous page. A selection of these comments are below and overleaf:

Review 1 – Undertake a Full Review of Retained Establishment and Duty System and payments

Have you reduced the number of people at the top? Review the wages of senior managers

Pay the Retained for the cover they actually provide not based on the current system where people get the same pay for providing 40 to 79 hours

Review the number of senior managers (not middle managers) posts and salaries

The Service survives in most areas due to the Retained and they should be supported and enhanced

The whole Retained system is surely outdated in the 21st century. The number of people who now live and work in the same town is completely different to when the system was first used. I cannot see how employers can afford for their staff to drop everything to attend an emergency call; the same would apply for self-employed people. The Fire Service would have fire engines in stations, but with no crews to man them, that is not providing a fire service. Fire Engines are pointless without crews to man them!

Review 2 – Commence the purchase of two Aerial Rescue Pumps for Hastings and the City of Brighton and Hove

Aerial Rescue Pumps are a waste of money. They do not have the capability or functionality of a dedicated aerial appliance. They are extremely large and heavy and are not suitable for accessing large areas of our towns and cities. They remove your dedicated aerial ability and commit the entire appliance and crew to any aerial incident. Similarly if they are in attendance at another type of incident how does it get released to attend any new aerial incident?

I think the purchase of two Aerial Rescue Pumps for the city of Brighton and Hove would prove to be an excellent saving

Aerial Rescue Pumps and any new specialist equipment are worth their weight in gold, and although prevention is paramount, when they are needed they are paramount to a successful rescue

I understand that the Aerial Rescue Pump cannot be used as a fire engine when it has deployed as a big ladder. Is this not another engine gone in Brighton and Hove?

Review 3 – Revisit the results of the Rural Review with focus on the future of some retained stations

The Rural Review is completely out of date and irrelevant. As per the Knight Report the Service should be focusing on bolstering the Retained service as a cost-effective method of fire cover delivery. The rural community pay most for their fire cover and already get the slowest response times. It is unfair to continue to focus the best service on the coastal population. No Retained stations should be closed unless they cannot viably be crewed

The Rural Review focused on the lack of recruitment and since this review personnel at Mayfield had increased impressively. Mayfield gives a lot of support to the surrounding stations and no stations should close before principal officers' generous car allowances have ceased.

Review 4 – investigate the introduction of smaller appliances

Smaller appliances make sense for places where you need to get there fast

Smaller appliances seems like a good idea to me - surely a lot of calls really don't need a full size engine and crew, and smaller is cheaper to run

Smaller appliances are a must. ESFRS is a rural fire and rescue service with narrow streets and lanes of which the current fleet is unsuitable for in the majority of towns and countryside

Smaller appliances were once a feature in East Sussex though not as small as the current Land Rover quick response appliance currently in service. Smaller vehicles with effective essential equipment could be a way to save money as it would extend the service life of existing vehicles with adequate servicing.

Review 5 – review the technical rescue unit capability and usage

The two technical rescue units should be reviewed as the main object of their original purchase trench collapse etc. - has not seen much use. Perhaps one such vehicle would suffice, with even that equipment constantly being adapted to cover multi-role purposes.

Review 6 – review the number of flexible duty system (FDS) management posts through the introduction of retained support managers at watch manager level

Retained support managers don't work in all areas; they often result in a greater degree of managerial support needing to be provided to support managers rather than freeing up managerial time

This review could provide savings as under the original Day Crew system the sub officer was the officer-in-charge of the station responsible for Wholetime and Retained sections and the present watch managers should be capable of handling any incidents up to 4 pumps with a small core of officers on a flexible duty system able to attend on request.

Review 7 – consider demand-led rostering to better match resource levels to demand throughout the day and night

Demand-led rostering is treading on thin ice. If the brigade is to downsize men, appliances and stations this could be a cut too far with the endangering of the reduced crewing levels available.

Review 8 – carry out a full review of the schools education programme

Schools education programme works, but the budget was low

Scrap schools education, unless results can show it is worth saving

A return to school visits/talks by duty crews as it used to be would still enable children to benefit from fire safety awareness without the present non-operational unit

I believe more teaching in schools is necessary to help our new generation to grow sensibly. My own personal intervention at school was amazing and I learned how important the emergency services are. They don't do this in schools today and believe this is where a lot of children's knowledge is lost.

Review 9 – review the current policy for call challenge and attending calls and, consider the appropriateness of recovering costs from the owner or operator of the premises/locations where the number of false alarm calls is high

It may be an option to discourage false alarm calls. The population (teens) need to be educated about the futility of making false alarms and the cost to the community

People who falsely call out the fire service should be fined for wasted use of a public service that could be needed elsewhere

I feel it is appropriate to charge callers for false alarms and attendance at repeated events that should have been prevented

Trouble with charging for 'false alarms' is they won't get called in and could be the wrong call.

Review 10 – investigate the benefits of the provision of a new day crewed plus fire station in the Uckfield area and the impact on Crowborough fire station becoming a retained station

Crowborough is not to be an option for cutting. They are the only fully manned service left in our town. These guys and girls cover a vast area as well as the town. In an emergency we need some cover, which they give. I have experienced waiting for them coming with blues and twos going and driving at full throttle; it does not seem quick enough! If they were to come from Uckfield that would be at least another eight minutes to the centre of town...

This must not happen in a way that reduces Crowborough to a Retained station. Retained availability has always been a problem and the Wholetime personnel at Crowborough has always been essential to provide the public in this area with a reliable fire service

The Uckfield, Wealden and Crowborough area is huge, so I don't think you should take away any engines or personnel. They do a great job of covering the area and should be kept as they are

Don't like the idea of Crowborough being Retained and cover should be maximised in Uckfield due to how busy they are already having to help out at other stations, particularly as they seem to have to go into Lewes area a lot.

Is it a good idea to build accommodation for Day Crewed Plus fire stations on flood plains? Both Lewes and Uckfield are on flood plains and although there are defences, it is a risk that should be considered?

Any revisions of the Uckfield fire station must take into consideration the increase of housing (over 1000 new homes to be built) and the fire risk implications not only in private housing, but the increase in RTAs where fire crew assistance may be required.

Review 11 – investigate the benefits of the provision of a new day crewed plus fire station in Lewes and removing the retained appliance at Lewes

I agree to losing the Retained appliance at Lewes as it is rarely used and never crewed

Lewes must also cover calls outside its own area. Removal of an appliance could leave them shorthanded at such times

I understand that there has been an issue with the crewing of the second fire engine at Lewes for several years. If it is not available for long periods and has low activity when available then it makes sense to remove it. Not sure about the upgrade of Uckfield and Lewes as if calls are reducing then why upgrade? If you are thinking of upgrading Lewes why not put the new station between Lewes and Brighton (A27 area)? This will provide cover in the Lewes area and back up for the City as well.

Review 12 – review the provision of offshore maritime response

It would be a shame to stop the maritime response but if money is tight then we should look to save money on a service which is not used very much

The maritime response is a massive drain on resources and finance. This should be handed to the Navy/Coastguard

Ceasing of maritime response and animal rescue should be put in place before cutting emergency fire cover to the public.

Review 13 – review the provision of large animal rescue capability to Kent Fire and Rescue Service

Large animal rescue support is essential and really must not be removed

Considering the size of rural East Sussex I would have thought it would still need animal rescue capabilities of its own

Rural East Sussex covers a large area and I think probably needs its own large animal rescue equipment. Kent FRS also covers a wide area so if this facility is left for them to provide, would it always be readily available when needed in East Sussex?

If it is intended to pass large animal rescues to Kent FRS this will result in long delays due to the positioning of Kent's ARU which is currently stationed at Faversham. If it becomes a responsibility of Kent's technical rescue team, which is currently a proposal, the attendance times would not improve due to the method in which they are mobilised out of normal working hours. It would be at least two hours before they are mobile at the county boundary.

Consultation Findings: Public, Stakeholder and Staff Forums

Introduction

^{57.} The public, stakeholders and ESFRS staff discussed the three Phase Two proposals as outlined above in the Questionnaire Findings chapter. This section reports the findings from the seven meetings while also revealing the reasoning of participants. Not all the individuals gave equal emphasis to each aspect of the discussion, but, taken overall, the forums considered a wide range of issues that are reported fully below.

Main Findings

Proposal 1: The City

The Proposal

^{58.} Remove one firefighting appliance from the City, leaving four wholetime pumps crewed 24 hours a day.

Views of Members of the Public (Discussed at Brighton and Hove and Uckfield)

^{59.} In discussion, the questions asked and comments made clearly reflected some initial concern about the proposal, chiefly around:

The potential impact of fewer fire engines during simultaneous incidents

Are there statistics on times when you did not have enough fire engines to cover the incidents? (Uckfield)

The availability of fire engines from surrounding stations

What is availability like in other stations surrounding us? (Brighton and Hove)

Whether a reduction in the number of available firefighters will reduce the amount of important prevention work undertaken

Will prevention work be affected by this? (Brighton and Hove)

Will you continue or even increase the educational budget to continue to reduce risk? This is important to do to reduce risk. (Uckfield)

The increasing population (and thus perceived risk) in the City

There is more risk from young and old people...the City is growing and needs provision. (Brighton and Hove)

The impact of the proposal on firefighters

What will happen to the fire fighters? Will they be made redundant? (Brighton and Hove)

What do the fire fighters think? (Brighton and Hove)

^{60.} After discussion and clarification however, the Brighton and Hove forum almost unanimously endorsed the removal of one firefighting appliance from the City, as did the majority of participants at Uckfield (where 10 people agreed that the proposal is feasible and reasonable, five did not and there was one 'don't know'). While in an ideal world they would not wish to lose what they saw as an important local resource, most participants' typically understood the financial constraints within which ESFRS must now operate and considered the change somewhat inevitable because of this (and the reduction in incident numbers):

We don't want to lose it but in the current climate it seems reasonable (Brighton and Hove)

We have to do something, what alternatives are there? (Brighton and Hove)

We have to save a lot of money and this £1 million is a big bulk of it (Brighton and Hove)

Based on the evidence I'd say it's OK. Things haven't changed for a long time and there has been a drop in incidents so it seems like something they could do (Brighton and Hove)

We are looking at it logically and objectively. I know it's our city but if we do that it seems like a pump could be removed (Brighton and Hove)

If the rate of incidents has reduced by a third, it seems ok to reduce the resources by a fifth. (Uckfield)

^{61.} In terms of location, both meetings unanimously agreed that it would be preferable to remove an appliance from Hove rather than Preston Circus due to the more challenging demographics within the latter's station ground:

The red and yellow areas are closer to Preston Circus. The demographics are poorer there so it's probably needed (Brighton and Hove)

It's 'student land' and has a lot of HMOs. (Brighton and Hove)

- ^{62.} The overall sense of the meetings was that: *we're getting used to cuts now. If you'd asked us five years ago the answer would probably have been different; there would have been much more anger. I'm surprised how calm everyone is and how calm I am about it!* (Brighton and Hove)
- ^{63.} The importance of monitoring the situation (and reversing it if required) was, however, noted:

Could it change in future and be revisited and revised if necessary? (Brighton and Hove)

Views of Stakeholders

^{64.} As at the public forums, the questions asked and comments made at the City stakeholder forum reflected some initial concern about the proposal, mainly around:

The potential impact of fewer fire engines during simultaneous incidents

Is there any data on how many simultaneous calls you get and how many appliances you need at any one time?

It's about making sure there is enough cover for the two pump incidents.

Whether a reduction in the number of available firefighters will reduce the amount of important prevention work undertaken

Firefighters are engaged in prevention work which is equally crucial; would that be impacted?

The loss of firefighter posts

I understand and know we need to make savings but it is about the number of firefighter jobs that are lost within that.

^{65.} After discussion and clarification though, two of the three Brighton and Hove stakeholders endorsed the removal of one firefighting appliance from the City. They too understood the financial constraints within which ESFRS must now operate and considered that the reduction in incident numbers justifies the proposal:

I joined the fire service in 1972 and I think only one pump has been lost since then. The calls have decreased and in the day and age we live we cannot continue to provide the same number of appliances. It would be nice to have one on every corner but it's impossible – so yes there is scope for reduction

^{66.} Other reasons given for supporting the proposal were:

The lack of negative impact on response times due to the amount of neighbouring resource (although participants also cautioned against over-reliance on stations outside the City, particularly those in West Sussex)

Cover moves are happening all the time and cover coming into the city is actually very good

We have to consider provision in Shoreham when looking at the city as they cross the border a lot

We can't overly rely on Shoreham though as West Sussex will be going through their own review and may make changes.

The lack of discernible impact on members of the public – and on the number of fire deaths experienced

It is feasible and safe because the changes wouldn't have an impact on the calls not reached in 20 minutes

The public won't see a difference in this area and the impact will be minimal

Fire deaths often happen before the alarm is even raised so losing an engine will probably not have an impact on this.

^{67.} The stakeholder who rejected the proposal did so as they had not been convinced by the evidence that it is feasible and safe, though it would also seem that there was some political influence on their decision:

I absolutely don't want to lose an appliance from the City...I can't stand up in front of my constituents and endorse that. It is not right to remove a safety resource from the city...we should never do this...and my judgment is based on the incident levels and the evidence I have seen.

^{68.} All three stakeholders agreed that, if the proposal is ratified, the appliance should be removed from Hove rather than Preston Circus because of the more challenging demographics within the latter's station ground:

It should come from Hove; the demographics are worse in the Preston Circus area

I am not assured that the North East of the City wouldn't suffer in terms of response rates and I am speaking on behalf of my very deprived constituency. I'm not convinced it would be safe and I certainly don't think it's desirable...If the fire engine went from Hove then it would have a lesser effect.

^{69.} A couple of alternative suggestions were made at the forum, the first of which was to either merge Preston Circus and Roedean Fire Stations or, more radically, to cover the City with a single strategic fire station and have fire engines deployed in risky areas:

Have you discussed [moving] Preston Circus east and removing the Roedean Fire Station completely? Of course it would require a new site in the city.

Close all three and build a new one on the junction of the A23 and A37 and work on the Ambulance Service model where they book on at the beginning of the shift and then go off to where the likely incidents are.

^{70.} The second suggestion was to reduce the 'ridership factor' in the City by having a mobile team of firefighters deployed across all three stations. One stakeholder was very supportive of this idea whereas the other two were unsure on the grounds that, while it would offer more flexibility, the sense of familiarity, camaraderie and teamwork evident within firefighter watches would be lost:

There is an over-provision of firefighters on each separate station so could you pull the three areas into one? Sharing resources...one big watch that is sent out to cover all of the stations...flexible and mobile firefighters to move between stations to cover for absences, training and sickness

It gives a more flexible service but you do lose the familiarisation in terms of training together, familiarity with kit, equipment etc.

There's a sense of camaraderie and teamwork between teams that would be lost and that is one of the huge strengths of the Fire Service.

Views of Staff

^{71.} No-one at the Brighton and Hove staff forum was prepared to support the removal of one firefighting appliance from the City on the grounds of both principle and practical concerns. With regard to the former, it was said that while the proposal has the potential to 'pit' one station against another, this has not happened due to the solidarity within the Service:

Divide and conquer is not going to work; we're not going to fight each other.

^{72.} In terms of practical concerns, the principal among these were that: the City cannot be covered adequately with four pumping appliances; the loss of an appliance could compromise firefighter safety in terms of implementing safe systems of work; and 'over-the-border' resources cannot always be relied upon:

With five we can just about cover it but with four we won't be able to... The data does not support the removal of any of the pumps from the city

It also affects firefighter safety massively...our safe systems of work will be compromised

We can't put safe procedures of work in place until the second pump arrives

We can never guarantee the attendance from other stations in West and East Sussex because they have their own challenges in terms of attendance.

- ^{73.} It was also said that: Brighton and Hove are contributing a far larger proportion to the budget of the Fire Authority and they are suffering the cuts. It is disproportional.
- ^{74.} Brighton and Hove staff were strongly of the view that budgetary savings should be made in areas other than the 'front-line', echoing many of the questionnaire respondents in suggesting that ESFRS should consider: re-introducing the prospect of merger with West Sussex; more regional collaboration on a South East level; fewer Principal Officers; reducing support staff levels; and using some of its reserves to cover costs until the economic situation is clearer:

The cuts should come from other areas of the Service that aren't operational; mergers or at a higher level

Until a drastic amount of support staff have been cut and mergers considered we are not going to consider supporting any front-line cuts

In Scotland they have one Chief Fire Officer and we have one for all the SE regions Why can't we look to Surrey, Kent?

It's about £600,000 for the four POs; it would be a big slice of the pie

They liken it to waiting for a rainy day...the weather is pretty bad out there

This is looking years in advance. We have a general election coming and funding may change. Why not use reserves until we know what financial situation we will be in?

Just use the money you are going to put into the reserves...it's £1.5M in 2014/15 so why can't we use that instead of taking the pump away? If you're hard up sometimes you dip into your savings.

Proposals 2a and 2b: Battle and Hastings

The Proposals

- ^{75.} 2a: change Battle Fire Station from the Day Crewed Duty System to the new one watch system and remove the Retained Duty System (RDS) appliance at The Ridge Fire Station.
- ^{76.} 2b: convert Battle Fire Station from a Day Crewed to a one pump RDS station, reducing the establishment by nine wholetime posts.

Views of Members of the Public

^{77.} Overall, the Battle/Hastings public forum favored option 2b over option 2a: 13 of the 17 participants agreed it would be preferable, while only one chose 2a (on the grounds that *Battle doesn't seem to have too much red and yellow in it. Supply and demand wise it looks like you need the resources towards the centre*). There were also three 'don't knows'. People's main reasons for supporting 2b were as follows:

The Battle area is low risk

The risk shows that they could live with a retained appliance in Battle

It represents a significantly higher financial saving

There's a huge difference between the cost savings

The Ridge RDS is unavailable half the time currently

We are paying for the RDS pump at the Ridge when we can't use it 50% of the time

There will be a larger pool of potential RDS recruits within five minutes of Battle Fire Station than within five minutes of The Ridge

You might have more RDS crews available in Battle than on The Ridge so the fire engine could be more effective there

There is adequate cover from neighbouring stations – which is especially important to those living in rural areas to the north of Battle

I live [in a rural area] myself and I still think Battle going to RDS makes sense from the point of view of making savings. We still have support around us. We'll have Battle RDS, we have Broad Oak, Heathfield and I know they come from across the border. I don't think the service would suffer. ^{78.} Importantly though, participants stressed that RDS should only be considered at Battle if ESFRS can be certain the firefighters will be able to reach the station within five minutes – and there were some concerns that this is not achievable currently:

The Battle idea as just retained is a good one if you can ensure the RDS firefighters can get there within five minutes

I don't think the service will suffer too much if Battle is retained providing they can get there

In the paper it says it's not uncommon that the crew can't get to the Fire Station...if Battle goes to retained and they struggle to get there it wouldn't be reasonable.

^{79.} Other concerns were around: lengthier response times (particularly to the more rural areas north of Battle, with which existing firefighters are familiar); resilience for simultaneous incidents; and the loss of technical rescue from Battle (though it was acknowledged that this facility and its staff would simply be moved to either The Ridge or Bohemia Road):

If Battle goes to retained how long it would take to get to different areas? Will you still meet response time targets? Will there much of a difference?

If you had a fire in Battle, it would take longer for the fire engine to get there

I'm a rural dweller and only last week a neighbour had a chimney fire. Battle firefighters were with them very quickly as they knew where they were. If we draw services too far away I'm nervous we would lose that local knowledge

How often are the two Ridge engines out simultaneously?

If Battle is downgraded to an RDS, would the firefighters be properly trained in technical rescues? It could be a loss if it went from Battle...

^{80.} It should also be noted that 2b still represented an imbalance in risk to participants, most of whom endorsed another option: convert Battle Fire Station from a Day Crewed to a one pump RDS station and move The Ridge's RDS appliance to Bohemia Road. This, it was felt, would ensure a pattern of cover for the whole area that puts resources where they are most needed:

Does this not include Bohemia Road at all? It has the biggest number of call outs so don't they need more resources there? Why is it not part of the equation? If you're looking at the whole thing...why aren't you putting the equipment where it needs to be? It doesn't seem logical

You could still move The Ridge RDS to Bohemia...this would be a good idea in terms of balancing resources against risk

It makes more sense to have the RDS engine in Bohemia Road to supplement resources there.

^{81.} The Uckfield public forum also discussed options 2a and 2b: 14 of the 16 participants supported the latter (insofar as *option 2a hardly seems worth considering*), one rejected both and there was one 'don't know'.

Views of Stakeholders

82. The Battle/Hastings stakeholders made several arguments for both proposals. 2a was thought to have significant benefits for the Battle area, particularly with respect to providing adequate cover for the A21 – whereas 2b was considered preferable for addressing risks in Hastings, and for the villages to the east of the town, which apparently suffer poor transport links:

The A21 is one of the most notorious roads for accidents; it's a long time to get from Hastings or Bexhill to the A21

We have to have adequate resources at the Ridge to cover places like the hospital

Hastings is quite a large population centre and you have to accept the possibility of a largescale incident for which three pumps will not be adequate

It's the logistics of getting from A to B...Battle can be congested with traffic but the road to Fairlight is also problematic for fire engines to get to

Clearly option 2a has benefits for Battle but...[there] is the disadvantage to the villages to the east of Hastings. The retained pump may not be used as often but if the main pump is elsewhere and something happens in the villages to the East, its presence is critical.

83. Ultimately, four of the eight participants favoured option 2a over option 2b on the grounds of risk and reliability of fire cover (particularly in relation to the alleged difficulties faced by firefighters in getting to Battle Fire Station within five minutes):

You have to go for option 2a based on risk...if you have to choose one

I'd rather have them there in Battle seven days a week

It's very difficult for firefighters to get to Battle Fire Station in five minutes. If it became wholly retained it might cause difficulties

They assemble in five minutes only about 23-24% of the time. If that were the only provision in Battle the North East of the county would be affected in terms of response times

If Battle were reduced to just RDS, there will be large areas to the North and East which will have severe reductions in safety. The RDS has difficulties but if there is a crew there all the time at least you know they will be able to turn out even if there are traffic difficulties

It's going to depend where the firefighters live and the whole thing is terribly fragile. It is very dependent on where individuals live and it's not a robust system at all.

^{84.} Of the remaining four, two were 'don't knows' and two did not feel they could endorse either option in that they are based on possibly inaccurate predictions, do not seem to take transport logistics into consideration and could result in unacceptable additional fatalities:

I don't think it's an answerable question. One serious incident in Battle or Hastings' surrounding villages will change the modelling figures completely

These are predictions and you haven't taken into consideration things like logistics and getting from A to B...people getting to the station and getting to incidents

2a is better than 2b but neither of them are acceptable...you're only taking about one fatality per year but that's one too many.

85. One stakeholder, however, countered this reluctance to choose by saying that, while such decisions may seem unpalatable, they must be made in the current economic climate – and that while public perception may initially be negative, this can be overcome through reassurance that what remains offers a good service:

It's acceptable if there is no other choice because of the need to save money. If the money cannot be saved elsewhere then options like this have to be considered and difficult decisions have to be made

It's the public perception...the fear is greater than the reality normally and you need to know that the service is available when you need it

You will have reaction but if something practical is put in place it will subside.

86. Finally, it was asked whether ESFRS meets its targets with equal ease in the rural areas as in the towns and suggested that: one would assume not and this would be a concern for people in rural areas. I know we can't have wholetime stations everywhere because it's too expensive but it is an inescapable fact that should carry some weight when making decisions.

Views of Staff

^{87.} As in the City, no-one at the Battle/Hastings staff forum was prepared to endorse either proposal on the grounds of both principle and practical concerns. With regard to the former, it was said that while the proposal has the potential to 'pit' one station against another, this has not happened due to the solidarity within the Service:

I think it's very harsh to have staff members that work for the service to be pitched against each other. And that's what I feel about 2a and 2b. You are unlikely to get opinions because people in the Service won't fight against each other

It hasn't pitted people against each other; the potential is there but it hasn't happened in reality. Everyone here feels it is unacceptable for any of those front-line cuts to take place

In the Fire Service as a county we stand together; we don't fragment and bitch, we back each other.

88. In terms of practical concerns, the principal among these was that both options represent a downgraded service (2a because it compromises response to Hasting's high rise buildings, 2b because it compromises cover to the North and both because they compromise firefighter safety and lessen resilience in the area):

Why would anyone in this room vote for a downgraded service and say that option is better than the other?

Neither choice is rational; it's a downgrading of the service. By removing Battle you remove a lot of cover to the North of the county; it's the largest station ground in the county. And you lose a lot of technical expertise and the fourth appliance into Hastings quickly which compromises firefighter safety. With The Ridge you compromise response to large, high rise incidents and firefighter safety. And secondary incidents when the three Hastings pumps are out.

- ^{89.} It was also said that: *I would settle for the Hastings Review right now; it would have been entirely the right thing to do to move the appliance* [from The Ridge to Bohemia Road].
- ^{90.} Current response time standards were criticised insofar as they allow for the implementation of proposals that will result in slower attendance in certain areas. Indeed, stating that these proposals will not affect response times was considered disingenuous as this only applies Service-wide, and not to the affected areas:

Attendance standards over the past 20 years have decreased by two minutes...within our current standards there is slack to provide a slower service as it is a statistic, an average. Our average now is seven minutes so within the attendance standards there is room to be slower. And they say that these proposals will keep the whole service within attendance standards which is misleading because they don't tell people that they will get slower response times in their local areas

We are on the cusp of going outside the window of opportunity of getting enough resources to people in good time. And these standards allow this to happen.

^{91.} As at Brighton and Hove, staff at Battle/Hastings were strongly of the view that budgetary savings should be made in areas other than the 'front-line', echoing many of the questionnaire respondents in suggesting that ESFRS should consider: re-introducing the prospect of merger with West Sussex; more regional collaboration on a South East level; fewer Principal Officers; and using some of its reserves to cover costs until the economic situation is clearer:

Cuts should not come from front-line services; they should be a last resort

I think the merger would have been positive as it wouldn't have made much of a difference at station level. Now it seems like all of the proposals are affecting the coal face

It might have avoided some of the difficult decisions we are facing now

The merger was a no-brainer, a viable option, and we wouldn't be in this situation if it had taken place. Why can't we revisit it?

Mergers and working with the Ambulance Service. Not even just West Sussex, what about more regional...like a South East Regional FRS?

The whole of Scotland runs with three POs; we have five

I'd like to see the Chief Officer making necessary budgetary savings without cutting frontline resources. Sharing services...sharing of principal management and other staff and look to voluntary amalgamations between services

Utilise reserves to offset savings until the financial picture is better again

^{92.} Finally, there was some recognition at the Battle/Hastings staff forum that the current financial climate means the status quo is not an option - and that it is simply not enough for firefighters to say 'no to everything' for fear of what will be proposed instead:

The figures for the latter years are on the assumption that the savings have been made in the previous years? The issue is that if we don't make the savings the problem is only going to get worse

I do have a fear that if this is led financially and that if we say we don't accept any form of change, what happens next? I'm talking from my perspective in relation to the Hastings Review. What could happen in future when we have to make all of these savings? Where do we go from here?

If we just say no, no, no to everything, what will they come back with?

Proposal 3: Day Crewed Plus

The Proposal

^{93.} Introduce Day Crewed Plus at Roedean and The Ridge Fire Stations, reducing the establishment by 20 posts.

Views of Members of the Public

^{94.} Participants had many questions about the Day Crewing Plus duty system – particularly around how staff feel about it; and whether there is any danger associated with a firefighter being on-call at night-time having worked a full shift during the day (though it was acknowledged that firefighters from neighbouring stations could assist in this regard):

It is an interesting concept but what would happen if they work long hours during the night...they could make mistakes if working long shifts? (Brighton and Hove)

If you've got a fireman that's been on an eight or ten hour shift and they get called out in the middle of the night on a three or four hour job, he's got to start again at eight. Could that cause issues? (Battle/Hastings)

What do firefighters think...here and in other areas? (Brighton and Hove)

Have you spoken to the firefighters up North about how they find it? (Battle/Hastings)

In The Ridge, if you do have a driver that is knackered after working on an incident during the night, Bohemia Road could help out. (Battle/Hastings)

^{95.} Several people also questioned the necessity and desirability of having families on-site in relation to effective working and possibly causing disruption to others:

If you join a service, then you join a service! Service people have to leave their families behind! (Battle/Hastings)

It's not really compatible with effective and positive working is it? I wouldn't want to pay for them to have parties with their families and it could be disruptive to others. (Brighton and Hove)

^{96.} Ultimately, though, most members of the public at Battle/Hastings and Uckfield (15 of 17 and 13 of 16 respectively) considered it reasonable for ESFRS to consider and develop the Day Crewed Plus model across appropriate stations given that it is already working effectively in other FRSs and that similar systems are also in operation across other professions and industries:

If it's working in some places it should be looked at...it sounds a reasonable idea (Battle/Hastings)

This happens with dock workers in some places and industries (Uckfield)

The doctors do it...they do day shifts and are then on call for days on end. (Battle/Hastings)

^{97.} Indeed, as one participant at Battle/Hastings said:

If it's a saving and there are firefighters that are prepared to do it it's a fantastic idea. (Battle/Hastings)

^{98.} At Brighton and Hove, while they could see the attractions of Day Crewed Plus, participants were concerned about its workability in practice (particularly with respect to ensuring firefighters have sufficient rest periods). As such, they suggested that it should be trialled at existing stations with accommodation prior to rolling it out at those that do not:

Could it be trialled in stations that already have accommodation like Preston Circus and Roedean to see if it works. (Brighton and Hove)

^{99.} Further, they were not keen to see the introduction of Day Crewed Plus in the city alongside the withdrawal of a pumping appliance:

I'm concerned about it in conjunction with losing an appliance. There could be a loss of resilience with fewer firefighters. (Brighton and Hove)

Views of Stakeholders

^{100.} All stakeholders at both Battle and Hastings ultimately endorsed the consideration and development of Day Crewed Plus as an efficient way of working – though they did express some concerns around: firefighter redundancy (and its associated costs); staff welfare; its impact on family life; reduced resilience across ESFRS as a whole; and the need for capital financing:

Is it putting firefighters out of work? Will it involve compulsory redundancy? (Battle/Hastings)

I'm convinced about efficiency but there could be welfare issues (Brighton and Hove)

I'm leaning towards a yes but what happens if overnight there's a call and it's several hours? When is the decision made to take that crew out of action and you lose that appliance? Would there be adequate cover on such an occasion? I would want more information on things like that (Brighton and Hove)

It will have an impact on family life as you work a lot of weekends on day crewed but I can see the financial benefits of the system and that it would work very well (Brighton and Hove)

There is the resilience overall; you could be taking too much out of the whole system (Brighton and Hove)

There will be capital costs attached to building the accommodation and the redundancies but presumably these will be spread across five years? (Battle/Hastings)

^{101.} Further, participants at the Battle/Hastings forum did not wish to see what they described as the 'double whammy' of the loss of the RDS pump and the conversion of the wholetime pump to Day Crewed Plus at The Ridge:

The overall principle of this looks good but I wouldn't like to see the double whammy at The Ridge of this plus the reduction of the RDS pump. (Battle/Hastings)

^{102.} One participant at Brighton and Hove questioned why Day Crewed Plus cannot be implemented across more of ESFRS's fire stations. Specifically they wondered why it has not been considered as an alternative to removing a firefighting appliance from the City:

Why does Day Crew Plus have to be a one-pump system? Why can't one be wholetime and one Day Crewed Plus or, more radically, two Day Crewed Plus? (Brighton and Hove)

Why is Day Crewed Plus not being considered at Hove? Which is the most acceptable...to remove one pump or to have more Day Crewed Plus? After all, if you remove one wholetime fire engine then you are removing four watches of firefighters. (Brighton and Hove)

^{103.} Finally in terms of stakeholders' views, those at the City forum suggested a small-scale trial to ensure the system works for ESFRS and its staff:

It could be rolled out across other stations but there is that detail again re the welfare issues above. Start small and see how it works. (Brighton and Hove)

Views of Staff

^{104.} Some firefighters at Battle/Hastings were in favour of Day Crewed Plus: they commented on its cost-effectiveness and suggested that it may be a very attractive system for some staff (most notably young firefighters and those coming to the end of their careers who wish to 'boost their pension'):

Overall, it seems like a very cost-effective way of running a fire station (Hastings Staff)

There are benefits and it may suit some people (Battle/Hastings)

It will be attractive to certain people. People with no families and people wanting to boost their pension in the last few years of their working lives. (Battle/Hastings)

There may be some who find it attractive (Brighton and Hove)

It's people in the last few years of service because the extra money they are getting is pensionable...they are doing it because they are getting extra money. (Brighton and Hove)

^{105.} Indeed, it was said that ESFRS has spoken to firefighters in the North of England and *they say they love it* (Battle/Hastings) – and that, if implemented, it would, in time, become the 'norm':

When you get the turnover of staff, when the new people start they will accept the terms and conditions that are on offer at that time. It will come around to the point where people know no different and they will accept what's on offer. (Battle/Hastings)

^{106.} However, others at Battle/Hastings and all at Brighton and Hove rejected the introduction of Day Crewed Plus on the following grounds:

It could result in over-worked and over-tired firefighters (and a loss of productivity) unless there is an adequate support system, which could in itself prove expensive

People could be working harder than they ought to do (Battle/Hastings)

People are making fundamental mistakes on the fourth day because they are still in work conditions even when off-station (Brighton and Hove)

Productivity dwindles massively where it's introduced (Brighton and Hove)

Is there a support system for this? If you're Day Crewed and you work late you can come in late in the morning. What happens in this system? (Battle/Hastings)

You have to get pumps in from other stations to cover firefighters who have been at long incidents at night which is not cost-effective. They have to have rest periods under the EWTD. (Brighton and Hove Staff)

It is not family-friendly

It's not family friendly so it won't be for everyone (Battle/Hastings)

Who wants to have their family on station? It's like going back to Victorian times (Battle/Hastings)

It just wouldn't work with a family. It's only going to work for single people (Battle/Hastings)

It's incarceration...Victorian. (Brighton and Hove)

It is not an inclusive system

My husband is a firefighter and we have three children so we are completely excluded from this. It is totally un-inclusive to me because we couldn't possibly work

this system. The accommodation that's available at the moment just wouldn't suit our family (Battle/Hastings)

They only allow two adults and two children and no pets (Battle/Hastings)

It could result in reduced prevention activity

The system can turn fire stations into purely response stations without any prevention work (Battle/Hastings)

The prevention and education work can suffer if people are taken out of action during the daytime if they have been at a long incident at night. (Brighton and Hove)

It will result in fewer firefighters overall (and thus less resilience)

It means people losing their jobs (Brighton and Hove)

What will be the knock-on effect of reducing the total number of firefighters? (Battle/Hastings)

It will result in personnel displacement as some will be unable or unwilling to work the system at their current station

I don't want to work anywhere else but I may be forced to if Roedean goes to Day Crew Plus as I don't want to work that system (Brighton and Hove)

There's the displacement of personnel. If no-one wants to do Day Crew Plus at Roedean, where are they all going to go? (Brighton and Hove)

Night-time turnout times will increase

It enhances fire cover on what was previously a day crewed station but it increases the turnout time at night. If you're doing it on a wholetime station it will be very slightly slower (Battle/Hastings)

It could be a barrier to career progression for those who work it

It does create a stop gap in your career progression. To move up the chain you have to take a pay cut (because you're earning more than a Watch Manager) so it encourages people to stay where they are and not move on (Battle/Hastings)

It could prove costly with respect to pension costs and the need for capital financing

People can be receiving an enhanced pension and it's difficult to quantify how long people will be in receipt of a pension. It could cost the Fire Authority money year on year. So it's difficult to quantify the savings that will be made. Has this been factored in? (Battle/Hastings)

How much is it going to cost to build the 'Travelodge' at Roedean? (Brighton and Hove)

^{107.} Some at the Battle/Hastings forum were neither for nor against Day Crewed Plus because they felt they do not know enough about the system to make an informed judgement on it:

This is a system that the majority of us don't know much about. We are in danger of agreeing to something we don't know enough about. We don't know how it weathers and of the long-term implications (Battle/Hastings)

More information is needed and should be available to individuals before it's implemented. (Battle/Hastings)

Other Issues

^{108.} It should be noted that firefighters at both sessions strongly criticised the information and evidence underpinning both the current consultation and past processes. Some typical comments were:

There were a lot of issues with the data in the previous consultation which makes us question the data being used now (Brighton and Hove)

Lies, damn lies and statistics...that's what we're talking about here (Brighton and Hove)

We are suspicious about the format. In the past we've had consultation processes and documents that have been very favourable to the outcomes the Fire Service want (Battle/Hastings)

The public are being led to vote on what the Fire Service wants (Battle/Hastings)

Forgive our suspiciousness but we've gone through a lot of consultations and they have been done biasedly and have come out with the outcome they wanted. They haven't been proper consultations. Half the time, I think these processes are a way of placating the workforce and the public. They are a waste of time and they are only doing them because they have to. (Battle/Hastings)

^{109.} They were particularly concerned about members of the public being shown what they considered to be inaccurate or incomplete information, specifically in relation to: incident reduction percentages; AFA call challenging; response times; the number of appliances required for a 'persons reported' life-threatening incidents; and the amount of prevention work undertaken by firefighters:

We haven't reduced calls by 32%; we're just not going to them. Incidents attended by mobilisation have reduced by 32%. Incidents get call challenged so we don't go out to a lot of them anymore and that has contributed to the drop in calls (Brighton and Hove)

Jobs that used to be classed as fires are not any more. For example we're told to put it in as an AFA false alarm because nothing has spread even though a person has been pulled out with smoke inhalation (Brighton and Hove)

There is not a reduction in the number of incidents; we just don't go to them anymore. Control are put under pressure to not send us to incidents (Brighton and Hove) Is there anything in terms of how we call challenge AFAs? (Battle/Hastings)

Do the public know that 5% of the time they won't get a response within 20 minutes? (Battle/Hastings)

It's at least three or four pumps to life-threatening incidents with persons reported – so it's misinformation and trying to steer the public into agreeing to things. The information you've been given is flawed (Brighton and Hove)

Are you telling them about the prevention work we are doing and how that's brought the incidents down...and the danger to that of cutting firefighter numbers? (Battle/Hastings)

^{110.} Further, informing the public that 72% of ESFRS's budget is spent on employees was thought to be 'steering' them to consider that firefighter reductions are essential to make savings:

What you've been given to use is misleading the public...the public are being steered. They are being told that 72% of costs are on employees and Phase 2 is all about us so the public is being steered towards thinking about us (Brighton and Hove)

Members of the public will look at that and say 'we need to look at that area' as it's the area of most expenditure. (Brighton and Hove)

^{111.} Firefighters at the Battle/Hastings forum said that they would have had more faith in the process if ESFRS had sought their input on potential savings earlier in the process, as opposed to only asking for their views on firm proposals:

If they said to us 'can you come up with some ideas?' we would have more faith in this but they have never done that (Battle/Hastings)

We're being given a choice about what we think and we know that if these savings aren't made other changes will have to be made. But we haven't been given the opportunity to come up with other ideas; we've only been asked to vote on 2a and 2b. All we've see is cuts rather than opportunities to generate income. We don't want to give our opinions on this; we should have been asked a long time ago for our opinions on things. All we get asked to do is comment on cuts (Battle/Hastings)

It is important that the workforce have the chance to say what they should be doing before looking at the front line. (Battle/Hastings)

^{112.} City staff also suggested that the consultation has not been sufficiently widely or pro-actively publicised:

The consultation has not been widely enough publicised... (Brighton and Hove)

I'm a resident of East Sussex and I haven't received or ever seen a questionnaire (Brighton and Hove)

People are not going to go onto the website if they don't know about the consultation. (Brighton and Hove)

^{113.} In relation to more operationally-based issues, members of the public at Battle/Hastings and the City stakeholders suggested that Day Crewed start and finish times should be amended to reflect periods of demand more accurately:

8:30 until 6:30...these are not the most practical times to have them there anyway. This should be looked at to make sure the Day Crew is there when they're needed (Battle/Hastings Public)

Day Crew hours is something to look at because incidents peak at between six and seven. (Brighton and Hove Stakeholders)

^{114.} The need to share resources and work more closely with other emergency services was stressed by the Battle/Hastings stakeholders and members of the public in the City:

What about sharing accommodation with the other blue light services – to what extent does this happen in East Sussex? (Battle/Hastings Stakeholders)

Look at sharing resources with other organisations such as ambulance, even army. (Brighton and Hove Public)

^{115.} Finally, some of the Battle/Hastings stakeholders were convinced that the changing landscape of local Government funding from 2015 onwards (insofar as *it is generally regarded that there will be no Government grant settlement by 2018/20*) will force the re-consideration of the merger with West Sussex – and another said that:

I think this is where a lot of the political lobbying outside the Service will have to grow in strength. When salami slicing, you reach a point that you cannot deliver the service because you don't have the resources to do it. With the growth in population in the South East, if we don't invest from Central Government and look at implementing planning laws like having sprinkler systems in new build properties then there will be some difficult questions to answer in future. (Battle/Hastings Stakeholders)

Overall Balance of Opinion for 3 Options

Proposal 1: The City

- ^{116.} Just under two fifths (38%) of **questionnaire respondents** agreed with ESFRS's proposal to remove a fire engine from the City. However, just over half (51%) disagreed.
- ^{117.} If the change does go ahead, 3 in 10 respondents (30%) would recommend removing a fire engine from Hove Fire Station, while around a fifth (21%) would recommend removing a fire engine from Preston Circus Fire Station. However, almost half of respondents thought that ESFRS should not remove either engine.
- ^{118.} The Brighton and Hove **public forum** almost unanimously endorsed the removal of one firefighting appliance from the City, as did the majority of participants at Uckfield. While in an ideal world they would not wish to lose what they saw as an important local resource, most participants' typically understood the financial constraints within which ESFRS must now operate and considered the change somewhat inevitable because of this (and the reduction in incident numbers).
- ^{119.} In terms of location, both meetings unanimously agreed that it would be preferable to remove an appliance from Hove rather than Preston Circus due to the more challenging demographics within the latter's station ground.
- ^{120.} Two of the three Brighton and Hove **stakeholders** supported the removal of one firefighting appliance from the City, with the remaining one objecting. All three stakeholders agreed that, if the proposal is ratified, the appliance should be removed from Hove rather than Preston Circus because of the more challenging demographics within the latter's station ground.
- ^{121.} No-one at the Brighton and Hove **staff forum** was prepared to support the removal of one firefighting appliance from the City, preferring instead to see ESFRS considering: re-introducing the prospect of merger with West Sussex; more regional collaboration on a South East level; fewer Principal Officers; reducing support staff levels; and using some of its reserves to cover costs until the economic situation is clearer.

Proposals 2a and 2b: Battle and Hastings

- ^{122.} 52% of **questionnaire respondents** agreed with option 2a; only 33% disagreed. Just under a third of respondents (29%) agreed with option 2b; almost three fifths (56%) disagreed.
- ^{123.} More than half of respondents (53%) thought that option 2a is the better option for service delivery, while just over a quarter (27%) thought that option 2b is the better option. Just over a fifth stated that neither option is suitable.

- ^{124.} Overall, the Battle/Hastings **public forum** favored option 2b over option 2a: 13 of the 17 participants agreed it would be preferable, while only one chose 2a and there were three 'don't knows'. It should also be noted that 2b still represented an imbalance in risk to participants, most of whom endorsed another option: convert Battle Fire Station from a Day Crewed to a one pump RDS station and move The Ridge's RDS appliance to Bohemia Road. This, it was felt, would ensure a pattern of cover for the whole area that puts resources where they are most needed:
- ^{125.} The Uckfield public forum also discussed options 2a and 2b: 14 of the 16 participants supported the latter, one rejected both and there was one 'don't know'.
- ^{126.} Four of the eight Battle/Hastings **stakeholders** favoured option 2a over option 2b on the grounds of risk and reliability of fire cover (particularly in relation to the alleged difficulties faced by firefighters in getting to Battle Fire Station within five minutes). Of the remaining four, two were 'don't knows' and two did not feel they could endorse either option in that they are based on possibly inaccurate predictions, do not seem to take transport logistics into consideration and could result in unacceptable additional fatalities.
- ^{127.} No-one at the Battle/Hastings **staff forum** was prepared to endorse either proposal, preferring instead to see ESFRS considering: re-introducing the prospect of merger with West Sussex; more regional collaboration on a South East level; fewer Principal Officers; and using some of its reserves to cover costs until the economic situation is clearer. It should, however, be noted that there was some recognition that the current financial climate means the status quo is not an option and that it is simply not enough for firefighters to say 'no to everything' for fear of what will be proposed instead.

Proposal 3: Day Crewed Plus

- ^{128.} Almost half (47%) of **questionnaire respondents** agreed with the proposal to introduce the "Day Crewed Plus" duty system at Roedean and The Ridge Fire Stations; almost 3 in 10 respondents (29%) disagreed.
- ^{129.} Ultimately, though, most **members of the public** at Battle/Hastings and Uckfield (15 of 17 and 13 of 16 respectively) considered it reasonable for ESFRS to consider and develop the Day Crewed Plus model across appropriate stations given that it is already working effectively in other FRSs and that similar systems are also in operation across other professions and industries.
- ^{130.} At Brighton and Hove, while they could see the attractions of Day Crewed Plus, participants were concerned about its workability in practice (particularly with respect to ensuring firefighters have sufficient rest periods). As such, they suggested that it should be trialled at existing stations with accommodation prior to rolling it out at those that do not.
- ^{131.} All **stakeholders** at both Battle and Hastings ultimately endorsed the consideration and development of Day Crewed Plus as an efficient way of working though they did express some concerns around: firefighter redundancy (and its associated costs); staff welfare; its impact on

family life; reduced resilience across ESFRS as a whole; and the need for capital financing. Those at the City forum suggested a small-scale trial to ensure the system works for ESFRS and its staff.

- ^{132.} Some **staff** at Battle/Hastings were in favour of Day Crewed Plus: they commented on its costeffectiveness and suggested that it may be a very attractive system for some staff (most notably young firefighters and those coming to the end of their careers who wish to 'boost their pension').
- ^{133.} However, others at Battle/Hastings and all at Brighton and Hove rejected the introduction of Day Crewed Plus on the many grounds highlighted earlier in the report. Further, some at the Battle/Hastings forum were neither for nor against the system because they felt they do not know enough about it to make an informed judgement.

Appendix D Transcript of text responses from online questionnaire

City Proposal

1, SLOWER RESPONSE TIMES, WITH FIRE ENGINES TAKING LONGER TO REACH US IN OUR TIME OF NEED, ESPECIALLY IF WE HAVE A HIGH RISE INCIDENT IN THE CITY, WHICH THERE IS A HIGHER RISK OF, DUE TO THE AMOUNT OF HIGH RISE PREMISES WE HAVE. I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO POINT OUT THAT THE 12 PREMISES IN HOVE ALONE, WHICH HAVE NO DRY RISER MAIN FOR FIREFIGHTING PURPOSES AND FOR THAT REASON HAVE AN ENHANCED PRE-DETERMINED ATTENDANCE, OF 5 FIRE ENGINES AND AN AERIAL LADDER PLATFORM. IF THERE IS A DELAY IN ANY OF THESE FIRE ENGINES TURNING UP TO THE INCIDENT, AN INCIDENT COMMANDER IS UNABLE TO PUT A SAFE SYSTEM OF WORK IN PLACE, THEREFORE THERE IS A BIG DELAY IN THE INTERVENTION PHASE OF THE INCIDENT THUS PUTTING LIVES AT RISK. 2, THERE WILL BE FEWER HOME AND SCHOOL FIRE SAFETY VISITS TO HELP KEEP THE PUBLIC SAFE. THE GOVERNMENT HAVE ALREADY SAID THERE ARE FEWER INCIDENTS DUE TO THE EXCELLENT COMMUNITY FIRE SAFETY ADVICE FIREFIGHTERS GIVE. NOW YOU PROPOSE TO CUT THE NUMBER OF FIRE APPLIANCES AND FIREFIGHTERS, THIS FIRE SAFETY ADVICE WILL BE LESS AND YOU WILL UNDO ALL THE GOOD WORK ALREADY DONE BY FIREFIGHTERS ACROSS THE CITY OF BRIGHTON AND HOVE. ONCE THE FIRE SAFETY ADVICE GETS LESS THE INCIDENTS WILL SIMPLY RAISE AGAIN AND YOU WILL NOT HAVE THE RESOURCES TO DEAL WITH THE INCREASING INCIDENTS. 3, THERE WILL BE A SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED RISK TO BOTH THE PUBLIC AND FIREFIGHTERS ALIKE. DESPITE WHAT THE CHIEF FIRE OFFICER TELLS YOU. WE MAY WELL STILL GET ONE FIRE ENGINE ATTENDING TO OUR INCIDENT IN 8 MINUTES WHICH IS FINE IF THE INCIDENT WARRANTS JUST 1 FIRE ENGINE, BUT MORE SERIOUS INCIDENTS REQUIRE FURTHER FIRE ENGINES ATTENDING. THE DELAY IN THESE FIRE ENGINES ATTENDING PUTS MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC AND FIREFIGHTERS AT RISK. FOR INSTANCE FOR AN INCIDENT COMMANDER TO PUT A SAFE SYSTEM OF WORK IN PLACE AT A HOUSE FIRE IT INITIALLY TAKES 2 FIRE ENGINES IN ATTENDANCE BEFORE FIREFIGHTING OR RESCUE ACTIONS CAN COMMENCE. IF THE INCIDENT IS A CONFIRMED FIRE WITH PERSONS REPORTED EAST SUSSEX FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE SEND A PRE-DETERMINED ATTENDANCE OF 3 FIRE ENGINES. IF THIS HAPPENS FOR THE TIME THAT INCIDENT IS RUNNING, YOU ARE LEAVING FIRE COVER VERY SHORT IN THE CITY TO DEAL WITH OTHER INCIDENTS. I AM AWARE THAT WE NEED TO REDUCE OUR COSTS, SO WHY THE HELL IN TIMES OF AUSTERITY ARE EAST SUSSEX FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE CONTINUING TO PRESS FORWARD WITH DUTIES THAT ARE NOT CONSIDERED STATUTORY. SURELY STATUTORY DUTIES AND FRONTLINE COVER MUST TAKE PRECEDENCE ABOVE ALL ELSE. AFTER ALL THAT IS WHAT ME AND THE PUBLIC PAY FOR AND EXPECT.

ACCORDING TO THE PRESS, THE SERVICE HAS FAR TOO MANY SENIOR OFFICERS WHO EARN FIVE TIMES WHAT FIREMEN EARN, WHY NOT REMOVE THESE BEFORE JEOPARDISING THE PUBLIC?

ALL FIRE ENGINES AND CREWS ARE VITAL TO LOCAL AREAS AND COMMUNITIES WHO FEEL SAFER AS A RESULT.

ALTHOUGH THE TOTAL NUMBER OF CALLS MAY HAVE DROPPED, THERE ARE TIMES WHEN ALL THE PUMPS IN THE CITY ARE BUSY AND WE ARE STRETCHED. HOVE ARE OFTEN CROSS THE BORDER TO ASSIST WEST SUSSEX IN SHOREHAM, PLUS AN INCIDENT IN A HIGH RISE CAN EASILY USE UP ALL THE CITY RESOURCES ON ONE CALL. TAKING A PUMP FOR EITHER HOVE OR PRESTON CIRCUS WOULD HAVE A KNOCK ON EFFECT TO SURROUNDING STATIONS.

AS A CITY WITH TOURISTS AND TRAFFIC CONGESTION, I THINK THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO KEEP THE FIRE ENGINES IN BRIGHTON AND HOVE. THE CITY IS DENSELY POPULATED AND FIRE COULD SPREAD EASILY.

AS AN ACCOUNTANT, I WOULD SUGGEST SERIOUS MEASURES ON TAX AVOIDANCE. THERE ARE MUCH BETTER MEASURES THAN ANY GOVERNMENT HAS TRIED WHICH SUGGEST NO GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN SERIOUS ABOUT TAX AVOIDANCE, WHICH PROBABLY ACCOUNT FOR AT LEAST £100 BILLION PER YEAR IN LOST INCOME. THE GOVERNMENT MUST BE TOLD THAT TO KEEP CUTTING AND FORCE ARTIFICIAL EFFICIENCIES IS UNACCEPTABLE. I HAVE ALSO HEARD FROM STAFF THAT IF SUSSEX HEIGHTS HAS A HIGH-RISE FIRE, IT WILL NEED AT LEAST FOUR FIRE ENGINES, WHICH WOULD ONLY LEAVE ONE ENGINE TO COPE LOCALLY. CUTS YEAR-ON-YEAR WILL LEAD TO INCREASED RISKS AND TO SAY THERE ARE NO RISKS IS UNACCEPTABLE. FIRE STAFF NOT ONLY HAS TO TACKLE FIRES, BUT MANY OTHER EMERGENCIES AND PREVENTION WORK. TELL THE GOVERNMENT 'NO!'.

AS YOU ONLY PUT YOUR VIEWS AND NOT OTHERS WHO ARE KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT THE SUBJECT YOU LOAD THE QUESTIONNAIRE, I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO KNOW HOW YOU EXPECT MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC TO HAVE ALTERNATIVES. THE POINT IS THAT SERVICES WILL SUFFER AND RISKS INCREASE.

BANKERS SHOULD BE HELPED TO GET MORE OF OUR MONEY. IT DOESN'T MATTER MUCH IF MORE PEOPLE DIE.

BECAUSE FIRES KILL. TO SAY KEEPING THE STATUS QUO ISN'T AN OPTION MEANS THIS ISN'T A CONSULTATION.

BECAUSE IT WILL REDUCE THE FIRE SERVICE CAPACITY AT THIS STATION BY 25% AND JOBS WILL BE CUT.

BECAUSE PEOPLE SHOULD ALWAYS FEEL SAFE. THIS IS ONE OF MANY CUT BACKS WHICH SHOULD NOT BE ON THE LIST.

BECAUSE TO GO STEP HOVE BRIGHTON OR THE OTHER WAY - RIGHT ONTO HOVE IN HEAVY TRAFFIC WILL ADD TIME ON TO GET TO FIRE!

BRIGHTON AND HOVE IS STILL A HIGH RISK AREA, HAVING VERY CONGESTED AND NARROW ROADS. KEEP THE FIREFIGHTERS AND TRIM THE MANAGEMENT.

BRIGHTON AND HOVE SEEMS TO BE GETTING BIGGER AS THERE SEEMS TO BE MORE PEOPLE RELOCATING DOWN HERE FROM LONDON. IT DOES CONCERN ME THAT REDUCING THE AMOUNT OF ENGINES WILL HAVE A POTENTIAL SAFETY ISSUE TO PEOPLE WHO MAY NEED THIS SERVICE. I APPRECIATE THAT SOMETHING NEEDS TO BE DONE AND I WOULD NOT OBJECT TO AN INCREASE IN WHAT IS PAID TO THE FIRE AUTHORITY FROM WHAT I PAY IN COUNCIL TAX.

BUDGETS SHOULD NOT BE USED TO ENDANGER LIVES. YOU SHOULD BE LOBBYING CENTRAL GOVERNMENT FOR MORE FUNDS.

BY TAKING FIRE ENGINES AWAY IS PUTTING PEOPLE'S LIVES AT RISK. SURELY CUTTING SUPPORT STAFF I.E. CLEANERS, DRIVERS AND HYDRANT MEN. SURELY FIRE FIGHTERS CAN DO HYDRANTS LIKE THEY USED TO.

CALL IT A 'GUT FEELING'. SO KEEP THE FIRE ENGINE.

CAMPAIGN FOR ADEQUATE FUNDING FROM THE GOVERNMENT.

CFOA AND FIRE AUTHORITIES TO PRESSURE DCLG AND GOVERNMENT TO REPEAL CUTS IN FUNDING ACROSS UK TO ENSURE PUBLIC SAFETY.

CHANGE THE CREWING DUTY SYSTEM AT HOVE FROM WHOLE TIME AND RETAINED THEREBY MAKING THE SECOND PUMP RETAINED.

CONSIDER COMBINING THE CALL CENTRE OPERATIONS WITH WEST SUSSEX.

CONSIDER COST CONTROL OF OTHER 'NON REACTIVE', EMERGENCY SERVICES. TOP LEVEL MANAGEMENT, OUTSOURCE FINANCE, HR ETC.

CONSIDER RDS AT HOVE.

COVER IN THE CITY AREA NEEDS TO REMAIN THE SAME TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THAT THERE ARE VERY OFTEN MULTIPLE CALLS TO DIFFERENT INCIDENTS ON THE THREE STATION GROUNDS AT THE SAME TIME, PLUS THE 'OVER BORDER' SUPPORT THAT WEST SUSSEX OFTEN REQUEST IMPINGES ON COVER IN THE CITY.

COVER SHOULD NOT BE REDUCED ANYWHERE. TRIM THE FAT FROM SENIOR OFFICERS AND HQ. AND THEIR PAY, NOT FRONT LINE WORKERS.

CUT ADMINISTRATION COSTS, AND STORES I.E SHARE PURCHASE WITH OTHER BRIGADES. CUT THE DOG AND HIGH PAID OFFICER THAT SERVICES IT. IT'S BASIC FIREMAN SHIP TO DISCOVER THE CAUSE OF AN INCIDENT, NOT A GIMMICK DOG.

CUT BACK ON PRINCIPLE OFFICERS, ESFRS HAS MANY AS THE SCOTTISH FIRE SERVICE. REDUCE BOROUGHS AND BOROUGH COMMANDERS FROM 6 TO 3. CARRY OUT A FULL MANAGEMENT RESTRUCTURING; THIS WILL PROTECT THE FRONTLINE SERVICES THAT APPEAR TO BE BEING TARGETED BY SENIOR OFFICERS.

CUT BACK ROOM STAFF, SENIOR OFFICERS BLOATED WAGES, GET RID OF EXECUTIVE CARS, REDUCE THE NUMBER OF OFFICERS, NO CUTS FROM THE FRONTLINE.

CUT COSTS FROM HQ SUCH AS MARKETING COMMS., HR, ALL WE NEED ARE FIRE STATIONS, FIREFIGHTERS AND FIRE ENGINES. INCREASE COUNCIL TAX.

CUT FROM ADMIN STAFF AND EXPENDITURES AND SELL UNUSED BUILDINGS ETC.

CUT HIGHER EARNERS WAGES AND SPEND LESS ON OTHER PROJECTS.

CUT MEMBERS' EXPENSES AND MANAGEMENT COSTS. USE RESERVES, RATHER THAN CUTTING FRONTLINE SERVICES.

CUT NON-STATUTORY DUTIES.

CUT OFFICERS AND MERGE WITH OTHER FIRE OR POLICE SERVICES. CHARGE FOR WASTED CALL OUTS AND LIFTS BREAKDOWNS.

CUT PAY SALARIES FOR PEOPLE HIGHER UP SITTING IN THE OFFICE MAKING DECISIONS THAT AFFECT PEOPLE'S LIVES.

CUT SOME OF THE MANAGEMENT ROLES RATHER THAN FRONT LINE PERSONNEL WHO SAVE LIVES.

CUT SUPPORT STAFF, AMALGAMATE WITH WEST SUSSEX TO CUT SENIOR SUPPORT MANAGEMENT, GREATER BUYING POWER FOR UNIFORM, GOODS, AND CENTRAL TRAINING.

CUT TOP HEAVY MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE. CLOSE ALL NON-ESSENTIAL DEPARTMENTS AND SERVICES. CARRY OUT ONLY CORE DUTIES TO PROTECT FRONTLINE FIRE COVER.

CUTS COST LIVES. GET RID OF SENIOR MANAGEMENT FIRST!

CUTS SHOULD BE FOUND IN OTHER AREAS. NO FIRE ENGINES OR FIREFIGHTERS SHOULD BE CUT.

CUTS SHOULD BE MADE ELSEWHERE THAN FRONT LINE FIRE APPLIANCES.

CUTS TO FIRE APPLIANCES IN THE CITY WILL PUT LIVES AT RISK ESPECIALLY IF YOU HAVE A HIGH RISE INCIDENT. TO PUT A SAFE SYSTEM OF WORK IN PLACE AT THESE TYPES OF INCIDENTS YOU NEED FIRE ENGINES QUICKLY. GO BACK TO RUNNING CORE STATUTORY BUSINESS, MAKE CUTS ELSEWHERE IN THE ORGANISATION RATHER THAN FRONTLINE EMERGENCY SERVICES.

CUTTING AN APPLIANCE WILL INCREASE THE RISKS TO FIREFIGHTERS AND THE PUBLIC IN BRIGHTON AND HOVE. HOW ABOUT REDUCING SENIOR MANAGEMENT WHO COST ESFRS OVER £500,000 A YEAR? DOES A SMALL SERVICE LIKE ESFRS REALLY NEED 4?? A CHIEF AND DEPUTY WOULD SURELY BE ADEQUATE.

CUTTING ENGINES FROM FIRE STATIONS IS WRONG IT PUTS LIVES AT RISK.

DENSELY POPULATED AREAS AND MANY HIGH RISES, YOU CANNOT PUT LIVES AT RISK - OR MAKE CUTBACKS WITH APPLIANCES AND MANPOWER - MAKE CUTBACKS ELSEWHERE SUCH AS UNIFORM WASTAGE ETC.

DISAGREE, AS HOVE SEEMS TO COVER SURROUNDING AREAS IN WEST SUSSEX SUCH AS SHOREHAM, AN EXTRA APPLIANCE IN HOVE AND REDUCE SHOREHAM TO ONE APPLIANCE.

DOING NOTHING IS AN OPTION, THE CHIEF FIRE OFFICER AND FIRE AUTHORITY SHOULD LOBBY GOVERNMENT FOR THE MONEY TO KEEP ALL FIRE STATIONS AND FIRE ENGINES IN PLACE, YOUR PROPOSALS ALREADY LOOK TO ACHIEVE AN 8 MINUTE ATTENDANCE TIME AND THIS IS TOTALLY UNSATISFACTORY, THE PROPOSALS SHOULD REDUCE THE ATTENDANCE TIMES BELOW 8 MINUTES AS THE FIRE WILL NOT WAIT FOR THE BRIGADE RESOURCE TO BE DEPLOYED BEFORE INCREASING IN SIZE. TO SAVE MONEY CUT THE SALARIES OF THE TOP SENIOR MANAGERS AND LOCAL COUNCILLORS WHO SIT ON THE FIRE AUTHORITY, REDUCE SALARIES OF TOP HR. MANAGERS AND OTHER NON-UNIFORMED SENIOR MANAGERS. SEEK A STATUTORY DUTY TO ATTEND FLOODING'S AND OTHER ROLES THEREBY INCREASING THE FUNDING FOR THE SERVICE.

DOING NOTHING IS VIABLE AS AT SOME POINT STANDING UP AGAINST GOVERNMENT CUT BACKS IS THE ONLY OTHER OPTION. DON'T JUST SIT THERE 'TAKING IT' SAY NO!

DOING NOTHING MAY NOT BE AN OPTION (ALTHOUGH THIS IS A RATHER BADLY WRITTEN AND INCITING WAY TO PHRASE THIS QUESTION), BUT IN CASES WHERE THERE IS MORE THAN ONE FIRE AT ANY POINT THEN THIS BECOMES AN ISSUE. SURELY THERE ARE OTHER CUTS THAT CAN BE MADE WITHOUT THE LOSS OF JOBS AND AN ENGINE THAT THIS WOULD ENTAIL? PERHAPS THE OPTION FOR REDUNDANCY PAY OUTS FOR SOME OF THE MORE EXPENSIVE OFFICERS. EQUALLY, PERHAPS FURTHER FIGHTS WITH A GOVERNMENT WHO HAVE LITTLE INTEREST IN PUBLIC SERVICE AND BETTER MEDIA AND LOCAL COVERAGE IN ORDER TO EXPLAIN THE REAL IMPLICATIONS FOR BOTH THE LOCAL COMMUNITY AND JOB LOSSES. THIS IS NOT INCLUDED IN YOUR STATEMENT AT THE BEGINNING AS THE IMPACT IS IN NO WAY MADE CLEAR FOR LOCAL COMMUNITIES. EDUCATE MPS AND GOVERNMENT MINISTERS TO RECOVER MONIES FROM THOSE WHO GOT THE UK INTO THE FINANCIAL DISASTROUS POSITION IT IS IN AT PRESENT.

EITHER FIND THE SAVINGS ELSEWHERE OR RAISE MORE TAX.

FIGHT THE CUTS. STOP THIS GOVERNMENT DESTROYING OUR PUBLIC SERVICES.

FIND THE SAVINGS FROM SOMEWHERE OTHER THAN FRONTLINE SERVICES. FIRE ENGINES AND FIREFIGHTERS SHOULD BE THE LAST PLACE CUTS ARE MADE AS THIS IS WHERE IT WILL COUNT THE MOST. WHEN LIVES ARE LOST AS A DIRECT RESULT OF A SLOWER RESPONSE.

FIRE ENGINE ATTENDS 1000 OR MORE CALLS A YEAR.

FIRE ENGINES ARE REQUIRED AT BOTH LOCATIONS DUE TO THE POPULATION OF THE AREAS. ALL ENGINES MUST BE KEPT.

FIRE SPREADS QUICKLY AND KILLS, THIS WILL PUT MORE LIVES AND BUSINESSES AT RISK!

FIVE APPLIANCES COVERING THE CITY OF BRIGHTON AND HOVE IS THE CORRECT FIRE COVER BASED ON THE EVIDENCE PROVIDED.

FOLLOWING CHANGES TO DOWNGRADE STANDARD RESPONSE TIMES, THE AVERAGE TIME TAKEN FOR A FIRE CREW TO ARRIVE HAS INCREASED BY TWO MINUTES IN BRIGHTON. THIS HAS LED TO INCREASED FIRE DEATHS AND INCREASED COSTS. THE ARGUMENT THAT THERE IS SCOPE FOR A REDUCTION IN FIRE ENGINES OR FRONTLINE FIREFIGHTERS IS FALLACIOUS. WE NEED TO RETURN TO THE OLD STANDARDS. THE ONLY PLACE WHERE THERE IS SCOPE FOR CUTS IS TO OVER-PAID FIRE CHIEFS AND TO REDUCE THE HUGELY EXPANDED MANAGEMENT LAYER AT ESFRS.

FOR THE AMOUNT OF HIGH RISE BUILDINGS THREE FIRE ENGINES IS SIMPLY NOT ENOUGH. THINGS CHANGE QUICKLY SO WAITING FOR AN ONCOMING TRUCK FROM NEWHAVEN OR LEWES WOULD SIMPLY TAKE TOO LONG. WHAT IF THERE IS MULTIPLE INCIDENT'S IN THE CITY?

FRONT LINE SERVICES SHOULD NOT BE AFFECTED BY CUTS IN FUNDING. THERE MUST BE OTHER METHODS WITHIN BEHIND THE SCENE SERVICES THAT CAN BE CHANGED. DO YOU HAVE A TOP HEAVY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM IN PLACE FOR YOUR SERVICE?

FRONTLINE SERVICES SHOULD NOT BE CUT, FIREFIGHTERS ARE VALUABLE, USE THEM MORE TO CARRY OUT OTHER DUTIES AS THEY USED TO AND GET RID OF THE OTHER STAFF.

GET RID OF CFS STAFF AND DO WE NEED SUCH A LARGE HQ BUILDING AND SENIOR OFFICERS WITH JOINT WORKING/COLLABORATION.

GO TO THE GOVERNMENT WITH PROOF THAT YOU CAN'T CUT FIRE ENGINES. IT'S EASY, WORK OUT CALLS YOUR ATTENDANCE TIMES AND GOES BACK WITH THE EVIDENCE. THE FIRE SERVICE IS A PUBLIC UTILITY, PAID FOR BY THE PUBLIC. IT SHOULD BE USED FOR EVERY INCIDENT THE PUBLIC REQUIRES IT. FIRES, FLOODS NO MATTER WHAT. OUR FIRE SERVICE IS THERE TO HELP NOT CUTBACK! THE SKILLS OF FIREFIGHTERS MUST BE USED TO THE BEST ADVANTAGE.

HAS THE FIRE SERVICE LOOKED INTO SHARING FIRE CHIEFS INSTEAD OF REMOVING FIREFIGHTERS FROM OUR CITY. I WOULD RATHER THE NUMBER OF FIRE FIGHTERS AND FIRE ENGINES REMAINED THE SAME.

HAVE A STRONGER LOOK AT WHAT HAS BEEN PROPOSED AT THE END OF YOUR PROPOSAL AND IMPLEMENT THAT FIRST THEN LOOK AT OTHER WAYS OF SAVING MONEY BEFORE TOUCHING FRONTLINE SERVICES.

HOW DO YOU PROPOSE TO COVER MULTIPLE INCIDENTS WITH REDUCED COVER? IT'S ALL VERY WELL TO STATE THAT YOU ARE OVER RESOURCED AND CAN GET 5 FIRE ENGINES TO A SERIOUS FIRE WITHIN A CERTAIN TIME SCALE. HOW DO YOU MANAGE WHEN 2 OF THOSE ENGINES ARE ALREADY DEALING WITH A FIRE, RTC, AND ANY OTHER INCIDENT OR ON STANDBY ELSEWHERE? THESE APPLIANCES ALSO PROVIDE COVER OUT OF THE CITY TO THE STATIONS YOU STATE WILL BE SUPPORTING THE CITY.

I AM ABSOLUTELY DISGUSTED THAT CUTTING A FIRE APPLIANCE IS EVEN BEING PROPOSED. GIVEN THE TOP HEAVY NATURE OF THE ESFRS MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE, COUPLED WITH THE LIST OF JUST HOW MUCH MONEY HAS BEEN, AND STILL IS BEING WASTED BY ESFRS (SUCH AS EQUIPMENT THAT IS UNPROVEN, UNUSED AND/OR UNFIT FOR PURPOSE, PROPERTY COSTS ETC. ETC.), I WOULD FIRSTLY SUGGEST PERHAPS A REGIONALISATION OF SENIOR MANAGEMENT MORE LIKE SCOTLAND.

I AM CONCERNED THAT THE PROPOSAL DOES NOT TAKE ACCOUNT OF FACTORS SUCH AS UNDER STAFFING OF APPLIANCES. NOR AM I PERSUADED BY ARGUMENTS THAT SAFETY WILL NOT BE COMPROMISED. AS I UNDERSTAND IT, THE PROVISION OF APPLIANCES IN BRIGHTON AND HOVE IS NOT EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE CITY'S USE NOR DOES IT TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE 10 MILLION VISITORS EACH YEAR AND THE ECONOMIC IMPACT FROM BAD PUBLICITY SUCH AS LOSS OF LIFE AT A GUEST HOUSE FIRE OR INCREASED TRAFFIC COST BECAUSE OF INCREASED RESPONSE TIMES. I THINK THE CASE NEEDS TO BE MADE TO CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO FUND THE SERVICE ADEQUATELY, SO THAT PUBLIC SAFETY CAN BE UPHELD.

I AM UNSURE WHAT TO DO AS I DON'T KNOW WHAT THE OTHER OPTIONS ARE. WHAT ELSE HAVE YOU CONSIDERED? MINI COOPERS AS USED IN OLYMPIC PARK? SHARING OF EQUIPMENT, REDUCING MANAGEMENT STAFF, ETC. I BELIEVE THAT IF THERE WERE MAJOR INCIDENTS (WHICH THERE WILL BE, ESPECIALLY INCREASES IN FRACKING) THAT THERE WILL BE MORE INCIDENTS. PLUS WITH MORE PEOPLE BEING HOUSED IN THIS AREA MEANS A HIGHER RISK OF NEED FIRSTLY BECAUSE OF THE POPULATION GOING UP SO DOES THE RISK; SECONDLY THE NUMBER OF FALSE ALARMS AND HOAX CALLS WILL INCREASE. NO MATTER HOW MUCH YOU PUT INTO EDUCATING PEOPLE ABOUT RISK, INCIDENTS WILL HAPPEN. WITH THE INCREASE OF NATURAL DISASTERS, AND THERE ARE, WE IN THE CITY CAN, AS YOU STATED NOT GET TO ALL CALL OUTS WITHIN THE DESIGNATED TIME FRAME, SO HOW WILL YOU COPE WITH FOR EXAMPLE IF THERE IS A MULTI-PILE UP, A TRAPPED PERSON AND A FALSE ALARM FROM A SCHOOL, WHEN OUR APPLIANCES ARE ALL OTHERWISE ENGAGED IN ANOTHER AREA. ALSO, THE LESS FIRE SERVICE WE HAVE, SO THE FUNDING WILL DECREASE YEAR ON YEAR, THEN IT WILL COME IN TO DISREPUTE THEN THE GOVERNMENT WILL DRIVE MOVES TO PRIVATISE IT. THIS IS THE BEGINNING OF A VERY DANGEROUS, SLIPPERY SLOPE AND THAT NEEDS TO BE AVOIDED AT ALL COSTS.

I BELIEVE THAT THE CITY AND SURROUNDING AREA REQUIRES 5 FIRE APPLIANCES TO DELIVER A PROFESSIONAL SERVICE.

I DISAGREE AS IT WOULD AFFECT THE COMMUNITY WITHIN THE CITY WITH BRIGHTON HAVING THE MOST CALLS, I WOULD MAYBE CHANGE ONE OF THE WHOLE TIME STATIONS TO A DAY CREWED AND SUCH AS ROEDEAN OR HOVE.

I DISAGREE BECAUSE IT MAY INCREASE RISK, NOT NOW, BUT IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND MAY LEAD TO DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES. CUTS SHOULD BE MADE ELSEWHERE LIKE IF FIRE STATIONS, BUILDINGS DON'T GET USED MUCH, HIRE IT OUT TO PEOPLE WHO MAY NEED TO USE IT.

I DISAGREE WITH ANY CUTS TO FRONTLINE SERVICES BECAUSE IT PUTS LIVES AT RISK. DON'T ASSUME THE GOVERNMENT WILL SAY NO TO MORE FUNDING - ASK THEM.

I DISAGREE WITH ANY CUTS TO FRONTLINE SERVICES. I BELIEVE THE SERVICE SHOULD JUST GO BACK TO THE CORE BUSINESS OF BEING AN EMERGENCY SERVICE HAVING A FULLY TRAINED WORKFORCE TO DEAL WITH NOT ONLY FIRES BUT OTHER INCIDENTS LIKE MAJOR FLOODING WHICH IS ON THE INCREASE. BASICALLY HAVING THE RESOURCES TO ANSWER 999 CALLS. YOU SAY INCIDENTS HAVE GONE DOWN TO THE EXCELLENT FIRE PREVENTATIVE WORK FIREFIGHTERS DO, IF YOU CUT THOSE RESOURCES ALL THAT WORK IS UNDONE AND PEOPLE IN THE COMMUNITY CHANGE ALL THE TIME AND THE INCIDENTS WILL RISE. THE FIRE AUTHORITY SHOULD CHALLENGE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT FIRST BEFORE PROPOSING CUTS AND ASK FOR MORE MONEY. THE CHIEF HAS ALREADY SAID IT WILL BE A RESOUNDING NO BUT HE HAS NOT EVEN ASKED.

I DISAGREE WITH THE PROPOSAL BECAUSE ANY CUTS IN FRONTLINE SERVICES PUTS LIVES AT RISK. ALTHOUGH INCIDENTS HAVE GONE DOWN DUE EXCELLENT FIRE PREVENTION WORK BY FIREFIGHTERS IF YOU REMOVE THE FIREFIGHTERS THE EDUCATION WORK IN THAT AREA DOES NOT GET DONE AND INCIDENTS WILL RISE. I WOULD SUGGEST THE SERVICE GOES BACK TO RUNNING JUST THE CORE BUSINESS OF BEING AN EMERGENCY SERVICE OR ASK THE GOVERNMENT FOR MORE FUNDING AND NOT JUST ASSUMING THE GOVERNMENT WILL SAY NO.

I DISAGREE WITH THE PROPOSAL. CUT SENIOR POSITIONS, PERKS AND PAY.

I DISAGREE WITH THE REDUCTION OF FRONT LINE APPLIANCES, SAVINGS COULD BE FOUND ELSEWHERE I.E. THE REMOVAL OF FLEXIBLE DUTY ALLOWANCES FROM PRINCIPLE OFFICERS AS THEY ATTEND VERY FEW INCIDENTS IN A YEAR REQUIRING STRATEGIC COMMAND WHICH COULD BE CARRIED BY LOWER LEVEL OFFICERS.

I DO NOT AGREE WITH REMOVING FIRE ENGINES AS THAT ALSO MEANS REMOVING FIREFIGHTER JOBS, WHEN THE CHIPS ARE DOWN WE NEED THEM ALL. WE NEVER KNOW WHEN A LARGE INCIDENT WILL OCCUR, WHICH WILL RESULT IN NEEDING MORE THAN 5 FIRE ENGINES, PLUS MAINTAINING COVER IN THE AREA.

I DO NOT AGREE WITH THIS PROPOSAL. PERHAPS LOOKING AT REDUCING SUPPORT STAFF IS AN OPTION OR CUTTING SENIOR RANKS.

I DO NOT BELIEVE IT IS POSSIBLE TO MAKE CUTS WITHOUT IMPACTING ON THE SERVICE PROVIDED. THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD MAINTAIN CURRENT FUNDING LEVELS.

I DO NOT BELIEVE OR FEEL THAT YOU CAN SAFELY PROVIDE EFFECTIVE FIRE COVER BY REDUCING THE NUMBER OF FIRE ENGINES TO 4 IN BRIGHTON AND HOVE. EXPLORE OTHER AREAS FOR CUTS SUCH AS LOOKING AT THE NUMBER OF SENIOR MGT.

I DO NOT THINK THAT PROPER ACCOUNT HAS BEEN TAKEN OF USING THE SCOTTISH FIRE SERVICE AMALGAMATION MODEL. IT CLAIMS SAVINGS OF £1.7 MILLION OVER 15 YEARS. WHY HAVE YOU NOT PRESENTED A SE REGIONAL ANALYSIS AS AN ALTERNATIVE? WHAT EXTERNAL SCRUTINY BY THE CHIEF INSPECTOR OF THE FIRE SERVICE HAS OCCURRED?

I DON'T BELIEVE THE FIRE SERVICE SHOULD HAVE ANY RESOURCES REMOVED.

I DON'T FEEL THAT ENOUGH UNBIASED EVIDENCE HAS BEEN PROVIDED HERE FOR ME TO DECIDE.

I HAVE VISITED THE PRESTON CIRCUS FIRE STATION ON A TOUR AND HAVE SPOKEN TO THE FIRE MEN. THE WORK THEY UNDERTAKE IS VITAL AND THEY ARE THE MOST COMMITTED WORK FORCE I'VE COME ACROSS. THEY DO SO MUCH MORE THAN JUST PUT OUT FIRES AND ARE CONSTANTLY UNDER PRESSURE BECAUSE OF WORKING PRACTICES THAT CENTRAL GOVERNMENT NEED SEEM TO DISLIKE. THEY ARE THE BEST PEOPLE TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS.

I LIVE IN A HIGH RISE FLAT, AS I UNDERSTAND IT MORE APPLIANCES ARE REQUIRED TO DEAL WITH THIS TYPE OF FIRE, SO WOULD FEEL UNSAFE AND UNPROTECTED, THIS IS NOT WHAT I EXPECT FROM MY FIRE SERVICE.

I OPPOSE THE PROPOSALS, THAT AREN'T DOING ANYTHING; IT IS STANDING UP AND SAYING WE CANNOT AFFORD THE CUTS.

I STRONGLY DISAGREE WITH REMOVING ANY FRONT LINE APPLIANCE AND FIREFIGHTER POSTS FROM THE CITY. BRIGHTON AND HOVE HAS AN EXPANDING POPULATION WITH VERY HIGH TOURIST NUMBERS. THE SIZE OF ESFRS HQ AND THE NUMBER OF PRINCIPAL OFFICERS MUST BE LOOKED AT BEFORE THE FRONT LINE.

I SUGGEST YOU COME UP WITH A BETTER SET OF PROPOSALS. YOUR CHIEF EARNS OVER £150,000 PLUS PERKS WITH THAT INCENTIVE, I AM SURE AN ALTERNATIVE CAN BE FOUND WHICH SAVES FRONTLINE FIRE ENGINES.

I UNDERSTAND THAT TOWER BLOCK FIRES REQUIRE 4 FIRE ENGINES, SO BY REMOVING ANY ENGINES FROM THE CITY OF BRIGHTON AND HOVE SEEMS LIKE IT WILL BE PUTTING RESIDENTS NOT JUST OF TOWER BLOCKS AT RISK, BUT RESIDENTS ALL OVER THE CITY TOO, IF THE ONLY ENGINES AVAILABLE ARE ALL ATTENDING A TOWER BLOCK FIRE. ALSO, SURELY A REMOVAL OF ANY ENGINES FROM THE CITY WILL MAKE ROEDEAN FIRE STATION MUCH BUSIER? MONEY CAN BE SAVED ELSEWHERE, WITHOUT PUTTING LIVES AT RISK; THERE SHOULD BE BETTER MONEY MANAGEMENT THROUGHOUT THE SERVICE, RATHER THAN DESTROYING IT.

I UNDERSTAND THE CONTEXT OF CUTS, BUT NOT AGREEABLE TO REDUCTION OF SERVICES. NEVER KNOW WHEN A MAJOR INCIDENT WILL TAKE PLACE SO REDUCTIONS RISK PUTTING LIVES AND WELL-BEING AT RISK. CANNOT OFFER ALTERNATIVES AS NOT AWARE OF ENOUGH OF RELEVANT INFORMATION.

I UNDERSTAND, BUT WILL THERE BE JOB LOSSES?

I WOULD CUT THE NUMBER OF 'TOP HEAVY' MANAGERS IN THE FIRE SERVICE AND AT THE COUNCIL. THEY ARE NOT THE ONES RISKING THEIR LIVES TO HELP OTHERS, BUT THEY ARE WILLING TO RISK OTHER PEOPLES LIVES TO SAVE THEIR OWN PAY CHECK!

I WOULD FUND THE SHORTFALL IN BUDGET FROM THE 'RESERVE FUND' WHERE £10-11.5 MILLION POUNDS IS SITTING UNUSED. THE £7.1 MILLION POUNDS REQUIRED COULD EASILY BE MET AND STILL LEAVE A SUBSTANTIAL POT FOR CONTINGENCIES. PLEASE BEAR IN MIND THE FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS COULD COMPLETELY CHANGE THE SITUATION.

I WOULD INITIALLY WANT TO LOOK AT THE ORIGINAL STATEMENT WHICH ALLOCATED THE EXISTING NUMBER OF FIRE STATIONS AND THE REASONS WHY.

I WOULD LIKE THE CHIEF TO STAND UP TO THE GOVERNMENT AND ACTUALLY TELL THEM THAT THE CUTS BEING HANDED DOWN ARE UNSUSTAINABLE AND ANY CLOSURES, OR REMOVAL OF FIRE ENGINES WILL PUT LIVES AT RISK!

I WOULDN'T REMOVE THE FIRE ENGINES BECAUSE WE NEED THEM. I HAVE A DAD WHO IS DISABLED AND MY NAN LIVES IN BRIGHTON. HOW WOULD THE FIRE SERVICE RESCUE HER IF SHE WAS IN A FIRE? I WOULD WRITE TO STEPHEN LLOYD (MP OF EASTBOURNE) FOR HELP AND ADVICE.

I'M CONCERNED TO SEE THE BASIS OF THE PROPOSAL. TO WHAT EXTENT DOES IT TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION 'REAL INEFFICIENCY' IN THE SYSTEM? I.E. ON PAPER, IT LOOKS OK TO REDUCE FIRE TENDERS, BUT IN REALITY, FIRE ENGINES HAVE TO DEAL WITH TRAFFIC, NARROW STREETS, AND OTHER SUCH ISSUES.

IF FINANCIAL SAVINGS MUST BE MADE, THEY SHOULD COME FROM RE-STRUCTURING THE SERVICE, CUTTING THE AMOUNT OF PRINCIPAL OFFICERS, AND MERGING WITH OTHER BRIGADES.

IF JUST ONE HIGH RISE INCIDENT OCCURS THERE WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH APPLIANCES OR PERSONNEL TO SAFELY DEAL WITH THAT INCIDENT AND IF ANOTHER INCIDENT OCCURRED AT THE SAME TIME THERE WOULDN'T BE ANY APPLIANCES TO RESPOND. TO SAVE MONEY PROJECTS LIKE BUILDING A BRAND NEW STATION IN NEWHAVEN SHOULD BE PUT ON HOLD. SERVICES SHOULD BE MERGED WITH OTHER BRIGADES WITHIN A REGION. THAT WOULD MEAN MANY SENIOR MANAGEMENT POSTS COULD BE REDUCED, OTHER BEHIND THE SCENES JOBS COULD BE MERGED. THE HEADQUARTERS BUILDING IS ENORMOUS AND IT COULD BE SOLD TO MAKE UP THE BUDGET SHORTFALL. THE OFFICERS THAT WORK THERE COULD WORK FROM HOME OR FROM RETAINED STATIONS. EVEN IF THERE ARE FEWER INCIDENTS TO ATTEND THE INCIDENTS THAT OCCUR, THEY STILL REQUIRE THE SAME NUMBER OF PERSONNEL TO SAFELY DO WHATEVER IS REQUIRED. FIREFIGHTER DEATHS ARE ON THE INCREASE GIVING THEM LESS RESOURCES AND WORSE RESOURCES WOULD INCREASE THE RISK OF HAVING MORE DEATHS IN EAST SUSSEX.

IF YOU TAKE ANOTHER FIRE ENGINE OUT OF BRIGHTON AND HOVE, YOU WILL AFFECT RESILIENCE. YOU MAY ALSO LIMIT YOUR OPTIONS FOR EFFECTIVE AND SAFE INTERVENTION AT HIGH RISE INCIDENTS. THERE IS ALSO A NUMBER OF BUSINESS AND LOCAL PREMISES WITH A HIGH LIFE RISK AND THE BENEFITS FOR A QUICK AND WEIGHTY ATTACK WILL OVERWHELMINGLY OUT-WEIGH ANY SMALL FINANCIAL SAVING, CONSIDERING WHAT COULD GO WRONG.

IN A CITY THE SIZE OF BRIGHTON AND HOVE IT COULD WELL BE DANGEROUS TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF ENGINES. FAR BETTER TO LOOK AT COSTS OF HQ MANAGEMENT AND ALLOWANCES TO FIRE AUTHORITY MEMBERS.

IN ORDER TO EFFECTIVELY INITIATE BA PROCEDURES CREWING LEVELS SHOULD BE MAINTAINED AT THE PRESENT LEVEL IN ORDER THAT THE FIRST STRIKE IS MADE QUICKLY, AND ALSO ENSURES THE SAFETY OF FIREFIGHTING CREWS.

IN THE PERFECT SCENARIO THE COVERING FIRE ENGINE WOULD GET THERE, BUT THAT NEVER HAPPENS DUE TO TRAFFIC OR AT ANOTHER INCIDENT! SECONDS AS SHOWN IN LONDON ARE IMPORTANT IN A FIRE SITUATION!

INCIDENTS MAY HAVE REDUCED HOWEVER, IF THERE WAS A FIRE AT MY HOUSE AND IT REQUIRED 5 FIRE ENGINES I WOULD WANT THEM ALL THERE STRAIGHT AWAY, NOT 2 OR 3 TO 'JUST DO A JOB' AND PUT MY FAMILY AT RISK. TEN MINUTES FOR A FURTHER FIRE ENGINE FROM LEWES OR NEWHAVEN IS JUST NOT GOOD ENOUGH AND WILL COST LIVES. IMAGINE THAT TIME WHEN THERE ARE 2 SERIOUS FIRES GOING ON AT THE SAME TIME AND YOU CAN ONLY SEND 2 FIRE ENGINES TO EACH UNTIL SO CALLED BACKUP CAN REACH THE INCIDENT. MAKE SAVINGS YES, BUT DON'T REMOVE FIRE ENGINES AS THESE ARE WHAT SAVE PEOPLE FROM FIRES.

INSTEAD OF CUTTING FRONTLINE EMERGENCY FIRE APPLIANCES, SAVE MONEY BY MERGING WITH OTHER FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICES! STREAMLINE TOP PRINCIPAL OFFICERS ON VERY LARGE SALARIES! TELL THE GOVERNMENT NO TO ANYMORE FRONTLINE CUTS!

IT IS STATISTICALLY PROVEN THAT BRIGHTON AND HOVE HAVE AN INCREASING POPULATION. WITHOUT FURTHER STATISTICS REGARDING THE USAGE OF ALL FIRE ENGINES IN THE AREA IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR A MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC TO REALISTICALLY ASSESS WHETHER A CUT IN THE NUMBER OF ENGINES WOULD BE DETRIMENTAL TO PUBLIC SAFETY. ADDITIONALLY I AM ASSUMING THIS PROPOSAL WAS MADE BEFORE THE FLOODING IN THE LAST MONTH AND MY UNDERSTANDING IS THE ONE OF THE ENGINES AT HOVE WAS IDEALLY PLACED TO ASSIST ON LOCAL COUNTIES. WHERE WILL THE FIRE ENGINE BE SENT ONCE REMOVED? IT SEEMS CRAZY TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF FIRE ENGINES AND REDUCE THE PROTECTION GIVEN WHEN COUNCILS ARE BEING FORCED TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE LIVING IN EAST SUSSEX. THE DEMAND ON THE INFRASTRUCTURE IS CONTINUALLY INCREASING AND NOW THERE ARE PLANS TO REDUCE THE SERVICES. FUNDING SHOULD COME FROM A REDUCTION IN CENTRAL / LOCAL GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY.

IT WOULD PUT ENORMOUS AMOUNT OF WORK ON THE INITIAL PUMP TURNING UP. WHY NOT CONSIDER A RETAINED PUMP OR DAY CREW TO MAN A SECOND PUMP.

IT'S ALL VERY WELL SAYING THAT MOST SERIOUS FIRES REQUIRE 2 OR 3 APPLIANCES, BUT WHAT IF MORE ARE REQUIRED OR ANOTHER INCIDENT OCCURS IN THE CITY AT THE SAME TIME. YOU WON'T GET PUMPS THERE IN 8 MINUTES THEN. APPLIANCES AREN'T THE EXPENSIVE PART, YES LOSING A PUMP CAN SAVE YOU ABOUT 20 JOBS BUT IF YOU CAN LOSE THOSE JOBS THROUGH NATURAL WASTAGE ACROSS THE BRIGADE AND NOT REPLACE THEM THEN SAVINGS WILL BE MADE AND EXCELLENT COVER MAINTAINED IN THE CITY.

IT'S FINE UNTIL A DISASTER HAPPENS AND REMOVING ALL THESE FIRE ENGINES WILL JUST COME AND BITE BACK. THEY WE'RE PUT THERE IN THE FIRST PLACE.

JUST BECAUSE THERE HAVE BEEN FEWER INCIDENTS, THERE COULD BE MORE INCIDENTS IN THE FUTURE ESPECIALLY A MORE WIDE VARIETY I.E THE RECENT FLOODING. I WOULD HAVE THOUGHT THAT REDUCING TOP MANAGEMENT AND PERHAPS MOVING YOUR HEADQUARTERS TO A MORE MODEST SITE.

KEEP ALL FIRE STATIONS, BUT MAKE EACH ONE EFFICIENT.

KEEP BOTH, BUT OUTSOURCE THEM TO OTHER FIRE STATIONS OUTSIDE OF PEAK ACTIVITY TIMES.

KEEP OUR COUNTRY SAFE, NO CUTBACK FOR OUR SAFETY.

KEEP THE FIRE ENGINE, BUT GET PART TIME 'ON CALL' FIREMEN TO OPERATE IT.

LEAVE EVERYTHING AS IT IS, IF YOU CUT SERVICES THERE WILL BE A TIME IT WILL PUT PEOPLE'S LIVES AT RISK.

LEAVING FOUR PUMPS IN THE CITY IS NOT AN OPTION BECAUSE IT TAKES FOUR TO DEAL WITH ONE HIGH RISE INCIDENT. THE CITY'S POPULATION SWELLS IN THE SUMMER AND 4 PUMPS DOES NOT LEAVE ENOUGH RESILIENCE.

LOGIC SAYS THAT YOU HAVE MORE APPLIANCES IN THE CITY, PRESTON CIRCUS, AND HOVE CAN COVER THE WESTERN SIDE OF THE CITY, SHOULD PRESTON CIRCUS APPLIANCES ALL BE TASKED AT THE SAME TIME.

LOOK AT DIFFERENT CREWING OPTIONS DOUBLE JUMPING ALP OR INTRODUCTION OF SMALLER APPLIANCE.

LOOK AT HIGHER RANKS BEFORE FRONT LINE STAFF WHO ARE THERE TO SAVE LIVES NOT MONEY.

LOOK AT OTHER WAYS TO IMPROVE FUNDING I.E. CHARGING FOR SOME OF THE SERVICES PROVIDED, FOR EXAMPLE, ROAD TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, AND NON-FIRE RELATED SERVICES.

LOOK AT TARGETED RESPONSE VEHICLES.

LOOK AT THE INTEGRATED RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN AND DECIDE AT WHAT PEAK TIMES OFFER THE GREATEST LEVEL OF RISK AND RESOURCE ACCORDINGLY. CONSIDER THE USE OF VCS SCHEMES FOR BOTH APPLIANCES. LIKEWISE LOOK FOR OTHER AREAS OF THE BRIGADE THAT ARE OVER RESOURCED. JUST BECAUSE THE LEVEL OF INCIDENTS IS IN DECLINE DOES NOT MEAN THAT THIS IS AN ONGOING TREND IN MY OPINION, WHAT IF SERIOUS INCIDENTS START TO INCREASE IN THE FUTURE? WHAT IF WE SUFFER A MAJOR INCIDENT SUCH AS THE RECENT FLOODING WITH FRS COMICALLY UNDER RESOURCED IN THE INITIAL STAGES? WHY NOT LOOK AT THE PROVISION OF APPLIANCES THAT CARRY MORE THE STANDARD 6 FIREFIGHTERS, SINCE IT REQUIRES PEOPLE AT SCENE AS OPPOSED TO LOADS OF SURPLUS EQUIPMENT STANDING IDLE ON FIRE APPLIANCES?

LOOK FOR EFFICIENCIES ELSEWHERE. IF THESE AREN'T ACHIEVABLE, THEN SAY WHAT YOU'VE LOOKED FOR, AND WHY YOU CAN'T ACHIEVE THAT.

LOOK TO MAKING THE SAVINGS THROUGH AMALGAMATIONS SUCH AS SHARING OF PRINCIPLE OFFICERS OR OFFICE FACILITIES, NOT FRONT LINE SERVICES SINCE ANY CUT IN FRONT LINE SERVICES WILL HAVE AN AFFECT ON PUBLIC AND FIREFIGHTER SAFETY.

MAINTAIN EXISTING COVER.

MAKE CHANGES IN OTHER AREAS.

MAKE HOVE AND OR PRESTON CIRCUS DAY CREWED PLUS.

MAKE SAVINGS AT THE TOP (MANAGEMENT) AS THEY COST THE MOST-HIGHER WAGES PLUS PERKS TO SMT 20% EXTRA FOR ATTENDING INCIDENTS THAT THEY DO NOT ATTEND, CAR ALLOWANCES THAT ARE A DISGRACE. ESFRS MANAGEMENT ARE TRYING TO SAVE MILLIONS EVERYONE KNOWS THAT IF YOU LOOK AFTER THE PENNIES THEN THE POUNDS LOOK AFTER THEMSELVES, LOTS AND LOTS OF LITTLE SAVINGS WILL BE SAFER TO BOTH THE PUBLIC AND FIRE CREWS.

MAKE SAVINGS AT THE TOP.

MAKE SURE YOU KEEP OPERATIONAL APPLIANCES AND SEEK TO RECOUP THE COST BY EFFICIENCY SAVINGS OF NON-OPERATIONAL FIRE SERVICE STAFF.

MAKE THE SAVINGS FROM YOUR OVER PAID MANAGEMENT.

MAKING ONE FIRE ENGINE AT HOVE RETAINED THUS KEEPING ALL 5 FIRE ENGINES IN THE CITY.

MAKING SAVINGS FROM CHIEF OFFICERS PAY AND CARRYING OUT THE SUGGESTIONS ON THE E-PETITION.

MANAGEMENT RESTRUCTURING NEEDS DOING URGENTLY. NOT ATTACKS ON PUBLIC SAFETY.

MERGE WITH ANOTHER FIRE AUTHORITY AND SAVE THE £7 MILLION BY REMOVING UNNECESSARY MANAGEMENT RATHER THAN FIRE CREW. YOU SHOULD CUT FROM THE TOP DOWN AND NOT FROM THE BOTTOM UP!

MORE PROPERTY IS BEING BUILT IN THE CITY INCLUDING HIGH RISE FOR WHICH 4 FIRE ENGINES ARE NEEDED.

MY INFORMATION IS THAT YOU HAVE TIGHTENED THE CRITERIA FOR CALL OUTS - NOT RECEIVED LESS CALLS? ANYWAY, YOU SHOULD BE LOOKING AT WORKING SMARTER AND REORGANISING BACK-OFFICE FUNCTIONS / AMALGAMATING (LIKE SCOTLAND), OTHER THAN CUTTING FRONTLINE SERVICES AND RISKING LIVES.

NO TO FRONTLINE CUTS, GET FIRE AUTHORITY TO LOBBY PARLIAMENT, CUTS ARE NOT AN OPTION CUTS START AT THE TOP NOT THE BOTTOM.

ONCE IT'S TAKEN AWAY THEN IT WILL NEVER COME BACK AND WHO KNOWS PERHAPS THE TREND IN REDUCTIONS WILL INCREASE IN FUTURE.

PEOPLE WILL BE AT RISK IF THERE IS A FIRE. IT WILL TAKE LONGER FOR ANOTHER FIRE ENGINE TO ARRIVE.

PERHAPS A CHANGE TO CREW NUMBERS, GIVEN THAT APPLIANCES AND FIREFIGHTERS ARE ALWAYS REQUIRED, EVEN IF YOU SAY CALLS ARE LOWER?

POSSIBLY CONSIDER THE WAY FIRE ENGINES ARE CREWED TO SAVE MONEY. CONSIDER REDUCING THE AMOUNT OF MANAGERS AS IT IS CLEAR THEY WILL BE MANAGING FEWER FRONT LINE FIREFIGHTERS IN THE FUTURE. REDUCING THE AMOUNT OF FIRE ENGINES WORKS IN THEORY, BUT DURING THE RECENT AND CONTINUED BAD WEATHER THE FIRE SERVICE WAS STRETCHED WITH LARGE AMOUNTS OF CREWS BEING PAID OVERTIME TO HELP DEAL WITH THE FLOODS.

RAISE COUNCIL TAX A FEW PENCE THAT SHOULD PAY FOR ALL THESE POINTLESS CUTS, SOONER OR LATER IT WILL ALL GO HORRIBLY WRONG THEN WHO WILL TO BLAME? HOW ABOUT THE CHIEF FIRE OFFICER FOR CORPORATE MANSLAUGHTER?

REDUCE BOROUGH COMMANDERS FROM 6 TO 3. THIS IS A SIMPLE SAVING THAT'S NOT FRONTLINE AND PUTTING THE PUBLIC AT DIRECT RISK.

REDUCE EXECUTIVE PAY. FINE BUSINESSES THAT ARE REPEAT 'AFA' FALSE ALARM OFFENDERS.

REDUCE EXPENDITURE WITH SENIOR OFFICERS AND UNNECESSARY STAFF.

REDUCE MANAGEMENT AND SUPPORT STAFF.

REDUCE MANAGEMENT COSTS, MERGE EAST SUSSEX AND WEST SUSSEX.

REDUCE NUMBER / PAY OF 6TH FLOOR OFFICERS AT HQ.

REDUCE THE NUMBER OF PRINCIPLE MANAGERS AND MIDDLE TO HIGH MANAGERS. PUBLIC DESERVE AND NEED FIRE ENGINES WHEN IN NEED. DON'T NEED A TOP HEAVY ORGANISATION. CLOSE DEPARTMENTS THAT ARE NOT TO DO WITH PUBLIC SAFETY. USE RESERVES. STOP RENOVATIONS AND NEW BUILDS.

REDUCE THE NUMBER OF STAFF BY CUTTING THE UNNECESSARY AMOUNT OF MANAGERIAL AND BEHIND THE SCENES JOBS THAT HAVE BEEN CREATED SINCE THE HEADQUARTERS MOVE TO EASTBOURNE. SELL THE 'OVER THE TOP' HEADQUARTERS AND RE-LOCATE CONTROL AND ONLY THE NECESSARY MANAGEMENT TO ONE OF THE FIRE STATIONS YOU PROPOSE TO CUT, HOW IT USED TO BE MANY YEARS AGO. DISSOLVE THE PRITCHARD 'EMPIRE' THAT HAS BEEN CREATED OVER THE LAST 15-20 YEARS OR SO, REMOVE THE INCUMBENT CHIEF OFFICER WHOM I UNDERSTAND HAS ALREADY RETIRED AND HAS A HANDSOME PENSION, AND UNBELIEVABLY BEEN RE-EMPLOYED. YOU CANNOT DEPLETE FRONT LINE SERVICES ANY MORE JUST BECAUSE THERE HAVE BEEN LESS INCIDENTS, TAKE EXAMPLE FROM THE RECENT FLOODING IN THE WEST COUNTRY WHERE FRONT LINE SERVICES ARE ESSENTIAL, ONCE YOU HAVE LOST THEM, THEY ARE GONE FOR GOOD, HOW WOULD YOU REPLACE THEM WHEN THEY WILL INEVITABLY BE REQUIRED.

REDUCE TOP HEAVY MANAGEMENT AND BEAN COUNTERS AND PRESERVE FRONT LINE FIREFIGHTERS.

REDUCE TOP LEVEL MANAGEMENT TO CUT HIGHEST SALARIES AND BE ABLE TO CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE FRONTLINE STAFF.

REDUCING FIRE ENGINES AND CREWS PUTS LIVES AT RISK - LOOK FOR SAVINGS AT MANAGEMENT LEVEL FIRST BY COMBINING WITH OTHER FIRE AUTHORITIES TO REDUCE MANAGERS.

REDUCING FRONTLINE SERVICES IS NOT THE ONLY WAY TO MEET BUDGET RESTRICTIONS. HOWEVER, IF THIS IS THE ONLY OPTION THEN LOOKING AT DUAL CREWING THE ALP WITH A SMALLER FAST RESPONSE VEHICLE WITH 4X4 CAPABILITY WOULD PROVIDE FURTHER ENHANCEMENT TO THE CITY WITHOUT LOSING POSTS.

REDUCTION IN PRINCIPLE OFFICERS AND THEIR COSTS, SALE OF HEADQUARTERS BUILDING, CANCEL PURCHASE OF THE AWFUL 'CARP' APPLIANCES. THEY HAVE BEEN PROVEN UNRELIABLE AND ANGLOCO ACKNOWLEDGE THEY PERFORM NEITHER TASK WELL.

REFUSE TO CARRY OUT SWINGEING GOVERNMENT CUTS.

REFUSE TO IMPLEMENT CUTS THAT THREATEN SERVICE LEVELS.

REMOVAL OF ANY FIRE APPLIANCE FROM THE CITY OF BRIGHTON AND HOVE WILL ENDANGER BOTH THE PUBLIC AND FIRE FIGHTERS. IN THE LONG TERM IT WILL INCREASE COST DUE TO INCREASED PROPERTY DAMAGE.

REMOVAL OF FRONT LINE FIRE APPLIANCES IS GAMBLING WITH LIVES. BOTH THE PUBLIC AND FIREFIGHTERS WILL HAVE A POORER SERVICE AND REDUCED SUPPORT, PLACING FIREFIGHTERS AT GREATER RISK AND THE PUBLIC IN INCREASED DANGER. INSTEAD LOOK AT YOUR OTHER EXPENDITURES, PERHAPS FALLING BACK ON CORE RESPONSIBILITIES, ALSO ANY FUNDING BEING GIVEN TO OUTSIDE AGENCIES FOR WORK THE FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE COULD BE DOING SHOULD BE STOPPED IMMEDIATELY.

REMOVAL WILL ENDANGER LIVES, AND CAUSE A DELAY IN FIRE ATTENDANCE.

REMOVE AND CLOSE HERSTMONCEUX. THEY CAN'T CREW MOST OF THE TIME.

REMOVE SUPPORT STAFF.

REMOVING A FIRE APPLIANCE FROM THE CITY DOES NOT PROVIDE RESILIENCE FOR LARGER OR MULTIPLE INCIDENTS OR SPATE CONDITIONS, SUCH AS THOSE EXPERIENCED IN THE LAST WEEKS ACROSS THE COUNTRY. REDUCING FIRE COVER WILL INCREASE THE RISK TO MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC AND MEMBERS OF THE EMERGENCY SERVICES ESPECIALLY FIREFIGHTERS. RECENT WEATHER CONDITIONS AND THE DECIMATION OF HOMES AND SERVICES IT HAS CAUSED SHOWS THE RESULTS OF CUT BACKS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR. I WOULD BE WILLING TO PAY A SMALL INCREASE IN MY COUNCIL TAX TO ENSURE THE LEVEL OF FRONT LINE SERVICES IN EAST SUSSEX ARE MAINTAINED.

REMOVING ANY FRONT LINE, APPLIANCES WILL ENDANGER THE PUBLIC. LOOK AT SENIOR MANAGERS BEFORE MAKING CUTS AT THE FRONT END.

REMOVING EITHER APPLIANCE WILL INCREASE ATTENDANCE TIMES ONE WAY OR ANOTHER. TO STAND A CHANCE OF SAVING A LIFE FROM FIRE YOU NEED AN ATTENDANCE WITHIN 4 MINUTES WITH A CREW OF SIX IF ALL ASPECTS OF FIRE SERVICE PROCEDURES ARE TO BE COMPLIED WITH.

REMOVING FIRE APPLIANCES IS VERY SHORT SIGHTED, THERE ARE A LOT OF HIGH RISE BUILDINGS IN BRIGHTON WHICH REQUIRE 4 APPLIANCES AND 1 APPLIANCE, 1 OF THESE CALLS WOULD ALMOST WIPE OUT THE FIRE COVER IN THE CITY. IF YOU REMOVE 1 FIREFIGHTER POST FROM EACH WHOLE TIME WATCHES THIS WOULD PRODUCE THE SAME SAVINGS.

REMOVING ONE APPLIANCE FROM AN EVER INCREASINGLY POPULATED AREA AS BRIGHTON AND HOVE IS ABSOLUTELY LUDICROUS. LESS FIRE ENGINES, LESS FIREFIGHTERS AND FEWER STATIONS MEANS MORE DEATHS!

RESILIENCE WOULD BE LOST AND FIRE APPLIANCES WOULD HAVE TO TRAVEL FURTHER TO GET TO AN INCIDENT AND REDUCE COVER IN THE AREA THEY CAME FROM.

RESPONSE TIMES ARE CRITICAL, NEED TO ABLE TO RESPOND TO MORE THAN ONE INCIDENT AT A TIME. MAKE CUTS IN BACKGROUND SERVICES AND HEAD OFFICES. COMBINE WITH OTHER EMERGENCY SERVICES.

RISK IN CITY IS TOO GREAT. HIGH RISE NEEDS 4 PUMPS TO EVEN START SAFE FIREFIGHTING AND RESCUES. RESILIENCE NEEDS TO BE MAINTAINED WITH 5 PUMPS IN CITY. EAST SUSSEX IS TOO HEAVY WITH PRINCIPLE OFFICERS AND FURTHER CUTS TO SUPPORT STAFFING REQUIRED TO SAVE PUMPS. SPRINKLERS TO CITY BUILDINGS WILL NOT SAVE LIVES, STAFFED FIRE ENGINES THAT CAN GET THERE IN TIME WILL.

SAFETY CAN NEVER BE COMPROMISED.

SAFETY FOR PUBLIC AND FIREFIGHTERS SHOULD BE FIRST PRIORITY, NOT SAVING MONEY! PERSONALLY I KNOW OF QUITE A FEW INCIDENTS WHERE ALL FIVE CITY APPLIANCES HAVE BEEN BUSY. NEWHAVEN AND BRIGHTON FISH MARKET, AT SHOREHAM HARBOUR BEING ONE OF THE MOST RECENT ONES. PLEASE DON'T PRETEND TO US THAT THIS DOESN'T HAPPEN. ALSO, RESOURCES ARE USED UP VERY QUICKLY AT AN INCIDENT AND A SPEEDY AND FULL RESPONSE IS MOST IMPORTANT. WE DON'T REALLY WANT TO BE WAITING FOR RETAINED CREWS TO ATTEND AGES AFTER THE INITIAL CALL. IF IT'S JUST ABOUT SAVING MONEY, THEN MAY I SUGGEST TRIMMING FROM MANAGEMENT FIRST? YOU HAVE FIVE PRINCIPLE OFFICERS ALL ON A SALARY OF OR EXCEEDING £100,000. PLUS SO MANY SUPPORT STAFF AND MANAGERS AT THAT ENORMOUS HQ IN EASTBOURNE. DO WE REALLY NEED A 6 STOREY OFFICE BLOCK FOR SUCH A SMALL SERVICE (24 STATIONS)?

SAVE MONEY THROUGH OTHER METHODS, FOR EXAMPLE BENEFITING FROM ECONOMY OF SCALE GAINED BY COMBINING FORCES WITH OTHER EMERGENCY SERVICE PROVIDERS.

SHARING BACK ROOM FUNCTIONS AND SENIOR MANAGERS WITH SURROUNDING FIRE SERVICES. DOWN SIZE SERVICE HQ. LOOK TO GENERATE INCOME FROM EXTERNAL PROJECTS.

SPARE CAPACITY IS ESSENTIAL WHEN LIVES ARE AT RISK.

STRONG FIRE COVER IN THE CITY IS A NECESSITY.

STRONGLY DISAGREE WITH THE PROPOSAL TO REMOVE A FIRE ENGINE, THEN NEXT QUESTION ASKS WHICH ONE I WOULD RATHER REMOVE WITH NO OPTION TO SAY NEITHER. WHAT A LOAD OF TOSH.

SUGGEST RAISING TAX TO COVER COST OF MAINTAINING CURRENT PROVISION. THE CURRENT FIRE COVER ALLOWS FOR BOTH MAJOR INCIDENTS AND MULTIPLE CALLS OCCURRING IN THE BRIGHTON / HOVE AREA AT THE SAME TIME.

SURELY THEY ARE NEEDED FOR TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS AS WELL AS FIRE IN VARIOUS INCIDENTS, SUCH AS SPILLAGE ETC.

SUSSEX HAS BEEN CUTTING TOO MUCH IN RECENT TIMES FROM PEOPLE AND SERVICES AT THE SHARP END. THE EFRS IS LIKE AN INSURANCE POLICY, YOU HOPE TO NOT USE IT. WAITING FOR EFRS ON A 999 CALL IS LIKE WAITING FOREVER, WHAT DO YOU DO IN RUSH HOUR? PEOPLE DIE IN A VERY SHORT TIME, THESE GUYS AND GIRLS ARE WONDERS AND HEROES. STANDING IN THE ROAD JUMPING UP AND DOWN AND SEEING AN ENGINE IN THE DISTANCE ON THE WRONG SIDE OF THE ROAD WITH BLUES AND TWOS GOING AND PERHAPS SOMEONE IS AT RISK AFTER AN ACCIDENT, YOU SMELL BURNING AND FEEL HEAT COMING FROM SOMEWHERE IN THEIR CAR. YES! REMOVE IGNITION, BUT HAVE YOU? IT MIGHT BLOW AT ANY MINUTE; THEY HAVE THE EXPERIENCE, TOOLS AND MACHINES TO ACT QUICKLY!

TAKING ANY PUMP OUT OF THE CITY, I THINK WOULD BE A BAD DECISION. THE CITY IS A BUSY PLACE AND ARE THESE NUMBERS THAT YOU HAVE AN AVERAGE OR ACTUAL FIGURES?

TAX PAYERS IN BRIGHTON AND HOVE SUBSIDISE SERVICES IN OTHER PARTS OF EAST SUSSEX. THIS IS NOT ACCEPTABLE IF A FIRE STATION IS BEING TAKEN AWAY FROM THE CITY. YOU ARE ASKING TAX PAYERS TO PAY MORE FOR A WORSE SERVICE. THE SALARIES AND ALLOWANCES OF THE PRINCIPAL OFFICERS ARE VERY HIGH - THE CFO IS PAID MORE THAN THE PM! IF THESE SALARIES AREN'T BEING REVIEWED, WHAT ELSE HASN'T BEEN LOOKED AT? WHY IS THE CFO PAID OVER £16K A YEAR TOWARDS A CAR WHEN YOU ARE GOING TO SACK FIREFIGHTERS?

THE CHIEF FIRE OFFICER SHOULD COME UP WITH OTHER PLANS. ISN'T THAT WHAT THE CHIEF FIRE OFFICER GETS PAID TO DO?!

THE CITY HAS MANY HIGH RISE BUILDINGS WHICH REQUIRE AT LEAST 4 APPLIANCES TO BE IN ATTENDANCE BEFORE ACTION CAN BE TAKEN. IF THE CITY IS REDUCED TO 4 APPLIANCES WOULD THE SERVICE BRING IN A STANDBY CREW FROM ANOTHER AREA IF ONE CITY APPLIANCE ATTENDS A ONE PUMP CALL? IF NOT THEN CREWS ATTENDING A HIGH RISE BUILDING FIRE AT THE SOMETIME WOULD HAVE TO WAIT FOR A CREW FROM LEWES OR NEWHAVEN. IF AT NIGHT, THIS COULD BE 30 MINUTES BEFORE THE CREWS COULD AFFECT AN ENTRY.

THE CITY IS EXPANDING RAPIDLY AND THEY WANT TO SLASH THE FIRE COVER, TO ME THIS SOUNDS LUDICROUS. I WOULD GET THE CHIEF TO TELL PARLIAMENT THAT HE CANNOT SAFELY MAKE THESE CUTS AND ACTUALLY STAND UP FOR HIS WORK FORCE AND START EARNING HIS ASTRONOMICAL WAGE INSTEAD OF ASKING THE PUBLIC TO DO IT!

THE FIRE SERVICE IS NOT A FAILING SERVICE UNLIKE THE OTHER EMERGENCY SERVICES, BUT THESE CUTS WILL CHANGE THAT NO MATTER HOW YOU MANIPULATE YOUR FIGURES. MAYBE LOOK AT CUTTING THE HIGHER MANAGEMENT, THIS WOULD SAVE THE MONEY AND NOT AFFECT PUBLIC SAFETY.

THE MAJORITY OF LEVEL 2 / 3 INCIDENTS WITHIN E.SX ORIGINATE IN THE CITY. TO REDUCE THE CITY'S FIRE COVER IS NOT A SENSIBLE OR VIABLE OPTION.

THE NEWSPAPERS SUGGEST THE OFFICERS WITHIN THE SERVICE ARE OVER SUBSCRIBED, WHY NOT START REDUCING THESE PEOPLE BEFORE YOU SACRIFICE FRONT LINE SERVICES?

THE PROPOSAL SAYS THAT TWO OR THREE APPLIANCES ARE ENOUGH TO DEAL WITH MOST SERIOUS FIRES, BUT THE SERVICE POLICY ON HIGH RISE BUILDINGS IS FOR FIVE APPLIANCES AND AN AERIAL. THIS INCREASES TO SIX AND AN AERIAL IN HIGH RISE BUILDINGS WITHOUT AN OPERATIONAL RISING MAIN. GIVEN THE NUMBER OF HIGH RISE BUILDINGS IN THE CITY, THIS STATEMENT APPEARS TO BE MISLEADING AS TO THE LEVEL OF RESOURCES REQUIRED IN THE CITY. THE PROPOSAL SAYS THAT ATTENDANCE STANDARDS WOULD CONTINUE TO BE MET. HOWEVER, THIS STATEMENT IS DEPENDENT ON THE METHOD OF MEASURING 'MEETING THE ATTENDANCE STANDARD'. A FIRST PUMP MAY WELL CONTINUE TO MEET THOSE STANDARDS, BUT A SINGLE PUMP IS INSUFFICIENT RESOURCING FOR ANY PRIMARY FIRE OR RTC. THEREFORE CORRECT INTERVENTION CANNOT BE UNDERTAKEN UNTIL AT VERY LEAST A SECOND PUMP ARRIVES (OBVIOUSLY MORE FOR A HIGH RISE INCIDENT). THE PROPOSAL ALSO SAYS THAT RISKS WOULDN'T BE INCREASED BY THE REMOVAL OF A PUMP. HOWEVER, SENDING INSUFFICIENT RESOURCES TO AN EMERGENCY SITUATION, PARTICULARLY WITH LIFE RISK, WOULD PUT FIREFIGHTERS IN THE UNENVIABLE POSITION OF EITHER WAITING FOR SUFFICIENT RESOURCES TO ARRIVE BEFORE INTERVENING, OR FEELING THEY MUST TAKE ACTION WITHOUT THE CORRECT RESOURCES IN PLACE. THIS IS A DANGEROUS SITUATION. THIS IRMP IS FOCUSED ON CUTTING THE FRONTLINE RESOURCES IN THE SERVICE. THE PUBLIC PAY FOR THIS SERVICE THROUGH THEIR TAXES, AND EXPECT THE FRONTLINE TO BE PROTECTED AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. THERE ARE FOUR PRINCIPLE OFFICERS EARNING VERY LARGE SALARIES (THE CFO EARNS MORE THAN THE PM), IN A SERVICE WITH ONLY 6 WHOLE TIME SHIFT STATIONS. HQ APPEARS TO BE A MUCH LARGE OFFICE SPACE THAN IS NEEDED BY A SMALL SERVICE LIKE EAST SUSSEX. ESPECIALLY WHEN THERE IS SO MUCH UNUSED OFFICE SPACE ON STATIONS THROUGHOUT THE SERVICE. PRESTON CIRCUS HAS A WHOLE UNUSED FLOOR. CONSIDERATION SHOULD ALSO BE GIVEN TO SHARING MORE OFFICE SERVICES WITH OTHER FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICES AND THE COUNCIL. FINALLY, IT'S NOT BEYOND REASON TO THINK THAT THE CFO AND/OR THE FA COULD GO TO WESTMINSTER AND INFORM THEM THAT THE CUTS ARE TOO MUCH, AND BEYOND WHAT CAN BE ACHIEVED SAFELY.

THE REMOVAL OF A FIRE ENGINE SHOULD BE THE ABSOLUTE LAST RESORT WITHIN A FIRE SERVICE, FIRE ENGINES ARE ULTIMATELY WHAT THE PUBLIC NEED AND EXPECT FROM A FIRE SERVICE. THERE ARE MANY COMMUNITY INITIATIVES THAT THE SERVICE ARE INVOLVED IN, WHICH ALTHOUGH ARE VERY WELL MEANING, ULTIMATELY THEY ARE NOT LIFESAVING. LIFESAVING SHOULD BE THE FIRST AND LAST PRIORITY OF THE SERVICE. MANY SAVINGS COULD ALSO BE MADE WITHIN MIDDLE MANAGEMENT; THE NUMBER OF MANAGERS IS HUGELY OUT OF PROPORTION TO THE NUMBER OF ACTUAL OPERATIONAL FIREFIGHTERS. THE SERVICE WILL MAINTAIN THAT THESE MANAGERS ARE OPERATIONAL BUT THE REALITY IS THAT THEY RARELY ATTEND INCIDENTS. THE WAY IN WHICH INCIDENTS ARE RESPONDED TO AND RECORDED HAS LED TO THE SO CALLED 'REDUCTION' IN CALLS. ULTIMATELY THE REDUCTION IN FIRE ENGINES WILL LEAD TO GREATER RISK TO THE PUBLIC AND FIRE CREWS ALIKE.

THE REMOVAL OF CREWS AND FIRE ENGINES IS A RETROGRADE BACKWARD STEP THE ONLY REASON FIRES ARE REDUCING AND FIRE DEATHS ARE LOWER IS BECAUSE WE HAVE THE RIGHT LEVEL OF STAFF NOW. I WOULD LOOK ONTO THE OBVIOUS AND BLATANT FINANCIAL MISS-MANAGEMENT THAT EXISTS IN THE LOCAL FIRE SERVICE.

THE REMOVAL OF LOCAL FIRE STATIONS IS COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE AS IT HAS BEEN PROVEN THAT THE EXTRA FEW MINUTES IT TAKES TO GET FROM A STATION FURTHER AWAY TO A FIRE INCIDENT, ESPECIALLY IN THE HOME, DOES COST LIVES!

THE ROADS IN THE CITY OF BRIGHTON AND HOVE, DO NOT ALLOW SPACE FOR FIRE ENGINES, THEREFORE IT WOULD SEEM IMPORTANT TO PROVIDE FROM VARIOUS AREAS TO SAID FIRE EMERGENCY.

THE SERVICE HIGH RISE POLICY REQUIRES 4. THIS WOULD LEAVE NOTHING LEFT IN THE CITY FOR ANY OTHER CALL, SHOULD IT ARISE. JOIN 'FORCES' WITH KENT, WEST SUSSEX, SURREY, AND SHARE HR, TRAINING, UNIFORM, SENIOR MANAGEMENT. A GREATER SAVING, AND NO REDUCTION IN FRONTLINE SERVICES.

THE STATISTICS STATE THAT REMOVING A FIRE ENGINE FROM EITHER STATION WILL RESULT IN INCREASED DEATHS. THAT IS UNACCEPTABLE. SELL THE HUGE AND UNOCCUPIED HEADQUARTERS IN EASTBOURNE. REDUCE THE HIGH WAGE MANAGERS, STARTING WITH THE PRINCIPLE OFFICERS. SCOTLAND AS A WHOLE IS RUN BY LESS PRINCIPLE OFFICERS, AND THEY ARE PAID LESS THAN OURS. REDUCE THE OFFICER'S EXPENSES CLAIMS, UNNECESSARY COURSES. HOW MANY STATION MANAGERS, WATCH MANAGERS, CREW COMMANDERS OR FIREFIGHTERS NEED NEBOSH QUALIFICATIONS. RUN SHORTER QUALIFICATION COURSES FOR FIREFIGHTERS THAT DO NOT REQUIRE ALL THE INSTRUCTORS TO BE CLAIMING OVER-TIME. STOP ACTING-UP, TO FILL IN THE VOIDS. ANY OF THE CURRENT HQ STATION MANAGERS OR ABOVE SHOULD BE ABLE TO FILL IN ON-STATION ROLLS THAT ARE OPEN DUE TO LONG-TERM SICKNESS, EVEN IF THE ROLL IS A LOWER RANK. RATHER THAN PAYING SOMEONE MORE TO ACT-UP WHEN YOU COULD USE SOMEONE WHO IS ALREADY ON THE HIGHER WAGE AND SHOULD BE QUALIFIED TO COVER THE ROLL.

THERE ARE SOME LARGE PREMISES IN THE CITY WITH THE POTENTIAL FOR A LARGE NUMBER OF FATALITIES IN CASE OF A SERIOUS FIRE. I FEEL THAT AN APPLIANCE SHOULD BE REDUCED IN A MORE RURAL LOCATION OR EVEN THE CLOSURE OF A

RURAL FIRE STATION.

THERE IS NO REDUCED RISK, THE RISK REMAINS THE SAME, AND YOU ARE PROPOSING TO REDUCE CAPABILITY. THIS QUESTION IS LOADED TO GIVE AN ANSWER THAT SUITS YOUR REQUIREMENT.

THIS IS A FALSE BINARY - THE OPTIONS AREN'T JUST 'REMOVE AN ENGINE' OR 'DO NOTHING' - THIS IS MISLEADING THE PUBLIC. YOU COULD CAMPAIGN TO THE GOVERNMENT FOR MORE MONEY JOINTLY WITH THE UNIONS IF YOU WANTED TO, YOU COULD LOOK AT SLASHING EXECUTIVE PAY, YOU COULD EXTEND CONSULTANCY SERVICES E.G. PROVIDING FIRE SAFETY COURSES TO BUSINESSES FOR MONEY ETC.

THIS IS NOT A CONSULTATION. IT IS A HEAVILY LOADED PIECE OF PROPAGANDA AND I HOPE IT WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

THIS IS THE ONLY OPTION PRESENTED TO US. IF 'DOING NOTHING' IS NOT AN OPTION, WHY ARE YOU NOT LOOKING AT OTHER COST-SAVING MEASURES. YOUR QUESTION IS LOADED HEAVILY IN FAVOUR OF AGREEING WITH YOUR PROPOSAL.

THIS SUPPOSES THAT ONLY ONE SERIOUS INCIDENT NEEDING 2-3 TENDERS WOULD OCCUR AT ANY ONE MOMENT. IN THE CASE OF TWO SERIOUS INCIDENTS OR, INDEED, TENDERS BEING CALLED OUT BY OTHER AREAS, COVER FOR THE SECOND INCIDENT WOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE. I WOULD SUGGEST A CULL OF ADMINISTRATIVE OR MANAGEMENT STAFF SHOULD BE CONSIDERED; OR COMBINING THESE BACK-ROOM FUNCTIONS WITH OTHER SERVICES.

TO FIND A WAY TO SAVE THE MONEY WITHOUT REMOVING A FIRE ENGINE.

TO REMOVE ANY APPLIANCE FROM THE FORCE IS TEMPTING PROVIDENCE, THE NEED FOR THE REMOVAL OF ANY FIRE AND RESCUE COVER IS AND WILL BE PROVEN TO BE DANGEROUS AND IRRESPONSIBLE, CEASE PAYING BILLIONS TO FOREIGN AID.

TOO MUCH RISK TO PEOPLE'S LIVES.

USE OF RESERVES, STREAMLINING AND SHARING OF IT, HUMAN RESOURCES, WORKSHOPS, SENIOR MANAGEMENT WITH OTHER FIRE SERVICES. AMALGAMATION WITH OTHER FRS TO ACHIEVE REAL LONG TERM SAVINGS.

USE THE MONEY IN THE EMERGENCY FUND INSTEAD. £8 MILLION I BELIEVE AND MERGE WITH ANOTHER FIRE AUTHORITY TO SAVE ON MANAGEMENT COSTS. IN OTHER WORDS, CUT FROM THE TOP DOWN FIRST, NOT THE BOTTOM UP!

UTILISE RESERVE MONIES. REDUCE BACK ROOM STAFF. CEASE UNNECESSARY BUILDS AND RENOVATIONS. PROTECT FRONTLINE SERVICES. CUT TOP HEAVY MIDDLE AND SENIOR MANAGERS BEFORE FRONTLINE FIREFIGHTERS.

WE NEED TO HAVE ALL THE FIRE ENGINES WE CAN GET IN EVERY PLACE BECAUSE IF THERE IS A BIG INCIDENT AND WE NEEDED LOADS OF FIRE ENGINES FOR IT, THEN WE WOULD HAVE PLENTY OF THEM. IF WE GOT RID OF SOME OF THEM, THEN WE BECOME SHORT ON FIRE ENGINES.

WE WILL PAY THE SAME COUNCIL TAX FOR A LESSER SERVICE.

WHAT ABOUT WHAT MOST LARGE COMPANIES HAVE DONE. EFFICIENCY SAVINGS. LOOK AT EVERY ASPECT OF THE JOB, IS THIS PERSON NEEDED, GIVE PEOPLE MORE TO DO ETC. OFFICE ROLES IN THE COMPANY I WORK FOR HAVE BEEN CUT BY A THIRD YET NOT EFFECTING STORES, DUE TO INVESTMENT IN TECHNOLOGY ETC.

WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THERE ARE MORE THAN 2 FIRES IN THE CITY AT THE SAME TIME, OR A CAR CRASH ETC. WOULD I HAVE TO WAIT FOR OVER 15 MINUTES FOR ANOTHER ENGINE TO SAVE ME FROM NEWHAVEN OR LEWES.

WHEN ONE APPLIANCE ARRIVES AT AN INCIDENT THEY MAY MEET ATTENDANCE TIMES, BUT THE CREW WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO OPERATE SAFELY UNTIL THE ARRIVAL OF ANOTHER APPLIANCE. YOU CAN SAVE MONEY WITH NO REDUCTION IN SAFETY BY CUTTING THE CORPORATE EMPIRE AT HQ. YOU COULD ALSO CUT THE PRINCIPLE OFFICERS WHICH ALSO WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON PUBLIC OR FIREFIGHTERS SAFETY.

WHEN THE PUBLIC DIAL 999, THEY WANT TO SEE A FIRE ENGINE AND FIREFIGHTERS TURN UP. TO SAVE THIS PROFESSIONAL ATTENDANCE, SENIOR MANAGERS SHOULD BE DRASTICALLY REDUCED TO SAVE MONEY AND THUS PROVIDE FINANCES FOR FRONT LINE SERVICES.

WHILST I CAN SEE WHAT YOU ARE TRYING TO PUT ACROSS ABOUT FIRE ENGINES GETTING TO A CALL IN THE RIGHT TIME, YOU HAVE ONLY TALKED ABOUT THAT IN THE SINGULAR, WHAT HAPPENS IF THERE ARE TWO OR MORE FIRES IN BUILDINGS AT THE SAME TIME?? DO YOU NEED AS MANY SENIOR MANAGERS OF CHIEF OFFICER LEVEL AND WOULD THAT PROVIDE A GOOD PORTION OF THE SAVINGS THAT NEED TO BE MADE? I DON'T NEED A SENIOR MANAGER IF MY HOUSE CATCHES ON FIRE BUT I WILL NEED A FIRE ENGINE!

WHY CUT FRONT LINE SERVICE IN A CITY WHICH IS EXPANDING! THIS IS LUDICROUS. THE SERVICE MUST BE THICK WITH A LAYER OF NON-PRODUCTIVE OFFICE BASED STAFF WHO HAVE NO REASON TO BE THERE THEN TO SHUFFLE PAPER. LET'S LOOK AT EVERY ANGLE BEFORE CUTTING FRONT LINE STAFF.

WHY DO YOU FEEL THAT YOU HAVE TO MAKE CUTS FROM FRONTLINE SERVICES. MAKE SAVINGS FROM HIGHER UP THE CHAIN, LESS CUTS TO ACHIEVE THE SAME RESULT.

WHY REMOVE AN APPLIANCE WHEN YOU SHOULD BE LOOKING AT THE PAY BILL FOR 4 PEOPLE IN A FIRE SERVICE THAT ARE ON OVER £600,000 A YEAR AND THAT MONEY IS BEING WASTED ON A CONTROL CENTRE THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN OPENED LAST YEAR AND OTHER DEPARTMENTS THAT ARE WASTING MONEY LEFT RIGHT AND CENTRE.

WITH A GROWING POPULATION IT IS ERRONEOUS TO REDUCE FRONT LINE SERVICES WHICH WILL NEED TO BE REINSTATED IN THE FUTURE TO SAFELY PROVIDE EFFECTIVE FIRE AND RESCUE COVER. SAVINGS CAN BE MADE BY REDUCING THE NUMBER OF MIDDLE MANAGEMENT ROLES AND SUPPORT STAFF ROLES. THE SERVICE SHOULD ALSO LOOK AT GENERATING INCOME BY OFFERING A WIDER RANGE OF COMMERCIAL TRAINING TO PRIVATE BUSINESSES.

WORK TOWARDS A SUSSEX WIDE SERVICE STARTING WITH A SHARED ADMINISTRATION, HR. DEPARTMENT AND PENSION ADMINISTRATION OR EVEN EXPLORE AMALGAMATING THESE WITH ADJACENT AUTHORITIES, BUT KEEPING LOCAL DELIVERY OF FRONTLINE SERVICES INTACT.

YOU ARE ONLY SUGGESTING THAT THE FIRES OCCUR IN PROPERTIES THAT DO NOT REQUIRE INCREASED RESOURCES WHAT ABOUT HIGH RISE FIRE AND RESCUE.

YOU ASKED MY OPINION NOT TO DO YOUR JOB FOR YOU. OF COURSE I WANT THE BEST AND FASTEST FIRE COVER FOR THE CITY.

YOU DO NOT MENTION THE NUMBER OF FIREFIGHTERS ON EACH FIRE ENGINE. IF YOU REMOVE A FIRE ENGINE ARE YOU GOING TO INCREASE THE RIDERS ON THE REMAINING ONES TO ENSURE SAFE SYSTEMS OF WORK? OR IS THE REMOVAL OF A FIRE ENGINE REALLY A JOB LOSS IN DISGUISE?

YOUR CUTS WILL COST LIVES.

Proposal 2a

1. PROPOSAL 2A WOULD SAVE ONLY £56,000 OF THE £1.7 MILLION SAVINGS NEEDED, SO IT IS POINTLESS. 2. IT WOULD THEREFORE NEEDLESSLY RISK ADDITIONAL FATALITIES (FSEC). 3. THE RIDGE RETAINED PUMP PROVIDES INVALUABLE SECOND APPLIANCE TURN OUT IN EASTERN SUSSEX, WHICH CANNOT BE REPLACED (FIGURES 30 AND 31).

1. THE PROPOSAL SAVES ONLY £56,000 OF THE £1.7 MILLION SAVINGS NEEDED. 2. THE RIDGE'S RETAINED APPLIANCE PROVIDES INVALUABLE EXTRA COVER EAST OF HASTINGS. 3. FIGURES 30 AND 31 CONFIRM THIS COVER WOULD BE LOST UNDER THIS PROPOSAL.

2B.

4, THERE WILL BE A SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED RISK TO BOTH THE PUBLIC AND FIREFIGHTERS ALIKE, DESPITE WHAT THE CHIEF FIRE OFFICER TELLS YOU. WE MAY WELL STILL GET ONE FIRE ENGINE ATTENDING TO OUR INCIDENT IN 8 MINUTES WHICH IS FINE IF THE INCIDENT WARRANTS JUST 1 FIRE ENGINE, BUT MORE SERIOUS INCIDENTS REQUIRE FURTHER FIRE ENGINES ATTENDING, THE DELAY IN THESE FIRE ENGINES ATTENDING PUTS MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC AND FIREFIGHTERS AT RISK, FOR INSTANCE FOR AN INCIDENT COMMANDER TO PUT A SAFE SYSTEM OF WORK IN PLACE AT A HOUSE FIRE IT INITIALLY TAKES 2 FIRE ENGINES IN ATTENDANCE BEFORE FIREFIGHTING OR RESCUE ACTIONS CAN COMMENCE. IF THE INCIDENT IS A CONFIRMED FIRE WITH PERSONS REPORTED EAST SUSSEX FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE SEND A PRE-DETERMINED ATTENDANCE OF 3 FIRE ENGINES. IF THIS HAPPENS FOR THE TIME THAT INCIDENT IS RUNNING, YOU ARE LEAVING FIRE COVER VERY SHORT IN THE CITY TO DEAL WITH OTHER INCIDENTS. I AM AWARE THAT WE NEED TO REDUCE OUR COSTS, SO WHY THE HELL IN TIMES OF AUSTERITY ARE EAST SUSSEX FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE CONTINUING TO PRESS FORWARD WITH DUTIES THAT ARE NOT CONSIDERED STATUTORY. SURELY STATUTORY DUTIES AND FRONTLINE COVER MUST TAKE PRECEDENCE ABOVE ALL ELSE. AFTER ALL THAT IS WHAT ME AND THE PUBLIC PAY FOR AND EXPECT.

ACTION SHOULD NOT REDUCE THE RIDGE.

AGAIN WITH THE FALSE BINARY!

AGAIN YOU'RE ONLY PUTTING THE OPTION OF REMOVING FIRE ENGINES AND FIREFIGHTER JOBS. YOU ARE PUTTING THE SAFETY OF THE COMMUNITY AT RISK PLUS THE SAFETY OF YOUR EMPLOYEES, REMEMBER MARLIN FARM - I DO!

AGAIN, CUTS FROM THE FRONT LINE. SURELY SENIOR OFFICERS CAN AFFORD TO BUY THEIR CARS AND ANY COMPANY MILEAGE CAN BE DONE IN POOL CARS.

AGAIN, CUTTING FRONTLINE SERVICES WITH NO MENTION OF CUTTING SENIOR MANAGEMENT POSITIONS. THIS IS JUST NOT VALUE FOR MONEY.

AGAIN, RUSH HOUR AND WEEKENDS? DO ACCIDENTS AND FIRES ONLY HAPPEN 9 TO 5, WHICH PLANET ARE YOU ON?

AGAIN, THE REAL IMPACT HAS NOT BEEN EXPLAINED AND IT APPEARS THAT WE ARE BEING GIVEN THE MINIMUM AMOUNT OF INFORMATION. IF THERE IS MORE THAN ONE FIRE IN BATTLE AND HASTINGS? WHICH TYPE OF STAFF ARE MORE EXPENSIVE? ARE THERE MEMBERS OF STAFF WHO WOULD TAKE VOLUNTARY REDUNDANCY? WHO SAYS IT WOULDN'T INCREASE RISK AND ARE THEY ACCOUNTABLE IF ANY DEATHS OR SERIOUS INJURIES OCCUR DUE TO THE CUTS? ARE THERE TOO MANY STAFF HIGHER UP THAT ARE EXPENSIVE AND CAN BE CUT?

ALL FIRE ENGINES AND CREWS ARE VITAL TO LOCAL AREAS AND COMMUNITIES WHO FEEL SAFER AS A RESULT. LEAVE WELL ALONE - STATIONS, SERVICES AND COMMUNITIES.

ALTHOUGH THE ENGINE AT RIDGE ATTEND A FEW CALLS I DISAGREE THAT ITS REMOVAL WOULD NOT INCREASE RISK, I ALSO FEEL THAT ITS REMOVAL WOULD NOT ACHIEVE ANY SIGNIFICANT SAVINGS, IMPROVING THE WHOLE TIME READINESS OF OTHER STATIONS IS WELCOMED, AND WOULD IMPROVE PUBLIC AND FIREFIGHTER SAFETY, BUT THIS SHOULD NOT BE AT THE EXPENSE OF THE ENGINE BASED AT RIDGE.

ARE YOU REALLY SAYING, IF I LIVE NEXT DOOR TO THE FIRE STATION YOU ARE PROPOSING TO CLOSE THAT THE RISK TO ME DOES NOT INCREASE?

AS A HASTINGS RESIDENT IN THE EAST OF THE TOWN, I CANNOT SUPPORT THE REMOVAL OF A RETAINED FIRE ENGINE FROM THE RIDGE. THIS WOULD POTENTIALLY PUT LIVES AT RISK.

AS BEEN PREVIOUSLY STATED WHEN YOU TRIED TO CLOSE DOWN THE STATION THE ATTENDANCE TIME FROM THAT EDGE OF THE BUILT UP AREA TO THE RURAL LOCATIONS IS THAT MUCH QUICKER. PROBLEMS WILL ALSO INCREASE WHEN THE DECISION TO ROUTE HEAVY TRAFFIC VIA THE RIDGE IN BOTH EAST AND WEST DIRECTIONS TO AVOID THE A 259 BEXHILL ROAD IS COMPLETED.

AS BEFORE, GET RID OF NON-FRONT LINE SERVICES BEFORE TAKING FIRE ENGINES AWAY.

AS I SAID BEFORE.

AS STATED, IN THE PHASE 1 EXPLANATION, THE SHORTFALL COULD BE EASILY MET BY THE 'RESERVE FUND'.

BATTLE ATTEND VERY FEW CALLS PER YEAR, AXE THE RETAINED PUMP AT THE RIDGE, AND RELY ON BATTLE OR BEXHILL TO COVER.

BATTLE FIRE STATION SERVES A VERY WIDE AREA OF REMOTE OUTLYING VILLAGES AND ALSO MAJOR ROADS.

BATTLE FIRE STATION SHOULD NOT BE CLOSED. OTHER SERVICES SHOULD BE RE-EXAMINED.

BATTLE HAS A LARGE AREA TO COVER AND ALREADY PROVIDES A WHOLE TIME ELEMENT OF COVER AT WEEKENDS, UTILISING THIS TO COVER THE RIDGE WOULD FURTHERMORE REDUCE COVER IN BATTLE DUE TO INCREASED RESPONSE INTO HASTINGS.

BATTLE HAS VERY LOW CALL NUMBERS TO ITS STATION GROUND. IT SHOULD BE FULLY RDS; REMOVING FIRE APPLIANCES WOULD REDUCE THE OVERALL FIRE COVER IN THE HASTINGS AREA. THIS WOULD ALSO REDUCE THE AMOUNT OF WHOLE TIME FIREFIGHTER POSTS. REMOVING RDS APPLIANCES SAVES VERY LITTLE MONEY.

BATTLE STATION ALSO SERVES AN AREA TO THE NORTH WHICH COULD NOT EASILY BE SERVED FROM HASTINGS. RETAINED FIREFIGHTERS MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE.

BECAUSE A FIRE APPLIANCE WOULD BE PERMANENTLY LOST. IF IT WAS MOVED AND THE ASSET VALUE OF THE SITE REALISED TO SUPPORT THE MOVE IT MAYBE ACCEPTABLE.

BECAUSE IT REDUCES THE EFFICIENCY OF THE SERVICE.

BETTER OPTION IS TO DOWNGRADE BATTLE TO RDS STATION AS THE RISK PROFILE DOES NOT WARRANT WT CREW.

BODIAM PARISH COUNCIL HAS CONCERNS ABOUT THE RESPONSE TIMES FOR BODIAM.

BUILD A NEW STATION ON THE BEXHILL LINK ROAD. THIS WOULD ALLOW YOU TO CLOSE BOHEMIA ROAD, BEXHILL AND BATTLE. KEEPING THE RIDGE AS A DAY CREWED PLUS TO PROVIDE RESPONSE RESILIENCE TO ORE AND ROTHERHAM.

CAMPAIGN FOR MORE FUNDING.

CLOSE THE RIDGE MAKES BEXHILL DAY CREWED PLUS, MAKE BATTLE RETAINED.

CONCERNED OVER CHANGES TO SHIFTS TO BATTLE - EFFECT ON CREWING AND FAMILY LIFE.

COST!

CUT BACK ON PRINCIPLE OFFICERS, ESFRS HAS MANY AS THE SCOTTISH FIRE SERVICE. REDUCE BOROUGHS AND BOROUGH COMMANDERS FROM 6 TO 3. CARRY OUT A FULL MANAGEMENT RESTRUCTURING; THIS WILL PROTECT THE FRONTLINE SERVICES THAT APPEAR TO BE BEING TARGETED BY SENIOR OFFICERS.

CUT CFO.

DO YOU ACTUALLY NEED TO CHANGE THE SYSTEM AS IT STANDS? SURELY IF BATTLE USED RETAINED AT WEEKENDS IT WAS DUE TO LOW DEMAND? THE RIDGE IS WELL LOCATED FOR HASTINGS, BATTLE AND TOWARDS RYE, SO SHOULD KEEP ITS CURRENT SYSTEM - AS SHOULD BATTLE? IF IT AIN'T BROKE WHY CHANGE IT?

DUE TO THE HIGH LEVEL OF CALLS IN HASTINGS I DO NOT FEEL IT WOULD BE BENEFICIAL TO REMOVE THE RETAINED PUMP FROM THE RIDGE.

DURING THE NIGHT TIME HOURS FIRES TEND TO GO LONGER BEFORE BEING DETECTED MAKING A VERY PROMPT ATTENDANCE EVEN MORE NECESSARY, THE EXTRA TIME TAKEN FOR CREWS TO RESPOND FROM HOME WILL ALLOW THE FIRE TO GAIN A BIGGER HOLD AND LESSEN THE CHANCE OF RESCUE.

EAST AND WEST SUSSEX FIRE SERVICES SHOULD COMBINE ALONG THE LINES OF THE POLICE SERVICE. INTERNAL BUDGETARY DIFFICULTIES OF THE TWO COUNTY COUNCILS AND THE THREAT OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO REMOVE A FURTHER £3 MILLION IN SUPPORT ARE ALL DISAPPOINTING RESPONSES TO A RESTRUCTURING THAT WOULD PROVIDE BETTER VALUE FOR MONEY.

EVEN IF THE RETAINED CREW AT THE RIDGE ONLY GO TO A SMALL NUMBER OF CALLS THE ONES THEY ATTEND ARE NORMALLY SERIOUS INCIDENTS. THE PROPOSALS IN THE LAST SECTION COULD MAKE THE SAVINGS REQUIRED.

EXISTING COVER IS CORRECT.

FIGHT THE CUTS; STOP THE GOVERNMENT DESTROYING OUR PUBLIC SERVICES. CREATE A REGIONAL FIRE SERVICES WHICH WILL GET RID OF MOST OF THE OVERPAID PUBLIC SERVICES EMPLOYEES AT THE TOP, ONE TRAINING CENTRE, ONE TEAM OF HR.

FIRE CREWS ARE A MUST. HOW MUCH LONGER WOULD IT TAKE IF THEY HAD A CALL TO THEIR HOMES. IT'S PUTTING FAMILIES AT RISK.

FIRE CUTS KILL.

FIRSTLY I DO NOT AGREE WITH ANY CUTS TO FRONTLINE EMERGENCY SERVICES. I BELIEVE THAT ALL FIRE APPLIANCES SHOULD BE CREWED 24 HOURS A DAY 7 DAYS A WEEK AND NOT HAVE RETAINED PERSONNEL ON THEM AS THEY CANNOT POSSIBLY KEEP UP THEIR COMPETENCIES. I BELIEVE FIRE STATIONS SHOULD BE MOVED TO LOCATIONS WHERE ALL AREAS WILL RECEIVE THE SAME ATTENDANCE TIMES AND SHOULD BE CREWED 24 HOURS A DAY 7 DAYS A WEEK WITH NO RETAINED.

FULL RETAINED AT BOTH BATTLE AND THE RIDGE.

FURTHER INVESTIGATION AND DATA ANALYSIS WOULD BE REQUIRED BEFORE I COULD OFFER A VALID, INFORMED ALTERNATIVE.

GREAT, MANNED BY RETAINED, WHEN THEY CHANGE JOBS, AND CAN'T COMMIT THE HOURS THE PUMPS GO OFF THE RUN? HASTINGS APPLIANCE IS MORE IMPORTANT.

HASTINGS HAS HIGHER SLEEPING RISK AND LIFE RISK THAN BATTLE. BATTLE COULD BECOME A RETAINED STATION.

HASTINGS IS UNIQUE IN EAST SUSSEX. IT HAS A LARGE DIVERSE AND DEPRIVED POPULATION LIVING IN POOR QUALITY HMO'S AND POOR CONDITIONS. MUCH OF THIS SECTOR OF THE POPULATION IS OUT OF WORK AND OFTEN RELIANT ON DRUGS AND ALCOHOL. (I KNOW THIS; I WORK WITH THEM ON A DAILY BASIS). THIS PUTS THEM VULNERABLE AND AT VERY HIGH RISK. REDUCING FIRE COVER IN HASTINGS IS GAMBLING WITH PEOPLE'S LIVES. WE DO NOT YET KNOW WHAT AFFECT THE HASTINGS BYPASS WILL HAVE ON TRAVEL TIMES OR INCIDENT TYPES AND NUMBERS. ESFRS SHOULD PRIORITISE THOSE MOST VULNERABLE AND NOT WASTE TIME, MONEY PROVIDING SMOKE DETECTORS FOR MIDDLE CLASS HOMES WHO ARE IN A POSITION TO HELP THEMSELVES. HAVE A STRONGER LOOK AT WHAT HAS BEEN PROPOSED AT THE END OF YOUR PROPOSAL AND IMPLEMENT THAT FIRST, THEN LOOK AT OTHER WAYS OF SAVING MONEY BEFORE TOUCHING FRONTLINE SERVICES. IF YOU IMPLEMENT THIS IT WILL COST MORE MONEY, NOT LESS, AND TO SAY THAT BATTLE WILL GET INTO HASTINGS QUICKER IS NOT TRUE, IT WOULD NOT GET TO AREAS LIKE FAIRLIGHT ANY FASTER. THE RDS STAFFS HAVE GIVEN COVER OVER AND ABOVE TO THE TOWN OF HASTINGS.

HAVING HAD A FIRE IN THE BUSINESS PREMISES I RENT IN HASTINGS, I REALISE THE IMPORTANCE OF HAVING TWO FIRE STATIONS IN SERVING HASTINGS AND ST. LEONARD'S.

HIGH PROBABILITY THERE WOULD NOT BE COVER AVAILABLE FOR ROBERTSBRIDGE AND NEIGHBOURING RURAL VILLAGES. HELP WOULD TAKE LONGER IN REACHING US. LOSS OF SPECIALIST EQUIPMENT. OUR LIVES WOULD BE PUT AT INCREASED RISK. REMOVAL OF WHOLE TIME CREW AND APPLIANCE FROM BATTLE WOULD BE DISASTROUS.

HOW CAN IT BE QUICKER TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO HASTINGS FROM BATTLE? IF IT IS SUPPORT TO HASTINGS DRIVING YOUR PROPOSAL YOU NEED TO KEEP THE APPLIANCE IN HASTINGS.

HOW CAN IT POSSIBLY BE CLAIMED THAT THIS OPTION DOES NOT INCREASE RISK. ALTERNATIVE, PREVIOUS SUGGESTION REGARDING MANAGEMENT AND FIRE AUTHORITY MEMBER COSTS.

I AGREE WITH THE BATTLE PART OF IT, BUT NOT THE REMOVAL OF A FIRE ENGINE FROM THE RIDGE, WOULD IT NOT BE EASIER TO REMOVE ONE ENGINE FROM BOHEMIA FIRE STATION WHERE THEY HAVE MORE RATHER THEN ATTACK A SMALL VILLAGE FIRE STATION THAT IS NEEDED. THE TOWN NEEDS MORE THEN ONE FIRE STATION.

I AM OPPOSED TO THE REMOVAL OF THE SECOND PUMP FROM THE RIDGE. WHILE IN MOST CIRCUMSTANCES THERE WOULD NOT BE A PROBLEM, I WOULD BE CONCERNED THAT IF A MAJOR INCIDENT IN HASTINGS COINCIDED WITH AN INCIDENT IN THE VILLAGES TO THE EAST OF HASTINGS THERE COULD BE A SERIOUS PROBLEM. SERVICE REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE FOCUSSED ON HEAD OFFICE STAFF AND NOT FRONT LINE SERVICES.

I BELIEVE 2B IS THE BETTER PROPOSAL.

I BELIEVE THAT THE RIDGE RETAINED FIRE ENGINE PROVIDES IMPORTANT COVER FOR THE TOWN. ALSO, I FEEL IT IS BETTER TO MAKE BATTLE A RETAINED STATION AS THAT WAY YOU STILL KEEP THE SAME NUMBER OF APPLIANCES, BUT BATTLE WOULD BE CREWED BY RETAINED FIREFIGHTERS. FURTHERMORE HASTINGS IS A BIGGER AREA WITH MORE RISKS SO IT'S BETTER TO HAVE THE RIDGE FIRE ENGINE AS IT'S CLOSER.

I BELIEVE THIS PROPOSAL WAS ALREADY DISCUSSED IN THE LAST YEAR OR TWO, AND WAS STOPPED DUE TO THE PUBLIC RESPONSE. REDUCING CALL TIMES IN ONE AREA TO INCREASE IN ANOTHER IS NOT A SAFE OPTION. IF I LIVED IN THE AREA THAT WAS HAVING MY FIRE COVERED REDUCED WHILE ANOTHER IS ALLEGEDLY IMPROVED, I WOULD EXPECT TO SEE MY COUNCIL TAX REDUCED, NOT INCREASED.

I DISAGREE. WHOLE TIME FIREFIGHTERS NEED A BREAK AND WEEKENDS ARE THE ONLY TIME EXCEPT HOLIDAYS BOOKED. RETAINED FIREFIGHTERS SHOULD DO THE WEEKENDS.

I DO NOT KNOW THE SAID AREA BUT FEEL WITH THE TRAFFIC VOLUMES EVER INCREASING THROUGHOUT THE UK, THE FIRE STATION SHOULD BE MANNED AT ALL TIMES BY FIREFIGHTERS. THIS WILL MEAN QUICKER ATTENDANCE TO SITUATIONS THAT ARISE, WHICH MEANS LESS DAMAGE TO PROPERTY ETC., SO SAVING MONEY ON INSURANCE, WHICH IN TURN BRINGS DOWN THE COST OF LIVING SO MORE PEOPLE CAN AFFORD HIGHER COUNCIL TAX WHICH WILL PAY FOR THE STATION TO BE MANNED 24/7. OTHER COURSE OF ACTION INCLUDES GETTING RID OF MORE MANAGERS OR GIVING THEM A PAY FREEZE AND MAKING SURE MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ARE AT HAND TO PREVENT WORKERS TAKING TIME OFF DUE TO STRESS.

I DON'T BELIEVE REMOVING THE THIRD FIRE ENGINE FROM HASTINGS IS THE RIGHT OPTION AND THE SAVING IS MINIMAL.

I DON'T SEE HOW REMOVING A FIRE ENGINE FROM ANY STATION DOES NOT POSE A RISK. AGAIN, ASK CENTRAL GOVERNMENT FOR MORE FUNDING.

I FUNDAMENTALLY OPPOSE ANY OPTION THAT PITCHES ONE STATION GROUNDS NEEDS AGAINST ANOTHER. THOUGH I AGREE WITH INCREASE OF ESTABLISHMENT FOR BATTLE, I FEEL THAT IT IS LUDICROUS TO BALANCE THIS AGAINST ANOTHER STATION. WHY DO IT THIS WAY. THIS SEEMS LIKE SOMEONE IS PLAYING GAMES.

I OBJECT TO THE PREMISE THAT DISAGREEING IMPLIES DOING NOTHING. I SEE NO DISCUSSION ABOUT REDUCING BACK OFFICE FUNCTIONS, DOWNSIZING MANAGEMENT OR SHARING SERVICES BETWEEN FORCES HERE.

I THINK THAT PROPOSAL 3, IS THE BEST WAY OF GOING FORWARD, MAYBE NONE CORE RESPONSIBILITIES SHOULD BE CUT, SOME OF THE SMALLER PUBLIC LIBRARIES.

I WOULD CUT THE NUMBER OF 'TOP HEAVY' MANAGERS IN THE FIRE SERVICE, AND AT THE COUNCIL. THEY ARE NOT THE ONES RISKING THEIR LIVES TO HELP OTHERS, BUT THEY ARE WILLING TO RISK OTHER PEOPLE'S LIVES TO SAVE THEIR OWN PAY CHECK!

I WOULD DO NOTHING (GOVERNMENT WANT IT ALL THEIR OWN WAY, WITH OUR MONEY, NOT IMMIGRANTS MONEY. OUR PENSIONERS WHO HAVE LOST LOVED ONES FOR THIS GOD FORSAKEN HELL THE GOVERNMENT IS LEADING US INTO).

I WOULD REMOVE A FIRE ENGINE FROM WHERE IT IS LEAST MISS INSTEAD OF TAKING FIREFIGHTERS AWAY FROM THEIR JOBS.

IF BATTLE RECEIVES A LOW NUMBER OF CALLS NOW, WHAT'S THE POINT IN MAKING IT FULLY WHOLE TIME? SOME RETAINED STATIONS IN SUSSEX RECEIVE MORE CALL OUTS THAN BATTLE. I WOULD SAY TURN BATTLE FULLY RETAINED AND FOCUS YOUR MONEY ELSE WHERE.

IF SCOTLAND CAN RUN WITH AS MANY PRINCIPLE OFFICERS AS ESFRS, YOU COULD CUT BACK AND PREVENT LOSING FRONTLINE FIRE APPLIANCES.

IF THEY DO NOT CREW 24/7 BY WHOLE TIME FIREFIGHTERS THEN SURELY IT MAKES SENSE TO PLACE THE STATION AS RETAINED, AS THEY COVER MOST OF THE TIME NOW.

IF YOU ARE DOING THAT PROPOSAL YOU ARE SAVING £14,000 POUNDS FOR THE YEAR, IF YOU REMOVE THE DAY CREWED STATION IN BATTLE AND MAKE IT RDS FULLY, YOU WILL SAVE £200,000 A YEAR, DO NOT MAKE DECISIONS FOR POLITICAL REASONS, DO WHAT IS RIGHT FOR EAST SUSSEX.

IF YOU ARE SERIOUS ABOUT CONSULTATION IT MAKES NO SENSE TO CENSOR THE RESPONSES. THIS COUNTRY AND THIS COUNTY ARE BOTH RICH. GET MORE MONEY INTO THE FIRE SERVICE.

IF YOU REMOVE THE RIDGE IT WILL PUT LIVES AT RISK, IT MAY ONLY BE 10 MINUTES TO GET A FIRE ENGINE TO THE RIDGE, BUT THIS COULD BE THE DIFFERENCE TO THE LIVES OF MANY.

IF YOU THINK HASTINGS IS SOME WAY AWAY FROM BATTLE TO START WITH.

INCIDENTS IN THE NORTHERN PARTS OF HASTINGS ARE DIFFICULT TO GET TO. WOULD PREFER THAT A RETAINED SERVICE KEPT AT THE RIDGE. WHAT EFFECT WOULD MAKING BATTLE A RETAINED STATION HAVE?

IT IS DISASTROUS TO REMOVE ANY FIRE ENGINES FROM ANY AREA, LOOK AT YOUR FINANCIAL MISS-MANAGEMENT.

IT SHOULD BE FULLY STAFFED AT ALL TIMES TO ALLOW A QUICK RESPONSE TO RURAL AREAS.

KEEP EAST SUSSEX A SEPARATE FIRE SERVICE. KEEP EASTBOURNE FIRE STATION OPEN AND ALL ITS FIRE ENGINES, I LIVE IN EASTBOURNE. KEEP 24 HOURS FIRE SERVICES IN EAST SUSSEX.

KEEP THE FIRE STATIONS SERVICED AS THEY ARE. THEY DON'T JUST FIGHT FIRES BUT PROVIDE VALUABLE EDUCATION RESOURCES.

KEEPING A PRESENCE AT THE RIDGE, ORE WILL HELP SPREAD RESOURCES RATHER THAN CONCENTRATE THEM. ORE PROVIDES GOOD DEMOGRAPHICS TO RESPOND / BACK UP TO RYE AND HASTINGS.

LESS SENIOR MANAGERS, LESS NON-UNIFORM STAFF. GET RID OF A MASSIVELY OVERSIZED HQ, ONLY OBTAINED TO INCREASE EGOS.

LIKEWISE, THE ROAD SITUATION IN HASTINGS AS WE ALL KNOW LEAVES A LOT TO BE DESIRED. TRAFFIC JAMS DO NOT ALLOW FOR EMERGENCIES.

LIVES WOULD BE LOST, AND ATTENDANCE TO FIRES WOULD TAKE LONGER!

LOOK FOR SAVINGS IN TOP MANAGEMENT. STOP SENIOR CAR AND CALL ALLOWANCES. REDUCE NUMBER OF MIDDLE MANAGERS. USE RESERVES. STOP NEW BUILDS AND RENOVATIONS. SELL YOUR HEADQUARTERS.

MAKE CUTS FROM THE HIGHLY PAID (EXPENSIVE PENSIONS) SENIOR FIRE OFFICERS ROLES. I DO NOT SEE HOW A FASTER RESPONSE CAN BE MADE INTO HASTINGS FROM BATTLE RATHER THAN HAVING A PUMPING APPLIANCE AVAILABLE IN HASTINGS!

MAKE THE CUTS ELSEWHERE. I PAY COUNCIL TAX FOR FIRE STATIONS, FIRE ENGINES AND FIREFIGHTERS, NOT SO SENIOR OFFICERS CAN EARN OUTRAGEOUS SALARIES WHILST CONTRIBUTING LITTLE TO PUBLIC SAFETY.

MAKING CUTS TO THESE SERVICES IS TO PUT PEOPLE'S LIVES AT RISK. I KNOW THIS AS MY HOUSE IS STILL STANDING DUE TO THE EXCELLENT SERVICE.

MORE MONEY WOULD BE SAVED BY NOT PUTTING BATTLE CREWED 7 DAYS A WEEK AS THEY HAVE A LOW NUMBER OF CALLS, IF THEY DIDN'T HAVE THE TRU AND LINE RESCUE, THEY WOULD ONLY HAVE THE SAME AMOUNT OF CALLS AS A RETAINED STATION, KEEPING THE RETAINED PUMP IN HASTINGS MAKES MORE SENSE AS A NUMBER OF BATTLES CALLS ARE INTO HASTINGS ANYWAY.

MOVE TO RESTRUCTURE FROM 6 BOROUGHS TO 3. THIS WILL GIVE HUGE SAVINGS ON LESS BOROUGH COMMANDERS. WHY HAS THIS NOT BEEN DONE FIRST BEFORE FRONTLINE CUTS?

NEED ALL FIRE ENGINES IN THIS AREA.

NEEDS TO BE MANNED AS MANY HOURS AS POSSIBLE, IT COVERS RURAL AREAS WHICH WOULD BE AT REAL DANGER OTHERWISE.

NO CUTS TO ENGINES OR FIREFIGHTERS.

NO EMERGENCY SERVICE SHOULD BE CUT IN TIMES OF AUSTERITY WE SHOULD JUST RUN CORE STATUTORY BUSINESS AND CUT OTHER PARTS OF THE ORGANISATION RATHER THAN CUTTING FRONTLINE EMERGENCY SERVICES.

NOT REMOVE RIDGE FIRE ENGINE.

NUMBER OF APPLIANCES COVERING THE TOWN OF BATTLE IS THE CORRECT FIRE COVER BASED ON THE EVIDENCE PROVIDED. ON CALL FIREFIGHTERS HAVE NO OBLIGATION TO ATTEND, MOST SERIOUS PROPERTY FIRES OCCUR IN THE EARLY HOURS, YOU ARE BUILDING A DELAY IN TURNOUT INTO THE RESPONSE TIME. I WOULD AGAIN SUGGEST RECONSIDERING YOUR SUPPORT FUNCTIONS AND IF NECESSARY FALL BACK TO CORE RESPONSIBILITIES. IF THIS IS STILL NOT SUSTAINABLE THEN AN INCREASE IN COUNCIL TAX SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED, NOT CUTS!

ONCE AGAIN, INCREASED RISK!

PEOPLE'S LIVES AND SAFETY HAVE TO BE OUR MOST IMPORTANT OBLIGATION. I HAVE MODERATELY DISAGREED BECAUSE (A) I AM NOT COMFORTABLE WITH THE RISK INVOLVED AND (B) I DON'T KNOW ENOUGH ABOUT THE LOCAL AREA TO BE DECISIVE IN MY RESPONSE.

PREFER OPTION 2B.

PROTECT THE FRONTLINE! DOWN SIZE ESFRS HQ BUILDING AND MERGE DEPARTMENTS WITH OTHER COUNCIL RESOURCES! HR., PAY ROLE ETC.

PROVIDED THERE IS NO REDUCTION IN COVER PROVIDED FROM THE RIDGE HASTINGS, BOTH RETAINED AND WHOLE TIME CREW MEMBERS ARE ESSENTIAL TO GIVE THAT PART OF THE BOROUGH AND THE RURAL AREAS ON THE EASTERN SIDE OF THE COUNTY.

REDUCE MANAGEMENT COSTS.

REDUCE MANAGEMENT; ESFRS HAS ONE OF THE WORST OFFICERS TO FIREFIGHTER RATIOS. SEE KEN KNIGHTS REPORT ON THIS PLEASE.

REDUCE THE NUMBER OF PRINCIPAL OFFICERS ON EXTORTIONATE SALARIES.

REDUCING COVER AT BATTLE INCREASES RISKS IN RURAL COMMUNITIES. PROVIDE COVER FOR HASTINGS FROM ELSEWHERE.

REDUCING THE NUMBER OF MACHINES AND CREW IS PUTTING LIVES AT RISK HOWEVER, YOU DRESS IT UP.

REMOVAL OF ANY APPLIANCE INCREASES RISK TO LIFE.

REMOVAL OF FIREFIGHTERS AT THE RIDGE WILL PUT OUTLYING VILLAGES SUCH AS PETT AT HIGH RISK. THERE IS NO DIRECT ROUTE FROM BATTLE TO PETT, THEREFORE THEY WOULD BE SOLELY RELIANT ON THE HASTINGS TOWN SERVICE.

REMOVAL OF THE APPLIANCE IN HASTINGS WILL REMOVE RESILIENCE AND QUICK BACK TO CREWS IN HASTINGS WHEN THEY ATTEND THE MOST SERIOUS INCIDENTS. IT WILL ALSO PUT THE PUBLIC AND FIREFIGHTERS AT GREATER RISK.

REMOVAL OF THE RIDGE FIRE STATION WOULD LEAVE RESIDENTS IN THAT PART OF HASTINGS HAVING TO WAIT MUCH LONGER FOR THE FIRE BRIGADE TO ATTEND A FIRE. EVERY SECOND COUNTS IN A FIRE INCIDENT AND THE EXTRA TIME IT WILL TAKE A FIRE ENGINE TO GET TO THAT PART OF HASTINGS WILL, INEVITABLY, RESULT IN DEATHS.

REMOVE FULL-TIME FIREFIGHTERS AND MAKE FULLY RETAINED.

REMOVE SUPPORT STAFF.

REMOVING THE APPLIANCE WILL REDUCE CAPABILITY, NOT REDUCE THE RISK.

REMOVING THE RETAINED FIRE ENGINE FROM THE RIDGE WOULD NOT INCREASE RISK. DO ANY OF YOU ACTUALLY LISTEN TO WHAT YOU ARE PROPOSING?! HOW CAN REMOVING ANY SAFETY DEVICE OR SERVICE NOT INCREASE RISK?! BESIDES, IT WOULD BE INTERESTING TO KNOW HOW MANY COUNCILLORS VOTING ON THIS ARE FROM BATTLE (WHO WILL GAIN) AND HOW MANY ARE FROM HASTINGS (WHO WILL LOSE OUT).

REMOVING THE RIDGE'S RETAINED PUMP IS A MINIMAL SAVING.

RETAINED COVER AT NIGHTS DOES NOT GIVE YOU A QUICKER SUPPORT AT ANY TIME.

RETAINED CREWS ARE A FUNDAMENTAL PART OF THE FIRE SERVICE WHO ARE MORE COMMITTED THAN WHOLE TIME CREW. THEY DO A NORMAL JOB AND THEN MAKE THEMSELVES AVAILABLE FOR UNSOCIABLE HOURS IN THE EVENING, THUS HAVING MORE COMMITMENT TO THE JOB.

RETAINED PUMP AT THE RIDGE IS VERY CHEAP. YOU NEED TO HAVE A WEIGHT OF RESPONSE.

RETAINED STAFF COST A FRACTION OF THEIR WHOLE TIME COLLEAGUES.

RISING COUNCIL RATES AND POORER SERVICES!

SAME ANSWER AS LAST QUESTION!

SAVE MONEY BY RESTRUCTURING SENIOR MANAGEMENT.

SAVE MONEY ELSEWHERE AND IF ANY LIVES ARE TO BE PUT AT RISK.

SEE PREVIOUS RESPONSE.

SERIOUS FIRES OFTEN HAPPEN AT NIGHT.

SURELY GOING DOWN THE ROUTE OF OTHER FIRE SERVICES WOULD BE MORE BENEFICIAL.

THE COMMUNITY OF BATTLE AND THE RIDGE DESERVE THE BEST AND FASTEST FIRE COVER AND BY REMOVING APPLIANCES WILL REDUCE THIS AND PUT LIVES AT RISK.

THE CURRENT STAFFING AT BATTLE SEEMS TO BE MUCH MORE SENSIBLE AS TO HAVE ONLY RETAINED FIREFIGHTERS ON DUTY AT ANY TIME SEEMS VERY RISKY.

THE FIRST CREW TO ATTEND AN INCIDENT MUST WAIT FOR THE SECOND TO PROVIDE SAFE SYSTEMS OF WORK.

THE NEEDS OF HASTINGS TOWN ARE HIGH, HOUSES OF MULTIPLE OCCUPANCY AND STUDENT ACCOMMODATION. ADOPT PROPOSAL 2B.

THE PROPOSAL SAYS THAT REMOVING THE RETAINED APPLIANCE FROM THE RIDGE WOULD NOT INCREASE THE RISK. THIS STATEMENT IS INCORRECT. DEALING WITH EMERGENCY INCIDENTS ISN'T JUST ABOUT ARRIVING AT THE INCIDENT, BUT ARRIVING AT THE INCIDENT WITH SUFFICIENT RESOURCES TO MAKE A RAPID INTERVENTION. REMOVING THE RETAINED PUMP WOULD MEAN THAT THE CREW FROM THE RIDGE WOULD HAVE TO WAIT LONGER FOR A SECOND PUMP. I MADE SUGGESTIONS FOR MAKING FINANCIAL SAVINGS IN THE LAST TEXT BOX.

THE RIDGE COVERS A LARGE AREA OUTSIDE OF HASTINGS GOING OUT TO ICKLESHAM AND THE SURROUNDING VILLAGES, IT WILL TAKE LONGER FOR AN ENGINE FROM BATTLE TO ATTEND.

THE RIDGE FIRE STATION IS NEXT TO A LOCAL SCHOOL AND RESIDENTIAL AREAS AND WE HAVE SEEN RECENTLY HOW HAVING A STATION CLOSE BY LIMITS THE RISK OF FATALITIES! I WILL CONTINUE TO STRONGLY OPPOSE ANY CUTS TO MY LOCAL FIRE STATION AT THE RIDGE AS I LIVE JUST AROUND THE CORNER!

THE RIDGE IS A VERY BUSY ROAD AND A COUPLE OF YEARS AGO I LOST MY COUSIN ON THAT ROAD. DRIVERS SHOULD GIVE WAY IF THERE IS AN EMERGENCY.

THE ROADS AROUND BATTLE ARE GRIDLOCKED AND IT WOULD MEAN A DELAY WHEREAS KEEPING AN ENGINE AT THE RIDGE WOULD BE SAFER FOR HASTINGS. MAKE BATTLE RETAINED ONLY.

THE STATION IS NOT BUSY ENOUGH TO WARRANT HAVING WHOLE TIME PERSONNEL. IT SHOULD BE DOWNGRADED TO AN RDS STATION.

THE SYSTEM WORKS AS IT IS AND PROVIDES SAFETY MEASURES THAT ARE PROVEN TO BE NEEDED, AGAIN FINANCE OUR OWN NEEDS THAT FOREIGN BLACK HOLES.

THERE MUST BE OTHER WAYS TO SAVE MONEY THAN CUTTING FRONT LINE SERVICES.

THESE ARE SUBJECTS THAT THE CHIEF FIRE OFFICER SHOULD BE WORKING TO AND GIVING OTHER OPTIONS!

THESE OPTIONS SEEM TO BE GEARED MORE TO BATTLE GIVING HASTINGS SUPPORT THAN TO THE NEEDS OF THE BATTLE AREA. HAVE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE BATTLE PERSONNEL AS THEY HAVE KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE OF THE RURAL SITUATION RATHER THAN WORKING WITH STATISTICS OVERALL.

THINKING ABOUT THE OLD HASTINGS PIER WOULD CONCERN ME.

THIS SEEMS TO BE MORE ABOUT BATTLE GIVING SUPPORT TO HASTINGS. THE RURAL AREA BATTLE COVERS COULD BE COMPROMISED. NEEDS LOOKING AT AGAIN.

THIS WOULD LEAD TO INCREASE IN RESPONSE TIMES.

TO APPOINT FURTHER DAY CREW SEEMS A MORE EXPENSIVE OPTION THAN THE CURRENT RDS CREW.

TRAFFIC ON THE RIDGE CAN BE VERY CONGESTED SO RESPONSE TIMES ARE BOUND TO INCREASE AT BUSY TIMES, SO COUNTY COUNCIL MUST FIND OTHER WAYS TO SAVE.

TRIM HQ MANAGERS ETC., NOT FRONTLINE STAFF.

VERY STRONG COMMUNITY SUPPORT DEMONSTRATED BY PEOPLE IN HASTINGS AGAINST CLOSURE OF THE RIDGE FIRE STATION. SHOULD RESPECT OPINION OF THOSE COUNCIL TAX PAYERS!

WE SHOULD NOT BE DROPPING RURAL FIRE COVER.

WHICH WAS COMBINING WITH OTHER BRIGADES TO SHARE RESOURCES.

WHOLE TIME FIREFIGHTERS DAYTIME AT WEEKENDS BUT RETAINED FIREFIGHTERS OUT IF THOSE HOURS. THESE SHOULD BE COVERED BY FULL-TIME CREW ON SITE. THIS WOULD HAVE A CREW READY FOR A CALL INSTEAD OF WAITING FOR A RETAINED CREW.

WHY ARE FRONT LINE SERVICES BEING ATTACKED?

WHY UPGRADE WHEN THE STATIONS ACTIVITY IS LOW.

WOULD PUT AT RISK THOSE PROPERTIES TO THE 'NORTH' OF BATTLE, BECAUSE OF EXTRA TIME DELAY IN BEING ABLE TO ATTEND THE SCENE.

WOULD QUERY WHETHER RETAINED MEN COULD REACH FIRE GROUND AS QUICKLY. I DON'T THINK SO. TRIM UPPER MANAGEMENT.

YOU ARE ASKING PEOPLE TO SAY THAT THEIR FIRE COVER IN BATTLE IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN THOSE IN HASTINGS. CAN YOU NOT SHARE A HEADQUARTERS BUILDING WITH THE POLICE OR AMBULANCE SERVICE OR SELL THE CURRENT HEADQUARTERS AND GET SOMETHING SMALLER?

YOU ARE TAKING COVER FROM BATTLE TO COVER HASTINGS PUTTING PEOPLE AT BATTLE AT RISK.

YOU CANNOT SAY 'IT WILL NOT INCREASE THE RISK' AS THE ATTENDANCE TIME WILL INCREASE. WHY NOT CLOSE HEADQUARTERS AND RELOCATE THOSE WORKERS IN FIRE STATIONS? I AM SURE THERE IS ROOM IF YOU EMPLOY CREATIVE THINKING.

YOU SAY IT WILL IMPROVE THE SERVICE, THIS IS ABSOLUTE NONSENSE, AND OF COURSE IT WILL PUT THE PUBLIC AND FIREFIGHTERS LIVES AT RISK. GET YOUR CHIEF TO STAND UP TO CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND FIGHT FOR HIS SERVICE.

YOU STILL WON'T SAY WHAT THE OTHER OPTIONS ARE. THERE MUST BE SOME.

Proposal 2b

2A IS INCORRECT AS A CREW IS AVAILABLE AT BATTLE AT WEEKENDS EITHER TOTALLY OR PARTLY. AN OPTION WOULD BE TO SUPPLEMENT BATTLE CREW ON WEEKENDS WHERE ONLY A PARTIAL CREW IS AVAILABLE WITH RETAINED PERSONNEL ON A DAYS MONEY, THUS NEGATING THE NEED TO FULLY EMPLOY FURTHER FIREFIGHTERS AND ALSO ENSURING IMMEDIATE TURNOUT 7 DAYS A WEEK. THIS OPTION COULD BE EMPLOYED AT OTHER DAY CREWED STATIONS THUS MAKING A SAVING ON THESE STATIONS AS WELL.

2B WOULD BE BETTER BECAUSE IT OFFERS REAL ECONOMIC SAVINGS, AND OFFER THE PUBLIC AS GOOD SERVICE AS 2A.

4, THERE WILL BE A SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED RISK TO BOTH THE PUBLIC AND FIREFIGHTERS ALIKE, DESPITE WHAT THE CHIEF FIRE OFFICER TELLS YOU. WE MAY WELL STILL GET ONE FIRE ENGINE ATTENDING TO OUR INCIDENT IN 8 MINUTES WHICH IS FINE IF THE INCIDENT WARRANTS JUST 1 FIRE ENGINE, BUT MORE SERIOUS INCIDENTS REQUIRE FURTHER FIRE ENGINES ATTENDING, THE DELAY IN THESE FIRE ENGINES ATTENDING PUTS MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC AND FIREFIGHTERS AT RISK, FOR INSTANCE FOR AN INCIDENT COMMANDER TO PUT A SAFE SYSTEM OF WORK IN PLACE AT A HOUSE FIRE IT INITIALLY TAKES 2 FIRE ENGINES IN ATTENDANCE BEFORE FIREFIGHTING OR RESCUE ACTIONS CAN COMMENCE. IF THE INCIDENT IS A CONFIRMED FIRE WITH PERSONS REPORTED EAST SUSSEX FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE SEND A PRE-DETERMINED ATTENDANCE OF 3 FIRE ENGINES. IF THIS HAPPENS FOR THE TIME THAT INCIDENT IS RUNNING, YOU ARE LEAVING FIRE COVER VERY SHORT IN THE CITY TO DEAL WITH OTHER INCIDENTS. I AM AWARE THAT WE NEED TO REDUCE OUR COSTS, SO WHY THE HELL IN TIMES OF AUSTERITY ARE EAST SUSSEX FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE CONTINUING TO PRESS FORWARD WITH DUTIES THAT ARE NOT CONSIDERED STATUTORY. SURELY STATUTORY DUTIES AND FRONTLINE COVER MUST TAKE PRECEDENCE ABOVE ALL ELSE. AFTER ALL THAT IS WHAT ME AND THE PUBLIC PAY FOR AND EXPECT.

AGAIN, THE IMPLICATION IN YOUR QUESTIONNAIRE IS OFFENSIVE. YOU HAVE SELECTED A NUMBER OF CUTS IN FRONTLINE SERVICES. I WOULD LIKE TO SEE OPTIONS IN MANAGEMENT AND BACK OFFICE FUNCTIONS.

ANY CLOSURE OR REMOVING WHOLE TIME COVER IS DOWNGRADING THE SERVICE, AND THE RESULT IS ALWAYS WORSE PERFORMANCE. YOU CAN MASSAGE THE FIGURES AND CHANGE YOUR TARGETS AS MUCH AS YOU LIKE, BUT IT IS STILL A LESSER FIRE SERVICE.

ANY REDUCTION IN OPERATIONAL CREWS IS INCREASING RISK TO THE AREAS. I HAVE SAID 2A IS PREFERABLE PURELY BECAUSE I BELIEVE THAT THERE SHOULD BE LESS RELIANCE ON CREWS WITH WHICH THERE IS NO GUARANTEE THEY WILL BE AVAILABLE WHEN THEY ARE NEEDED. THE MORE CREWS WHICH ARE AVAILABLE IMMEDIATELY THE BETTER. THERE IS HUGE EVIDENCE THAT THE QUICKER THE RESPONSE TO AN EMERGENCY, FIRE, ROAD ACCIDENT OR ANY EMERGENCY, THE BETTER THE OUTCOME FOR ALL INVOLVED, WHICH IS ULTIMATELY WHY WE PAY OUR TAXES.

AS BATTLE IS A RELATIVELY QUIET STATION MAKE IT WHOLLY RETAINED WOULD BE AN OPTION.

AS BATTLE IS AN HISTORIC TOWN WITH MANY VERY OLD BUILDINGS, INCLUDING THE CASTLE. THAT IS WHY, IN MY OPINION BATTLE SHOULD BE A RETAINED STATION.

AS BATTLE, IT IS A TECHNICAL RESCUE STATION, ANY REDUCTION IN WORKING TIMES WOULD IMPACT UPON THE STANDARD OF THEIR TRAINING, POTENTIALLY RESULTING IN DANGEROUS WORKING PRACTICES AND PUTTING FIREFIGHTERS AND THE PUBLIC AT RISK.

AS BEFORE, LET'S LOOK AT NON-PRODUCTIVE NON-EMERGENCY STAFF, LET'S LOOK AT THE OVERPAID OFFICERS WHO HAVE SEEMED TO NOT BEEN EFFECTED BY THESE CUTS.

AS BEFORE.

*** PREVIOUS RESPONSE REPEATED 1 TIME ***

AS I SAID BEFORE.

AS PER PREVIOUS 2 ANSWERS.

AS PER PREVIOUS 2 ANSWERS. MANY SIMPLE SAVINGS THAT ARE NOT FRONTLINE EXIST THAT HAVE NOT EVEN BEEN CONSIDERED OR PRESENTED TO THE FIRE AUTHORITY MEMBERS.

AS PER PREVIOUS ANSWERS. GET SAVINGS FROM OTHER DEPARTMENTS NOT BY CUTTING FIRE COVER.

ASK FOR MORE GOVERNMENT FUNDING.

BATTLE ALREADY STRUGGLES TO PROVIDE COVER UTILISING ITS RETAINED CREWS SO THIS WOULD PUT MORE TIMES WHEN NO COVER IN BATTLE WOULD BE AVAILABLE, THE SPECIALIST APPLIANCES AT BATTLE WOULD NO LONGER GIVE SUPPORT.

BATTLE COVERS A LARGE AREA OF EAST SUSSEX WHERE THE FIRE AND RESCUE COVER WOULD BE GREATLY LOWERED BY TAKING AWAY IMMEDIATE COVER BY A WHOLE TIME CREW.

BATTLE HAS THE TECHNICAL RESCUE UNIT (ONE OF ONLY TWO IN ESFRS), A ROPE RESCUE UNIT (BOTH OF THESE ARE MANNED BY A SPECIALLY TRAINED TEAM), PROVIDES VITAL BACK UP AND COVER TO HASTINGS AND ALL OVER THE COUNTY, THEY ARE CLOSE TO THE A21 WHICH FREQUENTLY SEES VERY SERIOUS ACCIDENTS WHICH BATTLE ARE OFTEN FIRST ON THE SCENE TOO. IF BATTLE IS DOWNGRADED, THIS WILL COST LIVES.

BATTLE IS A VERY BUSY STATION AND ANY REDUCTION IN SERVICES WOULD BE DANGEROUS.

BATTLE IS AN IMPORTANT STATION AS IT COVERS AREAS OF ROTHER TO THE NORTH AND EAST OF BATTLE. HAVING JUST A RETAINED STATION WOULD PUT MANY MORE LIVES AT RISK DUE TO INCREASE TIME FOR ENGINES TO GET TO THE AREA FROM HASTINGS IF THERE WERE A MAJOR INCIDENT. THE NORTH EASTERN AREA OF ROTHER IS POORLY SERVED WITH SO MANY SERVICES - THE FIRE SERVICE IS A MAJOR REQUIREMENT FOR SUCH A RURAL AREA. BATTLE FIRE STATION SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE MANNED.

BATTLE IS NOT A VERY BUSY TOWN, SO IT DOESN'T NEED SO MANY FIRE ENGINES.

BATTLE OPTION WILL IMPROVE FIRE COVER.

BATTLE SERVES HOMES IN THE COUNTRYSIDE SURROUNDING THE TOWN ALONG WITH THE DANGEROUS A21, IT WOULD BE MADNESS TO REDUCE THE SERVICE FROM THERE. HASTINGS HAS A GROWING POPULATION, IT WOULD BE EQUALLY AS MAD TO REDUCE THE SERVICE THERE. I WOULD INCREASE SUPPORT TO BOTH STATIONS.

BATTLE SHOULD NOT BE LEFT AS A RETAINED STATION ONLY. TRAFFIC AROUND BATTLE IS BAD AND RETAINED STAFF MAY TAKE TOO LONG TO ARRIVE. FOCUS SHOULD BE ON CUTTING HEAD OFFICE STAFF.

BECAUSE IT IS A CUT TO THE SERVICE.

BEST TO RETAIN WHOLE TIME AT BATTLE.

BODIAM PARISH COUNCIL HAS CONCERNS REGARDING RESPONSE TIMES FOR BODIAM.

BOTH BATTLE AND THE RIDGE FIRE STATIONS SHOULD RETAIN THEIR CURRENT STATUS WITH WORKING FIREFIGHTERS. THE ARGUMENT THAT THERE IS SCOPE FOR A REDUCTION IN FIRE ENGINES OR FRONTLINE FIREFIGHTERS IS DANGEROUS. THE ONLY PLACE WHERE THERE IS SCOPE FOR CUTS IN EAST SUSSEX FIRE SERVICE IS TO THE SALARIES OF OVER-PAID FIRE CHIEFS AND TO THE NUMBERS EMPLOYED IN THE HUGELY EXPANDED MANAGEMENT LAYER AT ESFRS.

BOTH PROPOSALS ATTEMPT TO EITHER REMOVE OR DOWNGRADE FIRE COVER IN THE AFFECTED AREAS AND ALTHOUGH YOU STATE THAT THEY ATTEND A LOW NUMBER OF INCIDENTS, NONETHELESS THEY DO ATTEND THEM, AND SHOULD BE KEPT IN SITU, THESE PROPOSALS WILL IMPACT ON PUBLIC AND FIREFIGHTER SAFETY CONTRARY TO WHAT YOU SAY.

BOTH STATIONS ARE NEEDED IN THEIR OWN RIGHT BECAUSE OF THE LARGE SURROUNDING AREAS WHICH THEY COVER AND THE A21 LISTED AS THE MOST DANGEROUS A ROAD IN THE COUNTRY. AS PHASE ONE SHORTFALL FROM RESERVE FUND.

BUILD A WHOLE TIME STATION AT GLYNE GAP, CLOSE BOHEMIA ROAD, WHOLE TIME CREW AT BEXHILL, MAKE BEXHILL ONE PUMP RETAINED STATION, AND BATTLE ONE PUMP RETAINED STATION.

BUSINESS, PEOPLE AND HOMES!

BY PROVIDING A FULL TIME CREW THEN YOU CAN COVER A WIDER AREA AND MAY BE ABLE TO LOOK AT APPLIANCES THAT ARE NOT ACTUALLY NEEDED IN THEIR LOCATION, BROADOAK FOR EXAMPLE.

CAMPAIGN FOR PROPER FUNDING.

CONSIDER TURNOUT AT BATTLE AND AVAILABILITY OF RDS.

CUTBACK ON PRINCIPLE OFFICERS, ESFRS HAS MANY AS THE SCOTTISH FIRE SERVICE. REDUCE BOROUGHS AND BOROUGH COMMANDERS FROM 6 TO 3. CARRY OUT A FULL MANAGEMENT RESTRUCTURING; THIS WILL PROTECT THE FRONTLINE SERVICES THAT APPEAR TO BE BEING TARGETED BY SENIOR OFFICERS.

CUTBACKS TO FRONTLINE SERVICES IN THE AREA ARE THE LAST POSSIBLE OPTION. CUTBACKS ARE STILL AN OPTION IN SENIOR MANAGEMENT WHICH ATTRACT SIGNIFICANT SAVINGS AND THINGS LIKE HYDRANT SERVICES COULD BE DONE IN HOUSE, SUBSIDIARY SERVICES LIKE BIKESAFE, LIFE PROJECTS ETC. ALSO, AMALGAMATION OF SERVICES CAN REDUCE COSTS. THERE ARE PLENTY OF OPTIONS OUTSIDE CUTTING BACK FIRE ENGINES.

DISAGREE WITH WHAT? YOU ASKED IF I PREFERRED 2A OR 2B, AND I TOLD YOU. POOR QUESTIONNAIRE LAYOUT!

EITHER OPTION WILL REDUCE THE RESPONSE CAPABILITY IN THOSE AREAS THUS INCREASING RISK.

GETTING RID OF ANY PUMPS WILL HAVE A HUGE IMPACT ON SERVICE DELIVERY. WHILST THE CALLS ARE DOWN, YOU CAN'T PLAN FOR LARGE INCIDENTS WHERE THESE RESOURCES WILL BE NEEDED.

HAVE DISCUSSIONS WITH PERSONNEL RATHER THAN OVERALL STATISTICAL CALCULATIONS.

HOW CAN RETAINED FIREMEN GIVE RAPID RESPONSE, USING RETAINED FIREMEN AS FIRST RESPONSE MUST ADD CONSIDERABLY TO FIRST RESPONSE TIMES.

HOW MUCH MORE OF OUR MONEY DOES THE GOVERNMENT WANT TO LINE THEIR POCKETS.

I AM AGREEING WITH OPTION 2A FOR BATTLE. BATTLE CAN NOT AFFORD TO BECOME A RETAINED ONLY STATION AS IT ALSO COVERS THE NORTH EAST OF THE COUNTY.

I AM NOT A DRIVER, BUT LOOKING ON THE MAP IT SEEMS BETTER TO SPACE OUT THE FIRE ENGINES.

I AM VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF BATTLE HAVING RETAINED STAFF ONLY. RESPONSE TIMES WILL BE SLOWER WHICH COULD ULTIMATELY MEAN LOSS OF LIFE. I UNDERSTAND TOO THAT BATTLE FIRE STATION ARE VERY MUCH RELIED UPON TO ATTEND INCIDENTS IN THE NORTH OF THE REGION PARTICULARLY ON THE A21. IT IS VITAL THAT THIS CONTINUES.

I BELIEVE I HAVE ALREADY ANSWERED THAT QUESTION BY INCREASING COUNCIL TAXES.

I DISAGREE WITH GETTING RID OF FULL TIME FIREFIGHTERS. I AM CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROPOSED REDUCTION IN COVER. I DO AGREE BUT TO PLAY OFF ONE TOWN AGAINST ANOTHER IS DISGUSTING BEHAVIOUR.

I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT EVERY OPTION HAS BEEN LOOKED AT. WHY IS THERE NO MENTION OF DRASTIC CUTS TO MANAGEMENT. ALL PROPOSED CUTS SEEM TO BE WITHIN THE FRONT LINE SERVICE?

I DO NOT HAVE ACCESS TO ANY DATA WHICH YOU HAVE USED TO COME UP WITH THESE PROPOSALS. THE DATA SHOULD BE RE-EXAMINED AND OTHER SUGGESTIONS PUT FORWARD.

I DON'T FEEL THIS INFORMATION IS SUFFICIENT TO MAKE AN INFORMED CHOICE. CAN I BE ASSURED THAT IF CONVERTED TO A RETAINED STATION THERE WOULD BE SUFFICIENT STAFF AVAILABLE ON ANY GIVEN DAY / TIME TO MAN THE NECESSARY APPLIANCES? ANECDOTALLY I HAVE HEARD THAT HASTINGS STRUGGLES TO RECRUIT WHOLE TIME STAFF LET ALONE RETAINED VOLUNTEERS. DOES BATTLE PROVIDE COVER FOR HASTINGS?

I DOUBT YOU WOULD RECRUIT SUFFICIENT RETAINED IN THE BATTLE AREA.

I FEEL BATTLE HAS A MORE CENTRAL LOCATION FOR A FAR REACHING AREA AND THE RIDGE IS CRUCIAL TO AN ANCIENT HISTORIC TOWN THAT REDUCING COVER COULD BE DETRIMENTAL TO THE SAFETY OF PEOPLE AS WELL AS PROPERTY.

I FEEL THAT WE NEED TO KEEP ALL FIREFIGHTERS WITHOUT COMPROMISING THEIR OR THE PUBLIC SAFETY!

I FEEL THAT YOU ARE BRIBING MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC INTO CHOOSING OPTIONS THAT WILL BE DETRIMENTAL TO OTHERS IN DIFFERENT LOCATIONS. IT IS STUPIDITY AND WHOEVER SUGGESTED THIS IS NOT WORTH THEIR £150K PAY PACKET!

I STILL DISAGREE TO ANY CUTS TO FRONTLINE EMERGENCY SERVICES. I BELIEVE RATHER THAN THE FIRE AUTHORITY ASSUMING THE GOVERNMENT WILL SAY NO TO MORE FUNDING THEY SHOULD AT LEAST ASK.

I THINK 2A IS MORE VIABLE FOR THE RESIDENTS OF BATTLE AND THE SURROUNDING AREA BECAUSE THE RESPONSE TIME IS MUCH QUICKER.

I THINK IT WOULD BE BETTER IF THERE ARE SOME FULL TIME FIREFIGHTERS AT THE STATION, AS DURING THEIR FREE TIME, MEANING NO CALLS TO ATTEND, MAYBE THEY SHOULD CHECK THE VEHICLE, EQUIPMENT'S AND MAKING SURE IT'S IN GOOD WORKING ORDER.

I WOULD CUT THE NUMBER OF 'TOP HEAVY' MANAGERS IN THE FIRE SERVICE AND AT THE COUNCIL. THEY ARE NOT THE ONES RISKING THEIR LIVES TO HELP OTHERS, BUT THEY ARE WILLING TO RISK OTHER PEOPLE'S LIVES TO SAVE THEIR OWN PAY CHECK!

I WOULD NOT DOWNGRADE A FIRE STATION AS I BELIEVE THAT EVEN THOUGH PERFORMANCE STANDARDS MAY BE MAINTAINED IN BATTLE, WHAT ABOUT THE OUTER LYING RURAL AREAS? I BELIEVE WE SHOULD BE TRYING TO IMPROVE PERFORMANCE STANDARDS WHEN IT COMES TO SAVING LIVES. FIREFIGHTERS LIVES WILL ALSO BE PUT AT RISK DUE TO ESSENTIAL BACK UP CREWS, WHEN YOU MIGHT NEED THEM MOST, WILL BE TAKING LONGER.

I WOULD REDUCE THE NUMBER OF SENIOR MANAGERS, HOLD A PAY REVIEW INTO ALL NON-OPERATIONAL UNIFORMED OFFICERS AND REDUCE THEIR PAY. I WOULD EMPLOY LOCAL CONTRACTORS FOR STATION WORK AT REASONABLE PRICES AND I WOULD HAVE ALL CHANGES NEGOTIATED AND AGREED WITH THE UNION.

I'M NOT SUGGESTING DOING NOTHING, I THINK YOU SHOULD LOOK TO CUTTING LAYERS OF MANAGEMENT AND SUPPORT STAFF BEFORE FIREFIGHTERS. FIREFIGHTERS COULD BE UP-SKILLED TO INCORPORATE A FIRST RESPONSE OR PARAMEDIC ROLE.

IF THE WHOLE TIME CREW IS LOST FROM BATTLE, WHO WILL COVER BATTLE AND THE SURROUNDING AREAS WHEN RDS

STAFF ARE UNABLE TO CREW THEIR APPLIANCES?

IN ADDITION TO THE NEED TO DEAL WITH FIRES IN THE NEARBY RURAL VILLAGES, BATTLE IS AN IMPORTANT STATION TO DEAL WITH ROAD TRAFFIC INCIDENTS ON THE A21 AND A FULL COMPLEMENT OF TRAINED FIRE FIGHTERS SHOULD BE MAINTAINED.

INCREASE THE NUMBER OF WHOLE TIME FIREFIGHTERS TO FULL DAY-CREWED STATUS AND REMOVE THE SECOND FIREFIGHTING APPLIANCE FROM BATTLE AND THE SECOND FROM THE RIDGE TO OFFSET THE COSTS. MOVE 4X4 VEHICLE CAPABILITIES FROM THE RIDGE TO BATTLE, KEEP A SMALL AMOUNT OF RDS FOR RESILIENCE AND COVER FOR SPECIALS.

IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT BOTH THE BATTLE AND THE RIDGE FIRE STATIONS ARE KEPT OPEN. INSTEAD OF FREEZING PARTS OF THE COUNCIL TAX, I AM SURE PEOPLE WOULD BE PREPARED TO PAY A LITTLE MORE IN ORDER TO KEEP A VITAL SERVICE. BATTLE RESIDENTS WOULD BE VERY VULNERABLE IF THE SERVICE WAS CUT AS PROPOSED AS THERE IS NO OTHER FIRE STATION IN THE BATTLE AREA TO SERVE THE RURAL COMMUNITIES. AGAIN, THE DISTANCE FROM HASTINGS TO BATTLE IS FAR TOO LONG AND, INEVITABLY, DEATHS WILL OCCUR MORE FREQUENTLY. WHY SHOULD COUNCIL TAX PAYERS HAVE TO PAY MORE, FOR A LESSER SERVICE? WE HAVE ALREADY HAD TO ENDURE MANY CUTS IN SERVICE, BUT THIS IS JUST ONE TOO FAR. THE FIRE SERVICE SAVES LIVES. WHAT PRICE WOULD YOU PUT ON A LIFE? BECAUSE THIS IS EXACTLY WHAT IS HAPPENING. IF THE CUTS GO AHEAD, ESFRS WILL BE PUTTING LIVES AT RISK. PEOPLE WILL NOT NECESSARILY MOVE INTO AN AREA WHERE THERE ARE NO VITAL SERVICES NEARBY, THEREBY CREATING GHOST TOWNS. BATTLE POLICE STATION HAS ALREADY GONE. WILL THE AMBULANCE SERVICE BE NEXT I WONDER?

IT STATES IT'S NOT JUST COVER FOR BATTLE, BUT FOR THE NORTH PART OF THE COUNTY. WHERE DOES THAT LEAVE THEM? I REFER YOU TO THE PREVIOUS ANSWERS WITH REGARD TO PUTTING FORWARD TO GOVERNMENT, COUNCIL AND LOCAL PEOPLE SO ALL HAVE FULL AND CLEAR INFORMATION, NOT JUST A BLAG THAT THERE ISN'T ANY INCREASED RISK, SINCE THIS CANNOT BE THE CASE. IT WOULD HELP TO HAVE A BALANCED VIEW INCLUDING THOSE ACTUALLY ON THE FRONT LINE SO WE THE PUBLIC AREN'T HAVING THE WOOL PULLED OVER OUR EYES ABOUT PUBLIC, LIFE ESSENTIAL SERVICES YET AGAIN.

IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS TO REDUCE ANY COVER AT BATTLE, AS QUITE FREQUENTLY ACCIDENTS HAVE OCCURRED AT JOHNS CROSS AND WHATLINGTON. WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF BOTH THE RIDGE AND BOHEMIA ARE OUT ON CALL AT THE SAME TIME IF A LARGE ACCIDENT OCCURS ON THE A21.

IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE IDEAS OF COMMUNITY COST.

KEEP ALL THE FIRE STATIONS IN EAST SUSSEX, CLOSE NONE OF THEM.

KEEP BATTLE FIRE STATION.

KEEP BOTH STATIONS AS THEY ARE DUE TO RESILIENCE.

KEEP THINGS AS THEY ARE.

KEEPING FULL TIME CREWS AT BATTLE GIVES A FAR BETTER RESPONSE TO A WIDER AREA. THIS ALONG WITH RETAINING THE FULL TIME CREW AT THE RIDGE PROVIDES THE PUBLIC WITH THE BEST OVERALL RESPONSE, WHICH MUST BE GIVEN AND MAINTAINED WHEN FACED WITH CUTS DUE TO GOVERNMENT DECISIONS BASED ON SAVING MONEY. MADE WITHOUT THOUGHT TO EMERGENCY RESPONSE. THE FIRE SERVICE IS ALL THAT IS LEFT OF CIVIL DEFENCE IN THIS COUNTRY AND SHOULD BE MAINTAINED, DESPITE COSTS. THIS SORT OF POLITICAL INTERFERENCE WILL COST LIVES!

LEAVE COVER AND STAFFING AS IT IS.

LOW INCIDENT NUMBERS IN NE OF COUNTY DO NOT JUSTIFY THE RISKS ATTENDANT ON AN APPLIANCE NEEDING TO GET FROM HASTINGS TO E.G. TICEHURST OR ASSEMBLING A RETAINED CREW TO DO THE SAME. 2A FAR SAFER; IT'S NOT ALL ABOUT STATISTICS!

MAINTAIN BATTLE CREWING AS IT IS CURRENTLY AND REMOVE PART TIME FIREFIGHTERS AT THE RIDGE.

MOVE TO RESTRUCTURE FROM 6 BOROUGHS TO 3. THIS WILL GIVE HUGE SAVINGS ON LESS BOROUGH COMMANDERS. WHY HAS THIS NOT BEEN DONE FIRST BEFORE FRONTLINE CUTS?

NO CUTS!

NO FRONTLINE SERVICES SHOULD BE CUT GO BACK TO STATUTORY DUTIES, AND CUT THE NON-EMERGENCY SIDE OF THE ORGANISATION BEFORE CUTTING FRONTLINE EMERGENCY SERVICES.

NO INCREASED RISK IS ARGUABLE NOT DEFINITE.

NUMBER OF APPLIANCES COVERING THE TOWNS OF BATTLE AND HASTINGS IS THE CORRECT FIRE COVER BASED ON THE EVIDENCE PROVIDED.

OPTION 2A GIVES A BROADER COVERAGE FOR BATTLE AND SURROUNDING DISTRICT. THE RIDGE WILL STILL HAVE COVER BACKED UP BY BOHEMIA HASTINGS.

OPTION 2A IS THE ONLY ACCEPTABLE OPTION.

PERHAPS A CUT IN THE NO EFFECTIVE ADMINISTRATION WOULD ALLOW FOR MORE FIREFIGHTERS TO BE ALLOCATED TO THE VARIOUS LOCATIONS.

PHASE 2 PROPOSALS MEAN A DANGER TO LIVES FROM FIRE IN RURAL PROPERTIES DUE TO LOSS OF WHOLE TIME CREW AND APPLIANCE AT BATTLE. AN HONEST APPRAISAL OF THE STATISTICS RATHER THAN THE CURRENT SKEWED ANALYSIS WOULD SHOW THE TRUTH OF THE NECESSITY OF RETENTION OF FIRE COVER.

PLEASE CONSIDER HAVING ONE SURREY, KENT AND SUSSEX FRS SINCE YOU WORK ACROSS BORDERS, IT WILL NEED FEWER VERY SENIOR STAFF, WILL BE MORE EFFECTIVE IN RESPONDING TO CALLS, WILL PROVIDE EFFICIENT TRAINING PROGRAMMES AND REQUIRE ONE IT, ADMINISTRATION AND HR. PROVIDER. THEN PLEASE ALSO CONSIDER JOINING FORCES WITH EMERGENCY SERVICES FOR IT, PLEASE DO NOT OUTSOURCE, HR., ADMINISTRATION AND TRAINING.

PLEASE SEE MY PREVIOUS RESPONSE TO CUTTING THE FIRE ENGINE AT THE RIDGE.

RECOUP MONEY ALREADY WASTED AND CONTINUING TO BE WASTED ON THE REGIONAL CONTROL PROJECT WHICH HAS RUN

INTO MILLIONS OF POUNDS.

REDUCE MANAGEMENT COSTS AND MERGE EAST SUSSEX AND WEST SUSSEX FRSAS.

REDUCING THE SERVICE AT EITHER LOCATION DOESN'T MAKE SENSE. WHEN THE NEW BEXHILL / HASTINGS LINK ROAD COMES INTO OPERATION, TRAFFIC VOLUME ON THE RIDGE WILL INCREASE, THIS INCREASING THE TIME IT WILL TAKE FOR EITHER THE BATTLE SERVICES REACHING HASTINGS OR HASTINGS REACHING BATTLE. ROTHER AND HASTINGS COUNCILS HAVE TO SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASE THE NUMBER OF DWELLING UNITS OVER THE NEXT 10-15 YEARS THUS INCREASING THE DEMANDS ON AN ALREADY STRETCHED INFRASTRUCTURE AND HERE ARE PLANS TO REDUCE THE SERVICES PROVIDED. DOESN'T MAKE SENSE.

REMOVAL OF THE BATTLE APPLIANCE WILL MEAN THE LOSS OF SPECIALIST ROPE RESCUE AND TECHNICAL RESCUE SKILLS FROM THE AREA. IT WILL ALSO MEAN A WORSENING OF THE FIRE COVER TO A LARGE PART OF THE EAST OF THE COUNTY. BATTLE WHOLE TIME FIREFIGHTERS SUPPORT A NUMBER OF RETAINED STATIONS WHO OFTEN HAVE DIFFICULTY IN CREWING APPLIANCES IN SURROUNDING VILLAGES. WITHOUT THE WHOLE TIME CREW BOTH THE PUBLIC AND FIREFIGHTERS WILL BE AT RISK DUE TO THE INCREASED TIME TO REACH INCIDENTS.

REMOVE OFFICER POSTS.

RESPONSE TIMES FROM THE RIDGE TO BATTLE AND NORTH EAST COUNTY AREAS CAN BE LENGTHY, WITH NARROW ROADS / TRAFFIC CONGESTION / LEVEL CROSSINGS CAUSING DELAYS. KEEP BATTLE WITH WHOLE TIME FIREFIGHTERS AT HIGH RISK TIMES.

RETAIN BOTH AS COMMUNITIES FEEL SAFER AND NEED THEIR LOCAL STATIONS.

RETAIN SERVICE AS IS.

RETAINED TAKE TOO LONG TO RESPOND TO CALLS, WHOLE TIME IS BETTER.

RETAINED TURNOUT AT BATTLE FAILS FREQUENTLY. IF THAT'S ALL THERE WERE THEN MUCH OF EAST SUSSEX, NORTH OF HASTINGS WOULD BE WITHOUT A RELIABLE SERVICE.

ROTATE STAFF. THIS THEN WOULD COVER ALL EVENTUALITIES.

ROTHER BOROUGH COVERS A VERY LARGE AREA, LIKE WEALDEN BOROUGH, AND NEEDS BATTLE TO BE AVAILABLE THERE WHEN NEEDED. YOU SEEM TO BE GIVING PRECEDENCE TO THE BIG TOWNS, AGAIN AT THE EXPENSE OF EAST SUSSEX RURAL AREAS. I WOULD SUGGEST THAT YOU ACTUALLY DISCUSS THE PROBLEMS AND CHANGES NEEDED WITH THE FIREFIGHTERS WHO HAVE TO PUT YOUR DECISIONS INTO OPERATION INSTEAD OF RELYING ON STATISTICS ALL THE TIME.

RURAL FIRE STATIONS COVER A LARGE AREA WHILE URBAN STATIONS' GROUND IS MORE COMPACT. DUMBING DOWN RURAL COVER IS NOT ACCEPTABLE. URBAN AND RURAL NEED DIFFERENT CRITERIA.

SAME ANSWER AS QUESTION BEFORE!

SAME AS BEFORE.

SAVE MONEY BY NOT WASTING BUDGET ON PRIVATE BUSINESS RETROFITTING SPRINKLER PROGRAM!

SAVINGS COULD BE MADE IN LOTS OF DIFFERENT AREAS; THE FIRE AUTHORITY SHOULD BE PRESSING THE GOVERNMENT FOR A REGIONAL FIRE SERVICE, REDUCING THE NEED FOR EXPENSIVE MANAGEMENT TEAMS AND LOCAL STRUCTURE. CASE IN POINT, THE SCOTTISH FIRE SERVICE.

SCRAP THE CHIEFS £18,000 PER YEAR CAR ALLOWANCE, SELL YOUR HQ. FOLLY AND YOU MAY SAVE OUR FIRE SERVICE.

SEE ALL THE ABOVE.

SEE PREVIOUS ANSWER.

SEE PREVIOUS ANSWERS, CUT OR SHARE IT, HR. FINANCE AND LEGAL DEPARTMENTS, STOP WASTING MONEY ON CONSULTANTS (SUCH AS ORS), REDUCE SENIOR OFFICER SALARIES, REDUCE SENIOR OFFICERS BY SHARING POSTS WITH OTHER NEIGHBOURING FIRE SERVICES.

SEE PREVIOUS ANSWERS.

SEE PREVIOUS RESPONSES.

SERVICE SHOULD BE MAINTAINED AT BOTH - IT'S NOT JUST FIRE BUT ALSO ROAD TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS ON ROADS SUCH AS THE A21 WHERE DEATH AND SERIOUS INJURY ARE COMMONPLACE.

SHARE SUPPORT SERVICES WITH OTHER DEPARTMENTS / COUNCILS / AUTHORITIES.

SINCE YOUR CONSULTATION LIMITS THE RESPONSES, IT ISN'T A CONSULTATION. I DON'T SEE MUCH CHOICE BETWEEN BEING BURNT TO DEATH SLOWLY AND BEING BURNT TO DEATH FAST. MORE FIREFIGHTERS NOT FEWER.

STOP CUTTING FRONTLINE AND LOOK AT OTHER PLACES TO TRIM FAT!

THE A21 HAS MAJOR ACCIDENTS AND THE COVER OF THIS MAJOR ARTERY FROM THE RIDGE WOULD MEAN LONGER DELAYS IN RESPONDING TO THIS TYPE OF ISSUE. SO MY BELIEF IS THAT A FULLY MANNED BATTLE STATION WOULD PROVIDE BETTER COVERAGE FOR THE AREA AND THE A21.

THE COMMUNITY OF BATTLE DESERVE THE BEST SERVICE AND THE REMOVAL OF THE WHOLE TIME PERSONNEL WOULD REDUCE TURNOUT TIMES, AND PUT THE APPLIANCE OFF THE RUN DUE TO A LACK OF RETAINED COVER.

THE NORTH-EAST AREA INCLUDING ROBERTSBRIDGE CANNOT ADEQUATELY BE COVERED BY HASTINGS OR THE RIDGE UNLESS BATTLE HAS FULL TIME COVER. THIS COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE WHICH IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN MONEY. THE RIDGE COULD LOSE AN ENGINE WITH NO LOSS TO RISK COVER.

THE RIDGE COULD BE DOWNGRADED AND BATTLE LEFT AS IS. WITH THE EXTRA TRAFFIC ENVISAGED ALONG THE RIDGE BECAUSE OF THE LINK ROAD, IT COULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO GET AN ENGINE FROM THERE TO BATTLE AND THE NORTH OF

THE COUNTY, ESPECIALLY TO ATTEND SERIOUS RTAS, OF WHICH WE SEEM TO GET A NUMBER ON THIS SIDE.

THERE ARE A LARGE NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS WITHIN THE BATTLE FIRE STATION AREA, INCLUDING ROBERTSBRIDGE AND SALEHURST. WHILST FIRES ARE RARE, WE DO NOT WANT TO BE WAITING ANOTHER 10-15 MINUTES FOR A FIRE ENGINE TO ATTEND FROM THE RIDGE. THOSE MINUTES ARE VITAL! ALSO, WHAT HAPPENS WHEN THE A21 IS SHUT DUE TO A ROAD TRAFFIC ACCIDENT AS IT OFTEN IS?

THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT THE 7 RETAINED STATIONS IN THE BATTLE AREA CONSISTENTLY FAIL TO TURN OUT 24/7. FAILURE RATES RANGE FROM 15% TO 76%. WORKING A SHIFT SYSTEM 7 DAYS A WEEK WHOLE TIME FIREFIGHTERS AT BATTLE COVER THESE FAILURES. UNFORTUNATELY, THE STATISTICS DON'T SHOW THIS. BURWASH FOR EXAMPLE FAILED TO RESPOND TO CALLS 72% OF THE TIME OVER THE LAST YEAR, WHICH MEANT THAT BATTLE HAD TO COVER THESE CALLS. THE PROPOSAL TO DOWNGRADE BATTLE ALSO DOES NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE RESPONSE TIME NEED TO ATTEND THE INCREASING NUMBER OF ACCIDENTS ON THE A21.

THERE WOULD BE NO FIRE SERVICE IF THERE WERE NO FIREFIGHTERS, STOP LOOKING AT CUTTING FIREFIGHTERS POSTS AND LOOK AT THE HEADS OF THE ORGANISATION.

THIS IS A DIVIDE AND RULE TACTIC WHICH WILL HAVE A DETRIMENTAL IMPACT ON THE NORTH EAST OF THE COUNTY.

THIS IS A SHOCKING SURVEY, AS BEFORE.

THIS IS ONLY MOVING THE PLAYERS, YOU SHOULD BE LOOKING AT KEEPING THE MANNING LEVELS AVAILABLE 24/7/365.

THIS PROPOSAL IS AGAIN LOOKING AT FRONTLINE CUTS, WHEN OPTIONS FOR OTHER CUTS IN THE SERVICE HAVEN'T BEEN FULLY EXPLORED. I WENT INTO MORE DETAIL IN ONE OF MY EARLIER ANSWERS AS TO WHERE THE SERVICE MIGHT LOOK TO MAKE SAVINGS.

THIS WILL LEAD TO UNSAFE AND INCREASED RESPONSE TIMES.

TIME AND DISTANCE WOULD BE COMPROMISED. TRIM MANAGEMENT.

WE DO NOT DISAGREE, WE THINK OPTION A IS BETTER, AS LONG AS IT IS NOT THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS CLOSING THE RIDGE FIRE STATION WHICH PROVIDES A VITAL SERVICE LOCALLY.

WE NEED THE CREWS AT THEIR STATIONS, AT ALL TIMES.

WHAT THOUGHTS HAVE BEEN TO LOOKING AT SENIOR PEOPLE AND CLERICAL STAFF? SURELY THE SERVICE IS SLIM AT THE MOMENT, WHAT HAPPENS WHEN SOMETHING LIKE THE FIREWORKS AT HALLAND OR FLIXBOROUGH HAPPENS?

WHY BREAK SOMETHING WHEN IT'S NOT BROKEN?

WHY NOT REDUCE ORE OR HASTINGS?

WILL CREATE A POORER SERVICE AND PUT LIVES AT RISK.

YOU NEVER KNOW WHEN THEY MAY BE A SERIOUS FIRE.

YOU SHOULD HAVE PUT AN OPTION OF NEITHER INSTEAD. I HAVE HAD TO TICK DON'T KNOW, WELL I DO KNOW! JUST BECAUSE AN AREA HAS A LOW NUMBER OF INCIDENTS DOES NOT MEAN YOU CAN REDUCE ITS FIRE COVER. WILL YOU BE REDUCING THEIR RATES FOR A LESSER SERVICE? I THINK NOT!

YOUR OPTIONS ARE BASED UPON REMOVAL OF APPLIANCES AND REDUCTIONS IN COVER AND RESPONSE STANDARDS. YOU CANNOT RELY ON ON-CALL FIREFIGHTERS BEING AVAILABLE WHEN REQUIRED. AGAIN, REVIEW YOUR SERVICES OUTGOINGS BEFORE CUTTING.

Day Crewed Plus

A FIREFIGHTER IS THERE TO DO A JOB, NOT HAVE VISITORS. IF CREW ARE TO BE LOST, IT HAS TO BE THROUGH RETIREMENT ONLY.

A VICTORIAN SHIFT SYSTEM WOULD SEE UNDUE STRAIN PLACED ON HOME LIFE. THE INCREASE IN PENSION PAYMENTS WILL HAVE TO BE FOUND BY THE EMPLOYER, CAN YOU AFFORD THIS?

AGAIN, NO OTHER OPTIONS TO COMMENT ON.

AGAIN, THIS FALSE BINARY IS EXTREMELY MISLEADING.

ALTHOUGH SUITABLE FOR SOME YOUNGER SINGLE STAFF MEMBERS IN MY OPINION THIS CANNOT BE SEEN AS PARTICULARLY FAMILY FRIENDLY WORKING CONDITIONS.

ALTHOUGH THE PERSONS WOULD BE AVAILABLE, I HAVE SERIOUS CONCERNS REGARDING PEOPLE BEING ESSENTIALLY AT THEIR PLACE OF WORK FOR SO LONG. IN A PROFESSION WHICH REQUIRES INSTANT DECISIONS WITH LIMITED INFORMATION I FEAR THAT BEING ON DUTY FOR EXTENDED PERIODS WOULD AFFECT PERFORMANCE.

AND WHO IS GOING TO PAY FOR THIS. WHEN CUTS HAVE GOT TO BE MADE YOU CAN FIND THE MONEY TO SET UP THIS MICKEY MOUSE SYSTEM?

ANY CHANGE WILL BE DETRIMENTAL TO COVER.

ANY REDUCTION IN PERSONNEL WILL AFFECT SERVICES. THE NATURE OF THE QUESTION DOES NOT GIVE AN ALTERNATIVE ARGUMENT THAT EXPRESSES THE OPINION OF THE FIREFIGHTERS. THEY ARE THE PEOPLE ON THE GROUND, THEY KNOW BEST HOW SERVICES WILL BE AFFECTED. COST CUTTING AT THE EXPENSE OF OUR SAFETY.

AS BEFORE. DON'T CUT FRONTLINE SERVICES.

AS I SAID BEFORE.

AS THERE IS NO DEFINITIVE PLANS ON THE ACCOMMODATION AND EXTRA PAYMENT THEN A CONCLUSION IS HARD TO MAKE.

ASKING FIREFIGHTERS TO WORK A 96 HOUR SHIFT, WITHOUT BEING ABLE TO LEAVE THE PREMISES IS NOT A FAMILY FRIENDLY SYSTEM. THEY WOULD HAVE TO DOUBLE THEIR HOURS FOR SMALL REWARD, DRASTICALLY REDUCING THEIR HOURLY RATE. USING THE TERM 'RECEIVING AN ON-CALL BONUS' IS A VERY LOADED WAY OF DESCRIBING A CUT IN WAGES. BECAUSE YOU ARE STILL CUTTING FIREFIGHTER POSTS WITH THIS SYSTEM. ASK THE GOVERNMENT FOR MORE FUNDING.

CHANGE IT TO DAY CREWING.

CONCERNED OVER TURNOUT OR AVAILABILITY TO CALLS UNDER PROPOSALS. REDUCTION IN POSTS CAUSES CONCERNS TOO.

CONSIDERATION MUST BE GIVEN TO AREAS THAT (ALBEIT) ARE A LOW EXPOSED AREAS.

CREATION OF 96-HOUR SHIFTS WOULD AFFECT FAMILY LIFE AND LEAD TO FATIGUED FIREFIGHTERS.

CUT BACK ON PRINCIPLE OFFICERS, ESFRS HAS AS MANY AS THE SCOTTISH FIRE SERVICE. REDUCE BOROUGH'S AND BOROUGH COMMANDERS FROM 6 TO 3. CARRY OUT A FULL MANAGEMENT RESTRUCTURING, THIS WILL PROTECT THE FRONTLINE SERVICES THAT APPEAR TO BE BEING TARGETED BY SENIOR OFFICERS.

CUTS COST LIVES. GET RID OF SENIOR MANAGEMENT FIRST!

CUTS.

CUTTING FRONTLINE POSTS AND REDUCING STANDARDS OF EMPLOYMENT CAN ONLY LOWER MORALE AND REDUCE THE QUALITY AND SAFETY OF THE SERVICE.

CUTTING POSTS DOES NOTHING TO INSTIL PUBLIC CONFIDENCE AND SHOULD BE AVOIDED AT ALL COSTS.

DAY CREWED PLUS IS NOT A SYSTEM OF WORK THAT IS FAMILY FRIENDLY OR INDEED ANY TYPE OF RELATIONSHIP FRIENDLY. AS I UNDERSTAND IF A FIREFIGHTER DOESN'T LEAVE THE PREMISES FOR 96 HOURS STRAIGHT.

DAY CREWED PLUS IS SO ANTI-SOCIAL, HOW CAN YOU EXPECT SOMEONE TO LIVE IN A BOX ROOM FOR 4 DAYS STRAIGHT AND NOT CRACK? WHAT FAMILY IS GOING TO WANT TO BRING THEIR CHILDREN TO A MOTEL TO SEE THEIR MUM OR DAD AS THEY ARE AWAY FROM FAMILY LIFE FOR 4 DAYS? THE RETAINED SYSTEM HAS WORKED FOR YEARS AND MANY PUMPS THESE DAYS ARE RARELY OFF THE RUN. THE FIREFIGHTERS WILL BE WORKING 96 HOURS AS OPPOSED TO 48 AND I KNOW THEY WON'T BE GETTING THEIR PAY DOUBLED.

DAY CREWING PLUS REDUCES THE RESILIENCE OF THE STATION BY REDUCING THE NUMBER OF FIRE FIGHTERS AVAILABLE, WHAT HAPPENS DURING BUSY PERIODS WHEN THE SAME PERSONNEL ARE REMAINING ON CALL FOR EXTENDED PERIODS. THE CURRENT SYSTEM ALLOWS THEM TO BE RELIEVED BY THE ONCOMING WATCH. RAISE CURRENT TAX TO COVER COST OF EXISTING PROVISION.

DAY CREWING PLUS WILL PROVE SHORT SITED AND MAY MAKE INDIVIDUALS WORK TWICE THE NUMBER OF HOURS FOR LESS MONEY. IN THIS COUNTRY WE ALREADY HAVE EXCESSIVE WORKING HOURS AND THOSE IN THE UK WORK HARDER THAN ANYONE ELSE.

DCP IS NOT FAMILY FRIENDLY AND CAUSES STRESS TO FIREFIGHTERS IN ALREADY STRESSFUL CONDITIONS. NOT CHANGING THE SHIFT PATTERNS IS A VIABLE OPTION. DO NOT FORGET THAT YOU ARE ASKING THE OPINION OF THE PEOPLE THAT ARE NOT ONLY THE USERS OF THIS SERVICE, BUT ARE PAYING FOR IT.

DISAGREE DUE TO REMOVAL OF POSTS.

DON'T JUSTIFY THIS. IT'S FAMILY UNFRIENDLY. MORE COUNCIL TAX.

DON'T THINK IT WOULD SAVE ANY MONEY WHICH IS THE OBJECTIVE.

DUE TO THE ADOPTIONS REQUIRED AT THE FACILITIES TO ENABLE THE CREWS TO REMAIN THERE OVERNIGHT.

EXPECTING FIREFIGHTERS TO LIVE AWAY FROM THEIR FAMILIES FOR 4 DAYS A WEEK IS NOT ACCEPTABLE. THE SAVING SURELY CAN'T BE MUCH AS YOU WOULD NEED TO BUILD ACCOMMODATION.

EXTRA EXPENSE IN PROVIDING ACCOMMODATION FOR FAMILY MEMBERS, WITH EXTRA PAY IN BONUSES. JUST HOW MANY HOURS EACH WEEK ARE THESE CREWS EXPECTED TO BE AT THE STATION. I WAS UNDER THE IMPRESSION THE EU HAVE A STIPULATION ON HOW MANY HOURS A WEEK PEOPLE SHOULD WORK AND THAT IS NO MORE THAN 48.

FIREFIGHTERS SHOULD BE AT HOME WITH THEIR FAMILY AND NOT HAVE THEIR FAMILY IN A 'STERILE' ENVIRONMENT WITH THEM.

GO BACK TO GOVERNMENT AND SAY THIS IS UNWORKABLE!

HASTINGS IS A TOWN WITH HIGH POVERTY AND SOCIAL DEPRIVATION, TEAMS FROM BOTH STATIONS ARE ABLE TO WORK CLOSELY WITH PARTNERS TO ACHIEVE A GREATER IMPACT. THE REDUCTION OF STAFF WILL LEAVE LESS STAFF TO PROVIDE LOCAL CONTACT POINTS AS THE WORK LOAD WILL INCREASE TO THOSE LEFT.

HAVING THEM 5 MINUTES FROM THE STATION VERSUS EXPENSE OF ERECTING HOTEL TYPE ACCOMMODATION SEEMS A WASTE OF MONEY.

HOW CAN YOU EXPECT PEOPLE TO PRACTICALLY LIVE IN TWO HOMES? HOW WILL THIS SAVE MONEY?

HOW IS THERE MONEY TO BUILD ACCOMMODATION BUT NOT FIREFIGHTER?

HOW LONG WOULD THE SHIFTS BE AND HOW MANY DAYS WOULD THE FIREFIGHTERS BE EXPECTED TO STAY AT THE STATION? IF IT IS FOR LONG PERIODS HOW WOULD THAT AFFECT YOUR STAFF IN TERMS OF WELFARE AND PERSONAL LIFE. DIDN'T VICTORIAN FIREFIGHTERS HAVE TO LIVE AT THE FIRE STATION? MAYBE LOOK AT APPROACHING CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND ASKING THEM TO PROVIDE THE RIGHT AMOUNT OF MONEY TO RUN A FIRE SERVICE.

HOW MANY HOURS A WEEK WILL YOU BE AT WORK?

HOW MANY HOURS DO YOU EXPECT THESE MEMBERS OF STAFF TO WORK? PROVIDING ACCOMMODATION AND ALLOWING FAMILY TO VISIT IS THAT REALLY PRACTICAL? IT MAY HAVE WORKED EXTREMELY WELL IN THE PAST WHEN YOU HAD FIRE SERVICE HOUSING ADJACENT TO ROEDEAN BUT NOW? HONESTLY?

I BELIEVE THAT IF A FIRE OFFICER IS ON DUTY THEY MUST REMAIN IN THE STATION AND DO SUCH WORK THAT MIGHT WARRANT ATTENTION, WHILST THEY ARE NOT ON CALL. BEING AT HOME ON CALL WILL DISTRACT FOR THAT WORK.

I DO NOT AGREE THAT AXING POSTS WILL NOT RESULT IN DETRIMENT TO THE SERVICE.

I DO NOT BELIEVE IN CUTTING ANY FIREFIGHTER POSTS ESPECIALLY TO A SYSTEM WHICH IS NOT FAMILY FRIENDLY THIS SYSTEM.

I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT ANY LOSS OF FRONTLINE POST SHOULD BE MADE AND BELIEVE SAVINGS SHOULD BE MADE FROM THE TOP DOWN.

I HAVE ISSUES RELATING TO THE LEGALITIES OF WORKING SUCH A LARGE AMOUNT OF HOURS ON THE TROT. WHILST THERE MAYBE PERIODS OF QUIET, THERE IS ALSO THE POSSIBILITY OF A BUSY NIGHT PERIOD COUPLED WITH WORKING AT DAY THAT COULD RESULT IN FIREFIGHTERS WORKING WHILE BEING DANGEROUSLY FATIGUED.

I HAVE LOOKED AT OTHER PEOPLE WHO DO THIS IN OTHER COUNTIES AND FEEL IT IS GOOD FOR PEOPLE WITH A COUPLE OF YEARS TO DO, BUT NOT FOR YOUNG FIREFIGHTERS.

I THOUGHT THE IDEA WAS TO TRY TO SAVE MONEY BUT THEN YOU PLAN TO SPEND MORE ON 'ACCOMMODATION'? YOU DO NOT SAY HOW THE 24 HOUR SESSIONS WOULD WORK, I.E. 24 ON AND 24 OFF FOR INSTANCE? ODD IDEA REGARDING FAMILIES THOUGH AND I CAN'T SEE THAT WORKING VERY WELL. IT SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN THROWN IN IN ORDER TO TRY AND MAKE THAT SYSTEM WORK? HAS THE WORKABILITY OF THIS SCHEME BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THOSE WHO HAVE TO PUT IT INTO PRACTICE? THAT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA.

I WOULD CUT THE NUMBER OF 'TOP HEAVY' MANAGERS IN THE FIRE SERVICE AND AT THE COUNCIL. THEY ARE NOT THE ONES RISKING THEIR LIVES TO HELP OTHERS, BUT THEY ARE WILLING TO RISK OTHER PEOPLE'S LIVES TO SAVE THEIR OWN PAY CHECK!

IF A FIREFIGHTER HAS TO MOVE FROM HOME TO A STATION ON A SHOUT, THIS WILL ADD TIME TO ANY CALL-OUTS, AND THE FEW MINUTES EXTRA COULD WELL BE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN LIFE AND DEATH. IF YOU NEED TO SAVE MONEY LOOK AT BACK ROOM OPERATIONS FOR THE SAVINGS.

IF A FIREFIGHTER WERE TO WORK FOR EXTENDED PERIODS OF TIME THEIR OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY WOULD BE GREATLY REDUCED, ALSO I WOULD BE INTERESTED TO KNOW WHAT THEIR 'BONUS' AMOUNTS TO AS IF THEY ARE ASKED TO SPEND A LOT MORE HOURS ON THE STATION, THEIR HOURLY WAGE WOULD BE REDUCED TO THAT OF UNSKILLED WORKERS. HARDLY THE WAGE A HIGHLY SKILLED FIREFIGHTER SHOULD EXPECT.

IF A SYSTEM ISN'T BROKEN WHY ARE YOU TRYING TO FIX IT? YOU SAY ATTENDANCE TIMES WILL NOT ALTER SO WHY THEN PAY OUT TO BUILD ACCOMMODATION WHEN THEY ALL READY HAVE SOME? SO YOU CAN REDUCE FIREFIGHTER JOBS, WHEN ARE YOU GOING TO LOOK AT REDUCING SENIOR MANAGEMENT ROLES AND SALARIES? NO, THOUGHT NOT.

IF CHANGING THE SYSTEM AS PROPOSED DOES NOT CHANGE RESPONSE TIMES, WHY GO TO THE EXPENSE OF PROVIDING OVERNIGHT ACCOMMODATION. THAT DOES NOT MAKE SENSE. NEEDS MORE THOUGHT ON THIS ONE.

IF FAMILY STAY WITH THEM, THAT WOULD MEAN CHANGES TO ACCOMMODATION AND THAT MEANS MORE MONEY TO MAKE THE CHANGES. THE LAST THING YOU NEED IS LOTS OF CHILDREN RUNNING AROUND WHEN THE CALL GOES OUT!

IF PROPOSAL 2A IS AGREED AND FOLLOWED THEN WHY NOT SIMPLY MOVE THE WHOLE TIME APPLIANCE FROM THE RIDGE TO THE OTHER HASTINGS STATION AS WAS PLANNED LAST YEAR. THEREFORE, YOU COULD THEN CLOSE THE RIDGE COMPLETELY.

IF THE GOING HOME OPTION ADDS NOT ADDITIONAL HOURS, WHY WOULD YOU SPEND MORE MONEY ON CALL OUTS AND ACCOMMODATION?

IT IS ALWAYS ABOUT CHANGE. I BET DOWNING STREET HAS 24/7 SERVICE AS WESTMINSTER ABBY AND THE HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT. ARE THEY SO MUCH MORE SPECIAL THAN EVERYONE ELSE? I THINK THAT INSTEAD OF CUTTING SERVICES, THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD TRACK DOWN TAX AVOIDERS WHICH RUN INTO MILLIONS OF POUNDS AND THAT WAY WE WOULD ALL HAVE THE LUXURY OF BEING A FEW MINUTES AWAY FROM DEATH AND NOT HAVING TO WORRY ABOUT WHERE IN THE COUNTY OUR FIRE SERVICE IS.

IT IS QUITE CLEAR THAT THE FIRE AUTHORITY ARE STILL SAYING THERE IS A DEFINITE NEED TO HAVE THESE TWO FIRE STATIONS PROVIDING 24/7 COVER. I MYSELF LIVE IN THE ROEDEAN AREA, THE SYSTEM THAT IS BEING PROPOSED IS A SYSTEM WHICH WILL HAVE A HUGE IMPACT ON PUBLIC SAFETY AND THE FIGURES THAT HAVE BEEN EMPHASISED IN THE DOCUMENT LINKS IN THIS WEBSITE ARE EXTREMELY SELECTIVE. YOU WILL BE EXPECTING FIREFIGHTERS TO LIVE ON SITE AND EFFECTIVELY BE ON CALL FOR DAYS AT A TIME. I HAVE WORKED ON A CALL SYSTEM FROM 2PM FRIDAY TO 8AM MONDAY AS A POLICE DETECTIVE IN A SEXUAL OFFENCES UNIT. AFTER BEING CALLED OUT TWO OR THREE TIMES OFTEN FOR SEVERAL HOURS AT A TIME IT TAKES ITS TOLL MENTALLY AND WHILST IN MY JOB THE BIGGEST RISK WAS SAYING SOMETHING INSENSITIVE OR COMPROMISING EVIDENCE I WAS NOT DEALING WITH LIFE OR DEATH SCENARIOS. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO GET ADEQUATE SLEEP ON ANY FORM OF ON A CALL SYSTEM AND THERE ARE A NUMBER OF RESEARCH / STUDIES TO SUPPORT THIS. SLEEP DEPRIVATION WILL AFFECT THE QUALITY OF THE SERVICE AND ANY ON CALL SYSTEM AND LIVING OFF SITE WILL INVOLVE A TRAVELLING TIME TO THE STATION AND SURELY AN INCREASED RESPONSE TIME AS A RESULT. ALSO, IN LIGHT OF THE CURRENT PENSION AND CONDITIONS REFORMS THIS APPEARS TO BE YET ANOTHER ATTACK ON FIREFIGHTER'S PERSONAL LIVES. HOW ON EARTH ARE THESE SHIFT CHANGES CONDUCIVE TO A FAMILY LIFE LET ALONE ARTICLE 8 OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT. THE OTHER ISSUE, THE ARGUMENT THAT 'EMERGENCY CALL OUTS HAVE DECREASED DUE TO FIRE PREVENTION MEASURES' FIRE PREVENTION MEASURES NEED TO BE MAINTAINED AND IMPROVED CONSTANTLY IN A SIMILAR WAY THAT CRIME PREVENTION DOES IN ORDER TO KEEP 'EMERGENCY CALLS' AT A LOWER LEVEL. FIREFIGHTERS STILL NEED TO CARRY OUT THIS WORK AND IN MY OPINION IF THEY ARE ON A DAY DUTY PLUS SYSTEM THAT WILL NOT BE FEASIBLE IF PUBLIC SAFETY LEVELS SHOULD BE MAINTAINED, WE CANNOT RELY ON A FEW EXTRA SPRINKLERS. INCIDENTALLY AS A SERVICE YOU SHOULD NOT BE LOOKING AT MAINTAINING PUBLIC SAFETY BUT CONSTANTLY STRIVING TO IMPROVE IT! IT'S IMPORTANT TO REMEMBER THAT EAST SUSSEX IS A FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE AND THEIR REMIT EXTENDING BEYOND MANY OTHER BRIGADES AND THE SKILL SET OF FULLTIME FIREFIGHTERS IS REFLECTED AS SUCH - RETAINED OFFICERS OFTEN HAVE A MINIMUM LEVEL OF TRAINING THAT CANNOT COMPETE WITH EXPERIENCE.

IT IS SAD IF THAT PART WILL HAVE TO GO, THIS IS NOT RIGHT. BUT I AM SURE YOU WILL DO IT.

IT SEEMS A DAY CREWED SYSTEM WOULD BE BETTER FOR ALL CONCERNED IF CHANGES HAD TO BE MADE, SO FIREFIGHTERS COULD LIVE WITH THEIR FAMILIES IN A NORMAL FASHION.

IT SEEMS THIS SYSTEM IS DETRIMENTAL TO FAMILY LIFE, AND EXCEEDS NORMAL LEGAL WORKING HOURS.

IT'S NOT FAMILY FRIENDLY AND SOUNDS LIKE THEY WOULD HAVE TO WORK A LOT MORE FOR NOT MUCH, HOW CAN THESE BE PROPOSALS WHEN YOU HAVE NO ALTERNATIVES!

JOURNEY TIMES HAVE GOT TO BE SLOWER FROM SEVERAL INDIVIDUAL LOCATIONS. SURELY THIS WILL IMPACT ON RESPONSE TIMES NEGATIVELY.

KEEP AS IS, WITH NO REDUCTION OF STAFF.

KEEP RIDGE ONE PUMP WHOLE TIME, REMOVE RETAINED PUMP. KEEP ROE DEAN FULL TIME.

KEEP THE CURRENT STATUS AND NUMBERS OF FIREFIGHTERS. THERE SHOULD BE NO CUTS IN FRONTLINE FIREFIGHTERS' POSITIONS. BEFORE CUTTING ANY FRONTLINE FIREFIGHTERS, WHO DOES THE JOB US RATEPAYERS IN THE COMMUNITY VALUE THE MOST. TRY CUTTING THE SALARIES OF OVER-PAID FIRE CHIEFS / MANAGEMENT AND REDUCING THE VASTLY EXPANDED NUMBERS OF MANAGEMENT EMPLOYED BY EAST SUSSEX FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICES.

KEEP THOSE STATIONS AS THEY ARE AND ACTIVELY ENCOURAGE RETIREMENTS, GET RID OF THE 'DEAD WOOD' AND DO NOT TURN FIRE STATIONS INTO HOTELS.

KEEP WHOLE TIME STAFF AT THE RIDGE.

KENT FIRE AND RESCUE SEE DAY CREWED PLUS AS WORKING AGAINST THE WORKING TIME DIRECTIVE AS YOU ARE STILL AT WORK. JOIN SURREY, WEST SUSSEX, AND KENT IN SHARING SERVICES, ENSURING A GREATER SAVING.

LOSS OF TRAINED FIREFIGHTERS.

NO CUTS.

NOT FAMILY FRIENDLY.

OF COURSE A REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF STAFF WILL AFFECT THINGS. YOU DON'T MENTION WHAT THE SHIFT SYSTEM IS. WHY?

OK IF YOU CAN GET THE FIREFIGHTERS WHO ARE PREPARED TO DO IT. IT MAY SUIT SOME WHO TRAVEL LONG DISTANCES TO WORK.

OUTRAGEOUS AGAIN, CUTS SHOULD BE MADE TO SLIM OFFICE MANAGEMENT NOT FRONTLINE SERVICES. ALSO, I UNDERSTAND IT IS FOR EFRS TO TELL THE GOVERNMENT WHAT THEY CAN CUT SAFELY AND THAT SEVERAL OTHER SERVICES HAVE WRITTEN TO STATE THEY CANNOT MAKE CUTS WITHOUT RISKING FIREFIGHTER AND PUBLIC LIVES.

PEOPLE ARE BEST TO BE ON CALL FROM FIRE STATION DURING PEAK TIMES AS INEVITABLY THERE ARE DELAYS (TRAFFIC / PEOPLE NOT AT HOME IF PAGER GOES OFF ETC.).

PROVE THAT THOSE FIREFIGHTERS ARE NEEDED.

PUTTING DAY CREW PERSONNEL ON DAY PLUS STATUS THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT MEANS THAT LESS FIREFIGHTERS WORK MORE HOURS WITH LESS REST PERIODS. THIS CANNOT BE IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF HEALTH AND SAFETY OR THE PUBLIC AT LARGE.

REDUCE MANAGEMENT COSTS.

REDUCE THE NUMBER OF BACK ROOM STAFF AND SENIOR OFFICERS, KEEP THE FIREFIGHTERS THAT ACTUALLY SAVE LIVES.

REDUCES STAFF AND HENCE JOBS.

REDUCING STAFF HOURS WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO REDUCING STAFF COMPLETELY, THOUGH SAVINGS SHOULD BE FOUND FROM SOMEWHERE OTHER THAN STAFFING AND EQUIPMENT.

REDUCTION OF SEVERAL POSTS ALWAYS MAKES ME WORRIED. ESPECIALLY IN SUCH A VITAL PUBLIC SERVICE.

REDUCTION OF STAFF OTHER THEN NON-OPERATIONAL IS UNACCEPTABLE.

REMOVE THE RETAINED PUMP FROM THE RIDGE AND LEAVE IT A SHIFT STATION.

RETAIN THE SERVICE - CAMPAIGN AGAINST PUBLIC SERVICE CUTS! THEY ENDANGER LIVES AND PEOPLE LOSE THEIR JOBS!

SECURE MORE FUNDING FOR DUTIES CARRIED OUT WHICH ARE NOT CURRENTLY A STATUTORY DUTY I.E. FLOODING.

SEE PREVIOUS ANSWER.

SEE RESPONSE TO OPTION 1. CUTS FROM THE OVER-INFLATED RANKS OF SENIOR OFFICERS FIRST WHO HAVE ALREADY TAKEN THEIR PENSIONS AND HAVE SINCE RE-ENGAGED.

STILL TOO EXPENSIVE, BETTER USE OF RDS REQUIRED.

STOP PAYING FOR CFOA MEMBERSHIPS FOR OUR PRINCIPLE OFFICERS. AS PREVIOUSLY STATED, REDUCE NON-FRONTLINE STAFF AND OVER THE TOP NUMBER OF OFFICERS TO FIREFIGHTERS. REDUCE BOROUGH COMMANDERS FROM 6 TO 3. THIS COULD BE DONE OVERNIGHT.

THE CHANCES OF LIVING FIVE MINUTES AWAY FROM A FIRE STATION THEN IS SEEN TO DOMINATE THE CHOICE OF EMPLOYEES. THE DISTANCE COVER IN FIVE MINUTES BY CAR, WOULD AGAIN DEPEND ON TRAFFIC.

THE CURRENT SYSTEM GIVES 24 HOUR COVER WITH NO DELAYS, GET RID OF ALL CFS STAFF, GET RID OF LARGE HQ BUILDING AND SENIOR OFFICERS.

THE DAY CREWED OPTION ALLOWS STAFF TO HAVE A FAMILY LIFE OUTSIDE OF THE FIRE BRIGADE. HAVING VISITORS TO STAY IS NOT THE SAME AS BEING ABLE TO PUT YOUR CHILDREN TO BED. IF THEY ARE CALLED OUT ON A LONG OVERNIGHT SHIFT WHO TAKES OVER FOR THE NEXT ONE OR DO THEY ALWAYS WORK ONE DAY ON ONE OFF - SEEMS A BIT HARSH. I DON'T KNOW ENOUGH ABOUT THE WAYS OF THE BRIGADE TO ANSWER HOWEVER, I WANT TO BE ASSURED THAT PEOPLE STILL FIND THE JOB ATTRACTIVE AND NOT AT A COST TO FAMILY LIFE. I WOULDN'T WANT MY HUSBAND ABSENT THREE OR FOUR NIGHTS A WEEK. AND I WANT MY FAMILY SAFE THAT REFRESHED FIREFIGHTERS ARE AVAILABLE ANY TIME NOT HAVING TO WORK THROUGH ENDLESSLY.

THE DAY CREWED PLUS HAS BEEN RULED OUT BY KENT FIRE AND RESCUE AUTHORITY FOR NOT COMPLYING WITH WORKING TIME REGULATIONS AND HAS DEEMED THIS SHIFT AS CONTINUOUS WORKING. IT ALSO SEES THIS SHIFT AS NOT FAMILY FRIENDLY. THE BONUS PAYABLE IS PENSIONABLE SO THE OVERALL SAVINGS ESTIMATED ARE DUBIOUS. IT ALSO RELIES ON VOLUNTEERS, WHAT IS THE PLAN IF THERE AREN'T ANY? PLEASE SEE KENT FIRE AND RESCUES 'LOOKING FORWARD TO 2020' REPORT.

THE EXISTING FIRE COVER FOR THE CITY OF BRIGHTON AND HOVE IS THE CORRECT BASED ON THE EVIDENCE PROVIDED.

THE IDEA OF RESIDING IN PODS WOULD NOT WORK. THERE ARE TOO MANY VARIABLES IN FAMILY MAKE-UP. IT COULD ALSO BE SEEN AS DECISIVE FOR SOME WITH AN OPPORTUNITY TO 'PLAY AWAY'.

THE INCREASE IN WAGES WOULD OUTWEIGH THE BENEFITS TRYING TO BE GAINED.

THE RIDGE AND ROEDEAN FIRE STATIONS ARE NOT NEEDED WITH THE REMOVAL OF THE PDAS.

THE SAME REASONS AS GIVEN FOR THE OTHER PROPOSED CUTS TO FRONT LINE EMERGENCY SERVICES.

THE WORKLOAD ON CREWS WILL LEAD TO FATIGUE AND ACCIDENTS OCCURRING. THE SYSTEM SHOULD STAY THE SAME AND YOU SHOULD LOOK TO YOUR OWN HEADQUARTERS AND SENIOR MANAGERS FOR CUTS.

THEN FIRE SERVICE HAS ALWAYS HAD A REPUTATION FOR BEING A FAMILY FRIENDLY SERVICE. HOW IS THIS FAMILY FRIENDLY MAKING YOUR FAMILY DRIVE TO SEE YOU BECAUSE YOU HAVE TO STAY ON AT THE STATION.

THERE IS A COST TO SUPPLYING AND MAINTAIN OVERNIGHT ACCOMMODATION.

THIS DOES NOT SOUND FAMILY FRIENDLY. DOES NOT AFFECT FIRE COVER DIRECTLY, BUT WOULD LEAD TO STAFF NOT BEING ABLE TO CARRY OUT AS MUCH PREVENTATIVE WORK.

THIS IS A DISGRACEFUL PROPOSAL TO FIREFIGHTERS WITH FAMILY LIFE WHO EVEN THINK OF MOVING A FAMILY ON TO A FIRE STATION EVERY SO OFTEN? THERE IS NO THOUGHT INTO THIS.

THIS IS A MAJOR CHANGE IN TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF STAFF AND SHOULD NOT BE OPEN TO CONSULTATION WITH THE PUBLIC, BUT SHOULD BE PROPERLY NEGOTIATED WITH THE UNION INSTEAD. HOW CAN I POSSIBLY KNOW AS A MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC THE IMPACT OF THIS PROPOSAL, BOTH FINANCIALLY TO THOSE AFFECTED AND TO THE PUBLIC WITH A REDUCTION IN POSTS? SAFETY IS PARAMOUNT!

THIS IS NOT A FAMILY FRIENDLY SHIFT SYSTEM, AND IS DOES NOT FIT IN WITH THE WORKING TIME REGULATIONS, THE DAY CREWED PLUS SYSTEM HAS BEEN REJECTED BY KENT FIRE SERVICE FOR THIS REASON. WHAT ARE THE START-UP COSTS (ACCOMMODATION BLOCKS?). THIS WOULD BE A VERY BUSY STATION, GREAT FOR VISITING FAMILIES, WATCHING THEIR PARTNERS GO IN AND OUT OF THE DOORS ALL NIGHT!

THIS IS NOTHING MORE THAN DRACONIAN; FIREFIGHTERS SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO SPEND TIME WITH THEIR FAMILIES IN THEIR OWN HOMES AND NOT HAVE TO REMAIN AT FIRE STATIONS FOR EXTENDED PERIODS SO AS TO CUT FIREFIGHTER POSTS. I HAVE NOT SEEN ANY PROPOSAL THAT STATES THAT BOTH THE CHIEF AND HIS SENIOR MANAGERS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO REMAIN ON A FIRE STATION AND THAT THEIR FAMILIES COULD SIMPLY VISIT THEM.

THIS MUST HAVE A SLIGHT IMPACT ON RESPONSE TIMES. SURELY IT WILL ADD AROUND 30 SECONDS TO A MINUTE TO THIS. NOT A LOT OF DIFFERENCE BUT WHEN YOU CLAIM EVERY SECOND COUNTS IN A FIRE!

THIS PROPOSAL IS NOT FAMILY FRIENDLY AND THE SERVICE SHOULD NOT BE EXPECTING IT'S EMPLOYEES TO LIVE UNDER 'HOSTEL' CONDITIONS WHEN THE TRIED AND TESTED SYSTEM HAS WORKED PERFECTLY WELL FOR A VERY LONG TIME. THE SERVICE SHOULD NOT BE MOVING BACKWARDS IN TIME JUST TO PLEASE THEIR POLITICAL PUPPETEERS.

THIS PROPOSAL MAKES HUGE ASSUMPTIONS! WHAT HAPPENS IF HOUSE PRICES RISE, INDEED, HAVE PROBABLY RISEN ALREADY IN THE AREA, MAKING IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR FIRE FIGHTERS TO LIVE WITHIN THE 5 MINUTE DISTANCE. IS ESFRS PROVIDING HOUSING SUBSIDIES? THIS ASSUMPTION COULD RESULT IN A LACK OF PROVISION.

THIS SEEMS LIKE A GOOD IDEA ALTHOUGH YOU ARE STILL GOING TO BE LOOSING LOTS OF JOBS. HOW LONG WILL THESE PEOPLE BE EXPECTED TO WORK FOR AND WHAT THE FIREFIGHTERS THINK? CAN YOU FORCE PEOPLE TO WORK THESE EXTENDED HOURS? IT SEEMS LIKE MORE INFORMATION AND RESEARCH IS NEEDED HERE.

THIS SOUNDS LIKE A HORRIBLE SHIFT SYSTEM TO WORK, MAY AS WELL BE IN PRISON!

THIS SOUNDS LIKE A TERRIBLE WAY TO CREW FIRE ENGINES. HOW CAN YOU KEEP STAFF ON SITE FOR SO LONG ESPECIALLY IF THEY DON'T TO WORK THIS SYSTEM. AS FOR FAMILY FRIENDLY THAT IS A JOKE, IT SOUNDS LIKE LIVING IN A PRISON WITH YOUR FAMILY GETTING VISITING RIGHTS. USE THESE STATIONS AS SATELLITE STATIONS TO THE OTHER NEAREST STATION. THE CREWS CAN COLLECT THE FIRE ENGINE THERE AND SPEND THE SHIFT AT THE SATELLITE STATION. YOU CAN THEN RUN THOSE PUMPS AT REDUCED CREWING I.E. FOUR NOT FIVE. NOT AS BIG A SAVING BUT LESS OUTLAY AND THE FIREFIGHTERS CAN STILL HAVE A LIFE.

THIS SOUNDS LIKE FIREFIGHTERS WILL WORK LONGER FOR LESS MONEY, I DON'T THINK IT SOUNDS EFFECTIVE, OR SAFE FOR EXHAUSTED FIREFIGHTERS TO BE OVERSTRETCHED LIKE THIS, AND AS A RESIDENT OF BRIGHTON, I DON'T WANT TO BE PUT AT RISK. I HAVE READ THAT THE CHIEF OF EAST SUSSEX FIRE BRIGADE EARNS MORE THAN THE PRIME MINISTER, AT £150,000; CAN HE NOT COME UP WITH SOME BETTER PROPOSALS? CUTTING HIS SALARY AND 18K CAR ALLOWANCE WOULD ALSO SAVE SOME MONEY. COULD THE NUMBER OF PRINCIPAL OFFICERS IN EAST SUSSEX BE CUT DOWN? IS THERE THE SAME NUMBER IN THE WHOLE OF SCOTLAND AS THERE ARE IN EAST SUSSEX?

THIS WOULD MEAN THE LOSS OF AROUND 24 FIREFIGHTER POSTS AND AN INCREASED PRESSURE FOR THOSE WHO WORK THE DC AND SYSTEM. IT IS FAR FROM FAMILY FRIENDLY AND WOULD IMPACT ON FEMALE FIREFIGHTERS THE HARDEST.

THIS WOULD REDUCE THE NUMBER OF FIREFIGHTERS IN THESE AREAS, AND WOULD MEAN PEOPLE WORKING LONG HOURS AND DAYS AWAY FROM THEIR FAMILIES!

TO HAVE FAMILY AND FRIENDS STAY IN FIRE STATIONS OVERNIGHT OR AT WEEKENDS IS NOT FAMILY FRIENDLY FOR BOTH PARTNERS AND THEIR CHILDREN OR DEPENDENT RELATIVES.

TO KEEP FIREFIGHTERS ON THEIR STATION FOR THIS AMOUNT OF TIME IS NOT A FAMILY FRIENDLY SYSTEM, WHAT ABOUT THEIR CHILDREN DO THEY NOT SEE THEIR PARENTS FOR 4 DAYS! FIREFIGHTERS WOULD BE BURNT OUT WITH THIS SYSTEM WHICH PAYS LESS THAN THE MINIMUM WAGE PER HOUR!

TO WHAT EXTENT WILL THIS SAVE MONEY AND HOW MANY CREW WOULD BE REDUCED FOLLOWING THE CHANGE OF DUTY SYSTEM ALLOWING FOR ACCOMMODATION COST?

USE THE MONEY BEING WASTED ON THE COMBINED SUSSEX CONTROL CENTRE. 76K POUNDS A MONTH FOR EMPTY BUILDING. THIS DOESN'T MAKE SENSE. THE MONEY CAN BE USED TO MAINTAIN PROPER FIRE COVER AS IT IS NOW.

WASTE OF MONEY, NOT FAMILY FRIENDLY, STAFF TRAPPED 'FINANCIALLY' DUE TO ADDITIONAL PAYMENT THEY GET, WILL END UP WITH PEOPLE GOING THERE TO TOP PENSIONS UP!

WE ALL KNOW YOU WANT RID OF US PENSIONERS. BURNING US WOULD BE RIGHT UP YOUR STREET!

WE ALL NEED A FULL TIME FIRE SERVICE TO MAKE SURE THE LIVES OF PEOPLE ARE MET AND ALSO AS MANY AS POSSIBLE JOBS ARE SECURE.

WE NEED MORE FIREFIGHTERS NOT FEWER.

WHAT CENTURY IS THIS? THIS SEEMS LIKE A VICTORIAN STYLE WORKING SHIFT, I DON'T WANT EXHAUSTED FIREFIGHTERS DEALING WITH INCIDENTS. ALSO, IF YOU LOSE A PUMP FROM THE CITY THIS WILL MAKE ROEDEAN BUSIER?

WHAT DO THE FIREFIGHTERS WHO YOU ARE EXPECTING TO DO THIS TO SAY? YOU DO NOT MENTION THEIR OPINIONS, WHY NOT?

WHY GO TO THE EXPENSE OF CHANGING SYSTEM AND PROVIDING EXTRA ACCOMMODATION IF 'RESPONSE TIMES WILL BE UNCHANGED'. OR DOES IT INVOLVE JOB CUTTING?

WORK MORE CLOSELY WITH TRADE UNIONS AND STAFF ASSOCIATIONS PLUS THE ASSOCIATION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES BEFORE BEING RUSHED INTO A SHORT TERM CHANGE WITH LONG TERM IMPLICATIONS.

YOU ARE EXPECTING FIREFIGHTERS TO GIVE UP EVEN MORE OF THEIR FREE TIME FOR A TOKEN RECOMPENSE. VISITING, COMFORTABLE?! MORE LIKE AN OPEN PRISON. IF THINGS ARE THAT BAD SEEK ADDITIONAL FUNDING THROUGH COUNCIL TAX RISES.

YOU DO NOT EXPLAIN THE COST IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW LIVING ARRANGEMENTS. IF A FIREFIGHTER IS HAPPY TO BE ON STATION FOR 4 STRAIGHT DAYS WITHOUT BEING ABLE TO LEAVE, WHILST SEEING THEIR PAY REDUCED TO NEAR MINIMUM WAGE, THAT IS UP TO THEM. MY CONCERN WOULD BE WITH FORCING PEOPLE INTO THIS POSITION. SOMEONE LIKE MYSELF JUST STARTING A FAMILY WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO WORK THIS SYSTEM. HAVE ENOUGH FIREFIGHTERS EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN THIS SYSTEM? AND ARE THE FULL FACTS AVAILABLE TO THEM? DOES THE FIRE AUTHORITY KNOW HOW MUCH THIS IS REALLY GOING TO COST? ARE THEY AWARE THAT ALL THE PROPOSED SAVINGS FOR THE COMBINED CONTROL CENTRES HAVE ALREADY BEEN LOST THROUGH POOR MANAGEMENT AND DECISION MAKING? THIS IS AN OUTRAGEOUS PROPOSAL UNTIL ALL THE FACTS ARE PRESENT.

YOU DO NOT GIVE ENOUGH INFORMATION TO MAKE AN INFORMED CHOICE HERE! WHAT LENGTH SHIFT PATTERNS ARE THEY? WON'T THE FIREFIGHTERS BECOME FATIGUED CREATING A LESSER SERVICE WHEN THEY RESPOND?

YOU WILL BE TAKING FIREFIGHTERS AWAY FROM THEIR FAMILIES. IT'S IMPORTANT TO HAVE A GOOD WORK, LIFE BALANCE AND THIS WOULD NOT BE ACHIEVED. GET RID OF THE WATCH MANAGER POSITION AND JUST HAVE CREW MANAGERS. THEY WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE CREW AND YOU COULD ALL OPERATE ON SHOUTS.

Phase 3 Proposals

1) FIRE FIGHTERS DO ENOUGH NOW. REVIEW USUALLY MEANS 'CUT'. 4) SMALLER APPLIANCES MIGHT BE A GOOD IDEA IN CRAMPED CITY STREETS. 9) YES, CHARGE TIME WASTERS. 11) NO TO REMOVING APPLIANCE IN LEWES.

1. - THE SERVICE SURVIVES IN MOST AREAS DUE TO THE RETAINED AND THEY SHOULD BE SUPPORTED AND ENHANCED. 2. - C.A.R.P'S ARE ALREADY PROVING NATIONALLY TO BE AN INADEQUATE AND UNSAFE RESOURCE. 3. - POSSIBLY. 4. - GOOD IDEA. 5. - YES. TOO MUCH MONEY SITTING AROUND DOING NOTHING AND OVERBEARING TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR OPERATORS. ALL SERVICE INVOLVEMENT WITH THE TYPES OF INCIDENT THE TRUE SUPPORT COULD BE DONE BY ONE SPECIALIST STATION WHERE ALL THIS TYPE OF RESOURCE (WATER CARRIER, ANIMAL RESCUE, TRU, HVP, ROPE RESCUE, CONTROL UNITS, ETC.) COULD BE ACCOMMODATED WITHOUT THE DISRUPTION CAUSED TO MULTIPLE STATIONS CARRYING A SINGLE OR TWO EXTRA SPECIALITIES. 6. - DEFINITELY AGREE. 7. - AGREE. 8. - AGREE. 9. - DEFINITELY AGREE. 10. - DISAGREE. 11. - AGREE. 12. - DEFINITELY AGREE. NO JUSTIFICATION FOR THIS RESOURCE. SHOULD BE A NATIONAL/ARMED FORCES RESPONSE. 13. - DEFINITELY AGREE, SERVICE MUST CHARGE ALL USERS ACROSS THE BOARD FOR THIS TYPE OF SUPPORT.

1. AGREE, A COST RESILIENCE REVIEW ALSO CONSIDERING TRAINING BURDEN AND ACTUAL COMPETENCE RATHER THAN NUMBER OF PERSONNEL. 2. DISAGREE; CONDUCT A FULL REVIEW OF THE FIRST ARP RELIABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS BEFORE COMMITTING TO FUTURE VEHICLES.

1. CUT STAFF (OFFICE) - YOU SAY YOU WANT FIREFIGHTERS TO WORK TILL THEY ARE 60+, IF THEY CAN'T STAY FIT PUT THEM IN THE OFFICE, THEREBY CUTTING DOWN ON CIVILIAN STAFF AND THUS CUTTING MORE MONEY. 2. FIREFIGHTERS COULD DO THE SMOKE ALARM JOBS, EITHER THAT OR GET THE RETAINED CREWS TO DO THE SMOKE ALARM JOBS WHICH ARE DONE BY CIVILIANS RIGHT NOW. 3. STOP DOING THINGS LIKE THIS AS THIS COSTS THOUSANDS?

1.6.8.10.12.13. REVIEW ADMIN COSTS, STORES PURCHASE, NUMBER OF PEOPLE SECONDED ON PROJECTS, RETIRED FIREMEN ROE EMPLOYED ON CIVILIAN POSTS, OVER ESTABLISHMENT OF RANKS ABOVE HOME OFFICE REQUIREMENTS.

1/2/6/7/10!

12, 11, 9.

12. 11, 9.

12. THIS PROVISION SHOULD BE STOPPED AND THE EQUIPMENT SOLD OFF.

13 - SHOULD BE A LAST RESORT. 1 AND 3 SHOULD BE PRIORITIES.

2, WHY SPEND MORE MONEY REPLACING AERIAL WITH A MACHINE THAT WILL REDUCE THE AERIAL CAPABILITY IN TWO AREAS WITH MULTIPLE HIGH RISE PREMISES. 8. WHY EVEN DO IT IN A TIME OF AUSTERITY. 12. HOW OFTEN DOES IT GET MOBILISED AND CAN THE COST BE PASSED TO THE OPERATOR. 13. IF KENT CAN'T PROVIDE THEIR OWN ANIMAL RESCUE THEN I WOULD DEARLY HOPE THAT ESFRS IS CHARGING THEM FOR INCIDENTS THAT THEY ATTEND.

3. WHY HAVE YOU NOT NAMED THE STATIONS AS IN THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT? 10 AND 11. ARE THESE JUST TO COVER UP FAILINGS IN ATTENDANCE STANDARDS ELSEWHERE? 10. HOW WILL YOU RECRUIT ADEQUATE RETAINED STAFF FOR CROWBOROUGH?

4, 9 12.

4, 9, 11.

4

9

A COMPLETE REVIEW OF HOW THE SERVICE IS OPERATED IS NECESSARY IN THE CURRENT FINANCIAL CLIMATE.

A RETURN TO REGIONAL MANAGEMENT OF THE SERVICE WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE IN REDUCING COSTS.

AERIAL PUMPS ARE A WASTE OF MONEY THEY DON'T PERFORM WELL.

AERIAL RESCUE PUMP IN EASTBOURNE HAS HAD TERRIBLE PERFORMANCE REPORTS FROM THE FIREFIGHERS TRAINING WITH THE APPLIANCE. IS ANYBODY LISTENING TO THEIR FEEDBACK BEFORE PURCHASING MORE APPLIANCES THAT ARE NOT FIT FOR PURPOSE?

AERIAL RESCUE PUMPS ARE A WASTE OF MONEY. THEY DO NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY OR FUNCTIONALITY OF A DEDICATED AERIAL APPLIANCE. THEY ARE EXTREMELY LARGE AND HEAVY AND ARE NOT SUITABLE FOR ACCESSING LARGE AREAS OF OUR TOWNS AND CITIES. THEY REMOVE YOUR DEDICATED AERIAL ABILITY AND COMMIT THE ENTIRE APPLIANCE AND CREW TO ANY AERIAL INCIDENT. SIMILARLY IF THEY ARE IN ATTENDANCE AT ANOTHER TYPE OF INCIDENT HOW DOES IT GET RELEASED TO ATTEND ANY NEW AERIAL INCIDENT?

AGREE WITH NUMBER 8. AGREE WITH NUMBER 12.

AGREE WITH R1, FAR TOO MUCH MONEY IS WASTED ON TOO MANY PERSONNEL TURNING IN AND THE WRONG COVER PROVIDED. TOTALLY DISAGREE WITH R2. AGREE R3. R4 IS UNCLEAR AS TO WHAT FOR. R5 MAYBE RELOCATE TO WHOLE TIME STATIONS. R6 RETAINED SHOULD HAVE A MANAGER WHO IS WHOLE TIME TO HELP WITH THE CORRECT TRAINING. R7 DISAGREE. R8 AGREE. R9 DISAGREE. R10 AND R11 NEITHER AGREE OR DISAGREE. R12 AGREE. R13 DISAGREE.

ALL APPEARS TO BE EMINENTLY SENSIBLE.

ALL LOOKS GOOD BUT AN AWFUL LOT OF WORK TO REVIEW AND INVESTIGATE.

ALL OF THESE ARE USEFUL TASKS OF THE FIRE SERVICE.

ALL THESE REVIEWS SEEM TO BE AFFECTING THE SERVICE PROVIDED DIRECTLY TO THE COMMUNITY. WHY AREN'T THERE MORE REVIEWS INTO SENIOR MANAGEMENT ROLES? I HAVE HEARD THAT AERIAL RESCUE PUMPS ARE VERY UNPOPULAR AND THAT OTHER SERVICES HAVE BEEN GETTING RID OF THEM.

AMALGAMATE EAST AND WEST SUSSEX TO REDUCE DUPLICATION.

ANY REVISIONS OF THE UCKFIELD FIRE STATION MUST TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE INCREASE OF HOUSING (OVER 1000 NEW HOMES TO BE BUILT) AND THE FIRE RISK IMPLICATIONS NOT ONLY IN PRIVATE HOUSING, BUT THE INCREASE IN RTA'S WHERE FIRE CREW ASSISTANCE MAY BE REQUIRED.

ARP APPLIANCES ARE EXPENSIVE MACHINES THAT HAVE FAILED ALL OVER THE COUNTRY! THEY ARE NOT THE WAY FORWARD! ONCE HOSE LINES ARE COMMITTED INTO A BUILDING IT BECOMES IMPOSSIBLE TO RE-SITE APPLIANCE TO PERFORM RESCUES WITH LADDER PACKAGE! PUMPING AND AERIAL WORKING ARE TWO VERY DIFFERENT JOBS WHICH HAVE TO WORK INDEPENDENTLY FROM EACH OTHER! PLEASE STOP THIS ATTACK ON OUR FRONTLINE SERVICE.

ARP'S DO NOT WORK. NO ONE HAS BROUGHT ANY APART FROM ESFRS. WAKE UP - THEY ARE DANGEROUS. CLOSING RDS STATIONS WILL SAVE NOTHING - THINK HOW MUCH MONEY COULD HAVE BEEN SAVED IF THE JOINT CONTROL CENTRE WASN'T DELAYED AGAIN AND AGAIN. STOP CUTTING THE FRONTLINE - IT'S NOT YOUR LIFE YOU ARE PUTTING AT RISK.

AS AN INFECTION PREVENTION NURSE WE ARE NOW HAVING TO GO BACK INTO SCHOOLS TO TEACH HAND HYGIENE BECAUSE PEOPLE DON'T REALISE WHY OR KNOW HOW TO DO IT PROPERLY. IT WAS THOUGHT PARENTS OR TEACHERS WOULD BUT THE REALITY IS THAT BECAUSE WE DIDN'T TEACH PEOPLE THEY DON'T. DON'T ASSUME CHILDREN WILL LEARN FROM THEIR PARENTS, MANY WON'T. DO INSURANCE COMPANIES PAY FOR FIRE SERVICES? IF YOU DO A GOOD JOB THEY PAY OUT LESS. COULD YOU

CHARGE FOR SOME SERVICES?

AS STATED LOOK INTO THE AREAS THAT HAVE BEEN CREATED OVER THE YEARS, THAT ARE NOT NECESSARILY IMPORTANT, THEY ARE NOT OF ANY USE WHEN INCIDENTS ARISE. AFTER ALL PREVENTION IS VERY GOOD, BUT WITH THE BEST WILL IN THE WORLD, DISASTERS AND INCIDENTS WILL ARISE, AND IT IS THEN THAT THE RESOURCES ARE NEEDED.

CALLS ARE GOING DOWN, REDUCTION IN FRONTLINE STAFF, BETWEEN 50-80, YET YOU STILL NEED THE SAME NUMBER OF BRIGADE MANAGERS - REVIEW THE BRIGADE MANAGER ROLE AND REVIEW THE CALLS THAT THEY GO OUT TO, ARE THEY STILL NEEDED?

CAMPAIGN AGAINST THESE CUTS AS WE NEED A PROPERLY FUNDED FIRE SERVICE!

CANNOT BELIEVE THAT YOU ARE THINKING OF REMOVING THE CURRENT AERIAL COVER IN THE CITY AND REPLACING IT WITH AN UNTRIED APPLIANCE THAT WILL GIVE LESS EFFECTIVE CAPABILITIES.

CARPS HAVE PROVED TO BE A NATIONAL DISASTER. DO NOT BUY THEM. THEY ARE NEITHER A GOOD HEIGHT VEHICLE OR PUMPING APPLIANCE. THEY WILL BE TOO BIG FOR NARROW STREETS AROUND HOVE AND BRIGHTON. CEASING OF MARITIME RESPONSE AND ANIMAL RESCUE SHOULD BE PUT IN PLACE BEFORE CUTTING EMERGENCY FIRE COVER TO THE PUBLIC. REVIEW NEEDS FOR THREE PRINCIPLE OFFICERS. ONE IS SUFFICIENT FOR SCOTLAND, SO WHY DOES EAST SUSSEX NEED SO MANY! CALL CHALLENGING PUTS THE PUBLIC AT RISK EVEN FURTHER.

CONTINUE REVIEW. BUY PUMPS. RURAL AREAS: LOW NUMBERS BUT STILL DESERVE A GOOD SERVICE: A RURAL FIRE JUST AS SERIOUS AND NEEDS RAPID ATTENDANCE! YES TO SMALLER APPLIANCES OR DIFFERENT TRANSPORT MECHANISMS. SHARE SOME SERVICES WITH KENT.

CROWBOROUGH BEING THE LARGEST INLAND TOWN IN SUSSEX AND HAVING A POOR DANGEROUS ROAD CONNECTION WITH UCKFIELD WOULD SEE FAR HIGHER RESPONSE TIME, IF IT WAS A RETAINED STATION, BUT DUE TO THE EXPENSE AND NATURE OF PROVIDING LARGE ANIMAL RESCUE TO A LIMITED NUMBER OF THE COMMUNITY, I FEEL IF ANYTHING IS CHANGED THIS SHOULD BE LOOKED AT. BETTER USE OF RESOURCES AND FINANCE POSSIBLY IN THE HIGHER LEVELS OF THE STRUCTURE SHOULD BE LOOKED AT BEFORE FRONTLINE SERVICES ARE AFFECTED AS THE TAX PAYER IS PAYING FOR THE LEVEL OF SERVICE CURRENTLY PROVIDED AND EXPECTS NO LESS. THE TAXATION CAN NOT ALWAYS BE DIRECTED UP COUNTRY TO SUBSIDISE THESE AREAS AT THE DETRIMENT OF THE SOUTHERN TAXPAYER.

CROWBOROUGH IS NOT TO BE AN OPTION FOR CUTTING, THEY ARE THE ONLY FULLY MANNED SERVICE LEFT IN OUR TOWN, THESE GUYS AND GIRLS COVER A VAST AREA AS WELL AS THE TOWN. IN AN EMERGENCY WE NEED SOME COVER WHICH THEY GIVE. I HAVE EXPERIENCED WAITING FOR THEM COMING WITH BLUES AND TWO'S GOING AND DRIVING AT FULL THROTTLE, IT DOES NOT SEEM QUICK ENOUGH! IF THEY WERE TO COME FROM UCKFIELD THAT WOULD BE AT LEAST ANOTHER EIGHT MINUTES TO THE CENTRE OF TOWN, DEATH?

CUTBACK ON PRINCIPLE OFFICERS, ESFRS HAS AS MANY AS THE SCOTTISH FIRE SERVICE. ALL OF THESE CUTS ARE FRONTLINE, THIS IS PLACING THE PUBLIC AT DIRECT RISK. CARRY OUT NON FRONTLINE CUTS AS THE SPENDING REVIEW SUGGESTS, REDUCE BOROUGH'S AND BOROUGH COMMANDERS FROM 6 TO 3. CARRY OUT A FULL MANAGEMENT RESTRUCTURING, THIS WILL PROTECT THE FRONTLINE SERVICES THAT APPEAR TO BE BEING TARGETED BY SENIOR OFFICERS.

CUTTING RETAINED STATIONS CAN BE COST EFFECTIVE BUT ALSO DANGEROUS TO THE POPULATION. I THINK THE COMMUNITIES CONCERNED WOULD BE VERY UNHAPPY ABOUT THEIR LEVEL OF COVER BEING DROPPED.

DAY CREWED PLUS IS OUTRAGEOUS FOR THE FIREFIGHTERS AND THEIR FAMILIES. ALL REVIEWS HERE TARGET FRONTLINE. WHAT ABOUT OTHER AREAS OF THE SERVICE? ALSO, WHAT ABOUT FIGHTING TO ACTUALLY GET FUNDING FROM THE GOVERNMENT FOR RTC ATTENDANCE?

DEFINITELY REVIEW 6, 8, AND 12.

DISAGREE WITH 6, 10, 11, AND 12.

DO LIKE THE POLICE HAVE WITH THE PCC - REPLACE THE FIRE AUTHORITY WITH ONE PERSON. STOP PRINTING LOTS OF THINGS AND DO IT ONLINE INSTEAD. CHARGE PEOPLE FOR REPEAT FALSE ALARMS. LOOK AT NEW WAYS TO MAKE MONEY THROUGH INSPECTIONS OR FINES.

DO NOT PURCHASE AERIAL RESCUE PUMPS AS THEY DO NOT WORK. CAN MARITIME RESPOND, AND ANIMAL RESCUE, UNLESS FUNDED FROM GOVERNMENT. DO NOT CHARGE FOR FALSE ALARMS.

DO NOT UNDERSTAND REVIEWS.

DON'T CUT ANYMORE FIRE ENGINES! KEEP CURRENT TALL AERIAL FIRE ENGINES THEY DO THE JOB DON'T SPEND ON OTHER ONES!

DUE TO THE GEOGRAPHY AND HEIGHT OF BUILDINGS IN HASTINGS AN AERIAL PUMP WOULD NOT SUIT, EASTBOURNE HAS HAD ONE FOR SOME TIME AND NOT YET IN USE. THIS IS MISLEADING BECAUSE IT DOES NOT EXPLAIN WHAT THIS APPLIANCE IS AND ITS LIMITATIONS. SCHOOLS EDUCATION PROGRAMME WORKS, BUT THE BUDGET WAS LOW. FIREFIGHTERS OFFERED SOME GOODWILL TO WORK AT LOWER RATES BUT WERE UNDERCUT BY A RUBBISH OFFER WHICH WAS AN INSULT. TROUBLE WITH CHARGING FOR 'FALSE ALARMS' IS THEY WON'T GET CALLED IN AND COULD BE THE WRONG CALL. ADDITIONAL. IT IS CLAIMED THAT, IN REGARDS TO BATTLE FIRE STATION, THERE IS NO DAY COVER AT WEEKENDS. THIS IS UNTRUE. BATTLE IS ALREADY COVERED 7 DAYS A WEEK! REMOVAL OF THE RETAINED IN HASTINGS WILL AFFECT THE LOCAL SAFETY. YOUR CONSULTATION PITCHES ONE TOWN'S SAFETY AGAINST ANOTHER, THIS IS HARDLY FAIR OR HUMANE. LOOK ELSEWHERE FOR SAVINGS. NOTICE THE HIGHEST PAID MEMBERS OF THE FIRE SERVICE ARE NOT TOUCHED.

EACH AND EVERY OPTION HAS TO BE EXPLORED. WHAT ABOUT SHARED SERVICES / OFFICES WITH THE BOROUGHS, DISTRICTS, COUNTY OR OTHER EMERGENCY SERVICES?

EVERYTHING SHOULD BE REVIEWED BUT, WHERE APPLICABLE, ENSURING THAT RESPONSE TIMES AND CAPABILITY ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED.

GO FOR IT!

GO FOR REVIEW 1. ALSO, DEFINITELY CONSIDER CHARGING FOR FALSE ALARMS WHERE THE INCIDENCE AT ANY ONE LOCATION IS ABNORMAL. ALSO, CONSIDER CHARGING FOR NON-URGENT / NON-ESSENTIAL CALL OUTS.

HAVE YOU REDUCED THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE AT THE TOP? REVIEW THE WAGES OF SENIOR MANAGERS?

I AGREE WITH REVIEW 9, BUT ALSO SEE AS YOU HAVE CUTS ALREADY TO PEOPLE'S JOBS, THE BUILDINGS YOU HAVE ARE GETTING SMALLER. WHY DON'T YOU JUST SELL THEM AND SOMETHING SMALLER AND CHEAPER TO MAINTAIN? OR HIRE OUT TO COMPANY MEETINGS ETC. INSTEAD. POTENTIALLY YOU COULD SAVE MONEY FROM THAT.

I AGREE WITH REVIEW 9, PEOPLE WHO FALSELY CALL OUT THE FIRE SERVICE SHOULD BE FINED FOR WASTED USE OF A PUBLIC SERVICE THAT COULD BE NEEDED ELSEWHERE.

I AM AGAINST REDUCTION IN SERVICE FOR ANY SECTION.

I AM HAPPY WITH THE PHASE 3 OPTIONS THAT ARE SUMMARISED ABOVE.

I AM NOT QUALIFIED TO COMMENT. ANY CHANGES NEED A FULL RISK ASSESSMENT IN TERMS OF SAFETY AND PREVENTION OF INJURY. A LOT OF THE ISSUES ARE ON TERMS AND CONDITIONS WHICH SHOULD BE NEGOTIATED WITH THE UNIONS.

I BELIEVE MORE TEACHING IN SCHOOLS IS NECESSARY TO HELP OUR NEW GENERATION TO GROW SENSIBLY. MY OWN PERSONAL INTERVENTION AT SCHOOL WAS AMAZING AND I LEARNED HOW IMPORTANT THE EMERGENCY SERVICES ARE. THEY DON'T DO THIS IN SCHOOLS TODAY AND BELIEVE THIS IS WHERE A LOT OF CHILDREN'S KNOWLEDGE IS LOST.

I BELIEVE THAT THE CONCEPT OF COUNTY FORCES IS OUTDATED AND SERVICES SHOULD BE COMBINED WHERE POSSIBLE REDUCING HEAD OFFICE COSTS. SIMILARLY ALL THE 999 SERVICES SHOULD LOOK AT WHERE SAVINGS COULD BE ACHIEVED BY SHARING ADMINISTRATION AND FACILITIES.

I CONSIDER A FAR MORE STRATEGIC OPTION NEEDS TO BE EXPLORED INVOLVING OTHER COUNTIES TO HARNESS THE ADVANTAGES OF IT MORE EFFECTIVELY AND TO GENERATE ECONOMIES OF SCALE.

I DO NOT HAVE THE SKILL OR EXPERIENCE TO EVALUATE THESE ISSUES.

I FEEL I HAVE MADE MY OPINIONS CLEAR REGARDING THE CHANGE IN DUTY SYSTEM AND DECREASED NUMBER OF FIREFIGHTERS. I WOULD ALSO SUGGEST THAT THE NEW LOCALITY MANAGER POST IS FARCICAL. MY UNDERSTANDING IS THIS WILL MEAN WATCH MANAGERS DOING STATION OFFICERS JOBS AND CREW MANAGERS DOING WATCH MANAGERS JOBS ALL FOR THE SAME AMOUNT OF MONEY AND IN A SLEEP DEPRIVED STATE. HOW CAN THIS NOT AFFECT JUDGEMENT AND MOTIVATION? I'M NOT IMPRESSED BY THE CONSTANT USE OF 'REVIEW' ESPECIALLY IN RELATION TO POINT 8 AND SURELY REVIEW 2, 4, 5, 7, 12, 13 ARE ALL POINTS THAT SHOULD ALREADY HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED AND DETAILED AS PART OF THE PROPOSALS.

I FEEL IT IS APPROPRIATE TO CHARGE CALLERS FOR FALSE ALARMS AND ATTENDANCE AT REPEATED EVENTS THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED.

I FEEL MOST OF THIS IS FOR EXPERTS, THAT IS, PEOPLE WORKING IN THE SYSTEM, TO COMMENT. IT IS REASSURING TO KNOW REVIEWS ARE BEING CARRIED OUT.

I FEEL THAT I AM NOT QUALIFIED TO COMMENT BUT I DO NOT FEEL THAT NO LIVES SHOULD BE PUT AT RISK TO SAVE MONEY. REVIEW 9 IS A GOOD IDEA.

I FIND IT DIFFICULT TO COMMENT. I WOULD LIKE MORE INFORMATION AND HAVEN'T GOT TIME AT THE MOMENT TO LOOK INTO IT. I WISH YOU LUCK IN SAVING THE MONEY, A DIFFICULT TASK AND I WILL HAVE TO LEAVE IT TO THE PROFESSIONALS TO MAKE THE DIFFICULT DECISIONS.

I HAVE READ AND HEARD THAT THE ARP'S YOU TALK ABOUT PURCHASING ARE NOT FIT FOR PURPOSE, PERHAPS TRIAL THE ONE YOU HAVE AT EASTBOURNE BEFORE COMMITTING TO ANOTHER PURCHASE. WOULD SMALLER VEHICLES PROVIDE THE SAME SERVICE AS LARGER VEHICLES? REVIEW 7. PLEASE TELL ME IF THERE IS ANY COMPUTER SYSTEM IN THE WORLD WHICH IS ABLE TO PREDICT WHEN A SERIOUS FIRE WILL OCCUR? REVIEW 9. CALL CHALLENGING, HOW CAN YOU TELL THE PERSON YOU ARE TALKING TO HAVE THE ABILITY TO SAY IF THE FIRE SERVICE IS REQUIRED / NEEDED? SURELY SENDING THE ACTUAL FIRE SERVICE TO CHECK WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATE.

I LIVE IN HEATHFIELD, CURRENTLY I UNDERSTAND THAT IT IS RETAINED, BUT FREQUENTLY IS UNAVAILABLE TO ATTEND INCIDENTS THROUGHOUT THE DAY DUE TO LACK OF CREW AVAILABLE. THERE SEEMS TO BE A DRIVE TO INCREASING THE NUMBER OF RETAINED, IF CROWBOROUGH WAS TO BECOME RETAINED THEN THE PROBLEM OF CREWS NOT BEING AVAILABLE WOULD ONLY INCREASE. THE WHOLE RETAINED SYSTEM IS SURELY OUTDATED IN THE 21ST CENTURY. THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO NOW LIVE AND WORK IN THE SAME TOWN IS COMPLETELY DIFFERENT TO WHEN THE SYSTEM WAS FIRST USED. I CANNOT SEE HOW EMPLOYERS CAN AFFORD FOR THEIR STAFF TO DROP EVERYTHING TO ATTEND AN EMERGENCY CALL; THE SAME WOULD APPLY FOR SELF-EMPLOYED PEOPLE. THE FIRE SERVICE WOULD HAVE FIRE ENGINES IN STATIONS, BUT WITH NO CREWS TO MAN THEM, THAT IS NOT PROVIDING A FIRE SERVICE, FIRE ENGINES ARE POINTLESS WITHOUT CREWS TO MAN THEM!

I SEE NOTHING ABOUT DOWNSIZING MANAGEMENT, SHARING SERVICES OR REDUCING BACK OFFICE FUNCTIONS.

I SUGGEST YOU LOOK VERY SERIOUSLY AT SAVINGS TO BE MADE IN MANAGEMENT VIA THAN CUTTING FRONTLINE STAFF.

I THINK THE DAY CREW PLUS IS A FANTASTIC IDEA. ISN'T IT WHAT THE AMERICANS ALREADY DO?

I THINK THE PROPOSAL PUT FORWARD BY THE FBU IN THE SOUTH AND SOUTH EAST FOR NINE FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICES (BERKSHIRE, BUCKINGHAMSHIRE, EAST SUSSEX, HAMPSHIRE, KENT, ISLE OF WIGHT, AND OXFORDSHIRE,) TO ACHIEVE THE REQUIRED SCALE OF SERVICES WITHOUT REDUCTION OF FRONTLINE STAFF. THE BIGGEST SAVING WOULD BE THE REDUCTION OF NINE PRINCIPLE MANAGEMENT TEAMS TO ONE, AS I UNDERSTAND HAS BEEN ACHIEVED IN SCOTLAND.

I THINK THE PURCHASE OF TWO AERIAL RESCUE PUMPS FOR THE CITY OF BRIGHTON AND HOVE WOULD PROVE TO BE EXCELLENT SAVINGS.

I THINK THESE ARE ALL VIABLE AREAS FOR REVIEW.

I UNDERSTAND THAT THERE HAS BEEN AN ISSUE WITH THE CREWING OF THE SECOND FIRE ENGINE AT LEWES FOR SEVERAL YEARS. IF IT IS NOT AVAILABLE FOR LONG PERIODS AND HAS LOW ACTIVITY WHEN AVAILABLE THEN IT MAKES SENSE TO REMOVE IT. NOT SURE ABOUT THE UPGRADE OF UCKFIELD AND LEWES AS IF CALLS ARE REDUCING THEN WHY UPGRADE. IF YOU ARE THINKING OF UPGRADING LEWES WHY NOT PUT THE NEW STATION BETWEEN LEWES AND BRIGHTON? (A27 AREA) THIS WILL ALLOW PROVIDE COVER IN THE LEWES AREA AND BACK UP FOR THE CITY AS WELL. WITH UCKFIELD WHY NOT PUT A STATION BETWEEN UCKFIELD AND CROWBOROUGH AND COVER BOTH TOWNS FROM ONE STATION. (FIVE ASH DOWN)?

I WOULD ASK YOU TO LOOK TO OTHER SERVICES FOR THEIR LEARNING OUTCOMES FROM SIMILAR CHANGES. RETAINED SUPPORT MANAGERS DON'T WORK IN ALL AREAS, THEY OFTEN RESULT IN A GREATER DEGREE OF MANAGERIAL SUPPORT NEEDING TO BE PROVIDED TO SUPPORT MANAGERS RATHER THAN FREEING UP MANAGERIAL TIME, AND MERSEYSIDE TRIED SOMETHING SIMILAR. I DON'T BELIEVE THAT ARPS ARE SUITABLE FOR TOWNS SUCH AS HASTINGS OR CITIES DUE TO SIGNIFICANT LIMITATIONS ON ACCESS TO RISKS.

I WOULD LIKE ESFRS TO ENSURE THAT ALL ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS / POSTS ARE REVIEWED, AS CURRENTLY SOME ARE GENEROUSLY STAFFED AND THEREFORE COULD PRODUCE FURTHER SAVINGS.

I WOULD LIKE TO SEE A BETTER BRAKE DOWN ON THE FIREFIGHTERS WAGE AS THIS INCLUDES FIREFIGHTERS AND OFFICERS; THIS SHOULD BE SPLIT SO WE CAN SEE WHERE WAGES ARE GOING. OTHER DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE LOOKED AT BEFORE ATTACKING FRONTLINE POSTS AND NO MATTER HOW YOU TRY AND WASH THINGS OVER, CUTS SHOULD START FROM THE TOP. THE PRINCIPLES, OFFICER'S WAGES ARE BASED ON THE AMOUNT OF STAFF IN THE WORKFORCE I EXPECT THEIR WAGES TO DROP IN LINE WITH THE SIZE OF THE WORK FORCE. AS MEMBERS OF THE AUTHORITY YOU HAVE A DUTY TO DO WHAT IS RIGHT FOR THE PEOPLE OF SUSSEX AND WHAT CUTS DO HAVE TO COME IN, IT IS DONE FOR THE SAVING NOT POLITICAL REASONS. IF YOU ARE DECIDING WHAT IS GOING TO HAPPEN WHAT IS THE NEED FOR THE 4 PRINCIPLE OFFICERS?

I WOULD SOONER SACK THE IDIOT THAT CAME UP WITH THE VARIOUS REVIEWS ABOVE, I DO NOT SUPPORT ANY REVIEW THAT SEEKS TO IMPLEMENT DRACONIAN PROPOSALS THAT WILL SEE FIREFIGHTERS LIVING ON FIRE STATIONS FOR EXTENDED HOURS SUCH AS DAY CREW PLUS. NEITHER DO I SUPPORT THE INTRODUCTION OF SMALLER APPLIANCES THAT WILL DO NOTHING OR LITTLE UNTIL THE ATTENDANCE OF A FULLY CREWED APPLIANCE.

I WOULD SUPPORT THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE CHIEF OFFICER. HOWEVER, AS ALREADY STATED, HE NEEDS IMPROVED COOPERATION FROM HIS POLITICAL MASTERS. THE HAILSHAM STATION WOULD SEEM TO OFFER AN EXAMPLE OF HOW TO ACHIEVE GOOD VALUE. THIS MODEL SHOULD BE USED AT MORE STATIONS.

I'M WORRIED ABOUT THE IMPACT OF THE AFOREMENTIONED REVIEWS, IN PARTICULAR REVIEW NUMBER 2 WHERE WOULD THE NEXT PROPER TURNTABLE LADDER FOR FIRES IN HOTELS AND FLATS COME FROM IF YOUR PROPOSING TO GET RID OF THE ONES IN HASTINGS AND BRIGHTON. REVIEW 10, CROWBOROUGH AND UCKFIELD ARE BOTH SIZEABLE TOWNS WOULD THIS SOLUTION NOT BE A SERIOUS DOWNGRADE OF COVER CONSIDERING THE ASHDOWN FOREST WHICH HAS REGULAR LARGE FIRES AND THE PROBLEM WITH RETAINED RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION?

IF BY SMALLER APPLIANCES YOU MEAN LESS CREW MEMBERS THEN THIS WOULD CREATE SAFETY PROBLEMS. MAKING DAY CREWED STATIONS, DAY CREWED PLUS AND REMOVING RETAINED APPLIANCES IS THE BETTER OPTION. IT WOULD BE A SHAME TO STOP THE MARITIME RESPONSE BUT IF MONEY IS TIGHT THEN WE SHOULD LOOK TO SAVE MONEY ON A SERVICE WHICH IS NOT USED VERY MUCH.

IF IT IS INTENDED TO PASS LARGE ANIMAL RESCUES TO KENT FRS THIS WILL RESULT IN LONG DELAYS DUE TO THE POSITIONING OF KENT'S ARU WHICH IS CURRENTLY STATIONED AT FAVERSHAM. THIS IS UNDER REVIEW. IF IT BECOMES A RESPONSIBILITY OF KENT'S TECHNICAL RESCUE TEAM, WHICH IS CURRENTLY A PROPOSAL, THE ATTENDANCE TIMES WOULD NOT IMPROVE DUE TO THE METHOD IN WHICH THEY ARE MOBILISED OUT OF NORMAL WORKING HOURS. IT WOULD BE AT LEAST TWO HOURS BEFORE THEY ARE MOBILE AT THE COUNTY BOUNDARY.

IF YOU ALWAYS DO WHAT YOU HAVE ALWAYS DONE YOU WILL ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU ALWAYS GOT.

IF YOU HAVE TO SAVE MONEY WHY ARE YOU PROPOSING TO BUY TWO NEW APPLIANCES FOR BRIGHTON AND HASTINGS AT A COST OF A HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF POUNDS?

IN TIMES OF AUSTERITY YOU SHOULD JUST BE DOING CORE STATUTORY BUSINESS OF RUNNING AN EMERGENCY SERVICE AND ALL OTHER PROJECTS SHOULD TAKE A BACK SEAT ESPECIALLY WHEN PROJECTS WASTE MONEY DUE TO DELAYS LIKE SUSSEX CONTROL CENTRE WHICH COST £78,000 PER MONTH, EVERY MONTH IT IS DELAYED, DID YOU LEARN NOTHING FROM THE FIRE CONTROL PROJECT.

INCREASE IN COUNCIL TAX.

INTRODUCING A SMALLER VEHICLE, PERHAPS A MOTORBIKE TO THE RIDGE AND / OR BOHEMIA STATIONS WOULD PERHAPS BE A CHEAPER INITIAL RESPONSE GIVEN THE NUMBER OF AFACS ATTENDED IN THE AREA. FLEXIBLE RESOURCE LEVELS MIGHT IMPROVE EFFICIENCY. REPEATED OFFENDERS OF FALSE ALARMS SHOULD DEFINITELY BE FINED TO SUPPORT THE STATIONS. LARGE ANIMAL RESCUE SUPPORT IS ESSENTIAL AND REALLY MUST NOT BE REMOVED.

INVEST IN MAKING THE SERVICE MORE VALUABLE, RENATIONALISATION IS AN OPTION.

IS IT A GOOD IDEA TO BUILD ACCOMMODATION FOR DAY CREWED PLUS FIRE STATIONS ON FLOOD PLAINS? BOTH LEWES AND UCKFIELD ARE ON FLOOD PLAINS, AND ALTHOUGH THERE ARE DEFENCES, IT IS A RISK THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED.

IS THERE NO WAY OF COMBINING THE CAPITAL BUDGET WITH THE REVENUE BUDGET? THAT MUST HELP MAKE SOME OF THE SAVINGS INSTEAD OF MAKING THE POTENTIAL LIFE SAVING CAPABILITIES REDUCED?

IT DOESN'T LOOK LIKE ANY OF THE PROPOSALS ARE LOOKING AT THE BEHIND THE BACK ROOM STAFF. SHARING RESOURCES WITH OTHER SERVICES WITHIN THE COUNTY AND THE FIRE SERVICE AS A WHOLE COULD SAVE A MASSIVE AMOUNT OF MONEY. THERE WOULDN'T NEED TO BE AS MANY CHIEFS AND SENIOR MANAGEMENT. THAT COULD SAVE MANY OF THE FRONTLINE

FIREFIGHTERS WHICH ATTEND THE INCIDENTS AND SERVE THE COMMUNITY.

IT IS SAD TO SEE THAT BY YOUR BLIND AND INCOMPETENT MANAGEMENT HAS LED THE SERVICE TO THE EDGE OF DISASTER TO PROPOSE OR EVEN CONSIDER THIS PLAN OF ACTION IS A SAD INDICTMENT OF YOUR TEAM.

IT ONLY BECAME A PROBLEM BECAUSE OF THE GOVERNMENT. I THINK THERE IS ENOUGH WEALTH IN THIS COUNTRY TO MAKE SURE EVERY SOUL HAS A GOOD CHANCE OF QUICK RESCUE AND SURVIVAL CHANCES. DEFY THE GOVERNMENTS TACTICS IN THE FIRST STEP OF PRIVATISING THE SERVICE, STRIKE, STRIKE, STRIKE. THIS IS NOT THE FAULT OF THE FIREFIGHTERS AND IT IS UNFAIR TO MAKE THEM SUFFER. I AM BEHIND THEM ALL THE WAY.

IT SEEMS TO ME THAT REMOVAL OF RETAINED POSITION IN FAVOUR OF FULL TIME DCP POSTS WOULD INCUR MORE EXPENSE IN SALARY BUDGETS AND ON CALL BONUSES THEREFORE NOT ACHIEVING ANY SAVING. WOULD A BETTER OPTION NOT BE TO INCREASE RDS POSTS?

IT SHOULD BE REMEMBERED THAT EMERGENCY SERVICES ARE FINANCED NOT FOR WHAT THEY DO BUT FOR WHAT THEY MAY HAVE TO DO.

IT'S CLEAR THE RETAINED STATIONS ARE CHEAPER TO RUN AND CLOSING THEM WILL NOT BE A HUGE SAVING CONSIDERING WHAT WILL BE LOST FOR THE MONEY. I BELIEVE RETAINED STATIONS SHOULD BE LEFT OPEN. REVIEWING THE RETAINED PAY IS A POSITIVE STEP. I PERSONALLY KNOW A RETAINED FIREFIGHTER AND IT IS AMAZING IN MY EYES WHAT HE GIVES UP BEING ON CALL FOR VERY LITTLE MONEY SO REVIEWING THE PAY IS DEFINITELY A GOOD IDEA.

KEEP ALL THE FIRE STATIONS IN EAST SUSSEX, THEY SAVE LIVES.

KNOWING THE PROBLEMS OF MAINTAINING SUFFICIENT RETAINED PERSONNEL OVER SOME 30 YEARS DUE TO THE CHANGE IN CIVIL WORKPLACES, WHOLE TIME CREWS SHOULD BE MAINTAINED AT ALL STATIONS WHERE THEY EXIST AT PRESENT EVEN WITH NEW DAY CREW PLUS SYSTEM. REVIEW 10 IS NOT GIVING THE NORTH AREA A SERVICE TO THE PUBLIC. CROWBOROUGH IS THE LARGEST INLAND TOWN AND WITH ITS SURROUNDING VILLAGE COMMUNITIES HAS A POPULATION IN EXCESS OF 31000 AND WITH THE CUTS AND NON COOPERATION IN NEIGHBOURING BRIGADES THIS MUST NOT BE FURTHER DETERIORATED, DAY CREW PLUS IF INSTIGATED MUST BE BOTH AT ICKFIELD AND CROWBOROUGH. REVIEW 1 -THIS WOULD GIVE AN OVERALL PICTURE OF THEIR AVAILABILITY TO CREW THROUGHOUT THE 24 HOUR DAY AND OVER EVERYDAY. MANY STATIONS COULD BE COVERED BY ADJOINING (WHOLE TIME CREWED) STATIONS AS HAPPENS AT PRESENT - STATIONS WHICH WERE IDENTIFIED AS SUCH IN 1974 (BOUNDARY CHANGE) WERE BARCOMBE, FOREST ROW AND MAYFIELD. OTHERS WERE ALSO CONSIDERED. MAYFIELD WOULD HAVE COVER FROM CROWBOROUGH AND THE BORDERING RETAINED STATIONS OF WADHURST AND HEATHFIELD. REVIEW 2 - WITH THE LIMITED USAGE OF EXISTING TURNTABLE LADDERS/HYDRAULIC PLATFORMS - EXTENDING THEIR LIFE SPAN WOULD SAVE MONEY. THE ENVISAGED USE OF A DUEL PURPOSE LADDER/PUMP CUTS THE AVAILABILITY AND FLEXIBILITY OF SUCH A SPECIAL APPLIANCE. REVIEW 3 - THIS WOULD ACHIEVE MUCH AS COMMENTING ON REVIEW 1 AND WITH RETENTION OF WHOLE TIME STATIONS AT HASTINGS, THE RIDGE AND BATTLE WOULD ENABLE THE FUTURE OF STATIONS AT BROAD OAK (BREDE) AND HERSTMONCEUX TO BE REVISITED. REVIEW 4 - SMALLER APPLIANCES WERE ONCE A FEATURE IN EAST SUSSEX THOUGH NOT AS SMALL AS THE CURRENT LAND ROVER QUICK RESPONSE APPLIANCE CURRENTLY IN SERVICE, SMALLER WITH EFFECTIVE ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT COULD BE A WAY TO SAVE MONEY AS WOULD EXTEND SERVICE LIFE OF EXISTING VEHICLES WITH ADEQUATE SERVICING, AS AT PRESENT OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONING APPLIANCES ARE BEING SENT FOR FURTHER USE TO OTHER COUNTRIES, A WORTHWHILE ACT OF CHARITABLE AID. HOWEVER IN PRESENT TIMES CHARITY SHOULD BEGIN AT HOME. REVIEW 5 - THE TWO TECHNICAL RESCUE UNITS SHOULD BE REVIEWED AS THE MAIN OBJECT OF THEIR ORIGINAL PURCHASE - TRENCH COLLAPSE ETC. HAS NOT SEEN MUCH USE, PERHAPS ONE SUCH VEHICLE WOULD SUFFICE WITH EVEN THAT EQUIPMENT CONSTANTLY BEING ADAPTED TO COVER MULTI ROLE PURPOSES. REVIEW 6 - THIS REVIEW COULD PROVIDE SAVING AS UNDER THE ORIGINAL DAY CREW SYSTEM THE SUB OFFICER WAS THE O-L-C OF THE STATION RESPONSIBLE FOR WHOLE TIME AND RETAINED SECTIONS AND THE PRESENT WATCH MANAGERS SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF HANDLING ANY INCIDENTS UP TO 4 PUMPS WITH A SMALL CORE OF OFFICERS ON A FLEXIBLE DUTY SYSTEM ABLE TO ATTEND ON REQUEST. REVIEW 7 - DEMAND LED ROSTERING IS TREADING ON THIN ICE. IF THE BRIGADE IS TO DOWNSIZE MEN, APPLIANCES AND STATIONS THIS COULD BE A CUT TOO FAR WITH THE ENDANGERING OF THE REDUCED CREWING LEVELS AVAILABLE. REVIEW 8 -THIS COULD AND SHOULD BE REVIEWED, A RETURN TO SCHOOL VISITS/TALKS BY DUTY CREWS AS IT USED TO BE WOULD STILL ENABLE CHILDREN TO BENEFIT FROM FIRE SAFETY AWARENESS WITHOUT THE PRESENT NON OPERATIONAL UNIT. REVIEW 9 -ANY MOVE TO CUT ATTENDANCE TO FIRE ALARMS OR INTRODUCE CHARGING WILL ONLY LEAD FIRMS TO NOT CALL THE FIRE SERVICE WHICH IS THE START OF LAX PRACTICES WHICH COULD COST LIVES, CHARGING SHOULD BE A LAST RESORT AS IT ALWAYS HAS BEEN. REVIEW 10 - THIS MUST NOT HAPPEN IN A WAY THAT REDUCES CROWBOROUGH TO A RETAINED STATION. RETAINED AVAILABILITY HAS ALWAYS BEEN A PROBLEM AND THE WHOLE TIME PERSONNEL AT CROWBOROUGH HAS ALWAYS BEEN ESSENTIAL TO PROVIDE THE PUBLIC IN THIS AREA WITH A RELIABLE FIRE SERVICE. KENT BRIGADES NEAREST STATION 'RUSTHALL' HAS BEEN CLOSED AND AS OVER THE BORDER ASSISTANCE/COOPERATION HAS ALWAYS BEEN A POLITICAL ISSUE, CROWBOROUGH'S WHOLE TIME CREWS ARE AN ESSENTIAL PART IN PROVIDING THIS NORTH WEALDEN AREA WITH A RELIABLE RESPONSE WHICH THE PUBLIC HAVE A RIGHT TO, IT SUPPORTS UCKFIELD, MAYFIELD, WADHURST AND FOREST ROW STATIONS AND IS CLASSIFIED AS A 'KEY RESPONSE' STATION WHICH ALSO CONTAINS THE ANIMAL RESCUE/FOREST FIRE AND DEEP/SWIFT WATER RESPONSE TEAMS AND EXPERTISE. LOSS OF ANY WHOLE TIME SYSTEM FROM CROWBOROUGH WILL SEVERELY AFFECT RESPONSE TIMES, LOSE VALUABLE SPECIALIST TEAMS AND MUST PUT THE PUBLIC AT RISK. IT IS ONLY IN 2013 THAT ESSENTIAL WORK TO UPGRADE THIS STATION FITTING IT FOR ITS WHOLE TIME ROLE WHICH HAD NOT CHANGED SINCE IT WAS OPENED IN 1966 EXCEPT TO PROVIDE FURTHER APPLIANCE BAYS. IF ANY REDUCTION TO RETAINED STATUS HAS TO BE MADE IT WOULD BE BETTER CARRIED OUT AT UCKFIELD WHICH WOULD HAVE WHOLE TIME CREWS SITTING AT LEWES AND CROWBOROUGH IN SUPPORT OF THEIR RETAINED APPLIANCES AND WEST SUSSEX CREWS FROM HAYWARDS HEATH. I DO NOT HOWEVER JUDGE THIS LOSS OF UCKFIELD TO BE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST, IT WILL BE INEVITABLE THAT LIFE WILL BE LOST THROUGH SUCH REDUCTIONS. THE FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE IS ALL THIS COUNTRY HAS FOR CIVIL DEFENCE AND IT IS PARED TO THE BONE LIKE NEVER BEFORE IN MODERN TIMES. POLITICIANS SHOULD STOP AND REMEMBER WHO IT WAS THAT PULLED THEM FROM THE

GRAND HOTEL BRIGHTON BOMBING., WHO IT WAS THAT RESTORED NORMALITY OVER THE YEARS OF RECENT FLOODING ETC. LIFE, PROPERTY AND COMMERCE ARE THE LIFEBLOOD OF THIS COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND THE CUTS IN FUNDING NOW TAKING PLACE WILL PUT ALL WE ARE ACHIEVING AT RISK. THE FIRE SERVICE IS ESSENTIAL AS IT STANDS TODAY AND SHOULD BE REGARDED FOR WHAT IS IT EXPECTED TO DO WHEN DISASTER STRIKES. WHY DOES THIS COUNTRY AND THOSE WHO GOVERN IT HAVE SUCH BLATANT DISREGARD FOR THIS 'MOST ESSENTIAL SERVICE'? REVIEW 11- THIS SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF RETAINING ESSENTIAL WHOLE TIME RESPONSE WHICH SHOULD BE RETAINED AS IT EXISTS AT PRESENT. ALL DAY CREWED STATIONS SHOULD REMAIN DAY CREWED, EVEN IF THIS MEANS INTRODUCING 'DAY CREWED PLUS' SYSTEMS. THE SERVICE SHOULD MAINTAIN THE ESSENTIAL CORE OF WHOLE TIME CREWS. REVIEW 12 - THIS PROVISION IS ONE THAT IS RARELY CALLED UPON AND IS NOT A REQUIREMENT THAT HAS TO BE MAINTAINED IN LAW. IT SHOULD BE LOOKED AT AND WITHDRAWN UNLESS NECESSARILY JUSTIFIED. REVIEW 13 - THIS ONCE AGAIN IS OVER THE BORDER POLITICS, HOWEVER LIVESTOCK IS THE RURAL COMMUNITIES STOCK IN TRADE AND LOSS OF ANY VALUABLE LIVESTOCK HAS A DETRIMENTAL EFFECT ON THE ECONOMY, LOCAL AND NATIONAL COSTS OF THIS CAN BE FAR REACHING. THE SERVICE SHOULD CONTINUE, HOWEVER POLITICIANS SHOULD ENSURE THAT COSTS ARE MET FROM THE APPROPRIATE AUTHORITY AND THE ESSENTIAL SERVICE MUST CONTINUE TO BE PROVIDED. OVERALL COMMENT - THE WAY TO SAVE MONEY AND STILL PROVIDE A FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE THAT SERVES THE PUBLIC IN A WAY THAT IS THEIR RIGHT IS TO COMBINE BOTH EAST AND WEST SUSSEX INTO ONE SUSSEX FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE. THIS SHOULD HAVE BEEN DONE IN THE 1974 BOUNDARY CHANGES. EAST SUSSEX IS MOST WILLING TO GO DOWN THIS PATH BUT WEST SUSSEX HAS RECENTLY REJECTED THIS PROPOSAL. IF GOVERNMENT IS SERIOUS ABOUT SAVING MONEY THEN THEY SHOULD TAKE THE STEP TO ORDER BOTH BRIGADES TO AMALGAMATE NOT SIT ON THE FENCE. THIS IS THE ONLY WAY THE COUNTY OF SUSSEX CAN MAINTAIN A CREDIBLE FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE. THIS HAS BEEN DONE WITH POLICE AND AMBULANCE SERVICES AND IS THE ONLY SENSIBLE WAY FORWARD FOR FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICES. IT WOULD CUT UPPER LEVEL MANAGEMENT, STREAMLINE DEPARTMENTS BUT ESSENTIALLY MAINTAIN FRONT LINE SERVICES TO THE PUBLIC, THE ULTIMATE CIVIL DEFENCE. ALL THIS WOULD CUT RUNNING COSTS AND NOT COST LIVES.

MANY OF THESE REVIEWS SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT AND CEASE BEFORE FIRE COVER IS REDUCED IN THE CITY OF BRIGHTON AND HOVE. THESE WILL MAKE MOST OF YOUR SAVINGS. DO NOT CUT FIRE COVER.

MERGE WITH ANOTHER AUTHORITY!

MERGE WITH ANOTHER FIRE AUTHORITY TO SAVE ON MANAGEMENT COSTS. IN OTHER WORDS CUT FROM THE TOP DOWN FIRST, NOT THE BOTTOM UP!

MORE INFORMATION NEEDED.

MOST, IF NOT ALL OF THESE REVIEWS HAVE BEEN DONE BEFORE, OFTEN PRODUCING RESULTS THAT ARE LESS THAN CLEAR. WHY WILL THESE NEW REVIEWS BE MORE SUCCESSFUL?

MOVE TO RESTRUCTURE MANAGEMENT AND REDUCE FROM 6 BOROUGHS TO 3. THIS WILL GIVE HUGE SAVINGS ON LESS BOROUGH COMMANDERS. WHY HAS THIS NOT BEEN DONE FIRST BEFORE FRONTLINE CUTS? PLEASE ENSURE THIS GOES TO FIRE AUTHORITY MEMBERS OSR.

NATIONALISE THE BANKS. NATIONALISE THE RAILWAYS.

NEED TO ENSURE THAT ANY PROPOSALS THAT EFFECT COVER IN THE NORTH OF THE COUNTY IS CAREFULLY CONSIDERED DUE TO THE POTENTIAL INCREASE TO ATTENDANCE TIMES IN THE RURAL COMMUNITIES.

NO COMMENT.

*** PREVIOUS RESPONSE REPEATED 3 TIMES ***

NO COMMENTS AT PRESENT.

NO COMMENTS.

NO CUTS TO ENGINES OR FIREFIGHTERS.

NO MORE FRONTLINE SERVICES SHOULD BE CUT. SAVINGS SHOULD BE MADE BY MERGING WITH THE WEST SUSSEX FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE, SO REDUCING THE NUMBER OF MANAGEMENT POSTS AND MAKING SAVINGS ON THOSE SALARIES.

NO NOT REALLY.

NO SPECIFIC COMMENTS AHEAD OF REVIEWS OTHER THAN TO BE ASSURED THAT THE REGARD OF RISK AND RESPONSE IS THOROUGHLY TESTED AGAINST EFFICIENCY OPTIONS.

NO.

ONCE AGAIN THERE ARE NO CUTS TO THE CORPORATE EMPIRE AT HQ. THERE ARE SEVERAL POSTS THAT COULD EASILY BE CUT THAT WOULD NOT HAVE ANY EFFECT ON PUBLIC OR FIREFIGHTER SAFETY.

ONCE AGAIN YOU ARE ASKING US AS MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC TO COMMENT ON TECHNICAL DECISIONS WITHOUT BETTER INFORMATION TO MAKE A GOOD DECISION! YOU SEEM TO BE LEADING US DOWN A PATH!

OPTION 2. THIS IS AN AWFUL PROPOSAL. VERY EXPENSIVE AND AN APPLIANCE THAT EVEN THE SUPPLIERS SAY, DOES BOTH TASKS POORLY.

OPTION NUMBER 9 SEEMS AN OBVIOUS ONE WITH REGARDS TO THE OTHERS, I DON'T KNOW; I AM NOT SURE THIS IS FOR THE PUBLIC TO DECIDE, BUT NEEDS TO BE DECIDED FOR THOSE WHO HAVE A MUCH BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE IMPLICATIONS.

OUTSOURCING OF HQ FUNCTIONS, E.G. IT, HR, L&OD CLOSE BUSINESS SERVICES. SELL HQ. UTILISE TOP FLOOR OF PRESTON CIRCUS.

PLEASE BE CAREFUL THAT THE FACTS ARE NOT SELECTIVE WHEN THE REVIEWS TAKE PLACE.

POINT 6 SHOULD BE REVIEWED BEFORE YOU START MAKING FRONTLINE CUTS!

POSSIBLY NUMBER 9 - BUT NOT TO FURTHER RAISE THE BAR IN CALL CHALLENGING. ANY SAVINGS IN MANAGEMENT COSTS, OR MERGING BACK OFFICE FUNCTIONS, AMALGAMATING INTO A REGIONAL SERVICE, SHOULD BE CONTINUOUSLY CONSIDERED.

PREFER NOT TO SAY.

PRIORITISE OPTIONS 9 AND 13 ABOVE AS PART OF STANDARDISING A NATION FIRE AND RESCUE GUIDELINE. THIS WOULD FACILITATE CREWS, WHO FOR DOMESTIC REASONS, WISH TO RELOCATE SO INCREASING FLEXIBILITY FOR FRONTLINE STAFF.

REDUCE THE NUMBER OF SENIOR MANAGERS, RELEASE ALL THOSE THAT HAVE RETIRED AND RE-ENGAGED. REDUCE OR REMOVE THE FIRE AUTHORITY. GET RID OF THE HEADQUARTERS AND UTILISE THE EMPTY SPACES ON FIRE STATIONS.

REGARDING 3 COSTINGS? I BELIEVE THE COMMUNITY WOULD BE BETTER ABLE TO DECIDE IF THE COSTS OF CONTINUING WERE PART OF 'LOCAL' CHARGES.

REMOVING FRONTLINE FIRE APPLIANCES AND CLOSING STATIONS IS NOT A GOOD MOVE AS THESE WILL BE LOST FOREVER, LEADING TO A POSTCODE LOTTERY SITUATION FOR RESPONSE TIMES AND UNSAFE WORKING CONDITIONS FOR STAFF, CONSIDER MERGING WITH OTHER LOCAL FIRE SERVICES TO SAVE MONEY.

REVIEW 1 - RETAINED COVER IN COUNTY IS POOR YET PEOPLE GET PAID TO PROVIDE COVER AND RARELY DO, PHASED ALERTERS ARE NEEDED INSTEAD OF FULL AVAILABILITY SURPRISINGLY BEING AVAILABLE ON BANK HOLIDAYS, YOU ROSTER WHOLE TIME REVIEW 3 - SURELY RETAINED STATIONS HAVE A HUGE REDUCTION IN CALLS SO DO WE NEED THESE IF WHOLE TIME STATIONS CAN COVER THESE AREAS IN 8 MINUTES. REVIEW 9 - START CHARGING PEOPLE AND MAKE REVENUE FROM UNWANTED CALLS. REVIEW 12 - DON'T PROVIDE MARITIME RESPONSE UNLESS FULLY FUNDED EXTERNALLY. REVIEW 13 - CHARGE FOR SHARING THIS RESOURCE.

REVIEW 1 AGREE REVIEW 2 DISAGREE WASTE OF MONEY ASK KFB REVIEW 3 AGREE REVIEW 4 AGREE AS LONG AS CREWING IS 4 REVIEW 5 AGREE REVIEW 6 AGREE REVIEW 7 AGREE REVIEW 8 AGREE REVIEW 9 AGREE REVIEW 10 DISAGREE. ONE MILLION JUST SPENT ON CROWBOROUGH PLUS THE RETAINED, RETENTION AT CROWBOROUGH IS POOR. RETAINED APPLIANCE WOULD BE OFF THE RUN MORE. CROWBOROUGH HAS THE MOST QUALIFIED SPECIALS AND CREW WITHIN THE SERVICE AND THIS WOULD BE LOST. REVIEW 11 AGREE. LEWES HAS A PROBLEM RECRUITING RDS PERSONNEL. REVIEW 12 AGREE REVIEW 13 AGREE. WHY ARE WE DOING THE WORK OF KFB AND BEARING THE COST. KFB CHIEF IS BOASTING HOW SHE IS SAVING AT OUR TAXPAYERS COST STOP THIS NOW.

REVIEW 1 PAY THE RETAINED FOR THE COVER THEY ACTUALLY PROVIDE NOT BASED ON THE CURRENT SYSTEM WHERE PEOPLE GET THE SAME PAY FOR PROVIDING 40 TO 79 HOURS. REVIEW 3 LOOK AT CALL NUMBERS AND GET RID OF STATIONS WITH LOW CALL NUMBERS COMBINED WITH LOW AVAILABILITY. REVIEW 8 IS THIS A STATUTORY REQUIREMENT? IF NOT STOP IT. REVIEW 12 GET RID OF IT. REVIEW 13 CHARGE KENT FOR ESFRS ATTENDANCE.

REVIEW 1 REVIEW 9 REVIEW 13.

REVIEW 1, RETAINED STATIONS ARE VERY CHEAP TO RUN, HOW MUCH WOULD THE REVIEW COST IN RELATION TO THE COSTS SAVED REVIEW 2, ARP'S DO NOT WORK, LOOK AT OTHER FIRE SERVICES ACROSS THE COUNTRY, KENT'S LASTED 3 YEARS! TOO BIG, TOO MUCH MONEY, LOOK AT ALP'S BEING CREWED BY RDS. REVIEW 3, SAVES VERY LITTLE MONEY CLOSING RDS STATIONS. REVIEW 4, REDUCING THE SIZE OF APPLIANCES DOES NOT WORK, OVER LOADED CHASSIS, UNDER POWERED ENGINES, UNABLE TO CARRY MUCH EQUIPMENT, HOSE AND WATER, SMALL PUMPS,(GREAT FOR HIGH RISE FIRES). REVIEW 5, REDUCE TO ONE VEHICLE, CENTRALLY LOCATED IN THE COUNTY, RDS CREWED. REVIEW 6, WHERE WILL THE LEVEL TWO OFFICERS COME FROM AT NIGHT? REVIEW 7, SUPPORT REVIEW 8, SCRAP SCHOOLS EDUCATION, UNLESS RESULTS CAN BE SHOWN WORTH SAVING. REVIEW 9, VERY RISKY, MISTAKES COULD BE MADE AND LIVES PUT AT RISK IF APPLIANCES NOT SENT BECAUSE THE OWNER WORRIED ABOUT BEING CHARGED, WOULD COVER UP THE FDR 1'S. REVIEW 10, DAY CREWED PLUS NOT FAMILY FRIENDLY, IF SUCH A GOOD IDEA WHY ARE OTHER FRS NOT USING THIS SHIFT SYSTEM? REVIEW 11, AS ABOVE. REVIEW 12, SEEK FULL GOVERNMENT FUNDING. REVIEW 13, YES CHARGE THEM FOR THE USE, THEY HAVE THEIR OWN LAR. WHY IS THERE NO REVIEW OF SENIOR AND PRINCIPAL OFFICERS WITH ALL THE REDUCTION IN FF POST, FIRE APPLIANCE REMOVAL, DOWN GRADING OF FIRE STATIONS, CLOSING OF RDS FIRE STATIONS, JOINT CONTROL ROOM HOW CAN THE TOP MANAGEMENT LEVEL STAY THE SAME?? LET'S HAVE A REVIEW OF THAT!

REVIEW 1, SOUNDS GOOD IDEA WHY HAS IT NOT BEEN DONE BEFORE. REVIEW 2, NO NOT AT THE COST, ARE YOU NOT TRYING TO SAVE MONEY. THESE VEHICLES ARE NOT PROVEN AND WILL NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY OF THE MACHINES YOU ALREADY HAVE. REVIEW 3, CAN'T COMMENT AS NO INFORMATION. REVIEW 4, NO YOU WILL NOT HAVE EQUIPMENT NEEDED FOR DIFFERENT TASKS OR THE CREW. REVIEW 5, CAN'T COMMENT - NO INFORMATION. REVIEW 6, IS THIS LEGAL GETTING RID OF SOMEONE PAID MORE AND REPLACING THEM WITH SOMEONE PAID LESS. REVIEW 7, NO YOU NEVER KNOW WHEN AN INCIDENT MIGHT HAPPEN AND YOU ALWAYS NEED THE CORRECT AMOUNT OF CREW. REVIEW 11, NO TO CROWBOROUGH BEING DOWNGRADED. REVIEW 12, GET RID AND SAVE MONEY ON TRAINING. REVIEW 13, NO A VALUABLE SERVICE, IF KENT USE IT CHARGE THEM.

REVIEW 1.

REVIEW 1. THE RETAINED STAFF SHOULD BE LOOKED INTO WITH REGARDS TO STAFF ON STANDBY AND THERE PAY LEVEL. REVIEW 2. LOOK INTO PROBABILITY OF ONE PUMP BEING PURCHASED. REVIEW 3. SOME RURAL STATIONS NEED TO BE REVIEWED/CLOSED. REVIEW 4. AGREE WITH SMALLER APPLIANCES AS LARGER APPLIANCES ARE VERY RARELY NEEDED. REVIEW 6. MANAGEMENT SHOULD BE SLASHED TO MANY CHIEFS AND NOT ENOUGH BRAVES AS THEY SAY. REVIEW 7. AGREE. REVIEW 8. YES AGREE. REVIEW 9. PEOPLE CHARGED WITH FALSE CALLS AND VERY HEAVILY FINED AND COURT PROCESSED FOLLOWED. REVIEW 10. THIS WOULD MAKE SENSE AS BOTH TOWNS AREN'T THAT FAR FROM EACH OTHER. REVIEW 11. AGREE. REVIEW 12. AGREE. REVIEW 13. AGREE. ALSO MAY I JUST SAY LOOK AT YOU POSTAGE MY WIFE WORKS FOR EFRS AND I'VE NOTED FIRST CLASS BEING USED, USE SECOND IT'S CHEAPER BY A LOT NOW ESPECIALLY AS POSTAGE IS GOING UP END OF MARCH 2014. REVIEW 10 - AGAIN, ON VIEWING THE MAP AND DISTANCES. I THINK THERE WOULD BE BENEFITS IF THIS WERE IMPLEMENTED.

REVIEW 10 - THE UCKFIELD, WEALDEN AND CROWBOROUGH AREA IS HUGE, SO I DON'T THINK YOU SHOULD TAKE AWAY ANY ENGINES OR PERSONNEL. THEY DO A GREAT JOB OF COVERING THE AREA AND SHOULD BE KEPT AS THEY ARE.

REVIEW 11.

REVIEW 12 AND 13 ARE OBVIOUS.

REVIEW 1: RETAINED FIREFIGHTERS DO AN OUTSTANDING JOB IN RURAL AREAS THAT ARE A MUST HAVE. REVIEW 2: AERIAL RESCUE PUMPS, AND ANY NEW SPECIALIST EQUIPMENT ARE WORTH THEIR WEIGHT IN GOLD, AND ALTHOUGH PREVENTION IS PARAMOUNT, WHEN THEY ARE NEEDED THEY ARE PARAMOUNT TO A SUCCESSFUL RESCUE.

REVIEW 2 - THE ARP IS TOTALLY UNPROVEN. IT HAS VASTLY LIMITED CAPABILITY COMPARED TO A PROPER ALP AND TIME WILL PROVE THAT IT IS A MISTAKE TO PURCHASE THESE VEHICLES. THEY WILL WORSEN THE SERVICE THAT IS DELIVERED TO THE PUBLIC AS THEY ARE SO LIMITED AND ALSO PUT FIREFIGHTERS AT RISK. SEVERAL FIREFIGHTERS HAVE ALREADY GONE DOWN THIS ROUTE AND WASTED MILLIONS OF POUNDS. THE FIRE AUTHORITY SHOULD BE LOOKING ELSEWHERE TO SAVE MONEY AND NOT MAKING FRONTLINE CUTS. ESFRS SHOULD PURSUE THE MERGER WITH OTHER FRS'S AND LOOK TO SHARE BACK OFFICE FUNCTIONS. REDUCE BOROUGHS FROM 6 - 3 AND SELL OFF THE LARGE HQ'S AND UTILISE ITS EXISTING PROPERTIES.

REVIEW 2 - WHAT WILL THESE AERIAL RESCUE PUMPS LOOK LIKE, WILL THEY STILL BE ABLE TO ACCESS ALL ROADS IN BRIGHTON AND SURROUNDING AREA? IF NOT THIS WILL MEAN ANOTHER FIRE ENGINE LOSS AT CERTAIN INCIDENTS LEAVING ONLY 3 IF YOU DECIDE TO LOSE ONE. SECONDLY IF THEY ARE BEING USED AS AN AERIAL LADDER CAN THEY STILL BE USED FOR FIREFIGHTERS TO TACKLE FIRES FROM THE GROUND AS SURELY THESE WILL BE ON JACKS THEREFORE BE SOME HEIGHT OFF THE GROUND.

REVIEW 2 AND REVIEW 6 APPEAR TO BE IMPORTANT AREAS TO BE CONSIDERED SOONER RATHER THAN LATER.

REVIEW 2. I UNDERSTAND THAT THE AERIAL RESCUE PUMP CANNOT BE USED AS A FIRE ENGINE WHEN IT HAS DEPLOYED AS A BIG LADDER. IS THIS NOT ANOTHER ENGINE GONE IN BRIGHTON AND HOVE? I AGREE AT LOSING THE RETAINED APPLIANCE AT LEWES AS IT IS RARELY USED AND NEVER CREWED. WHAT IS THE COST OF A SCHOOLS EDUCATION PROGRAMME?

REVIEW 2. SURELY IS A NONSTARTER. THE NEW AERIAL VEHICLE AT EASTBOURNE IS NOT FIT FOR PURPOSE AND I HATE TO SAY IT IS A WASTE OF MONEY. WHO EVER THOUGHT THAT PURCHASING IT WAS A GOOD IDEA WAS VERY WRONG. PERHAPS A BETTER IDEA FOR THE AERIALS WOULD TO MOVE THEM TO DAY CREWED, RETAINED STATIONS ALLOWING THEM TO BE CREWED BY ON CALL FIREFIGHTERS. A REDUCTION IN POSTS, BUT THE AERIAL CAPABILITY IS MAINTAINED, NOT REDUCED, ALL BE IT WITH A MUCH LONGER RESPONSE TIME.

REVIEW 2: AT WHAT COST? I THOUGHT THESE PROPOSALS WERE TO REDUCE EXPENDITURE. REVIEW 3: DEFINITELY NEEDS REVIEW! I READ THAT PROPOSALS UNDER PHASE 1 OF THE PLAN HAVE ALREADY BEEN AGREED BY THE FIRE AUTHORITY. A PUBLIC CONSULTATION WAS NOT HELD ON PHASE 1 AS CHANGES WERE DEEMED NOT TO QUALIFY FOR CONSULTATION. (SUSSEX EXPRESS) WHY? SURELY THE RURAL RESIDENTS OF EAST SUSSEX ARE ENTITLED TO HAVE THEIR SAY ON THESE CHANGES. WHAT IS BEING HIDDEN FROM THEM? DOUBLE STANDARDS INSTEAD OF @OPEN AND TRANSPARENT COME TO MIND! YOU SEEM TO BE GIVING PRECEDENCE TO THE URBAN AREAS AT THE EXPENSE OF THE RURAL AREAS. RELYING ON STATISTICS OFTEN GIVES FALSE RESULTS BECAUSE THESE DIFFERENCES ARE NOT TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT - URBAN AND RURAL EACH HAVE THEIR OWN CRITERIA. I AM SURE THAT THERE IS A WEALTH OF KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE TO BE FOUND AMONGST YOUR RURAL PERSONNEL WHOM I SUSPECT IS NOT TAPPED INTO BY URBAN MINDS. I WOULD SUGGEST YOU DISCUSS THEIR VIEWS WITH THEM AND LISTEN WITH AN OPEN MIND. TRY IT! REVIEW 6: WOULD RETAINED SUPPORT MANAGERS BE FULLY AVAILABLE. NOT SURE ABOUT THIS ONE. REVIEW 9: THIS WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA AND SHOULD CUT THE NUMBER OF FALSE ALARMS WHICH WOULD BE A SAVING TO THE SERVICE. REVIEW 10: TO MAKE CROWBOROUGH A RETAINED STATION COULD HAVE AVAILABILITY REPERCUSSIONS AND IS NOT A GOOD IDEA. I CAN'T SEE THE SENSE OF THE DAY CREWED PLUS SYSTEM AND FEEL IT NEEDS LOOKING AT AGAIN. REVIEW 11: LEWES MUST ALSO COVER CALLS OUTSIDE ITS OWN AREA. REMOVAL OF AN APPLIANCE COULD LEAVE THEM SHORTHANDED AT SUCH TIMES. REVIEW 13: CONSIDERING THE SIZE OF RURAL EAST SUSSEX I WOULD HAVE THOUGHT IT WOULD STILL NEED ANIMAL RESCUE CAPABILITIES OF ITS OWN.

REVIEW 2: JUMP CREW THE EXISTING.

REVIEW 2: SUFFICIENT HEIGHT CAPABILITY WILL NOT BE PROVIDED IN THE CITY WITH AN ARP. TO DATE OTHER BRIGADES ARE SELLING THEIR ARP'S AS THEY DO NOT WORK AS EITHER A PUMP OR AN AERIAL. DEDICATED APPLIANCES ARE NEEDED IN THE CITY. TO PROVIDE THE COVER REQUIRED BY CITY RESIDENTS. CITY STREETS ARE ALREADY DIFFICULT TO NAVIGATE IN STANDARD PUMPING APPLIANCES. A BIGGER ARP WILL SIMPLY NOT BE ABLE TO GET TO SOME INCIDENTS PUTTING LIVES AND PROPERTY AT RISK.

REVIEW 2: WHERE DOES THE MONEY COME FROM FOR THESE SPECIALISTS' PUMPS? REVIEW 3: THE RURAL REVIEW DEFINITELY NEEDS TO BE REVIEWED AGAIN. I READ THAT 'PROPOSALS UNDER PHASE 1 OF THE PLAN HAVE ALREADY BEEN AGREED BY THE FIRE AUTHORITY. A PUBLIC CONSULTATION WAS NOT HELD ON PHASE 1 AS CHANGES WERE DEEMED NOT TO QUALIFY FOR CONSULTATION.' (SUSSEX EXPRESS 04.04.2014) WHY? SURELY THE RURAL RESIDENTS OF EAST SUSSEX ARE ENTITLED TO BE INFORMED OF THESE CHANGES AND TO HAVE A VOICE ON THE SUBJECT. IT BEGS THE QUESTION 'WHAT IS BEING HIDDEN FROM THEM?' DOUBLE STANDARDS INSTEAD OF OPEN AND TRANSPARENT COME TO MIND! YOU SEEM TO BE GIVING PREFERENCE TO THE URBAN AREAS AT THE EXPENSE OF THE RURAL AREAS. RELYING ON OVERALL STATISTICS OFTEN GIVE FALSE RESULTS BECAUSE THESE DIFFERENCES ARE NOT TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION. URBAN AND RURAL EACH HAVE THEIR OWN CRITERIA AND I AM SURE THERE IS A WEALTH OF KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE TO BE FOUND AMONGST YOUR RURAL PERSONNEL WHICH I SUSPECT IS NOT TAPPED INTO BY URBAN MINDS. I WOULD THEREFORE SUGGEST YOU DISCUSS THEIR VIEWS WITH THEM AND LISTEN WITH AN OPEN MIND. TRY IT! REVIEW 9: I AGREE THAT COSTS SHOULD BE RECOVERED IN THE CASE OF FALSE ALARMS. REVIEW 10: CROWBOROUGH FIRE STATION SHOULD NOT BE REDUCED TO RETAINED ONLY. THIS IS A RETROGRADE STEP. AS TO CHANGING STATUS OF UCKFIELD FIRE STATION, PLEASE REFER TO REPLY GIVEN FOR REVIEW 3. REVIEW 11: REFER

TO REVIEW REPLY. REVIEW 13: RURAL EAST SUSSEX COVERS A LARGE AREA AND I THINK PROBABLY NEEDS ITS OWN LARGE ANIMAL RESCUE EQUIPMENT. KENT FRS ALSO COVERS A WIDE AREA SO IF THIS FACILITY IS LEFT FOR THEM TO PROVIDE, WOULD IT ALWAYS BE READILY AVAILABLE WHEN NEEDED IN EAST SUSSEX?

REVIEW 2: WHY WOULD YOU DECIDE TO BUY THESE WHEN YOU HAVE TO SAVE £7.1 MILLION, ALSO AFTER SPEAKING TO A FIREFIGHTER WHO HAS BEEN ON THIS APPLIANCE HAVE BEEN TOLD THEY ARE NOT VERY PRACTICAL. SUGGESTION: UNDERTAKE A FULL REVIEW OF CHIEF AND DEPUTY CHIEFS FIRE OFFICERS AND PAY. SUGGESTION: ESTATES, INSTEAD OF PAYING EXTORTIONATE AMOUNTS FOR OUTSIDE CONTRACTORS TO COME ON TO STATIONS AND CARRY OUT SMALL ROUTINE MAINTENANCE SUCH AS GARDENING OR SMALL ELECTRICAL OR ODD JOBS, UTILISE THE MANY SKILLS OF FULL TIMERS, MANY OF WHOM HAVE THE NECESSARY SKILLS TO COMPLETE THESE TASKS. AS YOU SAY CALLS ARE REDUCING AND THIS SHOULD GIVE THEM ENOUGH TIME TO DO THIS, ALSO GIVING THEM A BIT OF PRIDE IN THEIR STATION.

REVIEW 3.

*** PREVIOUS RESPONSE REPEATED 1 TIME ***

REVIEW 4 SEEMS VERY SENSIBLE GIVEN THE SMALLER HOMES PEOPLE ARE LIVING IN AND THE SMALLER ROADS GENERALLY IN THE SUSSEX AREA.

REVIEW 4, USE CONTINENTAL METHOD OF VAN ATTENDING ALL OBVIOUS FALSE ALARMS. REVIEW 9, PERSISTENT OFFENDERS TO BE NAMED AND FINED.

REVIEW 4,5,9,10,11.

REVIEW 4/7/9/8/9/12.

REVIEW 7 SEEMS VERY SENSIBLE. ALSO 10 AND 11 COULD SAVE MONEY WITHOUT REDUCING SERVICE STANDARDS.

REVIEW 7.

REVIEW 8: GET TEACHERS TO DO IT INSTEAD OF FIRE CREW.

REVIEW 9 - THE IDEA OF CHARGING IS NOT GOOD, AS PEOPLE WILL TRY TO PUT OUT FIRES THEMSELVES AND THE RESULT COULD BE DISASTROUS.

REVIEW 9 IS FAIR - CHARGE FOR NUISANCE CALLS AND REPEAT CALL OUTS OF FIRE ALARMS!

REVIEW 9 IS MUCH FAVOURED. AGREE WITH ALL OTHER OPTIONS.

REVIEW 9 MAY BE AN OPTION TO DISCOURAGE FALSE ALARM CALLS. THE POPULATION (TEENS) NEED TO BE EDUCATED ABOUT THE FUTILITY OF MAKING FALSE ALARMS AND THE COST TO THE COMMUNITY.

REVIEW 9 STRONGLY AGREE.

REVIEW 9.

REVIEW ALL MANAGEMENT POSITIONS AND WORTH AND ALSO RECONSIDER AMALGAMATION WITH WEST SUSSEX. THIS WOULD CUT THE UNNECESSARY DUEL MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES AND ALTHOUGH INITIALLY COSTLY WOULD BE OF MORE BENEFIT TO THE TAXPAYER IN THE LONG RUN.

REVIEW OF ALL 13 OPTIONS IS EMINENTLY SENSIBLE - BUT THE REASONS FOR MANY OF THEM CLEARLY IMPACTS ON PROPOSALS 2A AND 2B.

REVIEW THE ABILITY OF THE SERVICE TO SHARE WITH KENT, WEST SUSSEX, SURREY AND SHARE SERVICES LIKE HR, TRAINING, ENGINEERING, PROCUREMENT AND SENIOR MANAGEMENT.

REVIEW THE NUMBER OF SENIOR MANAGERS (NOT MIDDLE MANAGERS) POSTS AND SALARIES. REVIEW THE SICKNESS / ATTENDANCE POLICY AND ENACT IT INSTEAD OF KEEPING STAFF ON THAT ARE 'WORKING THE SYSTEM'. REVIEW THE EXPENSES OF SENIOR MANAGERS AND THE PERKS, I.E. CAR ALLOWANCE, SHOULD THEY NOT ALL BE DRIVING ECO FRIENDLY GREEN CARS, ALSO THE SAME FOR THE BRIGADE VEHICLES. REDUCE CARBON FOOTPRINT, KEEP MORE THINGS IN HOUSE INSTEAD OF OUTSOURCING, IT'S NOT ALWAYS CHEAPER WHEN CONTRACTS ARE RENEWED.

REVIEWS 1 AND 9 LOOK WORTHWHILE.

REVISIT MERGING WITH NEIGHBOURING AUTHORITIES TO CUT EXPENSIVE SENIOR POSTS.

RURAL AREAS NEED PROTECTION. BATTLE SHOULD CHANGE TO OPTION 2A TO ACHIEVE THIS AND WITH THIS IN MIND IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO REVIEW SOME OF THE RETAINED STATIONS IN RURAL AREAS.

RURAL COMMUNITIES SHOULD NOT BE DISADVANTAGED IN PREFERENCE TO LARGE URBAN COMMUNITIES.

SAVINGS COULD ACCRUE BY CENTRALISING PROCUREMENT ACTIVITIES TO ENSURE BEST VALUE FOR MONEY IS ACHIEVED, ESPECIALLY IN NON-CRITICAL AREAS SUCH AS CATERING, UNIFORM, TEMPORARY STAFFING ETC. AND A REVIEW OF ALL CONTRACTS.

SAVINGS SHOULD BE MADE WITHOUT THE RISK TO PUBLIC AND FIREFIGHTERS LIVES, WHY CAN EVERYONE APART FROM MANAGEMENT SEE THIS IS THE ONLY WAY, PHASE 1,2 AND 3 ARE DANGEROUS AND UNACHIEVABLE, IN ANY OTHER LINE OF WORK THEY MIGHT WORK, BUT NOT IN THE FIRE SERVICE.

SEE PREVIOUS ANSWER.

SMALLER APPLIANCES MAKE SENSE FOR PLACES WHERE YOU NEED TO GET THERE FAST, BUT TRAFFIC MIGHT BE BAD OR IF THERE ARE LOTS OF FALSE ALARMS TO CHECK OUT.

SMALLER APPLIANCES SEEMS LIKE A GOOD IDEA TO ME - SURELY A LOT OF CALLS REALLY DON'T NEED A FULL SIZE ENGINE AND CREW, AND SMALLER IS CHEAPER TO RUN.

SO LONG AS ALL REVIEWS ARE FAIR AND UNBIASED.

SOLAR PANELS ON ROOFS, WATER CAPTURE AND HEAT INSULATION TO HELP SAVE MONEY AS WELL AS RESOURCES.

SOMEONE MUST HAVE MISSED THE PRIME MINISTERS SPEECH ABOUT NO CUTS TO FRONT LINE SERVICES, WHY NOT FOCUS ON THE REAL WASTE? PUBLISH ALL SENIOR OFFICER SALARIES, SPENDS ON WHITE FLEET, SPENDS ON CONSULTANTS, ACCOUNTS, SPENDS OVER £500 AND PUT THEM IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN. WHAT DO YOU CURRENTLY HAVE IN YOUR 'RESERVES'? PLEASE PUBLISH.

STAND UP FOR YOUR WORKFORCE AND SAY TO THE GOVERNMENT THAT THEY CANNOT KEEP CUTTING FRONT LINE SERVICES TO THE BONE.

STOP MPS HAVING PAY RISES.

STRONGLY AGREE WITH NUMBER 9.

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£78.000 PER MONTH OF TAXPAYER'S MONEY? IF SO I THINK SUCH A WASTE OF PUBLIC MONEY WHICH I CONTRIBUTE TO IS AN ABSOLUTE DISGRACE. HOW CAN THIS HAPPEN AFTER THE DISASTER OF THE FIRE CONTROL PROJECT WHICH WAS THE BIGGEST FAILURE OF A PROJECT EVER. HAS NOTHING BEEN LEARNED? IS IT NOT ABOUT TIME WE STOPPED WASTING THIS SORT OF MONEY AND SCRAP THE PROJECT, WHICH COULD BE MONEY USED, SO CUTS DO NOT HAVE TO BE MADE.

STRONGLY AGREE WITH REVIEW 9. WITH REGARDS TO REVIEW 10, DON'T LIKE THE IDEA OF CROWBOROUGH BEING RETAINED AND COVER SHOULD BE MAXIMISED IN UCKFIELD DUE TO HOW BUSY THEY ARE ALREADY HAVING TO HELP OUT AT OTHER STATIONS PARTICULARLY AS THEY SEEM TO HAVE TO GO INTO LEWES AREA A LOT.

THE ABOVE PROPOSALS IN GENERAL APPEAR TO BE ILL THOUGHT OUT AND ATTEMPTING TO STILL CARRY OUT A SIMILAR SERVICE WITH FAR LESS RESOURCES THIS CANNOT WORK IN THE LONG TERM. LITTLE REFERENCE HAS BEEN MADE TO THE THINNING OUT OF THE ALREADY TOP HEAVY PRINCIPAL MANAGEMENT WHERE CUTS SHOULD BE MADE AND NOT ON THE FRONTLINE.

THE AERIAL APPLIANCES MUST BE FIT FOR PURPOSE AND NOT THE COMBINED VEHICLES WITH REDUCED OUTREACH.

THE ARP IS A FAILED CONCEPT AND IS NOT A REPLACEMENT FOR THE CURRENT AERIAL PROVISION. THE CONURBATION IS FILLED WITH HMO PROPERTIES EXCEEDING THE HEIGHT CAPABILITIES OF 12 METRE LADDERS. THESE ARP VEHICLES ARE FAR TOO BIG FOR MANY OF THE ROADS IN THE TOWNS AND CITY.

THE MARITIME RESPONSE IS A MASSIVE DRAIN ON RESOURCES AND FINANCE. THIS SHOULD BE HANDED TO THE NAVY / COASTGUARD. WHY ARE WE PURCHASING MORE AERIAL RESCUE PUMPS, WHEN SEVERAL SERVICES WHO HAVE PURCHASED THEM NO LONGER USE THEM DUE TO TECHNICAL / OPERATIONAL ISSUES? SUGGESTION - WITHDRAW THE LEVEL 4% FEE FOR TURNING OUT TO INCIDENTS. SUGGESTION - ALL THOSE ON RE-ENGAGEMENT SHOULD BE FORCED TO LEAVE THE SERVICE, PROTECTING THOSE WHO HAVE A FULL CAREER AHEAD OF THEM.

THE POPULATION OF BRIGHTON AND HOVE IS EXPECTED TO INCREASE, SO FIRE PROVISION SHOULD REFLECT THIS.

THE POSSIBILITY OF DOWNGRADING CROWBOROUGH FIRE STATION IS RIDICULOUS. IT IS THE LARGEST INLAND TOWN IN EAST SUSSEX. IT HAS BY FAR THE BUSIEST SPECIALIST APPLIANCES IN THE SERVICE, WHICH RDS CREWS STRUGGLE TO MAINTAIN THEIR COMPETENCE IN. ALSO, HAVING JUST SPENT £1.2M ON AN EXTENSION TO THE CURRENT SITE, IT WOULD BE A COMPLETE WASTE OF MONEY TO THE TAX PAYER HAVING SUCH FACILITIES NOT BEING USED FOR MOST OF THE WEEK, MINUS 2.5 HOURS FOR DRILL NIGHT.

THE PROPOSED PURCHASE OF TWO AERIAL RESCUE PUMPS FOR HASTINGS AND BRIGHTON IS A MISLEADING HEADLINE. THE ARP'S ARE ONLY BEING PROPOSED SO MORE FIREFIGHTER POST CAN BE CUT. THEY ARE AN INFERIOR PIECE OF EQUIPMENT WITH REDUCED CAPABILITIES THE WILL NOT WORK IN THE STREETS OF BRIGHTON. THERE HAS BEEN AN ARP AT EASTBOURNE FOR NEARLY A YEAR, AND IT IS YET TO BE MADE OPERATIONAL DUE TO ALL ITS FAULTS. ANOTHER BAD DECISION AND MORE MONEY WASTED. WHY WOULD ESFRS EVEN CONSIDER BUYING TWO MORE? IN MY OPINION, THE FIRE SERVICE HAS NOT SEEN ANY IMPROVEMENTS IN SEVERAL YEARS. CUTS SHOULD NOT BE MADE TO FRONTLINE SERVICES, BECAUSE WHEN I CALL 999 I WANT A FULL EQUIPPED FIRE ENGINE, WITH ENOUGH CREW TO RESCUE MY FAMILY. I DO NOT WANT A BIG HALF EMPTY HEADQUARTERS. AUDI TT'S FITTED WITH BLUE LIGHTS, WHICH NEVER GO TO BLUE LIGHT INCIDENTS. 2% OF THE PAY BUDGET BEING SPENT ON 4 PEOPLE. NUMEROUS OFFICERS OF STATION MANAGER RANK OR ABOVE WITH NO CLEAR ROLE.

THE PURCHASE OF ARPS IS A GOOD IDEA, BUT IT MUST NOT BE AT THE EXPENSE OF EASTBOURNE'S ALP CAPABILITY. SMALLER APPLIANCES MAY BE GOOD IN RURAL AREAS, BUT NOT IF PROPOSED CLOSER OF SOME RURAL STATIONS ALSO GOES AHEAD. REVIEW OF STATIONS SWITCHING TO DAY PLUS SYSTEM SHOULD WAIT UNTIL ANY PHASE 2 SWITCHES HAVE OCCURRED AND EVALUATED.

THE RESULTS OF THESE REVIEWS AND INVESTIGATIONS SHOULD BE AVAILABLE ON THE ESFRS WEBSITE.

THE RNLI HAVE ALWAYS OPERATED SUCCESSFULLY WITH VOLUNTEERS. I AM SURE THE FIRE SERVICE CAN DO LIKEWISE.

THE RURAL REVIEW FOCUSED ON THE LACK OF RECRUITMENT AND SINCE THIS REVIEW PERSONNEL AT MAYFIELD HAD INCREASED IMPRESSIVELY. MAYFIELD GIVES A LOT OF SUPPORT TO THE SURROUNDING STATIONS AND NO STATIONS SHOULD CLOSE BEFORE PRINCIPAL OFFICERS GENEROUS CAR ALLOWANCES HAVE CEASED.

THE RURAL REVIEW IS COMPLETELY OUT OF DATE AND IRRELEVANT, AS PER THE KNIGHT REPORT THE SERVICE SHOULD BE FOCUSING ON BOLSTERING THE RETAINED SERVICE AS A COST EFFECTIVE METHOD OF FIRE COVER DELIVERY. THE RURAL COMMUNITY PAY MOST FOR THEIR FIRE COVER AND ALREADY GET THE SLOWEST RESPONSE TIMES. IT IS UNFAIR TO CONTINUE TO FOCUS BEST SERVICE ON THE COASTAL POPULATION. NO RETAINED STATIONS SHOULD BE CLOSED UNLESS THEY CANNOT VIABLY BE CREWED.

THE SERVICE CURRENTLY IS SMALL, AFTER THIS ROUND OF SAVINGS IT WILL BE VERY SMALL AND THE ABILITY TO MAKE FURTHER SAVINGS WOULD QUESTION ITS VIABILITY. THERE SHOULD BE A VERY SERIOUS CONSIDERATION OF MERGING EAST AND WEST SUSSEX SERVICES. IF NEITHER SERVICE HAS THE APPETITE FOR THAT, THEN CONSIDERATION OF MORE SHARED SERVICES MUST BE CONSIDERED SUCH AS A JOINT TOP MANAGEMENT TEAM RATHER THAN TWO AND A SINGLE AUTHORITY.

THE SHIFT SYSTEMS HAVE BEEN REVIEWED TIME AND TIME AGAIN, THE IMPACT IS DRIVING MORAL LOWER. ARP HAVE BEEN SEEN TO BE COST EFFECTIVE HOWEVER THEY DO NOT OFFER THE CAPABILITIES OF ALPS OR TL, THE LOSS OF ALL AERIALS WILL LEAVE THE SERVICE VULNERABLE. SMALLER APPLIANCES ARE A MUST, ESFRS IS A RURAL FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE WITH NARROW STREETS AND LANES OF WHICH THE CURRENT FLEET IS UNSUITABLE FOR IN THE MAJORITY OF TOWNS AND COUNTRYSIDE. TECHNICAL RESCUE TEAMS NEED SPECIFIC TEAM SIZES FOR SAFE SYSTEMS OF WORK, THE USE OF A CREW CAB VEHICLE MAY REDUCE COSTINGS IN THE LONG RUN. CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO A TECHNICAL TEAM COVERING ANIMAL RESCUE, LINE RESCUE TECHNICAL RESCUE, SWIFT WATER AND HIGH VOLUME PUMP.

THERE IS A NEED FOR ALL THESE PROVISIONS AND NONE SHOULD BE REDUCED, HOWEVER PERHAPS MORE EFFECTIVE USE COULD BE MADE OF HQ MANAGEMENT STAFF AND LOCATIONS OF SUCH - WHY KEEP HQ AT EASTBOURNE AND A TRAINING CENTRE AT MARSFIED - WHY NOT COMBINE TO REDUCE COSTS THAT WOULD GIVE SAVINGS OVER THE PERIOD OF THE REVIEW AND BEYOND.

THERE IS NO MENTION OF MANAGEMENT RESTRUCTURING. WHY NOT?

THERE IS NO REVIEW OF SENIOR OFFICERS ROLES. SURELY ESFRS COULD PROVIDE BETTER VALUE FOR MONEY WITH FEWER SENIOR MANAGERS. DO WE NEED 4 PO'S?

THIS IS AWFUL! WHAT A RUBBISH SERVICE. A JOKE. YOU GIVE FALSE STATISTICS TO ARGUE YOUR CASE. THE ONLY REASON CALLS HAVE DROPPED IS BECAUSE YOU DON'T SEND TO ALL CALLS NOW, CALL MONITORING. NOT BECAUSE ACTUAL CALL NUMBERS HAVE DROPPED. FIRE CALLS AND FIRE DEATHS ARE STILL ABOUT THE SAME. ALSO, YOU DON'T RECORD ALL FIRES AS FIRES OR DEATHS AS FIRE DEATHS WHEN THEY CLEARLY ARE. YOU WANT THE PUBLIC TO PAY MORE IN TAX FOR A LESSER SERVICE THAT WILL ENDANGER EVERY BODY'S LIVES. I SEE THERE NOT MUCH MENTION OF REDUCING STAFF AT HQ, MANAGER OR PRINCIPLE OFFICER POSTS. STRANGE THAT? IT'S ALL FRONTLINE CUTS. NOT VERY FAIR AND EQUAL. YOU SHOULD BE ASHAMED OF YOURSELVES. IT'S DISGUSTING!

THIS IS ONE AREA OF THE COUNCILS SERVICES THAT SHOULD NOT BE CUT. FIREFIGHTERS PROVIDE SUCH SPECIALIST SKILLS AT TIMES OF ENORMOUS NEEDS. IT IS AN ESSENTIAL SERVICE THAT SHOULD REMAIN AS IT IS AS REDUCTIONS HAVE ALREADY BEEN MADE.

THIS SHOULD BE THE PHASE THAT STARTS FIRST THEN REVIEW FROM THERE ONWARDS AND YOU HAVE TO ASK WHY DOES EAST SUSSEX HAVE MORE PRINCIPLE OFFICERS THAN THE WHOLE OF SCOTLAND?

TRY LISTENING TO THE ACTUAL FIREFIGHTERS WHO STAFF EAST SUSSEX FIRE STATIONS AND UNDERTAKE THE REAL WORK OF ESFRS. THEY'RE BEST PLACED TO SAY WHICH, IF ANY, AREAS CAN BE ADJUSTED. DON'T TRY TO BAMBOOZLE US RATEPAYERS WITH JARGON AND TECHNICAL DETAIL WE WILL KNOW LITTLE ABOUT, AND DON'T TRY TO PLAY DIFFERENT LOCATIONS OFF AGAINST EACH OTHER. SO FAR I AM APPALLED AT THIS 'CONSULTATION'. WHEN WILL THERE BE A PUBLIC MEETING IN BRIGHTON AND HOVE?

TRY TO MERGE WITH NEIGHBOURING FRS TO REDUCE ADMIN COSTS. BUILDING NEW STATION IN A NEW LOCATION IN LEWES WILL BE DIFFICULT AS IS CURRENTLY SITUATED IN GOOD AREA.

WHAT A RIDICULOUSLY COMPLICATED QUESTION USING JARGON.

WHAT ABOUT REVIEW 14? GETTING RID OF THE HQ?

WHILST NOT BEING TOTALLY COMFORTABLE WITH SMALLER APPLIANCES, I THINK THAT IT IS BETTER TO HAVE SOMETHING TURNING UP THAN NOTHING BUT AT THE SAME TIME REALISE THAT YOU COULD POSSIBLY NEED 8 PERSONS TO APPLY A SAFE SYSTEM OF WORK.

WHY ARE 2 ARPS BEING PURCHASED FOR HASTINGS AND BRIGHTON AND HOVE WHEN THE CURRENT ALP CANNOT GET DOWN CERTAIN AREAS OF THE CITY IS THIS NOT JUST A BLATANT WASTE OF MONEY ESPECIALLY WHEN OTHER FRS ARE GETTING RID OF THEIRS? DAY CREWED PLUS SYSTEM ONLY HAS SAVINGS IN THE SHORT TERM AND AN OVERSPEND IN THE LONG TERM! YOU ALREADY EXPECT YOUR FIREFIGHTERS TO WORK UNTIL 60, BUT THIS SYSTEM WILL BURN THEM OUT A LOT QUICKER THAN YOUR CURRENT WATCH SYSTEMS. IS THERE MORE SAVINGS TO BE MADE IN THE OFFICER DEPARTMENT SURELY IF YOU ARE REDUCING THE WORKFORCE YOU DO NOT NEED SO MANY HIGH PAID OFFICERS TO DO THEIR JOBS ANYMORE?

WHY ARE YOU NOT CONSULTING ON REVIEW 14? WHO PUT THIS QUESTIONNAIRE TOGETHER THE KGB? YOUR CHIEF SHOULD BE ASHAMED OF HIMSELF, HE INHERITED A SUPERB FIRE SERVICE AND WISHES TO LEAVE IT IN AN APPALLING STATE. WHY DOES HE EARN MORE THAN THE PRIME MINISTER? NO STATIONS SHOULD CLOSE UNTIL HIS SO CALLED PRINCIPLE OFFICERS PAY AND PERKS, TEA CLAIMS INCLUDED ARE REIGNED IN. IN CONCLUSION THIS WHOLE PLAN IS A DISGRACE. LET THE TAX PAYERS HAVE A CONFIDENCE VOTE ON THE MANAGEMENT OF THE SERVICE NOT THE BUTCHERING OF IT.

WHY IS EAST SUSSEX SUBSIDISING KENT FOR ANIMAL RESCUE?

WHY IS THE NEED FOR 2 STATIONS IN HASTINGS WHEN YOU HAVE BATTLE BEXHILL AND BROADOAK SURROUNDING THE AREA? I THINK HASTINGS SHOULD HAVE ONE STATION WHICH WOULD BE DAY MANNED AND RETAINED.

WHY ISN'T THERE AN OPTION TO REVIEW SENIOR MANAGEMENT PAY?

WHY PURCHASE MORE ARPS WHEN THE ONE WE HAVE IS CONSTANTLY BREAKING, BEING KNOCKED WHILE DRIVING AND RECEIVING CONTINUED NEGATIVE FEEDBACK. LOOK AT THE OTHER FRS THAT ARE BINNING OFF THEIR ARPS IN FAVOUR OF GOING BACK TO ALPS AND TURN TABLE LADDERS. RUMOUR IS THAT EASTBOURNE'S ALP COULD HAVE AN OVERHAUL FOR 100,000 AND A NEW 15 YEAR LIFE SPAN, THIS SHOULD BE LOOKED IN TO.

WHY WAS THE RESULTS IF THE RURAL REVIEW, NUMBER 3, NOT SEEN THROUGH? AS THIS IS SEEN AS A SAVINGS SYSTEM THEN MAYBE IT COULD HAVE SAVED THE MESS YOU ARE IN NOW. DON'T DO HALF A JOB IF THERE IS A PROVEN NEED FOR IT THEN DO IT!

WITHOUT HAVING MUCH TIME TO CONSIDER IN DETAIL, I WOULD SAY AN INITIAL REVIEW OF ALL OPTIONS SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN WITH THE MOST TANGIBLE ONES THEN BEING TAKEN FURTHER.

YOU BUY CHEAP, YOU BUY TWICE.

Appendix E Details of any specific suggestions or alternative proposals

COUNTER PROPOSAL 2A & 2B

Removal of 72P4 (Battle retained pump) and 75P4 (The Ridge retained pump) Move 75M1 (The Ridge land rover) to Battle to support 72P1 (Battle wholetime pump) and for secondary fire use.

Reduce RDS Unit status to 10 whole units at Battle.

Keep the Wholetime establishment at Battle at 9 personnel on current duty system. When insufficient inpostings are available to maintain standard crewing at weekends use Battle RDS personnel.

Technical & Rope Rescue Skills retained.

Maximum cost of using up to 3 RDS personnel at weekends would be £29000 per year.

Savings by removal of 72P4 & 75P4 (Battle and The Ridge retained pumps) £180000 approx.

Received from Watch Manager Battle

Dear All,

Please find enclosed some proposals that I feel should be considered as part of the consultations.

1. Maintain the current 9 wholetime personnel at Battle.

By

Amend the current manual note to allow personnel from other stations to be sent to cover shortages at Battle at the weekend. If none are available then utilise the Retained at Battle. There are 104 weekend days during the year and the cost of a Retained person per day would be \pounds 91.98. The maximum we would need would be 2 per day costing \pounds 183.96 per day. If we needed them for every weekend day, as a maximum it would cost \pounds 183.96 x 104 days = \pounds 19,131.

This could be offset by the removal of the retained appliance at The Ridge which costs £80,000. With Battle whole time remaining at 9 and not bringing them up to 12 it would be a further saving of $3 \times \pounds40,000 = \pounds120,000$

Total savings could be in the region of £180,000.

2. Removal of Retained appliances at Battle and The Ridge and increase the wholetime at Battle to 12.

If we reduced the Retained complement to a core of people (half current numbers) and bring the 4×4 vehicle from The Ridge, this would be utilised, with a little adaption, to back up the wholetime appliance at Battle.

Removal of The Ridge Retained £80,000

Removal of half the current complement of Battle Retained [\pounds 120,000 divided by 2 = \pounds 60,000] Increase wholetime complement x 3 at a cost of \pounds 120,000

Total savings in region of £20,000

3. Removal of Retained appliances from Battle and The Ridge, reduce complement of Retained at Battle by half and move 4×4 from The Ridge to Battle. The 4×4 vehicle could be utilised to back up the wholetime appliance as per proposal 2. Inposting or Retained could be used to make up any shortfalls at the weekend.

Removal of The Ridge Retained £80,000 Removal of half the Retained at Battle £60,000 Cost of Retained to cover at weekends (max cost if every weekend day) £19,131 [£80,000 + £60,000 = £140,000 less £19,131 = £120,869]

Total savings in the region of £120,869

4. Removal of the Retained at both stations and increase the wholetime at Battle to 12. Removal of both Retained appliances, Battle $\pounds120,000 +$ The Ridge $\pounds80,000 = \pounds200,000$ less increase of 3 wholetime $\pounds120,000$ Total saving in region of $\pounds80,000$

Regards Marc Wise Appendix F Formal Rep Body Responses (FOA)

The Fire Officers Association - East Sussex Branch

ESFRS IRMP Consultation Response, 26th April 2014

The Fire Officers Association (FOA) represents ESFRS employees who serve in a range of roles, predominantly these are uniformed middle managers (Station Manager to Area Manager) but members also include staff from Sussex Control and the Service Training Centre as well as watch based personnel (including supervisory managers and Fire fighters).

FOA members often find themselves in the unique position of being expected by the nature of their employment to propose, plan and implement change despite, often, being personally affected by change proposals.

When representing its members FOA officials recognise this dilemma and seek to work with both Authority Members and Principle Officers to achieve the best possible fire and rescue service for the public whilst maintaining effective representation for our members. We recognise that there are many parties that have a legitimate interest in the fire and rescue service and we are always open to engaging and work with others, seeking to identify common ground and positive outcomes.

To that end in recent years the FOA in East Sussex has played a positive part in consultations for significant change, including Sussex Control, Flexi Officer Duty System change and the IRMP forum which has helped shape some of the proposals the Service is now consulting on.

As an example FOA Officials are pleased to see that the Phase Two proposals include consideration for Day Crewed Plus duty system stations. These were not proposed in the early stages of the IRMP Forum consideration of the Services plans, as a result the FOA asked that the Service should consider this duty system since it has been introduced to good effect in other FRS.

The FOA branch supports the East Sussex Fire Authority 2020 aims detailed in the consultation document.

The FOA is a non political association and therefore we make no comment on the rights and wrongs of the financial situation the Fire Authority now finds itself trying to reconcile. We do however recognise that the budget reductions faced by the Authority present significant challenges.

That said we are also very aware as FRS professionals of the down turn in incidents of all types experienced by FRS in England over the last ten years or so. Many of the findings in Sir Ken Knights May 2013 efficiencies review, Facing The Future, resonate with our members.

Whilst Sir Ken, by his own admission, avoids making specific recommendations, he does suggest areas that Services might look at when seeking efficiencies. Some of these rightly find their way into the ESFRS IRMP proposals; for instance his Chapter Two key finding in relation to crewing and staffing models are covered to a degree in proposals for single watches on Day Crewed stations, proposal for Day Crewed Plus stations and crewing arrangements for the proposed combined areal pumping appliances.

Other suggestions from Sir Ken, especially those relating to governance costs and the potential to share senior officers are not IRMP issues. However given that this IRMP plan will not, even if fully implemented, make the total efficiencies required to reconcile the Services medium term budget, they are essential discussion items for the near future. Discussions which the East Sussex FOA branch members wish to fully participate in.

We note with interest that Sir Ken proposes a 10% increase in Retained Duty System (On call) Fire fighters and that the Minister, Brandon Lewis MP, has challenged every English Fire Authority to look at every appliance on every station and consider if it could be crewed by RDS staff.

Yet despite Phase 2, Proposals 2A and 2B having some impact on RDS Fire fighter numbers (whilst the Phase 3, Review 1 could, depending on terms of reference, meet the Ministers suggestion, Reviews 3 and 11 seem very likely to not to) we find no evidence of a root and branch appliance by appliance review in this IRMP.

There are many similarities between the ESFRS facts and figures presented in the IRMP in relation to operational incidents and community safety activity and those found in Sir Kens report. Whilst we understand the numbers, and agree incidents of all types have fallen, it's clear to the members of the FOA that it would be reckless to extrapolate falling call numbers into a directly related reduction in FRS resources'. Resilience is required both locally and as demonstrated to dramatic effect earlier this year for the UK.

<u>Resilience</u>

Resilience is difficult to quantify in terms of numbers of staff and appliances as well as their capabilities, however it is the view of the FOA members in East Sussex that this is a piece of work that is required before many of the Phase 3 reviews could meaningfully be undertaken. Therefore we specifically propose that a resilience review is undertaken and consulted on with the representative bodies before any Phase 3 review is commenced.

Phase 1

The FOA broadly supports the Phase 1 proposals with one significant exception.

FOA members have specific concerns with Phase 1, Proposal 2, which will see the number of Community Safety Advisor posts reduced to four. It is our view that this proposal fails to recognise the important contribution of 'non operational' personnel to the reduction of incidents over the last ten years.

Delivery of Community Safety is a multi faceted activity in which operational Fire fighters rightly play a part, however we are aware that vocal desire to protect the front line obscures, and may even devalue, the vital work of our non operational colleagues.

Staff who undertake our most challenging Home Safety Visits, staff who work with modern fast paced media to distribute timely safety messages, staff who manage and deliver partnership related community safety activity are all professionals who play an important role in preventing incidents occurring, they prevent suffering and economic loss in our communities and do so in a economic and environmentally friendly way. In the FOA's opinion they very much form part of the Services front line.

Whilst we recognise that there is some capacity for operational crews to complete a higher number of HSV's and participate in wider community safety activity we believe that the need to move in crews of four or five, in major pumping appliances, whilst maintaining operational cover limits the range, and frequently continuity, of community safety activities they can deliver. Of course Watch Managers, Station Managers and Borough Commanders should continue to innovate to ensure these limitations are minimised but the FOA branch believes the decision to remove Community Safety Advisors from Borough control and reduce their numbers should be reconsidered.

Phase 2

Proposal 1 – Due to the sustained fall in call numbers the FOA supports this proposal. However the Service needs to ensure the ready availability of supporting appliances, which will mean working with West Sussex Fire & Rescue Service to understand their plans for provision across the border from the City. ESFRS will also need to ensure solid availability at Newhaven and Lewes Community Fire Stations, this may mean expediting the provision of a Day Crewed Plus station at Lewes.

Proposal 2A and 2B – It's the FOA view that these proposals are broadly equal in merit. However they both mask the underlying problem of fire and rescue provision in Hastings and the surrounding areas of Rother. That is as a direct result of the unfortunate and incorrect decision taken by the Authority in relation to the Hastings review.

Fire cover should be based on risk, that's the principle that underpins IRMP and is agreed by all the professional/representative bodies working within the FRS.

The area of greatest risk within Hastings is around Bohemia Road Community Fire Station, this station should be a two pump whole time station (though it may be able to operate on a Day Crewed Plus basis for one or both appliances).

Some of the financial savings that fall out of this risk based move (in WT crewing moving to one station, not requiring separate watch management and riding a rescue pump and a water tender) should be invested in a dedicated Community Safety Team who would specifically target the lower risk areas of Hastings, especially those properties served by the Ridge Community Fire Station to drive risk down even further. An RDS crew equipped with a rescue pump should remain at the Ridge Community Fire Station.

Before deciding what this means for crewing provision at Battle Community Fire Station research should be undertaken to establish the likely effects of the Bexhill Link Road along with the appliance relocation within Hastings. A holistic view would then be possible for fire cover arrangements in the Bexhill and Battle areas.

Proposal 3 – Supported (subject to the caveat regarding fire cover in Hastings above).

Phase 3

Subject to the FOA proposal that a Resilience review should be undertaken first the FOA is happy to participate in these thirteen reviews. That said our members view is that many of them have been undertaken in the past and that few, if any, have the potential to be truly bring about transformation within ESFRS, most of them will achieve timely fine tuning of areas of activity.

Conclusion

These IRMP proposals if implemented to any degree will have significant impacts on staff across the Service area.

The FOA branch recognises that senior managers within ESFRS, including our own members, have worked hard through the previous efficiency exercises, Service Prioritisation and Facing the Challenge, to consult with and inform staff. Considerable care has been taken to try and achieve staffing reductions through natural turn over and voluntary redundancy.

The scale of the proposed changes within the consultation document will challenge the Services ability to continue with this approach, yet in order to succeed, and have some hope of maintaining a positive workforce operating within Service values, every effort must be made to do so.

ESFRS has both significant financial reserves and significant managerial talent within its workforce. These funds and skills should be used to smooth the implementation of whatever plans the Authority chooses to adopt in order to reconcile reducing budgets and the need to maintain an effective prevention, protection and response capacity for the people of East Sussex and Brighton & Hove.

The challenge should not be under estimated though; it will impact on the capacity of individuals, teams and the whole Service. Urgent consideration should be given to all non core activities, especially those that take senior managers away from the workplace. Whilst it's important that ESFRS remains sighted on regional and national developments within both the FRS and the wider public sector, the first priority must be to ensure that change is well managed and successfully embedded within the Service.

The FOA branch members remain committed to the safety of the communities we serve and will continue to make a positive contribution by playing their part in proposing, planning and implementing change.

M. A. Rist Chair, East Sussex Branch of the Fire Officers Association

Appendix F

Formal Rep Body Responses

(FBU)



The Fire Brigades Union response to

Changing the Service- shaping our future- **Consultation Draft**



Forward

According to the East Sussex Fire and Rescue Service web-site *Changing the Service- shaping our future- Consultation Draft* is a public consultation document. (http://www.esfrs.org/document/pdf/changingtheservice/changing_the_service_consultation_document.pdf)

This is The Fire Brigades Union response to this public consultation exercise. It must not be assumed by East Sussex Fire Authority to form part of consultation and negotiation rights set out in *The Pay and Conditions Agreement 2003* and *The National Joint Council for local authority fire and rescue services - Scheme of Conditions of Service Sixth Edition (updated 2009),* known commonly as the Grey Book.

According to guidance and research published by Government, any of these options, if adopted will have an impact on staff and others, that is detrimental to their health, safety and welfare. According to this guidance and research, the proposed options if adopted, will have an impact that is detrimental to people, infrastructure, business, and the environment when emergencies occur.

East Sussex Fire Authority has embarked on public consultation. Public consultation has been tested in law , which has established fundamental propositions which are known as the *Gunning Principles*. The principles that must be adhered to are:

- Consultation must take place when the proposal is still at a formative stage;
- Sufficient reasons must be put forward for the proposal to allow intelligent consideration and response;
- Adequate time must be given for consideration and response; and
- The product of consultation must be conscientiously taken into account

The *Consultation Draft* fails the first three principles in that;

- The proposals are a fait accompli. No alternatives are given.
- The reasons for the proposals are not true, they are not the same as the Government's reasons for reducing expenditure
- The consul tee's are not supplied with sufficient explanation of the potential consequences to allow intelligent consideration and response

The Fire Brigades Union is surprised that East Sussex Fire Authority has not used its agreed procedures to assess the impact of the proposed options on staff and others before producing this consultation draft. We believe the fire authority would achieve the *Gunning Principles* if these procedures are followed, and the findings, from these procedures, are included in the *Consultation Draft*.

The Fire Brigades Union believe that failure to provide a true and accurate explanation to the public is inexcusable, and the Fire Authority must bring those responsible to account.

Introduction

This is The Fire Brigades Union response to East Sussex Fire Authority's public consultation exercise *Changing the Service- shaping our future*. It must not be assumed by East Sussex Fire Authority that this response forms part of consultation and negotiation rights as set out in *The Pay and Conditions Agreement 2003* and *The National Joint Council for local authority fire and rescue services - Scheme of Conditions of Service Sixth Edition (updated 2009),* known commonly as the Grey Book.

The purpose of our response is to assess whether the consultation is meaningful in that;

- Consultation has taken place when the proposal is still at a formative stage;
- Sufficient reasons have been put forward for the proposal to allow intelligent consideration and response; and
- Adequate time has been given for consideration and response, and
- The product of consultation is conscientiously taken into account

The Fire Brigades Union has assessed these against the requirements of fire and rescue national frameworks, and the 2010 Four-year spending review set out in *HM Treasury Spending Review 2010* and *Fire and Rescue Service Immediate Bulletin 1*.

The legislation for fire and rescue services is complex, however these complexities do follow some basic principles, and these are:

- that fire and rescue services need to identify and assess all risks and make these public;
- that fire and rescue services must put in place control measures for these risks and make these public;
- that they must provide systems to deliver these control measures that are equal, and fair; and
- that they must provide systems to deliver these control measures that are safe and protect the health and welfare of their employees; and
- These systems must not adversely affect the safety, health and welfare on those not in their employment.

Local authority fire and rescue services set the standard for these tests in the 2003 Pay Agreement and the Scheme of Conditions of Service, commonly known as the Grey Book, keeps these standards up to date.

These two agreements identify the statutory responsibilities of fire and rescue authorities and the functions of their fire and rescue services. These duties, along with reference to their Approved Codes of Practice and guidance are set out in Appendix B. In addition to assessing the fire authority's compliance with statutory duties we have also tried to assess societal expectations for their fire and rescue service. For example, in the *Introduction* to the *National Joint Council for local authority fire and rescue services - Scheme of Conditions of Service Sixth Edition (updated 2009),* known as the Grey Book, East Sussex Fire Authority representatives and The Fire Brigades Union jointly make this statement:

The role of local authority fire and rescue services in the United Kingdom is the reduction in the loss of life, injury, economic and social cost arising from fires and other hazards. The service is responsible for:

- Risk reduction and risk management in relation to fires and some other types of hazard or emergency.
- Community fire safety and education.
- Fire safety enforcement.
- Emergency responses to fires and other emergencies where it is best fitted to act as the primary agency responsible for the rescue of people including road traffic accidents, chemical spillages and other large-scale incidents such as transport accidents.
- Emergency preparedness coupled with the capacity and resilience to respond to major incidents of terrorism and other chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats.

The Explanatory Memorandum to The Fire and Rescue Authorities (National Framework)(England) Order 2012 states:

Policy background

The Fire and Rescue National Framework for England ("the Framework"), published on 11th July 2012, sets out the Government's priorities and objectives for fire and rescue authorities in England and what they should do to achieve them, as required by the Fire and Rescue Service Act 2004.

The Framework takes forward the objectives of the Open Public Services White Paper, and marks a key milestone in resetting the relationship between the Government and fire and rescue authorities; moving away from a prescriptive approach to enable authorities to deliver services in a way that makes sense locally, whilst meeting the wider needs of national resilience. The priorities in the Framework are for fire and rescue authorities to:

- identify and assess the full range of foreseeable fire and rescue related risks their areas face, make provision for prevention and protection activities and respond to incidents appropriately;
- work in partnership with their communities and a wide range of partners locally and nationally to deliver their service; and
- *be accountable to communities for the service they provide.*

We have used *The Fire and Rescue National Framework for England 2012* to assess *Changing the service – Shaping our future.* The last section assesses the consultation exercise against the expectations listed as bullet points in *Fire and Rescue Service Immediate Bulletin 1.*

Fire and rescue national framework for England 2012

Chapter 2 Accountable to communities

2.1 Fire and rescue authorities are accountable to their communities for their actions and decision making. They need to have transparent processes in place to deliver this and engage with their communities to provide them with the opportunity to influence their local service. Local accountability is a vital check on the services provided by fire and rescue authorities.

Communities planning their local fire and rescue service

2.2 The integrated risk management planning process is an opportunity for fire and rescue authorities to have an ongoing conversation with communities and to inform them through the provision of up-to-date, accessible data on risk. Through this transparent approach, communities can better influence local planning and how their authority meets risks both within their area and as part of mutual aid agreements.

2.3 Each fire and rescue authority integrated risk management plan must: be easily accessible and publicly available

reflect effective consultation throughout its development and at all review stages with the community, its workforce and representative bodies, and partners

cover at least a three year time span and be reviewed and revised as often as it is necessary to ensure that fire and rescue authorities are able to deliver the requirements set out in this Framework

reflect up to date risk analyses and the evaluation of service delivery outcomes

Transparent data enables communities to hold service providers to account

2.7 To hold fire and rescue authorities to account, communities need to be able to access information in a way that enables them to compare the performance of their fire and rescue authority with others. Both the Government and fire and rescue authorities need to have an open approach towards data and information to provide transparency for communities.

2.8 Fire and rescue authorities must make their communities aware of how they can access data and information on their performance.

2.9 Meeting this requirement includes, but is not limited to:

meeting the current code of recommended practice for local authorities on data transparency

publishing pay policy statements (a duty under sections 38 and 39 of the Localism Act 2011)

raising awareness of sources of comparable data and how to access these e.g. linking to other government department websites and data returns to the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy

linking to tools and best practice guidance provided by organisations such as the Local Government Association and the Chief Fire Officers' Association

acting in accordance with the Freedom Of Information Act and publication schemes set by the Information Commissioner

publishing any action plans arising from peer reviews and self-assessments

publishing any other locally held data that fire and rescue authorities feel will aid transparency to their communities

2.10 The Government is committed to publishing all the data it holds within the bounds of data protection and security, for example by publishing statistics on the internet and by making large data files available.

Public consultation has been tested in law , which has established fundamental propositions which are known as the *Gunning Principles*. The principles that must be adhered to are:

- Consultation must take place when the proposal is still at a formative stage;
- Sufficient reasons must be put forward for the proposal to allow intelligent consideration and response;
- Adequate time must be given for consideration and response; and
- The product of consultation must be conscientiously taken into account

Sufficient reasons for *intelligent consideration* must also include the qualifications for legal duties;

- The duty to identify all risks is not absolute and is qualified by the test of *what is foreseeable.*
- The duty to put in place control measures is not absolute and is qualified by the tests of economy, *efficiency, and effectiveness (cost benefit).*
- The duty to put in place control measures for these risks is also qualified by the test of *what is reasonably practicable*.¹
- Health, safety, and welfare duties are not absolute and these are qualified by the test of *what is reasonably practicable*.

The Fire Brigades Union has used evidence from the bulleted list below to apply to these tests:

- Court judgements, HSE judgements, Coroners judgements, and Serious Accident Investigation Conclusions
- Explanatory Notes that accompany legislation
- Recommendations made by statutory and non-statutory guidance for civil contingency and fire and rescue service legislation
- The terms of the 2003 Fire and Rescue Service Pay and Conditions Agreement
- The terms of the National Joint Council for local authority fire and rescue services -Scheme of Conditions of Service Sixth Edition (updated 2009), known as the Grey Book
- The requirements of fire and rescue national frameworks
- The aims and objectives of East Sussex Fire Authority

Background

¹ Civil Contingencies Act 2004, Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Contingency Planning) Regulations 2005

Parliamentary Acts provide a legal framework in which the citizens of the United Kingdom (UK)live. But being obliged to carry out duties should be seen as a last resort because Parliamentary Acts set the tone of Parliament. They set the way Parliament expects the citizens of the UK to behave towards others and the environment. The Fire Brigades Union believe the overall purpose of Parliamentary Acts is to provide a society that is democratic, fair, inclusive, safe and seeks to improve the wellbeing of citizens and the environment.

Two Acts describe the primary functions of fire and rescue authorities and these are the;

- Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 (Royal Assent 22 July 2004) which defines the provision of fire and rescue authorities and their functions; including water supply; false alarms; and advisory bodies; the provision of employment; and powers of employees; their education; training; and pension schemes; and the
- *Civil Contingencies Act 2004(Royal Assent 18 November 2004)* which defines the meaning of an *Emergency* and the duties to identify, assess, plan and advise

Secondary legislation², statutory guidance³, and non-statutory guidance⁴ support this primary legislation for fire and rescue⁵.

In the simplest terms fire and rescue authorities must plan for its fire and rescue services to;

- Prevent emergencies occurring, and to
- Respond immediately to emergencies to do something to reduce, control and mitigate the impact of the emergencies when they occur.

Fire and rescue authorities must produce and deliver an integrated risk management plan (IRMP) that sets out;

- What it will deliver and the expected outcomes from that delivery.
- What it will not deliver and why it will not deliver it.
- How it will measure the performance
- How it will review the expected outcomes, and
- Amend its delivery if the expected outcomes are not being met.

This plan must cover at least three years.

² The Civil Contingencies Act 2004(Planning)(England) Regulations 2005;

The Fire and Rescue Services (National Framework)(England) Order 2004;

The Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005;

The Fire and Rescue Services (Emergencies)(England)Order 2007;

The Fire Safety (Employees' Capabilities)(England) 2010;

The Fire and Rescue Authorities (National Framework)(England) Order 2012; The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Contingency Planning)(Amendment) Regulations 2012

³ Emergency Preparedness Revised Version 2012

⁴ Emergency, Response and Recovery 4th Edition

IRMP Guidance Notes 1-10

IRMP Steering Group Integrated Risk Management Planning: Policy Guidance: Environment Protection; Heritage; Equality & Diversity; Road Traffic Collision Reduction; Wildfire; Business Continuity Management

The Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 Guidance Notes

⁵ The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004

To summarise the functions within these plans;

- along with other Category 1 responder's fire and rescue authorities must form a Local/Borough Resilience Forum. Within this forum fire and rescue authorities must meet ,co-operate, coordinate and share information with other services and agencies to;
- identify emergencies by type; and to produce plans to;
- prevent these emergencies⁶ occurring; and
- to reduce, control, and mitigate the impact of these emergencies, should they occur.
- Currently these are;
- (a) an event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare in a place in the United Kingdom,
- (b) an event or situation which threatens serious damage to the environment of a place in the United Kingdom, or
- (c) war, or terrorism, which threatens serious damage to the security of the United Kingdom.
- (2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(a) an event or situation threatens damage to human welfare only if it involves, causes or may cause—
- (a) loss of human life,
- (b) human illness or injury,
- (c) homelessness,
- (d) damage to property,
- (e) disruption of a supply of money, food, water, energy or fuel,
- (f) disruption of a system of communication,
- (g) disruption of facilities for transport, or
- (h) disruption of services relating to health.
- (3) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b) an event or situation threatens damage to the environment only if it involves, causes or may cause—
- (a) contamination of land, water or air with biological, chemical or radio-active matter, or
- (b) disruption or destruction of plant life or animal life.

Note: The benchmark for *serious damage* has changed with the introduction of the *Initial Operational Response Programme*, which introduces new emergency response arrangements for the first hour of a civil contingency emergency.

⁶ ⁶ *The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 Subsection (1)* defines "emergency" for the purposes of Part 1. Events such as a terrorist attack, disruption of fuel supplies, contamination of land with a chemical matter and an epidemic could satisfy the definition, should they reach the required level of seriousness.

Subsections (2) and (3) specify exhaustively the kinds of event or situation which may threaten damage to human welfare or the environment. In order to satisfy the definition of "emergency", the event or situation must also threaten *serious* damage to human welfare in, or the environment of, *a place in the United Kingdom*. This definition differs from the definition of "emergency" for the purposes of Part 2 of the CCA in that, for the purposes of Part 2, the situation must threaten serious damage to human welfare in, or the environment of, the United Kingdom or in a Part or region (rather than a place in the United Kingdom).

- (4) A Minister of the Crown, or, in relation to Scotland, the Scottish Ministers, may by order—
- (a) provide that a specified event or situation, or class of event or situation, is to be treated as falling, or as not falling, within any of paragraphs (a) to (c) of subsection (1);
- (b) amend subsection (2) so as to provide that in so far as an event or situation involves or causes disruption of a specified supply, system, facility or service—
- (i) it is to be treated as threatening damage to human welfare, or
- (ii) it is no longer to be treated as threatening damage to human welfare.
- (5) The event or situation mentioned in subsection (1) may occur or be inside or outside the United Kingdom.
- On their own fire and rescue authorities must deal with emergencies; that cause or are likely to cause one or more individuals to die, be seriously injured, or become seriously ill, or serious harm to the environment (including the life and health of plants and animals⁷.
- Currently these are Fire, Road Traffic Accidents, chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear emergency, and rescue and protection in case of certain emergencies.

Fire and rescue national framework for England 2012

The *introduction* sets the priorities in this Framework are for fire and rescue authorities to:

- identify and assess the full range of foreseeable fire and rescue related risks their areas face, make provision for prevention and protection activities and respond to incidents appropriately
- work in partnership with their communities and a wide range of partners locally and nationally to deliver their service
- be accountable to communities for the service they provide

Chapter 1 Safer communities set out the duty to produce Integrated Risk Management Plans and what they must contain;

Identify and assess

1.3 Each fire and rescue authority must produce an integrated risk management plan that identifies and assesses all foreseeable fire and rescue related risks that could affect its community, including those of a cross-border, multi-authority and/or national nature. The plan must have regard to the Community Risk Registers produced by Local Resilience Forums and any other local risk analyses as appropriate3.



⁷ The term "emergency" is defined in section 58 of the *Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004*.

Government, to assist fire and rescue authorities, provides statutory and non-statutory guidance. In 2008 the Department for Communities and Local Government published three Fire Research Reports that establish the status and the necessity of this guidance⁸. Queens Council gave opinion that;

Reliance by fire and rescue authorities on Departmental advice is foreseeable; and it is also foreseeable that loss would be suffered if inadequate and/or outdated advice and guidance is made available to fire and rescue authorities. it is moreover arguable that a special relationship exists between central government and fire and rescue authorities in respect of advice and guidance specifically directed to such authorities; and that the Department has assumed responsibility to the claimant

Departmental guidance is provided on the process of identification and assessment;

- Fire and Rescue Authority Integrated Risk management Planning Guidance Note 1 published in 2003; and
- Chapter 4 (local responder risk assessment duty) of Emergency Preparedness, Revised Version publish March 2012

Note: These two pieces of Departmental guidance set out processes for risk assessment. Other Departmental guidance provides further guidance on the application of these processes.

Guidance Note 1 sets out a four-step process;

- Identify existing risks
- Evaluate effectiveness of current arrangements
- Identify improvement opportunities Determine policies and standards
- Determine resource requirements

Guidance Note 1 provides this guidance;

Identify existing and potential risks to the community within the authority area

The first task in preparing an IRMP is to identify, characterise and prioritise the existing and potential risks within your fire authority's area. You will need to look in some detail at what has happened in recent years, and what might reasonably be expected to happen. This will include examining the number, type, geographical location and time of day of all incidents attended in recent years (fires, RTAs, other special services e.g. flooding, co-responder, etc). While risk to property, the environment and heritage will continue to be of importance, risk to life will in future be given the highest priority.

The Appendix suggests a wide range of data types and sources you might look at. Fire authorities and their brigades already hold a lot of this information. You will need to consider the extent to which you can rely on existing information gathered for 1(i)(d), fire safety, and other purposes, and whether you need to visit any individual premises to gather additional or more specific information. The Community Fire Safety Toolbox 'Foundation Stones' offers detailed advice on the

⁸ Fire Research Reports 6, 11, and 12/2008 Legislative Base for Integrated Risk Management Plans

collection and analysis of information (see section on 'fire facts and statistics' in the Toolbox). The Toolbox website can be found at www.firesafetytoolbox.org.uk

Fire brigades that have taken part in the 'Pathfinder' trials in recent years will have more detailed information available for part or all of their areas than many others. However, we believe that every fire authority could make a sound start on its local risk identification by:

• assembling the data they have as simply as possible;

• consulting other local authority and public service departments about relevant data they hold, e.g. on the characteristics of housing or commercial areas, on population movements during the day or at weekends, etc; and

• consulting their staff about the information they have on the nature and causes of incidents.

You should be aiming to produce plans, maps, summaries or tables that show actual incidents and identifies areas, time periods, community groups, etc in terms of their relative risks. This may include risks that have not previously been considered. You may also identify in this part of the process data that it would be helpful to collect or improve, or research you would like to do into correlation between incidents and possible causal factors. These needs could feed into the first Action Plan so that work is undertaken over the year to fill the gaps.

Chapter 4 (local responder risk assessment duty) of Emergency Preparedness offers guidance that has further explanation;

Step 1: Contextualisation

In an initial discussion at the RAWG, Category 1 responders should begin by defining the scope of the risk management activity in the context of the Act and supporting guidance. They should review the process that they will adopt and identify the project's stakeholders. Key stakeholder groups must include the Category 1 responders who share the risk assessment duty, and may include Category 2 organisations with a contribution to the risk assessment process, as well as groups in the community with relevant knowledge and a particular interest in the results of the work (see 4.56). It is important that Category 1 responders understand, at the outset, the risk evaluation criteria and principles with which risks will be evaluated and prioritised (see Annexes 4D and 4F). This should prepare them for later stages of the process, in which they will need to decide which risks are acceptable and those which must be tolerated, including those which require planning.

An important part of step 1 is for Category 1 responders to describe the characteristics of the local area that will influence the likelihood and impact of an emergency in the community. This is to understand the context better, as well as to establish the vulnerability and resilience of the area to emergencies. To do this Category 1 responders should reflect on a number of aspects of their area, including:

- **Social:** What is the demographic, ethnic and socio-economic composition of the community? Are there any particularly vulnerable groups in the community? How are the various communities geographically distributed within the local area? How prepared and experienced is the community at coping with different types of emergencies?
- **Environment:** Are there any particular local vulnerabilities (e.g. poor coastal defences against flooding)? Is the area urbanised, rural or mixed? Are there any Sites of Special Scientific Interest?
- Infrastructure: How is the infrastructure configured in the area (transport, utilities, business, etc)? What are the critical supply networks in the area? Are there any sites in the area that are particularly critical for local and national essential services (e.g. telecommunications

hubs, health, finance, legal, etc)? What type of economydoesithave?Howprepared and experienced are the businesses in the area at coping with different types of emergency?

• *Hazardous sites:* What potentially hazardous sites exist in the area? Where are they in relation to communities or sensitive environmental sites?

Step 2: Hazard review and allocation for assessment

Hazards

Taking into account centrally provided guidance, in the form of the LRAG (see <u>Box</u> <u>4.4</u>), each Category 1 responder should consider the local context as described during step 1 and identify those non-malicious hazards that, in their view, present significant risks (i.e. could give rise to an emergency) in their areas over the next five years. These hazards will be identified on the basis of experience, research or other information (including from the community itself) and they are likely to present consequences to which a special mobilisation by the Category 1 responder is required

The RAWG should share and discuss these hazards at a meeting of the LRF with a view to agreeing a list of hazards to be assessed. The LRF should endorse the list of hazards, and determine which Category 1 responder will lead the assessment of each hazard on behalf of the group. The LRF will also need to decide how any additional hazards proposed by the RAWG should be assessed, whether by the appointment of a lead, delegation or otherwise

Box 4.3: longer term considerations

Category 1 responders should consider these aspects in the context of the current situation, but with regards to emerging trends and future events. They are also encouraged to take into account the longer-term risk context. Climate change, although not a risk considered in the time frames of the local risk assessment cycle, is a major driver of many of the risks that LRFs do consider Consideration of this longer term risk will allow responders to identify capability gaps and risk reduction measures that may need to be tackled over a longer term period. For example, will present coastal defences be sufficient over a longer term horizon. A suggested timeframe for longer term risk contextualisation is 20 years. The National Security Risk Assessment, first published in 2010, evaluates risk over the same timescale and can be drawn upon to inform longer term contextualisation. Other factors that may define the time frame of longer term consideration include the expected service lifetime of buildings, plants and equipment. This consideration of longer term risk drivers, is not a statutory part of the risk assessment process and should be included at the discretion of the LRF.

When overall risk scores are calculated at a later stage, events that are low in likelihood but high in impact will not score highly, implying a need for planning cannot be justified (e.g. asteroids hitting the earth). This is not to say that all low likelihood, high impact events should be excluded, but a careful judgment is needed about the likelihood below which events will be excluded from the assessment. It would be good practice to maintain a register of excluded risks as an appendix to the CRR; this would allow Category 1 responders to demonstrate that certain risks were considered at the outset but were then discounted for specified reasons (e.g. an assumption that the likelihood was so small that the hazard did not warrant further attention).

The responsibilities of the lead assessors would be to:

- assess the likelihood and impact of each hazard, based on the knowledge of RAWG members, the generic likelihood assessment (where available) and any other relevant information;
- liaise with the relevant government departments or agencies, as required;

- document assessments using the individual risk assessment example (Annex 4C), which will support the CRR, containing more detailed information on the assessment;
- present the likelihood assessment to the LRF and make changes as necessary;
- capture the results of the LRF risk assessment in the CRR; and
- ensure that the assessment is adequately described in the CRR.

Box 4.4: Local Risk Assessment Guidance (LRAG)

Central government departments, or their agencies, are often best placed to provide generic likelihood assessments for local hazards and threats. Members of the RAWG are well positioned to adapt these generic assessments of likelihood and, using their local knowledge of sites and conditions, to combine them with their assessments of the impacts of hazards. Through the involvement of the Department for Communities and Local Government, Resilience and Emergencies Division, the more specific local risk assessments will feed up into the UK picture. Consequently, the top-down and bottom-up risk assessment processes within the UK should become increasingly integrated.

Category 1 responders will receive Local Risk Assessment Guidance containing information on the likelihood and impact of generic threats and hazards. This guidance will be agreed each year in a process co- ordinated by the Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat and involving representatives from the departments and agencies responsible for providing the assessments, as well as representatives of the local emergency planners, including first responders. It will be made available by the Cabinet Office in England, and the Welsh Government in Wales. (For further detail on arrangements in the devolved administrations, see paragraphs 4.15-4.24.)

The framework is continually updated; Category 1 and 2 responders and other relevant parties are encouraged to put forward suggestions for improvements to the guidance. These will be fed back to the originating departments who will, where possible, reflect these suggestions in future versions of the guidance.

Chapter 4 (local responder risk assessment duty) of Emergency Preparedness sets out a sixstep process;

- Contextualisation
- Hazard review and allocation for assessment
- Risk analysis
- Risk evaluation
- Risk treatment
- Monitoring and reviewing

These processes do not appear to act in conflict, however are both required?

IRMP guidance issued in 2008⁹

Guidance Note 1 is not statutory guidance, but is status has been the subject of Queens Council opinion and court judgement.

⁹ IRMP Steering Group Integrated Risk Management Planning: Policy Guidance: Policy Guidance – Business Continuity Management; Section3 Risk Analysis

Chapter 4 (local responder risk assessment duty) of Emergency Preparedness is statutory guidance that the fire authority must have regard to. It is also kept up to date and postdates *Guidance Note 1* by nine years.

It seems logical to us to include the IRMP process within the six-step process used to comply with *Civil Contingencies Act 2004*.

We recommend that the seeks Departmental opinion on using the process set out in *Chapter 4 (local responder risk assessment duty) of Emergency Preparedness* to determine its Integrated Risk Management requirements for both *normal* (FRS Act) and *serious* (CC Act) emergencies.

Identify emergencies by type¹⁰;

Identify and assess

1.3 Each fire and rescue authority must produce an integrated risk management plan that identifies and assesses all foreseeable fire and rescue related risks that could affect its community, including those of a cross-border, multi-authority and/or national nature. The plan must have regard to the Community Risk Registers produced by Local Resilience Forums and any other local risk analyses as appropriate³.

1.9 Fire and rescue authorities must work with communities to identify and protect them from risk and to prevent incidents from occurring.

1.38 In order to meet the requirements of this Framework, fire and rescue authorities must work in partnership with their communities and a wide range of partners locally and nationally.

The legal duties to identify emergencies is summarised in *Fire and Rescue Service Operational guidance – Operational Risk Information*¹¹ published by DCLG in March 2012.

East Sussex Fire Authority must identify all emergencies by type and a number of national sources of evidence are available to the fire authority and these are;

The National Risk Assessment is a protected Document that is not available to the public however East Sussex Fire Authority has access to it.

The Nation Risk Register 2012 is the public version of **The National Risk Assessment** and this identifies 80 existing scenarios and 40 potential scenarios

Fire Service Emergency Cover Toolkit divides emergencies in four categories (Dwelling Fires, Other Buildings (17 sub categories), Special Services (9 sub categories), and Major Incidents (7 sub-categories)

¹⁰ Civil Contingencies Act 2004 Part 1 1(1) & 2(1); Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 Part 2 7(2)(d) , 8(2)(d), 9(3)(d)

 $^{^{11}}$ Fire and Rescue Service Operational guidance – Operational Risk Information Section 4

Dwelling fires	Other Buildings
	Hospital
Special services	Care Home
Road Traffic Accidents (RTAs)	НМО
Extrications	Purpose Built Flat, 4 storeys or more
Lift Rescues	Hostel
Lockins/outs	Hotel
Hazardous Chemical Incidents (Hazcher	House Converted to Flat
Line Rescues	Other Sleeping Accommodation
Ladder Releases	Further Education
Water Rescues	Public Building
Other Special Services	Licensed Premise
Major Incidents	School
Floods	Shop
Bombs	Other Premises Open to the Public
Railway Incidents	Factory or Warehouse
Shipping Incidents	Office
Aircraft Incidents	Other Workplace
Hazardous Chemical (Hazchem) Incider	
Vehicle Incidents	

Add essential Other Buildings data

Additional data will be need to be sourced and input on:

- HMOs that are 3 storeys or above
- Purpose built flats of 4 storeys or above
- Houses converted to flats of 3 storeys or above

The Incident Recording System provides Fire and Rescue Services in the UK with 'a fully tested and piloted means of collecting, validating, and transmitting data to DCLG on all incidents attended by the Fire and Rescue Service. This divides emergency response into three levels. Level 1 categories are; Alarms, Explosion, Fire , Humanitarian or Assistance, Hazardous Material, Rescues, Civil Disturbance/Unlawful Act, RTC, Other Transport incident, Flooding, Rescue or evacuation from water, other rescue/release of persons, Animal Assistance incidents.

Including all sub categories the *Incident Recording System* uses 459 categories for emergencies attended by fire and rescue services.

The DCLG Generic Risk Assessment divides emergencies into five sections and 39 model risk assessments

CFOA National Incident Types divides emergencies into three main types for mobilising (Fire, Special Service, and False Alarm). Each is further divided into sub-categories (fire 216 and special service 214).

Fire Brigades Union Assessment

Sufficient reasons have not been be put forward for the proposal to allow intelligent consideration and response. East Sussex Fire Authority has failed to provide sufficient identity of emergencies by type.

East Sussex Fire Authority has a very poor track record for identifying emergencies by type. THE Marlie Farm explosion and subsequent trials revealed Its failure to inspect properly, Inadequate knowledge and inadequate training that was found to have breached a number of statutory regulations¹².

Six years after the deaths of Brian Wembridge and Geoff Wicker , *The Argus* newspaper exposed the continued inadequacy of East Sussex Fire Authorities risk planning¹³.

A search of East Sussex Fire and Rescue Service web-site reveals CRR public v3.doc 75% <u>http://www.esfrs.org/qfsearch/Search/Servlet?site=www.esfrs.org&query=explosive+risk</u>

(http://www.esfrs.org/document/pdf/planningEmergencies/communityriskregister _20060317.pdf)

This document was placed on the web site on March 20th 2006 is the Community Risk Register for the Sussex Local resilience Forum approved by GW (presumably Gary Walsh). *HL07 Fire/Explosion at industrial Site* pre dates the Marlie Farm explosion and appears not to have been updated since then. A second search for *fire/explosion at industrial site* revealed this search as 95% accurate.

The Fire Brigades Union still hold the Authority and its principle management team responsible for deaths of its employees and the injury of many others at Marlie Farm..

How East Sussex Fire Authority identifies risk is not clear from their consultation media. *Changing the service – Shaping our future* web page contains the *main consultation document* and four video files which are;

- Changing The Service
- Explaining Risks

¹² Case No HQ10X0197 30/7/13 PARAGRAPHS 229-247

¹³ The Argus 1.10pm Friday 7th December 2012 in News by Bill Gardner

- Changing the Service proposals
- Understanding emergencies

None of these identify, in sufficient detail, the types of fire and rescue risks. Page 16 and 17 of the *main consultation document* give limited information on dwelling fires and road traffic accidents¹⁴. Page 50, 51, 52, 54, and 55 give further limited information on risks defined as *type* which are; *RTC, other Special Service Call; Secondary Fire; Primary Fire; False Alarm; Chimney fire*. Pages 29 -31 contains a section called *Our analysis How we assess risk.* Pages 30 and 31 give a brief explanation of software applications and these are; *Fire Service Emergency Cover Toolkit; Active Total Solution Mapping and Pheonix software; and Mosaic profiling.*

The Understanding emergencies video shows one slide that divide Special Services Calls 2012/13 into; Other; RTC; Lift Rescue; Flooding; Effect entry/exit; Other rescue: Animal rescue; and one slide that divides False Alarms 2012/13 into; False Alarm Apparatus; False Alarm Good Intent; Malicious False Alarm

The *Explaining risks video* shows two slides that divide dwelling fires by *different types of people; Dwelling fires (07-13) by Mosaic Group* sets out a bar graph of fires by 15 people groups.

The first thing that struck us is the inconsistency of approach between the main document and the videos. Different time spans and profiles are used by each. None of them identify community risks (emergencies) accurately. Even if the consul tee manages to piece the information provided together, this is still insufficient to make an intelligent decision.

Assess likelihood by type¹⁵

The RAWG lead assessors should consider the likelihood of the hazards occurring within the next five years (the same timescale adopted by the UK assessment).

East Sussex Fire Authority must assess the likelihood of each type of emergency happening in its area to establish trends and to forecast community needs to deal with them.

The Nation Risk Register 2012 is the public version of The National Risk Assessment and this identifies 80 existing scenarios and 40 potential scenarios. These estimate the likelihood

¹⁴ The Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 refers to Road Traffic Accidents rather than Road Traffic Collisions

¹⁵ The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Contingency Planning)Regulations 2005 Part 3 13; Emergency Preparedness Chapter 4 4.41, 4.42, 4.48, & 4.49; IRMP Steering Group Integrated Risk Management Planning 2008: Policy Guidance – Community Safety, Business Continuity Management; Environmental Protection; Equality and Diversity; Protection of Heritage Buildings and Structures; Road Traffic Collision Reduction; Wildfire

of identified events happening by, historical analysis, numeric modelling and expert judgement.

According to the National Risk Register the most likely risks are;

- Pandemic influenza (1 in 2—20)
- Severe space weather (1 in 2—20)
- Low temperatures and heavy snow (1 in 2–20)
- Heatwaves (1 in 2—20)
- Explosive volcanic eruption (1 in 2—20)
- Storms and gales (1 in 2–20)
- Public disorder (1 in 2—20)
- Disruptive industrial action (1 in 2–20)
- Attacks on transport systems (high)
- Cyber attacks: data confidentiality (high)

Another source of evidence is the *Fire Statistics Monitor* published by DCLG each year (<u>https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/fire-statistics-monitor-april-2012-to-march-2013</u>).

ESFRS Statistics¹⁶ for 2012/13 provisional (bold) - 2011/12 provisional/confirmed – 2010/11 – 2009/10

1All fires total 2,155 - 2,647/2,652 - 10/11 2,574 - 09/10 2,964 2Primary fires 1,274 - 1,336/1,336 - 1,346 - 1,617 3Primary fires in dwellings 610 - 609/609 - 574 - 655 4Primary fires in other buildings **264** – 291/294 - 298 - 376 5Primary fires road vehicle **335** -306/307 – 364 - 409 6Primary fires non-domestic buildings **190** – 221/223 – 236 - 313 7Secondary fires 642 - 1,148/1,149 - 1,027 - 1,136 8False alarms 4,579 - 4,793/4,816 - 5,863 - 6,164 9Malicious false alarms 168 - 107/107 - 173 - 204 10False alarms apparatus 3,319 - 3,481 /3,487 - 4,389 - 4,424 11False alarms good intent 1,092 -1,205/1,222 - 1,341 - 1,536 12Deliberate primary fires 329 - 362/363 - 404 - 542 13Deliberate road vehicle primary fires **161** – 149/150 – 189 - 231 14Deliberate primary fires other than road vehicles 168 – 213/213 – 215 - 311 15Deliberate secondary fires 389 - 805 /806 - 716 - 831 **16Special Services total 2,611 -**2,523¹⁷ - 2,758 – 3,093 17RTC 488 - 454-523 - 599 180ther transport incident **21** – 20 – 28 - 26 19Flooding **373 -**339 – 388 - 402 20Rescue or evacuation from water 10 - 5 - 4 - 7



¹⁶ Source: Fire Statistics Monitor published by DCLG https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/fire-statistics-monitor-april-to-september-2013

¹⁷ 2011-12 statistics provisional only

210ther rescue/release of persons 79 - 117 - 134 - 149 22Animal assistance incidents 223 - 238 - 235 - 227 23Hazardous materials incidents 38 - 19 - 30 - 33 24Spills and leaks (not RTC) 106 -140 - 131 - 164 25Making safe (not RTC) 43 - 130 - 92 - 183 26Lift release 403 - 390 - 488 - 595 27Effecting entry/exit **357** - 335 - 367 - 356 28Removal of objects from people 61 - 67 - 63 - 58 29Suicide/attempts 21 - 23 - 14 - 18 30Medical incident first responder 18 17 - - 30 - 33 - 24 31Medical incident co-responder 26 -32Evacuation (no fire) 1 - 1 - 4 - 533Water provision **0** -1 - 2 - 3 34Assist other agencies 80 - 103 - 105 - 102 35Advice only **33 –** 26 – 26 - 33 36Stand by 5 - 2 - 2 - 3 37No action (not false alarm) 77 -83 - 89 - 106 38Malicious false alarm 0 - Not included 2011/12 39Good intent false alarm 67 - Not included 2011/12

Fire Brigades Union Assessment

Sufficient reasons have not been be put forward for the proposal to allow intelligent consideration and response. East Sussex Fire Authority has failed to provide sufficient evidence of the likelihood of emergencies by type.

The reader has to get to page 50 of the *main consultation document* before information on *likelihood* is provided. Charts provide show crude columns that are hard to work out exact figures for incidents. These bar charts only breakdown incidents into six categories rather than the 39 that East Sussex has to record and report.

The *main document* fails to report that comparing figures pre 2009 to post 2009 is difficult because of inaccurate reporting and sampling of statistics prior to the introduction of the incident recording system.

Table 3 on Page 50 of the *main document shows mobilisation details for the pumps in the City* (we presume Brighton and Hove). It is not clear if these are mobilisations on their own station grounds or include other grounds. It also does not indicate at multiple pump incidents or cross border incidents.

The tables do indicate that the authority has the ability to breakdown calls and attendance times by postcode. We cannot understand why this information is not made available to the Public.

age 19

 $^{^{\}rm 18}\,{\rm 1}^{\rm st}$ responder and co responder stats not separated before 2012-13

Other organisations provide software applications that allow people to access information by postcode.

We recommend that East Sussex Fire Authority explores the use of software applications to provide incident data by postcode.

Assess the impact by type

The next stage is to assess the impacts of the hazards. At a generic framework is provided for assessing the local impacts of events in a consistent way.

East Sussex Fire Authority must assess the impact of emergencies to plan the resources required to deal with them.

According to our legal opinion *Best Value*¹⁹ still applies to fire and rescue authorities. *Best Value* guidance²⁰ reminds the authority must show continuous improvement in service quality and that should consider economic, environmental and social value of its services. this guidance also reminds the authority of how and who must be consulted and provides a link to the *Transparency Code*. The *Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004* requires the Secretary of State to ensure that fire and rescue authorities are economic, efficient and effective in making the public safe. The authority is required to improve social, economic and environmental wellbeing in its area²¹ to the whole I or any part of its area and to all or any persons resident or present in its area.

We are unable to find up to date national guidance that provides advice on the assessment of the financial costs of emergencies that is essential to comply with *Best Value* duties.

Fire and Rescue Service Operational guidance – Operational Risk Information provides risk matrices that place the *severity of* emergencies into five categories²². Our interpretation of this model is that most emergencies within the *Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004* definition of emergencies will only receive a *moderate* severity rating.

We recommend that the authority seeks clarification on whether the risk matrices in this guidance have legal opinion, and have been tested in law or tested by public opinion.

In 2008 DCLG published a series of guidance on behalf the *IRMP Steering Group*. This series called *Integrated Risk Management Planning* provided guidance for planning in seven

¹⁹ Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 Part 3 – 24 Best Value

²⁰ Best Value Statutory Guidance published by DCLG September 2011

²¹ The Local Government Act 2000 Part 1

²² Fire and Rescue Service Operational guidance – Operational Risk Information- Appendix A

areas of integrated risk management planning²³. Section 4 of *Business Continuity Management Planning* contains this paragraph;

Of particular relevance in the context of economic and social impact of fire and other adverse event, according to English RDA's website at <u>http://www.englandrdas.com</u> "Exclusion not only has a significant adverse economic impact, but also negative social effects with unemployment directly linked to increased poverty, poor health and low educational standards. Concentrations of economic inactivity occur throughout the UK and have become one of the major causes of regional disparities

None of the guidance in this series offers guidance on assessing the financial costs of emergencies.

The Nation Risk Register 2012 is the public version of **The National Risk Assessment** and this identifies 80 existing scenarios and 40 potential scenarios. These estimate the **impact** of identified events happening by scoring on a scale of 0 to 5 fatalities, illness, injury, social disruption, economic harm, psychological impact. Impact score;

- Catastrophic terrorist attacks (5)
- Pandemic influenza (5)
- Coastal flooding (4)
- Effusive volcanic eruption (4)

However, **The Nation Risk Register 2012** fails to assess the financial costs of these emergencies.

Another source of evidence is the *Fire Statistics Monitor* published by DCLG each year (<u>https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/fire-statistics-monitor-april-2012-to-march-2013</u>).

ESFRS Statistics²⁴ for 2012/13 provisional (bold) - 2011/12 provisional/confirmed – 2010/11 - 2009/10 Fatal casualties²⁵ by fire 4 - 10/10 - 3 - 5 Non-fatal casualties 91 - 107/107 - 130 - 160 Non-fatal casualties excluding precautionary checks 50 - 65/65 - 93 - 88 Non- fatal casualties' hospital severe 7 - 13/13 - 8 - 22 Non-fatal casualties rescue slight 43 - 52/52 - 85 - 66 Non-fatal casualties 1st aid 28 - 34/34 - 28 - 53

²³ IRMP Steering Group Integrated Risk Management Planning: Policy Guidance – Business Continuity Management; Community safety; Environmental Protection, Equality and Diversity; Heritage; Road Traffic Accidents; and Wildfire

²⁴ Source: Fire Statistics Monitor published by DCLG

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/fire-statistics-monitor-april-to-september-2013

²⁵ Source: Fire Statistics Monitor published by DCLG

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/fire-statistics-monitor-april-to-september-2013

Non-fatal casualties precautionary checks 13 - 8/8 - 9 - 19Fatal casualties in accident dwelling fires 3 - 8/8 - 2 - 2Non-fatal casualties accidental dwelling fires 70 - 72/72 - 102 - 106Non-fatal casualties 1^{st} aid cases accidental dwelling fires 38 - 42/42 - 72 - 46

Two research reports were released in 2011, **The Economic Cost of Fire 2006 Fire Research Report 2-2011²⁶** and **The Economic Cost of Fire 2008 Fire Research Report 3 -2011²⁷** provides some estimates of fire costs. Here is a selection of its reported estimates;

- Estimated cost of each fatality £1.65m
- Estimated cost of fatalities in the South East £75m
- Estimated cost of fatalities in England £552m
- Estimated cost of each serious injury £185,000
- Estimated cost of serious injuries in the South East £91m
- Estimated cost of serious injuries in England £780m
- Estimated slight injury costs in the South East £8m
- Estimated slight injury costs in England £70m
- Estimated cost as a consequence of fire in England £3,285 billion
- Estimated cost as a consequence of fire in South East £422m (national average £365m)
- Fatal and non-fatal casualties costs in England £1.4bn
- Fatal and non-fatal casualties costs in the South East £174m
- Property damage in England £1.5bn
- Property damage in the South East £209m
- Police and prison service responding to arson in England £350m
- Police and prison service responding to arson in the South East £33m
- Lost business in England £45m
- Lost business in the South East £6m

Underlying data comparisons between 2006 and 2008 Number of incidents -18%

²⁶ Source: Fire Research Report 2/2011

http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121108165934/http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/corporate/pdf/1838274.pdf

²⁷ Source: Fire Research Report 3/2011

http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121108165934/http://www.communities.gov.uk/archived/general-content/corporate/researcharchive/volume2/

Value of ABI claims as a result of fire + 12% (note: the report concludes that this is not relevant to anticipation costs, which seems odd as this increased cost will result in increased premium costs. This is also true for response costs e.g. larger fires require more resources)

Neither of these reports estimated a monetary value to environmental and social cost of fire and other emergencies.

The Association of British Insurers²⁸

The Association of British Insurers published *Tackling Fire: A Call For Action* in December 2009. This reported insurers increasing concerns about rising fire losses. The cost of fire damage in 2008 in the UK rose by 16% on 2007 to a record £1.3 billion - £3.4 million every day. In 2008 commercial fire damage costs of £865 million, up 15% on the previous yrear, and fire damage to homes cost £408 million up 17% on the previous year.

A web search has provided other sources of evidence for the costs of emergencies;

https://www.abi.org.uk/News/News-releases/2010/11/massive-rise-in-britains-flood-damage-bill-highlightsthe-need-for-more-help-for-flood-vulnerable-communities-says-the-abi.aspx

Massive rise in Britain's flood damage bill highlights the need for more help for flood vulnerable communities says the ABI

Britain's rising flood risk is further underlined today, with figures published by the ABI showing that the cost of flood damage since 2000 has leapt by 200% on the previous decade. With more people set to be at significant risk of flooding, the ABI is calling on the Government to ensure that spending on flood defences is targeted to the most flood vulnerable communities.

.One in six homes in England is currently at risk of flooding. Nearly 500,000 people face a significant flood risk, and it has been estimated that this could rise to 840,000 by 2035 without adequate investment in flood defences.1

ABI's figures highlight the huge financial cost of flooding:

• Since 2000 insurers have paid out £4.5 billion to customers whose homes or businesses have been hit by flooding. This is up 200% on the £1.5 billion paid in the previous decade in real terms.

• Major floods since 2000 have included the 2007 summer flooding which resulted in insurers paying out £3 billion, the 2005 floods in Carlisle that cost £272 million, and the Cumbrian floods in November 2009 costing £174 million.

• Reasons for the rise in flood costs include the increased frequency and severity of flooding in the UK and the growing problem of surface water flooding (the Environment Agency has estimated that 2.8 million properties are at risk of flooding from surface water). It has been previously estimated that the total value of assets under flood risk exceeds £200 billion - more than the current budget deficit.

²⁸ https://www.abi.org.uk/News/News-releases/2009/12/Record-rise-in-the-costs-of-fire-damage

These figures were released at the ABI's flood conference "Fighting Flood Risk Together" held today. At the conference over 100 representatives from the insurance industry, policy makers and community groups discussed the impact of the Government's recent announcement of a cut in flood defence spending, and what needs to be done to tackle the UK's flood problem.

Speaking at the conference, Tim Breedon, ABI Chairman and Group Chief Executive, Legal and General, said:

"Flooding devastates lives and communities. Insurers play a key role in helping those affected recover, but prevention must be better than cure. The recent announcement of a cut in Government investment in flood defences was disappointing, and it is now vital that Government spends its money wisely to bring real improvements where they are most needed."

Barry Smith, Chairman of ABI's Property Committee and Chief Executive of Ageas UK, stressed at the conference that:

"Millions of customers rely on the financial protection provided by flood insurance, and insurers are determined to do everything possible to ensure this continues. The insurance industry's flood insurance agreement with the Government, under which insurers commit to offering flood cover to existing customers, expires at the end of June 2013. To ensure flood insurance continues to remain widely available and competitively priced, further investment in flood management is needed when the public purse is in better shape".

http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/nov/24/industrial-pollution-costs-uk-billions

Industrial pollution 'costs UK billions each year'

Health and environmental damage from industry costs up to €18bn a year, according to the European environment agency

http://www.mansgreatestmistake.com/the-true-cost-of-cars/annual-motor-vehicle-accident-costs

Annual Motor Vehicle Accident Costs on UK Roads

1 COMMENT By mike Filed in \$ The True Cost of Cars, Death and Trauma Tagged with accidents, economics, waste October 4th, 2011 @ 10:59 am

It has been estimated that, on average, the economic damage caused by a fatal Road Traffic Collision amounts to nearly £1.8m and that the damage from a serious injury amounts to over £200k.

Despite clear improvements in road safety, the annual cost to the UK economy of all deaths and injuries remains significant at around **£13 billion** (i.e. around 1% of GDP), with damage-only accidents estimated to cost a further **£5 billion**.

Baker Tilley report for Institute of Advanced Motoring

So the annual motor vehicle accident costs are approximately **£18 billion** in the UK alone. Imagine what the world-wide cost must be. And imagine the human cost that lies behind the financial one.

A web search also revealed software applications that show road accidents by postcode

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-15975562

Every death on every road in Great Britain 1999 - 2010

Britain has an enviable record on reducing road casualties in recent years. Fatalities, for example, have dropped by nearly half in a decade. Yet, every day five people die on the roads as BBC News's Adrian Brown reports.

In 2010, the police recorded 1,850 deaths, 22,660 people seriously injured and 184,138 who received light injuries.

But this is still a fraction of the true number of people hurt in road collisions.

Though police say every death is recorded, there is widespread under-reporting of injuries. In fact, government officials estimate that around 730,000 are either killed or hurt every year.

The cost in terms of personal tragedy for many families is, of course, incalculable. The economic cost, however, is easier to gauge.

According to the Department for Transport, the annual economic burden of road casualties is between £15bn and £32bn. By way of comparison, Britain's budget deficit is around £17bn.

Last year saw the steepest fall in fatalities in the post-war period, down by 17%. It followed a fall of 12% between 2008 and 2009.

It is likely that much of this was down to the recession. When the economy slows, the number of road casualties usually does too.

http://data.gov.uk/search/everything/?f[0]=im_field_tags%3A17841&f[1]=im_field_tags%3A700

http://accidentdatabase.co.uk/accidents/BN1+2QQ

http://www.adls.ac.uk/department-for-transport/stats19-road-accident-dataset/?detail

http://www.transportxtra.com/magazines/local_transport_today/news/?id=30150

In Passing: Just how much does congestion cost the economy?

Announcing his private sector road plans last week, the Prime Minister said congestion was costing the economy £7bn a year, a figure that appears to be drawn from the 2006 report on transport and the economy commissioned by the Government from Sir Rod Eddington. But wait a minute – the Welsh Government suggested earlier this month that congestion costs the UK £30bn a year (LTT 16 Mar)! And didn't the CBI say in 1989 the cost was £15bn? LTT this week decided to clear up the confusion once and for all. So here, with the help of Google, is the answer to the question, what's the cost of congestion to UK? plc?

- David Cameron, March 2012: £7bn.
- CBI, March 2012: £8bn.
- Network Rail, undated: "Road congestion costs the British economy more than £10bn a year."
- Claire Haigh of Greener Journeys writing in the New Statesman in February 2012: "Congestion is also a massive drain on our economy with costs estimated at £11bn annually."
- Pteg: congestion costs urban economies alone "at least £11bn a year".
- Transport minister Norman Baker, March 2011: "Congestion can cause delay in urban areas at a cost of around £11bn a year."
- The Automotive Council UK, December 2011: "Congestion costs the UK economy about £12bn annually."
- The CBI, 1989: £15bn.
- Staffordshire County Council's website: "Traffic congestion costs UK businesses around £16bn a year (source: the CBI)."
- Freight on Rail lobby group: "Rail freight can help ameliorate road congestion, which, the Freight Transport Association estimates, costs the economy £17bn per annum."
- Friends of the Earth, October 2011: "Congestion costs the UK £19bn a year."
- The BBC, 1998: "Traffic jams are costing firms about £19bn each year, according to the Confederation of British Industry's publication, CBI News."
- The House of Commons transport committee: "The CBI has estimated that road congestion costs the UK economy £20bn a year."
- The Policy Exchange think-tank, 2008: £21bn.
- Hitachi, November 2011: "The Government has previously estimated that congestion costs the economy approximately £22bn a year."

- The British Chambers of Commerce, 2011: "Congestion costs business £23.3bn a year." (Nice precision Ed)
- Freight on Rail, December 2011: "Road congestion is now costing around £24bn annually, according to the Freight Transport Association."
- Transport minister Norman Baker, writing in Rail Professional, 2010: "Investment in rail will also help reduce congestion, which now costs the economy almost £25bn annually." (3.5 times the PM's estimate! Ed)
- The Institute of Directors, 2007: "A national congestion charging system ... is being considered by the Government in a bid to alleviate the £28bn cost to the economy of traffic jams."
- The Welsh Government, March 2010: "The most widely cited UK-wide study suggests that the cost of congestion to the UK economy is around £30bn per annum (Goodwin 2004)."

Fire Brigades Union Assessment

Sufficient reasons have not been be put forward for the proposal to allow intelligent consideration and response. East Sussex Fire Authority has failed to provide sufficient evidence of the impact of emergencies by type.

We are surprised that the authority on the extent of fire precautions in dwellings provides no evidence. During the 1970's and 80's the impact of fires in commercial and public buildings was greatly diminished the introduction of linked means of early detection and warning; fire resistant compartments; protected means of escape; and restrictions on fire loading. Regular inspection and enforcement of these regulations by the fire service were crucial to this success.

Fire Statistics for Great Britain provides evidence of Home fire safety checks²⁹ carried out by East Sussex Fire and Rescue Service. Since 2010 East Sussex staff have completed over thirty thousand home safety checks³⁰

The impact of fire on domestic dwellings will depend on the fire loading and the existence of these types of fire precautions. East Sussex Fire Authority has carried out home fire safety visits for ten years. Why have they failed to collate this essential data?

The authority also completed 671 Fire safety audits 2012-13. What is extremely concerning is that only 206 were satisfactory and 465 were unsatisfactory 465. The extent of fire precautions in the 265 'other building fires' is not reported. The impact of fires will be significant if this non-compliance is scaled up this up to the 34,693 premises known to FRA.

$$P_{age}26$$

²⁹ Source: Fire Statistics for Great Britain 2011-12

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/fire-statistics-great-britain-2011-to-2012

³⁰ fire and rescue authorities operational statistics https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/fire-and-rescue-authorities-operationalstatisticsIn 2012-13= 10,221; 2010-11= 10,144,;2011-12=9,644

Control measures for emergencies by type

Fire and rescue national framework for England 2012

Prevent and protect

1.9 Fire and rescue authorities must work with communities to identify and protect them from risk and to prevent incidents from occurring.

1.10 Each fire and rescue authority integrated risk management plan must:

demonstrate how prevention, protection and response activities will best be used to mitigate the impact of risk on communities, through authorities working either individually or collectively, in a cost effective way

set out its management strategy and risk based programme for enforcing the provisions of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 in accordance with the principles of better regulation set out in the Statutory Code of Compliance for Regulators, and the Enforcement Concordat

Respond

1.11 Fire and rescue authorities must make provision to respond to incidents such as fires, road traffic accidents and emergencies within their area and in other areas in line with their mutual aid agreements, and reflect this in their integrated risk management plans7.

1.15 Fire and rescue authorities must collaborate with other fire and rescue authorities to deliver intraoperability.

1.17 Fire and rescue authorities must collaborate with other fire and rescue authorities, other emergency services, wider Category 1 and 2 responders and Local Resilience Forums to ensure interoperability9.

Resilience

Collective engagement

1.26 Fire and rescue authorities must engage with the Fire and Rescue Strategic Resilience Board in order to support discussions and decision making in relation to national resilience12.

1.28 The purpose of the Board is to take a strategic view of fire and rescue capability in relation to national resilience. The Board considers whether and/or how to address any potential capability

gaps, providing advice to ministers as and when required. The Board also considers strategic intraoperability and interoperability issues.

Gap analysis

1.29 Fire and rescue authorities' risk assessments must include an analysis of any gaps between their existing capability and that needed to ensure national resilience (as defined above).

1.31 As part of their analysis, fire and rescue authorities must highlight to the Department, or the Fire and Rescue Strategic Resilience Board, any capability gaps that they believe cannot be met even when taking into account mutual aid arrangements, pooling and reconfiguration of resources and collective action.

Capability building

1.33 Fire and rescue authorities must work collectively, through the Fire and Rescue Strategic Resilience Board, to agree with the Department whether and/or how to address any capability gaps identified through the gap analysis.

Working in partnership

1.38 In order to meet the requirements of this Framework, fire and rescue authorities must work in partnership with their communities and a wide range of partners locally and nationally.

The benchmarks for these duties are set out in the *Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004,* the *Civil Contingencies Act 2004,* and their Secondary legislation³¹, statutory guidance³², and non-statutory guidance³³ support this primary legislation for fire and rescue³⁴.

The Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 requires this of fire and rescue authorities:

• They must be economic, efficient, and effective³⁵ in preventing³⁶ fire from causing one or more individuals to die, be seriously injured, or become seriously ill, or

The Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005;

³¹ The Civil Contingencies Act 2004(Planning)(England) Regulations 2005;

The Fire and Rescue Services (National Framework)(England) Order 2004;

The Fire and Rescue Services (Emergencies)(England)Order 2007;

The Fire Safety (Employees' Capabilities)(England) 2010;

The Fire and Rescue Authorities (National Framework) (England) Order 2012;

The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Contingency Planning)(Amendment) Regulations 2012

³² Emergency Preparedness Revised Version 2012

³³ Emergency, Response and Recovery 4th Edition

IRMP Guidance Notes 1-10

IRMP Steering Group Integrated Risk Management Planning: Policy Guidance: Environment Protection; Heritage; Equality & Diversity; Road Traffic Collision Reduction; Wildfire; Business Continuity Management

The Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 Guidance Notes

³⁴ The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004

³⁵ PART 3 ADMINISTRATION; **21 Fire and Rescue National Framework;** (4) The Secretary of State must discharge his functions under subsections (1) and (3) in the manner and to the extent that appear to him to be best calculated to promote-

⁽a) public safety, (b) the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of fire and rescue authorities, and (c) economy, efficiency and effectiveness in connection with the matters in relation to which fire and rescue authorities have functions.

³⁶ **PART 2** FUNCTIONS OF FIRE AND RESCUE AUTHORITIES; *Core functions;* **6 Fire safety** (1) A fire and rescue authority must make provision for the purpose of promoting fire safety in its area. (2) In making provision under subsection (1) a fire and rescue authority must in particular, to the extent that it considers it reasonable to do so, make arrangements for- (a) the provision of information, publicity and encouragement in respect of the steps to be taken to prevent fires and death or injury by fire;(b) the giving of advice, on request, about- (i) how to prevent fires and restrict their spread in buildings and other property;(ii) the means of escape from buildings and other property in case of fire.

serious harm to the environment (including the life and health of plants and animals).

- They must be economic, efficient, and effective in providing a fire and rescue service extinguishes fires and to protect life and property in the event of fire in its area³⁷, and securing water supplies to extinguish fires in their area.³⁸
- They must be economic, efficient, and effective in providing assistance to other fire and rescue services to extinguishes fires and to protect life and property in the event of fire in their areas³⁹
- They must be economic, efficient, and effective in providing a fire and rescue service to rescue people and to protect them from serious harm at road traffic accidents in their area⁴⁰ and when providing assistance to other fire and rescue services
- They must be economic, efficient, and effective in taking action when an event or situation is likely to cause one or more individuals to die, be injured or become ill or harm to the environment (including the life and health of plants and animals) in and outside their area⁴¹

The Fire and Rescue Services (Emergencies) (England) Order 2007 requires this of fire and rescue authorities:

³⁷ **PART 2** FUNCTIONS OF FIRE AND RESCUE AUTHORITIES; *Core functions*; **7 Fire-fighting** (1) A fire and rescue authority must make provision for the purpose of- (a) extinguishing fires in its area, and (b) protecting life and property in the event of fires in its area. (2) In making provision under subsection (1) a fire and rescue authority must in particular- (a) secure the provision of the personnel, services and equipment necessary efficiently to meet all normal requirements; (b) secure the provision of training for personnel; (c) make arrangements for dealing with calls for help and for summoning personnel; (d) make arrangements for obtaining information needed for the purpose mentioned in subsection (1); (e) make arrangements for ensuring that reasonable steps are taken to prevent or limit damage to property resulting from action taken for the purpose mentioned in subsection (1).

³⁸ PART 5 WATER SUPPLY; Duty to secure water supply etc; (1) A fire and rescue authority must take all reasonable measures for securing that an adequate supply of water will be available for the authority's use in the event of fire. (2) A fire and rescue authority may use any suitable supply of water for the purposes of extinguishing a fire or protecting life or property in the event of a fire (but must pay reasonable compensation for the water).

³⁹ **PART 2** FUNCTIONS OF FIRE AND RESCUE AUTHORITIES; *Core functions;* **13Reinforcement schemes;** (1) A fire and rescue authority must, so far as practicable, enter into a reinforcement scheme with other fire and rescue authorities. (2) A reinforcement scheme is a scheme for securing mutual assistance as between fire and rescue authorities for the purpose of discharging the functions conferred under section 7, 8 or 9 on any of the authorities participating in the scheme. (3) A reinforcement scheme may make provision for apportioning between the authorities participating in the scheme any expenses incurred in taking measures to secure the efficient operation of the scheme. (4) The fire and rescue authorities participating in a reinforcement scheme must notify the Secretary of State of-(a) the making of the scheme; (b) the variation of the scheme; (c) the revocation of the scheme. (5) The fire and rescue authorities participating in a reinforcement scheme.

⁴⁰ **PART 2** FUNCTIONS OF FIRE AND RESCUE AUTHORITIES; *Core functions;* **8 Road traffic accidents;** (1) A fire and rescue authority must make provision for the purpose of- (a) rescuing people in the event of road traffic accidents in its area; (b) protecting people from serious harm, to the extent that it considers it reasonable to do so, in the event of road traffic accidents in its area. (2) In making provision under subsection (1) a fire and rescue authority must in particular- (a) secure the provision of the personnel, services and equipment necessary efficiently to meet all normal requirements; (b) secure the provision of training for personnel; (c) make arrangements for dealing with calls for help and for summoning personnel; (d) make arrangements for obtaining information needed for the purpose mentioned in subsection (1); (e) make arrangements for ensuring that reasonable steps are taken to prevent or limit damage to property resulting from action taken for the purpose mentioned in subsection (1).

⁴¹ **PART 2** FUNCTIONS OF FIRE AND RESCUE AUTHORITIES; *Core functions;* **11 Power to respond to other eventualities** (1) A fire and rescue authority may take any action it considers appropriate- (a) in response to an event or situation of a kind mentioned in subsection (2); b) for the purpose of enabling action to be taken in response to such an event or situation. (2) The event or situation is one that causes or is likely to cause- a) one or more individuals to die, be injured or become ill; (b) harm to the environment (including the life and health of plants and animals). (3) The power conferred by subsection (1) includes power to secure the provision of equipment. (4) The power conferred by subsection (1) may be exercised by an authority outside as well as within the authority's area.

- They must be economic, efficient, and effective in preventing chemical, biological or radio-active contaminants from causing one or more individuals to die, be seriously injured, or become seriously ill, or serious harm to the environment (including the life and health of plants and animals)⁴².
- They must be economic, efficient, and effective in providing a fire and rescue service to remove chemical, biological, or radio-active contaminants from causing one or more individuals to die, be seriously injured, or become seriously ill in its area, and securing water supplies to extinguish fires in their area⁴³.
- They must be economic, efficient, and effective in taking action when a chemical, biological, or radio-active event or situation is likely to cause harm to the environment (including the life and health of plants and animals) in and outside their area⁴⁴
- They must be economic, efficient, and effective in providing a fire and rescue service to rescue people who may be trapped and protect them from serious harm, in an emergency involving the collapse of a building or other structure, a train, tram, or aircraft, and is likely to require a fire and rescue authority to use its resources beyond the scope of its day to day operations⁴⁵
- They must be economic, efficient, and effective in providing assistance to other fire and rescue services in an emergency involving the collapse of a building or other

⁴² EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM TO THE **FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICES (EMERGENCIES) (ENGLAND) ORDER 2007 2007 No. 735**

^{2.} Description 2.1 The Order gives fire and rescue authorities (FRAs) mandatory functions in connection with key types of emergencies: chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear emergences ('CBRN emergencies') and emergencies requiring the freeing of people from collapsed structures or non-road transport wreckages (urban search and rescue, or 'USAR emergencies'). 2.2 It makes it mandatory for FRAs to: make provision for decontaminating people following the release of CBRN substances; make provision for freeing people from collapsed structures and non-road transport wreckages; use, on request from an affected FRA, specialist CBRN or USAR resources outside their own areas to an extent reasonable for dealing with the CBRN or USAR emergency. 3. Matters of special interest to the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments 3.1 This is the first time that the power conferred by section 9 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 has been used. 4. Legislative Background 4.1 Under the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004, FRAs have discretionary powers to make provision for any type of emergency likely to cause individuals to die, be injured or become ill. This includes the CBRN and USAR emergencies: fires and road traffic accidents. The Secretary of State can, by order under section 9 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004, give mandatory functions to FRAs in England for other types of emergencies that s/he considers necessary 4.3 This Order gives mandatory functions to FRAs in connection with CBRN and USAR emergencies, giving them a statutory footing similar to that which already exists for firefighting and road traffic accidents. This further improves national resilience to such disruptive incidents.

⁴³ Chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear emergency; 2.—(1) A fire and rescue authority must make provision in its area for the purposes of— (a) removing chemical, biological, or radio-active contaminants from people in the event of an emergency(2) involving the release or potential release of such contaminants; and

⁴⁴ Chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear emergency; 2.—(1) A fire and rescue authority must make provision in its area for the purposes of— (b) containing, for a reasonable period, any water used for a purpose mentioned in sub-paragraph (a).
(2) In taking action for a purpose mentioned in paragraph (1) a fire and rescue authority must make arrangements for ensuring that reasonable steps are taken to prevent or limit serious harm to the environment.

⁴⁵ Rescue and protection in case of certain emergencies; 3.—(1) A fire and rescue authority must make provision in its area for the purpose of rescuing people who may be trapped and protecting them from serious harm, to the extent that it considers it reasonable to do so, in the event of—(a) an emergency involving the collapse of a building or other structure; or (b) subject to paragraph (2), an emergency falling within section 58(a) of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 which—(i) involves a train, tram, or aircraft, and (ii) is likely to require a fire and rescue authority to use its resources beyond the scope of its day to day operations. (2) Paragraph (1)(b) does not apply to provision for an emergency to the extent that it involves the collapse of a tunnel or mine.(3) In this article—(a) "structure" does not include a tunnel or mine; (b) "tunnel" means a man-made passage; and (c) "mine" means a mine within the meaning of section 180 of the Mines and Quarries Act 1954(3). Action required for purpose of functions conferred by Order 4. In making the provision required by article 2 or 3, a fire and rescue authority must—(a) secure the provision of such personnel, services and training as may be necessary efficiently to meet all reasonable requirements; (b) make arrangements for dealing with calls for help; (c) make arrangements for obtaining necessary information; and (d) make arrangements for ensuring that reasonable steps are taken to prevent or limit damage to property resulting from action taken pursuant to such provision.

structure, a train, tram, or aircraft, and is likely to require a fire and rescue authority to use its resources beyond the scope of its day to day operations extinguishes fires and to protect life and property in the event of fire in their areas⁴⁶

The Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 requires fire and rescue authorities to;

- inspect all premises that fall within the order and it is the inspecting authority;
- and enforce the provisions of the order and any regulations made under it in relation to premises for which it is the enforcing authority⁴⁷

The *Civil Contingencies Act 2004* requires this of fire and rescue authorities to cooperate with other Category 1 and 2 responders and meet at least once every six months⁴⁸ in order to:

- maintain plans for the purpose of ensuring, so far as is reasonably practicable, that if an emergency⁴⁹ occurs the person or body is able to continue to perform his or its functions⁵⁰,
- maintain plans for the purpose of ensuring that if an emergency occurs or is likely to occur the person or body is able to perform his or its functions so far as necessary or desirable for the purpose of preventing the emergency occurring⁵¹

⁴⁶ Responding to emergencies outside a fire and rescue authority's area; 5.—(1) This paragraph applies where—(a) a fire and rescue authority maintains specialist resources ("the first authority"); (b) an emergency of a type specified in article 2 or 3 has occurred or is likely to occur in the area of another fire and rescue authority ("the second authority"); and (c) the second authority has requested the first authority to use those resources in the second authority's area. (2) Where paragraph (1) applies, the first authority must use its specialist resources in the area of the second authority to such extent as is reasonable for the purpose of dealing with the emergency. (3) In this article, "specialist resources" means resources maintained for the purpose of taking action pursuant to provision made in accordance with article 2 or 3 including any personnel who have received specialist training for that purpose. The core functions of fire and rescue authorities are set out in sections 6 to 8 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 (the Act). These are functions in connection with fire safety, fire-fighting and road traffic accidents. Section 9 allows the Secretary of State to specify by order other core functions relating to emergencies for which fire and rescue authorities must make provision. Emergencies are defined in section 58 of the Act.

⁴⁷ Part 3 Enforcement; 25 For the purposes of this Order, "enforcing authority" means – (a) the fire and rescue authority for the area in which premises are to be, situated, in any case not falling within any of sub-paragraphs (b) to (c). Enforcement of Order; 26 – (1) Every enforcing authority must enforce the provisions of this Order and any regulations made under it in relation to premises for which it is the enforcing authority and for that purpose.. (2) In performing the duty imposed by paragraph (1), the enforcing authority must have regard to such guidance as the Secretary of State may give it.

⁴⁸ The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Contingency Planning)(Amendment) Regulations 2012; Amendment of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Contingency Planning) Regulations 2005

⁴⁹ Meaning of "emergency" (1) In this Part "emergency" means— (a) an event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare in a place in the United Kingdom, (b) an event or situation which threatens serious damage to the environment of a place in the United Kingdom, or (c) war, or terrorism, which threatens serious damage to the security of the United Kingdom. (2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(a) an event or situation threatens damage to human welfare only if it involves, causes or may cause— (a) loss of human life, (b) human illness or injury, (c) homelessness, (d) damage to property, (e) disruption of a supply of money, food, water, energy or fuel, (f) disruption of a system of communication, (g) disruption of facilities for transport, or (h) disruption of services relating to health. (3) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b) an event or situation threatens damage to the environment only if it involves, causes or may cause— (a) contamination of land, water or air with biological, chemical or radio-active matter, or (b) disruption or destruction of plant life or animal life. (4) A Minister of the Crown, or, in relation to Scotland, the Scottish Ministers, may by order— (a) provide that a specified event or situation, or class of event or situation, is to be treated as falling, or as not falling, within any of paragraphs (a) to (c) of subsection (1); (b) amend subsection (2) so as to provide that in so far as an event or situation involves or causes disruption of a specified supply, system, facility or service— (i) it is to be treated as threatening damage to human welfare, or (ii) it is no longer to be treated as threatening damage to human welfare, or (ii) it is no longer to be treated Kingdom.

⁵⁰ Contingency planning; 2 Duty to assess, plan and advise ; (c) maintain plans for the purpose of ensuring, so far as is reasonably practicable, that if an emergency occurs the person or body is able to continue to perform his or its functions, ⁵¹ Contingency planetics 2.2 is the person of body is able to continue to perform his or its functions,

⁵¹ Contingency planning; 2 Duty to assess, plan and advise; (d) maintain plans for the purpose of ensuring that if an emergency occurs or is likely to occur the person or body is able to perform his or its functions so far as necessary or desirable for the purpose of— (i) preventing the emergency,

 maintain plans for the purpose of ensuring that if an emergency occurs or is likely to occur the person or body is able to perform his or its functions so far as necessary or desirable for the purpose of reducing, controlling or mitigating its effects if an emergency occurs⁵²

Note: The benchmark for *serious damage* has changed with the introduction of the *Initial Operational Response Programme,* which introduces new emergency response arrangements for the first hour of a civil contingency emergency.

 provide advice and assistance to the public in connection with the making of arrangements for the continuance of commercial activities by the public, or the continuance of the activities of bodies other than public or local authorities whose activities are not carried on for profit, in the event of an emergency⁵³

FBU assessment

Sufficient reasons have not been be put forward for the proposal to allow intelligent consideration and response. East Sussex Fire Authority has failed to provide sufficient evidence of their control measures for emergencies by type.

The *Main Consultation Document Changing the Service – shaping our future* makes a number of statements that we challenge;

5. Our Challenges states that the authority has reviewed its prevention, protection and response activities. We have shown we our assessments of *identification*, *likelihood* and *impact* of emergencies by type that the authorities 'review' has failed to make the 'review' evidence public.

10 Risk in East Sussex and the City of Brighton and Hove claims that risks have been assessed from the perspective of both the public and our firefighters. This section also claims that Community Fire Stations are located primarily as a consequence of the previous national standards of fire cover. The authority claims that; these standards have been replaced by locally determined standards based on local risk and they are complemented by local emergency response standards.

⁵³ 3 Section 2: supplemental; 4 Advice and assistance to the public (1) A body specified in paragraph 1, 2 or 13 of Schedule 1 shall provide advice and assistance to the public in connection with the making of arrangements for the continuance of commercial activities by the public, or the continuance of the activities of bodies other than public or local authorities whose activities are not carried on for profit, in the event of an emergency.



⁵² Contingency planning; 2 Duty to assess, plan and advise; (d) maintain plans for the purpose of ensuring that if an emergency occurs or is likely to occur the person or body is able to perform his or its functions so far as necessary or desirable for the purpose of— (ii) reducing, controlling or mitigating its effects, or (iii) taking other action in connection with it,

The Fire Brigades Union has advised the authority on many occasions that their process of risk management is inadequate and their response standards are not effective and fail to protect firefighters and the public. This is most easily demonstrated by comparing the authority's response standards with **actual** response times.

The authority does not report the financial cost of fires and road traffic accidents in East Sussex. It also fails to estimate the financial benefits of prevention of emergencies; and reduction, mitigation, and control of the impact of emergencies when they occur.

In 1994/5 East Sussex Fire and Rescue Authority average response time to a primary fire was 6.8 minutes. In 2011/12 it was 7.6 minutes⁵⁴.

In 1994/5 East Sussex Fire and Rescue Authority average response time to a dwelling fire was 5.7 minutes (923). In 2011/12 it was 6.6 minutes (295)⁵⁵

The times for central Brighton and Hastings are likely to be less than this.

Incidents classified as life threatening will attract the following standard speed of attendance for the 1st Appliance;

- 60% of calls in 8 minutes
- 90% of calls in 13 minutes

And for the 2nd Appliance;

- 50% of calls in 8 minutes
- 80% of calls in 13 minutes

You can see from the figures above that the attendance standards set by the authority do not reflect the 'actual figures' they are able to achieve. It allows the authority to cut while still giving the appearance they are maintaining standards.

The most dishonest and perhaps the most callous 'standard' is the authorities' minimum attendance standard of eight firefighters as the initial response to dwelling fires. According to national research this is insufficient to provide an effective and safe system of work. Research carried out for the review of standards for emergency cover established that the minimum number of firefighters required for domestic dwellings is nine firefighters. Society expects firefighters to 'do something' when they arrive at an emergency. Senior Managers are fully aware of this. We believe the authorities' minimum attendance standard places an unfair burden of responsibility for safety on firefighters and is intended to protect Senior Management from legal action.

⁵⁴ Source DCLG Fire Incidents Response Times England 2011-12

⁵⁵ There is some doubt about ESFRS measurement of response times. It should be from time of call to time of attendance

Finally in 2013 We wrote to an ESFRS senior manager and set out what, the Fire Brigades Union, requires of the *Sussex Control Room Project Team* in order to satisfy the terms of the agreement between West Sussex County Council, and East Sussex Fire Authority, and the Fire Brigades Union as set out first in The *Pay and Conditions Agreement 2003* and ratified by *The National Joint Council for local authority fire and rescue services - Scheme of Conditions of Service Sixth Edition (updated 2009),* known as the *Grey Book.* We posed a series of questions to test delivery of services against Governments expectations as set out in The *Fire and rescue national framework for England 2012.*

We have finally just received a response to these questions.

The *Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004* requires the authority to make continuous improvement in all of their services. This duty was repeated in fire and rescue national frameworks. The authority is required to improve emergency response by ensuring that appropriate resources are in the right place at the right time⁵⁶. The 2008-11 framework advised the authority to review the effectiveness of cross border integration arrangements with neighbouring authorities and set these out in their IRMP's.

We believe the comments made in the *main consultation document* and supporting video files give a distorted view of the National Standards of Fire Cover and why they were replaced. We believe it is important that the authority provides an accurate record of the removal of national standards. In 2010 we presented a report to *DCLG Operational Guidance Programme Board.* We include extracts from that report to give background that we believe adequately reflect the changes in fire and rescue risk management.

Background (including extracts from *Operational readiness and the improper use of dynamic risk assessment by fire and rescue services*)

On 1st October 2004, the *Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004* replaced the legislation, which provided the statutory footing for the fire service for over 50 years, the *Fire Services Act 1947*. The repealed Act required fire authorities to make suitable provision to attend fires. It did not impose a similar specific duty regarding non-fire incidents such as road accidents, chemical spills, collapsed buildings etc. Despite the absence of any strict legal requirement to do so, the Fire Service has always attended non-fire emergencies but, unlike fire incidents, these attendance times have never been subject to strict performance evaluation against nationally recommended standards. In recognition of the broader role of the modern fire service, the *Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004* now formally requires Fire and Rescue Authorities to make provision to attend other incident types, not just those involving fire. The new Act also removes all reference to prescriptive national response standards (see

⁵⁶ The Fire and Rescue Service National Framework 2004/05 Chapter 1; The Fire and Rescue Service National Framework 2005/06 Chapter 1; The Fire and Rescue National Framework 2006/08 Chapter 1



explanation below). Instead, it makes Fire and Rescue Authorities responsible for determining their own standards based on evidence led analysis of local need.

The requirements of the 1947 Act were judged to have been satisfied when fire risk categorisation was undertaken, and attendance performance measured, in accordance with the 1985 report of the Joint Committee on Standards of Fire Cover (as set out in Fire Service Circular 4/1985). These reports (and earlier versions) recommended that national response standards were based on 6 risk categories – 'A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'remote rural' and 'special risk'.

Category 'A' was the highest risk, and 'remote rural' the lowest. 'Special risk' was reserved for buildings (or sites) with specific pre-planned emergency response arrangement which were more onerous than the risk categorisation of the surrounding area suggested (e.g. nuclear power station or chemical plant).

Approximately twice a decade, risk categorisation was undertaken by a process of dividing fire authority areas into half kilometre squares. Each of these squares was evaluated using a formula to examine building density, building construction, number of storeys and occupancy. Although occupancy was considered, it was done so in an arbitrary manner relating to potential fire severity rather than actual risk to life. In general, the formula placed greater emphasis on the construction and size of a building, than on the nature of the risk created by the people who were in occupancy. Where five or more squares of the same risk grade touched, all five squares were allocated the same grade. If less than five squares indicated a certain category (or didn't touch) then the lower category was allocated. In general, areas comprising many large buildings were deemed to pose a higher risk than those containing smaller or more dispersed buildings.

Category	Definition	Fire Appliance Attendance time (minutes)		
		1 st Appliance	2 nd Appliance	3 rd Appliance
'A' risk	Shopping and business centres, multi-storey hotels and offices, concentrations of theatres, cinemas, clubs, industry and commercial property	5	5	8
'B' risk	Multi-storey shopping and business areas, concentration of hotels, industry and trading estates. Concentration of older multi- storey residential property	5	8	No standard

Table 1:Categories, definitions and attendance requirements set out by the Joint Committee on
Standards of Fire Cover.



'C' risk	Extensive areas of residential dwellings such as terraced property, blocks of flats, or light industrial and commercial buildings	10	No standard	No standard
'D' risk	All areas not previously classified as remote rural	20	No standard	No standard
'Remote Rural'	Areas isolated from population centres, containing few buildings	No standard	No standard	No standard
'Special Risk'	Building or site with specific pre-planned emergency arrangements	Pre-Determined attendance		

Standards of fire cover determined using the national guidance were indicated on 1:50,000 scale Ordnance Survey maps. Illustration 1 indicates the arbitrary nature of the resulting risk categorisation.

In the 1990's the *Central fire Brigades Advisory Council* recognised the need for standards for emergencies other than fire and the to improve firefighter safety in 'C' and 'D' risk fires.

Note: Brighton and Hastings B' risk areas covered their concentrations of older multi-storey residential and commercial guest house properties. The authority recognised the need for firefighter safety and mobilised a two appliance attendance to 'C' and 'D' risk properties. The two appliance standard required nine firefighters (5 on the first and 4 on the second) and 2000 the authority achieved this standard on 99.8% of occasions.

In 1995 the move to a risk based approach for fire and rescue service planning began in earnest in 1995 with the publication of 'In the Line of fire' by the Audit Commission. The review contained numerous suggestions for ways the Audit Commission considered would make better use of resources which, it was suggested, could result in the saving of lives, suffering, and property. It made specific recommendations for action by the Home Office and the Central Fire Brigades Advisory Council (CFBAC) in particular it called for a review of the 1985 Standards of Fire Cover and for a shift in emphasis from firefighting to fire prevention, based on research.

Research was taken forward by the Home Office, steered by a joint committee of the CFBACs for England and Wales, and for Scotland. A Joint Committee on the Audit Commission Report was appointed. Extensive research was carried out to develop a risk-

based approach to fire and eventually emergency cover. This research established the relationship between fire service response times and fire and road fatalities. This research also established that rates of fire spread in buildings are time related dependant on their level of fire protection.

The research concluded that:

- increased attendance times were not acceptable
- existing response standards did not accurately match life risk
- a small number of fatalities could not be prevented by emergency response
- fire prevention should be targeted at those most at risk
- response standards needed to be improved in rural areas this could be 'offset' through targeted fire prevention
- firefighter safety must not be compromised

In 1998 The Joint Committee on the Audit Commission Report produced its findings as: 'Out of the Line of Fire - Modernising the Standards of Fire Cover'.

Further work continued to progress the recommendations made in 1998 to develop and trial a new methodology for determining the provision of Fire Service Emergency Cover (the term given to the methodology since it provides cover both for fires and incidents requiring Special Services).

In 2002 The Fire Cover Review Report of the Task Group to the Central Fire Brigades Advisory Councils.

According to the report:

"The new methodology provides a rational basis for planning the provision of Fire Service Emergency Cover. It has huge potential. In particular, it provides:

- a cornerstone of an integrated approach to fire risk management
- an evidence-based method for assessing and responding to actual risk, taking into account the effect of fire safety measures
- a logical and flexible method for response planning, which assesses the actual resources required at a given incident, taking into account firefighter safety
- a tool for assessing the impact of key decisions in relation to the provision of Fire Service Emergency Cover, and

• an auditable process where the consequences of decisions can be quantified and performance measured"

<u>Both</u> of these major reports, published in 1998 (Out of the Line of Fire) and 2002 (The Fire Cover Review), concluded that:

- nationally prescribed minimum levels of fire protection against the risk from fire must not be compromised
- longer response times will compromise public and firefighter safety
- response requirements for fire should be designed to meet the level of fire protection
- Based on a 'typical house fire' persons reported, a minimum crew size to establish safe system of work is nine firefighters,
- it is cost effective for the fire service alone to spend £100,000 per life saved (1998 figures) for special services
- a task and resource analysis approach should be used for response planning
- The practical implementation of a task approach to response planning will require brigades to develop the safety case based on 'worst case planning scenarios' for incidents.
- There would be possible savings through reduced attendance to well protected buildings
- Greater flexibility in risk and response will mean a greater reliance on inspection to maintain required levels of cover.

In order to achieve the above both reports made a number of recommendations, the key ones being:

Out of the line of fire

R.1 We believe that risk assessment should be accepted in principle as the way forward for future determination of fire cover.

R.2 We recommend that fire safety measures be formally included in the planning and assessment of fire cover.

R.3 We recommend that the response options data and methodology be validated for use:

as a reference for assessing the resource requirements of tasks contained in a library of standard tasks to be compiled and approved nationally, along the lines commenced in the research reported herein, and then

As the basis for planning flexible response. (The detailed procedures to be used require further consideration, however.)

R.4 We recommend that during the pathfinder trials of risk assessment, which are being set in hand, estimates should be made of how flexible response might be deployed in the risk assessed areas, in a representative number of different brigades over a period of a year. When the risk (taking account of the relevant fire safety measures) and response information has been obtained, the trials should continue with estimates being made of the costs of implementing fire cover on the new basis.

R.5 We recommend that the training aspects of the new techniques be incorporated into the later trials stages.

R.6 We recommend that the CFBACs be invited to remit to the Joint Strategic Committee on Safety and Standards the implementation work following from our review.

R.7 We recommend that the collection and analysis of data be monitored to ensure it is providing the information necessary to underpin the new methods.

R.8 We recommend that research be undertaken to complete the development of the necessary toolkits.

The Fire Cover Review (Key recommendations)

Endorse the FSEC principles as a sound basis for the provision of FSEC, subject to the outcome of further development.

Review the responses defined in the WCPSs with a view to ensuring that they are both appropriate and realistic.

Develop and model a range of alternative resource allocation strategies with a view to determining the optimum strategy to apply to the methodology.

Change the method used for calculating the benefit from the response so that the benefit is calculated on a comparable first response basis. This will also enable valid comparisons to be made between existing costs and losses and predicted costs and losses.

Commence planning for the implementation of the methodology by endorsing:

• the specification and procurement of a new user-friendly version of the software,

- the implementation of arrangements for the collection of historical incident data for use in the assessment of risk, and:
- The preparation of user guidance and training material.

Significant recommendations for future research and development

For the purposes of developing the methodology further for operational use, commission research to develop an appropriate method for calculating the benefit from the response, taking into account the weight and phasing of the response.

Develop the methodology in a way that supports an integrated approach to fire risk management and establish better relationships for assessing the impact of community fire safety initiatives for use in the risk assessment of Dwellings.

Establish better relationships between the response time and the rate of fatality (response time-fatality rate factors) on incidents requiring Special Services, particularly RTA's.

Implement arrangements to improve the quality of the reporting of incidents involving human casualties where Special Services are required.

Worst Case Planning Scenarios (WCPS)

Please see attached Appendix 1 - A brief history of WCPS

Between 2002/2003 saw the Fire Brigades Union entered a long and bitter pay dispute: as part of the pay agreement The Fire Brigades Union accepted the introduction of integrated risk management planning (IRMP) based on the research and development of the previous seven years.

This move, which began in 2002, was finalised under the Fire Services Act 2004. With the introduction of Fire and Rescue Service National Frameworks and the introduction of localised Integrated Risk Management Planning (IRMP), the Fire Brigades Union produced a National IRMP Document and assessment questionnaire to assist the renamed fire and rescue authorities with the new approach and their expanded responsibilities, The National IRMP Document provided:

- the history behind the move to integrated risk management
- the challenges face by fire and rescue services
- the methodology and approach agreed by the FBU

The IRMP questionnaire sought to, through a series of questions, to understand whether or not individual IRMP's were based upon a clear understanding of the scope of the issues to



be addressed, the scale of the risks involved and the effort involved in both mitigating the risks and managing the residual risk.

It was hoped that fire authorities would be able to answer these questions positively and demonstrate how they had addressed the issues raised. The FBU were seeking assurance that the Fire Authorities had met both the requirements of the IRMP guidelines published by government and also its responsibilities under the law. FRA's were advised that a 'no change' strategy was unlikely to be an acceptable demonstration of understanding or compliance with the guidelines and requirements.

FRA's were reminded of the importance to remember that whilst the plans must consider both commercial risk and safety risk, the primary concern was for the safety of people (public and firefighters) and the risk implications for individuals.

An introductory guidance was given to provide the legal context to the preparation and delivery of the IRMP and to support the relevance of the questions raised.

The sixty questions were divided into sections and sub sections:

1.1 RISK ASSESSMENT AND ALARP

1.2 SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

- A. Does your IRMP address all your Area Risk Scenarios?
 - A.1 Demographics
 - A.2 <u>Fire</u>
 - A.3 Special Services
 - A.4 Major Incident
 - A.5 <u>Firefighter Safety</u>
- B. <u>Does it meet Societal Expectations?</u>
 - B.1 Maintain or Improve Current Services
 - B.2 <u>ALARP</u>
 - B.3 Political Issues
 - B.4 HS (G) 65

The responses from fire authorities to both the IRMP document and the questionnaire were very disappointing; many did not bother to respond or only gave a simple reply. To many fire authorities, IRMP consultation was seen as separate to existing agreements such as the Grey book and outside of day to management systems such FRS Safety Committees.

The fire and rescue community now has over ten years' experience of the risk based approach. It is fair to say that risk management is not an exact science and it is reasonable for safety professionals to have different perceptions of risk and interpretation of guidance. However, The Fire Brigades Union believe these perceptions are now so far apart that it is of major concern and needs to be addressed nationally.

It is over six years since the Fire Brigades Union published 'In the Line of Duty' and six years since CFRA launched revised guidance for safe and effective emergency response.

'In the Line of Duty' identified failures in risk assessment processes and concerns with equipment and training. The report highlighted previously unpublished Operational Assessment of Service Delivery (OASD) reports that identified a litany of failures and weaknesses across fire and rescue services (see attached Appendix 2 - tables containing selected contents of OASD reports compiled for the Audit Commission).

Many of the recommendations from both these major reports published in 1998 (Out of the Line of Fire) and 2002 (The Fire Cover Review) have failed to materialise. Instead of response performance standards based on risk and resources required to deal with the emergency, many fire and rescue authorities only report average response times. Even here it is difficult to compare like for like. It was recommended that the attendance time is the time taken by a resource defined in the WCPS to arrive at the location of an incident, measured from the time when the brigade control operator has sufficient information to mobilise the resource. The WCPS should allow for the difference in time between the arrival of the resource at the location of an incident and the commencement of firefighting or rescue activities (source: The Fire Cover Review). It is not clear if this is the model that fire and rescue authorities use when reporting their attendance times.

What is clear is that average response times are getting slower year on year. England's dwelling fire average response time in March 2010 was 7.3 minutes. In 1996 it was 5.5 minutes. That is almost 2 minutes slower - or 33% or one-third slower. The Fire Brigades Union has not been able to establish if individual fire and rescue authorities have assessed the impact of slower response times.

Nationally the Parliamentary Select Committee's Communities and Local Government: Departmental Annual Report 2007 noted that the time taken by Fire and Rescue Services (FRSs) to respond to emergency calls is rising. Communities and Local Government commissioned Greenstreet Berman Ltd to research FRS response times. Their first report produced as Fire Research Series 1/2009 concluded that the increased response times may contribute to about 13 additional fatalities in dwelling and 'Other Buildings' fires each year, possibly 65 additional deaths in Road Traffic Collisions (RTCs) and an £85m increase in 'Other Buildings' fire damage loss. However, they say that recorded annual dwelling fire fatalities fell by 142 between 1996 and 2006, and the average size of fires has not increased. They suggest that increased response times to fires have been more than offset by other factors, particularly improved fire safety. Deaths in RTC's have also fallen in this period. Whilst the number of fires in 'Other Buildings' has fallen, they cannot find a clear trend in the number of 'Other Buildings' fire deaths.

It is not clear which, if any' Greenstreet Berman Ltd. consulted fire and rescue service stakeholders. The Fire Brigades Union has carried out a brief assessment of their findings and has concluded that this report will not stand up to close scrutiny. Many of their conclusions are based on hypothesis and the conclusion that increased response times are due to traffic does not explain increased response times at night.

Their passive conclusion that fire safety measures have more than offset the potential increased loss of life from slower response times will come as cold comfort to the relatives of fire and road fatalities. It is also an odd assumption for Greenstreet Berman Ltd to make as it has been impossible to assess the impact of community fire safety initiatives on fires and fire fatalities.

The overall trend in fire related deaths has been downward since 1981. However, the Fire Brigades Union has also noted that death and injury rates <u>per fire</u> have increased since the introduction of IRMP in 2004. Changes in the recording of fire deaths may also have contributed to the downward trends. For example fire and rescue authorities may report deaths at fires as 'drug related' or 'drink related' rather than 'fire related'.

In their report Greenstreet Berman Ltd fail to address record insured fire losses. They do, however, attempt to downplay the importance of response times to insured fire losses in their Initial report 'Examination of large loss fires in commercial buildings' published by Communities and Local Government in March 2010.

A further report on response times by Greenstreet Berman Ltd has been published as Fire Research Report 3/2010 (December). In December 2013 DCLG published the 2012 updates to the Fire Service Emergency Cover toolkit – special Service and fire fatality rate response time relationships. Both the report and the update evidence the importance that response times on the outcomes of emergencies.

It is the view of the Fire Brigades Union and indeed the wider fire community, that risk management has not been a success. It has been unable to develop successfully because of financial restraints imposed by successive UK Governments. Officially fire and rescue authorities are responsible for risk management planning. However, the Fire Brigades Union believe the Audit Commission maintained a tight grip and has been in control of the process.

It is the firm belief of the Fire Brigades Union that the Audit Commission was entirely the wrong body to be charged with overseeing this process.

The opinion of the Fire Brigades Union is that the Audit Commission focused on the direct costs of providing public services and has not sufficiently assessed the indirect costs that are borne by communities. In our full report we will evidence as examples;

- Firefighter fatalities,
- Record insured fire losses and:
- The increased likelihood of death or injury for persons exposed to property fires since 2004.

These salient and sobering facts are critical in assessing where we are now. Many of the Fire Brigades Union concerns were raised in our report 'Falling to the lowest common denominator – how the Audit Commission got it wrong on the fire service'.

The Fire Brigades Union has repeatedly raised concerns that IRMP has failed to deliver measurable improvements and that emergency response, legislative fire safety, and community fire safety are not fully integrated.

The wasted opportunity of Home Fire Safety visits is an example. By 2008 nearly 2 million homes had received a home fire safety visit, during these visits fire and rescue authorities should have gathered risk information to build up a profile of potential hazards.

A second example is the integration of legislative fire safety. By now fire and rescue authorities should have a detailed risk profile register of the premises in their area. They should know the construction of these properties, the level of fire protection, means of escape and fire loading. The IRMP legislative database work commissioned by the Government has made clear to fire and rescue authorities their duty to advise and regulate commercial premises. Although fire safety legislation has undergone a number of reforms, a duty to provide advice, to regulate and to enforce has been in place for forty years. The risk profile registers for commercial premises should be comprehensive.

Fire and rescue integrated risk management planning is meant to be outcome based, a balance of the potential loss from fire and other emergencies and the likelihood of fire and other emergencies occurring.

By now fire and rescue authorities should be able to match their emergency response resources for fire to the majority of their commercial premises and a large percentage of dwellings in their area. Lack of comprehensive risk profile registers is a major concern to the Fire Brigades Union.

The Fire Brigades Union believe that fire and rescue authorities are basing their operational readiness on the number of incidents they attend or the 'likelihood of emergencies happening' to plan their emergency response resources. They have neglected to assess the potential outcomes of emergencies 'actually happening. Neglecting the potential outcomes does affect their ability to deal with emergencies and provide safe systems of work for fire fighters

Since 2003 eighteen firefighters have been killed at work.

In 2008 The Health and Safety Executive commissioned a series of inspections of fire and rescue services. Their justification was as follows:

"HSE has decided to carry out this programmed of planned inspection because:

The FRS employs around 55,000 staff in 57 Fire and Rescue Services throughout GB, most in operational duties;

Little or no proactive inspection of the FRS has been carried out for a number of years;

Over the past few years there have been a number of multiple fatalities during operational incidents, and the incidence of fatal accidents appears to be higher than over the preceding period (note that the numbers are too small for any statistical significance to be drawn from the figures);

There is a concern within HSE and also the Service that a number of issues are contributing to a lower level of competence of operational staff, especially front-line supervision

More widely, there is continuing high level interest in the way that the FRS balances operational and health and safety responsibilities."

In 2010 the HSE released their consolidated report based on the eight inspections carried out so far.

The findings of the report concluded that:

1.11 There are 2 specific areas where the findings across all the inspections are consistent. They confirm the fundamental importance of 2 complementary aspects of effective safety management, namely:

- Competence assessment for firefighters at all levels including management
- A proportionate approach to risk assessment

1.15 Some other matters that need to be further considered and addressed by the FRS as a whole also emerged. These are:



- The extent to which firefighters should or should not take risks to save property
- Whether retained duty staff can fulfil all of the operational duties of a firefighter given the time they have available for training
- Clarity about how FRS can meet public expectations on water rescue
- How best to develop and implement consistent national guidance and improve interoperability on those matters that affect every FRS

The HSE's findings confirmed The Fire Brigades Union's fears that firefighter safety has been compromised.

The Fire Brigades Union believe that true IRMP is a process that, if done properly, leads to risk assessed, performance driven, cost effective improvement in fire and rescue service provision delivered by a safe, motivated workforce. In 2009 we produced our own guidance the 'FBU Framework Document- how to construct an IRMP/RRP' to assist fire and rescue service managers responsible for IRMP.

Along with other stakeholders the Fire Brigades Union has criticised the guidance provided for emergency response. Worst Case Planning Scenarios were established as the key element to firefighter safety within a risk based approach to emergency response. Without explanation Worst Case Planning Scenarios and the response options software were removed from the guidance provided to fire and rescue authorities. For some unexplained reason Central Government has failed to meet the recommendations of 'Out of the Line of Fire' and 'The Fire Cover Review'.

The Fire Brigades Union believe that the recommendations for Worst Case Planning Scenarios must be honoured and that these hold the key to improved public safety and improved firefighter safety.

The Fire Brigades Union were pleased that the previous fire minister agreed a programme to revise all operational guidance and the health and safety framework provided for fire and rescue services. In 2008 the Chief Fire and Rescue Advisor (CFRA) on behalf of The Department of Communities and Local Government (CLG) began a revision of existing operational guidance to provide a consistency of approach and forms the basis for common operational practices. To:

- Improve fire-fighter safety
- Provide safe systems of work for the fire and rescue services
- Promote interoperability and effective operational deployment

This work is still in its early stages and will need time to develop and be effective. What cannot wait is the need to address firefighter safety.

FRSs are still failing to assess their resource requirements to deal with incidents safely and effectively. The speed and weight of the initial attendance and phased response are crucial for effective incident command. Incident Commanders must be equipped with all the information and resources required to make tactical decisions at the incident.

Instead of this vital area of pre planning, and regardless of the resources available, FRSs are relying on Incident Commanders to provide safe and effective systems of work under the guise of 'Dynamic Risk Assessment'.

HSE research shows that the most significant causes of accidents at work are human error, based on the failure to perceive a risk or the faulty perception of a risk. The HSE have produced a whole series of Human Factors Briefing Notes for COMAH sites that the FBU believe are also relevant to FRS.

The highest risks for firefighters, in terms of moral/societal pressure to act, are 'persons reported' incidents. Firefighters continue to carry out very high levels of rescue from fires. Recent data obtained by the FBU from individual fire and rescues indicates that over seven thousand people (7,098) were rescued from fires in the UK between April 2009 and March 2010. In England alone during the same period over five thousand (5,196) people were rescued from fires. For the UK as a whole this represents nearly 600 rescues a month, or 19 every day of the year on average. These figures are the first results of a new electronic incident reporting system. CLG has not published figures on rescues over the last decade. The last set of published figures for the UK, in Fire Statistics UK 1999 recorded just over five thousand (3,816) in England.

By now fire and rescue services (FRSs) should have made a marked improvement in their operational risk assessment processes. Fire and rescue services are producing their next cycle of integrated risk management plans. It is disappointing to report that fire and rescue services are not demonstrating to the FBU any willingness to change or improve.

We use as an example 'interoperability' for the capitals emergency response. In October 2010, Fire Brigades Union Safety Representatives raised safety concerns with the Chief Fire Officers of Berkshire, Essex, Hertfordshire, Kent and Surrey Fire and Rescue Services and the Commissioner of London Fire Brigade.

Safety representatives requested immediate and comprehensive review of work practices for responding to, attending and dealing with cross border emergencies within London Fire Brigade jurisdiction.

The significant hazards that each named service had failed to address were:

The operational imperative - On the arrival of crews, there will be an expectation of action. Crews should be aware of the pressure to act, particularly when large crowds are at the scene of a serious incident.

The uncontrolled situation - When arriving at an operational incident, the Incident Commander will face an uncontrolled situation with several hazards and risks, incomplete information and an expectation to act.

Inappropriate and/or insufficient resources to provide safe systems of work for the FRS task - There is a societal expectation that a firefighting team will arrive and achieve something. Evidence from accident investigations has shown that firefighters will attempt tasks regardless of the resources available to them risking death or serious injury.

Limited experience – the service may have limited experience of certain types of incident. A particular hazard is the infrequency of rescues performed in these conditions and the societal/moral pressure on service personnel to save life regardless of resources, training, and experience.

The Fire Brigades Union Safety Representatives had identified weaknesses in control measures used in operational procedures. These were:

Pre-planning - An essential element of management of risk is pre-planning. The Integrated Risk Management Plan (IRMP) must identify service standards in terms of equipment and the operational personnel required for SSoW to be employed.

Safety Reps had reviewed all of the named authorities previous Integrated Risk Management Plans and had not been able to identify, service standards for each type emergency that employees are expected to respond to, within these plans.

To date none of the named services have reviewed their cross border working arrangements to the satisfaction of Fire Brigades Union Safety Representatives.

The Comprehensive Spending Review will, in the opinion of The Fire Brigades Union completely undermine any benefits likely to be gained by the revision programme.

In December 2010 two reports were released:

Evaluation options for Fire and Rescue Service fire safety activities

Fire Research Report: 5/2010 and: Update of response time loss relationships for the Fire Service Emergency Cover toolkit Fire Research Report 3/2010

Fire Research Report 3/2010

Main points:

$$P_{age}48$$

- No consistency in the way FRS collate and publish data
- proportion of rescues decline as the response time increases
- proportion that are casualties increase as the response time increases.
- The majority of rescues from fires occur during response times of five to ten minutes
- schools and public buildings. In terms of the magnitude of the rates of damage, the new damage rates are around three times the magnitude of those calculated previously.
- Financial loss in public buildings increases by £4090 per min
- Average fire damage is 64m2 per minute

Extracts from Fire Research Report 3/2010

It should be noted that many FRSs lacked data on one or more type of incident. Indeed, in some cases only a minority of FRSs had any incident data. It is assumed by the researchers that this is due to inconsistencies in how FRS record special service incidents. The FRSs contributing to each dataset are given below.

Whilst we can only speculate as to why data sets vary so much, it is clear that the ratio of fatalities to the total count of fatalities, non fatal casualties and rescues varies greatly and we assume this is due to inconsistencies in what is reported.

As discussed in Section 2.1.7, it is judged that the differences in fatality rates and slopes may simply reflect random differences in the data due to the inconsistencies in reporting practices. It is assumed that the differences in fatality rates do not reflect real changes in fatality rates.

This provided a set of fatality rates (rate of fatalities per casualty – where casualties include fatalities, non-fatal casualties and rescues) for the response time bands. These are shown in Figure 8 along with rates of casualty and rates of rescues. These indicate that the:

- proportion of rescues decline as the response time increases
- proportion that are casualties increase as the response time increases.

It can be seen that there is generally a degree of correlation between the ranking of the two sets of data, the two notable exceptions being offices, schools and public buildings. In terms of the magnitude of the rates of damage, the new damage rates are around three times the magnitude of those calculated previously.

Occupancy	Average damage (m2)	Rate of financial loss (£/min)	Previous rate of financial loss (£/min)
Other premises open to the public	64.5	4,090	n/a
Hospital	27.0	4,211	3,700
Factory or warehouse	194.6	1,997	1,600

Table 14: Rate of loss per occupancy type



Hostel	40.4	2,49012 (hotel)	n/a
Further education	41.3	2,318	1,700
Hotel	54.3	2,490	2,900
Care home	26.4	2,539	2,300
Office	46.4	2,284	700
School	68.2	1,830	3,300
Licensed premises	62.6	1,897	2,300
Shop	59.1	1,156	2,400
Other workplace	124.7	591	n/a
Public building	34.5	4,090 ₁₃	2,100

Here is an extract taken from:

Fire Futures

Role of the Fire & Rescue Service (Delivery Models) Report

Workstream Chair: Cllr David Milsted, Dorset Fire Rescue Authority

Page 6, under the heading "

FRS/EMS: INTEGRATION OF FRS AND EMERGENCY AMBULANCE SERVICE". 4th paragraph:

"We note that the most recent study (Audit Commission, Coordination and Joint Delivery of Fire & Ambulance Services, October 2010) records that fewer than half of all Ambulance Trusts are meeting their response time standard. In an FRS, such a shortfall would be the subject of public scrutiny by democratically accountable elected Authority members which would lead to a programme of improvement; in the ambulance service it appears to pass without public notice. Our suggested governance model of a Community Protection Authority (CPA) would remedy this deficiency."

The FBU suggest that Cllr Milsted should researched the response standards set by the UK's fire and rescue authorities before making this statement. While 46 per cent of fires were responded to within five minutes in 2001, the figure fell to 37 per cent in 2006, and in 2005 it was taking an average 7.11 minutes for the first fire engine to arrive on the scene after an emergency call. By March 2010, England's dwelling fire average response time had slipped to 7.3. The FBU are trying to obtain response times in relation to the 1985 risk categories to assess the impact on Urban/Rural response times.

In January 2011 the Department of Communities and local Government published; A review of current processes for operational training and development in the Fire and Rescue Service by Greenstreet Berman LTD.

Like the HSE Consolidated report this is a an indictment of FRS risk management planning systems.

Key points are highlighted:

Aims of the research

The aims of this project were to:

- Identify what current frameworks and processes are being used to develop and deliver operational training to ensure the competence of operational staff;
- Examine how operational staff are supported in their development and how operational competence is assessed and maintained; and
- Build an evidence base to assess the extent to which processes and frameworks for training, development and competence assessment are being implemented, used effectively and efficiently and are appropriate;
- Identify good practice in the provision of operational training and development and opportunities to help the sector improve and strengthen training and development provision for the future.

Current practice in the provision of operational training and development activity

From the work undertaken for this study it can be concluded that:

- Operational training, development and assessment activity is mainly localised to meet FRSs operational needs, which leads to levels of variation in approach;
- Common practice is however observed in the areas of: training needs analysis, the overarching structure of development programmes, the use of refresher training and the existence of competence assessments;
- FRSs are implementing, in the main, key principles of competence management, namely define jobs, select people, train and develop competence, assess and maintain competence;
- The auditing of processes for the provision of operational training, development and assessment is not standard practice across the Service.

This study found that limited information is available across the Service regarding:

- the form and frequency of operational training, development and assessment activity; and
- how FRSs determine the form and frequency of operational training, development and assessment activity;
- the extent to which current practices are effective and appropriate.

It should also be noted that variation in the approach to operational training and development is expected within the Service, as FRSs have different operational and organisational requirements and constraints such as:

- Available resource;
- Cost;

Page 51

- Governance arrangements;
- Fire-fighter population (retained, wholetime etc);
- Operational risks;
- Supply and demand of personnel;
- Geographical location and geographical location of individual stations.

It is unclear from the evidence, the extent to which different approaches to operational training and development achieve the same competence based outcomes as detailed in the National Occupational Standards (NOS).

Current challenges in the provision of operational training and development activity

Based on the evidence it can be concluded that:

- FRSs experience significant challenges utilising the NOS, Assessment and Development Centres (ADCs) and the National Fire-fighter Selection Tests (NFST) and operational debriefings to help them define jobs and identify training needs;
- Some FRSs have faced significant challenges aligning their system and approaches for operational training and development arrangements with other departmental systems within Operations, Risk Management and Human Resources regimes and in some cases this has not occurred;
- The different duty systems provide a challenge to the Service in terms of operational training and development, particularly around effective utilisation of time and resource and ensuring the operational competence of the retained fire-fighters;
- The underpinning rationale for the form and frequency of operational training and development in individual FRSs is unclear from the information gathered;
- FRSs appear to face a key challenge regarding how they map the form and frequency
 of training to risk, skills and knowledge and frequency of low occurring but high risk
 events;
- Some FRSs face challenges with maintaining the competence of assessors and the arrangements put in place to ensure assessments are triangulated and consistent;
- How the form and frequency of incident command training is determined appears to be a challenge across the sector, in particular the extent to which the current level of training ensures individuals can competently command incidents;
- External auditing of systems for operational training and development is limited across the service, potentially due to the localised nature and governance of FRSs.

Potential solutions to help tackle current challenges

The work identified a number of potential solutions that can be explored by the Service. These focused on:

Increasing the understanding of the NOS through training and providing further operational information within the NOS;

- Enhancing the validity and use of ADCs, NFST and operational briefing to help identify training needs;
- The use of national qualifications to increase a level of consistency in entry level operational training and development;
- Approaches used to overcome the unique challenge posed by the duty system;
- Approaches used to enhance and maintain the competence of assessors;
- Increasing the uptake of external auditing and sharing of best practice, through setting up an industry body to manage Service wide external auditing.

These independent investigations bring further evidence that Audit Commission was not competent to evaluate fire and rescue services. They also provide further evidence that the system of self-assessment and peer review set up by the Audit Commission are inadequate.

The response of the new coalition Government to the fire and rescue service has been to dust off the strategy used by the last Conservative administration and published 'In the Line of Fire' and impose further cuts on fire and rescue services.

The response of a number of fire and rescue services has been further cuts in frontline resources and firefighter posts.

The Fire Brigades Union believe that safe and effective emergency response is best achieved by intervention at the earliest opportunity with sufficient resources of equipment that is fit for purpose, and with firefighters who are properly trained and supervised, to resolve any emergency that an FRS is expected to respond. Incident Commanders must be equipped with all the information and resources required to make tactical decisions at the incident.

It is for the reasons outlined in this report that The Fire Brigades Union does not consider risk management planning by individual fire and rescue authorities to be sufficiently robust to meet their fire and rescue service statutory obligations towards public safety and firefighter safety. Urgent action is required.

Funding

Spending Review

The Governments Spending Review 2010 announced "Fire Resource expenditure will reduce by 13% in real terms over the Spending Review period. Within this, central government grants to local authorities will be reduced by 25% over the period. To achieve this savings, the Fire and Rescue Service will need to modernise, increase efficiency and deliver workforce reform. It will be for individual fire authorities to decide how to make these savings.⁵⁷

⁵⁷ Government Spending Review 2010 page 48 2.36

The Local Government Association estimate that Government cuts in funding equate to a reduction of nearly 40 per cent of the fire and rescue workforce.

These cuts are on top of eight years of *modernisation* that had already delivered £185 million pounds of *'savings'* since 2004^{58} .

Eric Pickles department claims they have identified seven areas where they consider potential *savings* could be achieved:

- 1. Flexible staffing arrangements
- 2. Improved sickness management
- 3. Pay restraint and recruitment freezes
- 4. Improved procurement
- 5. Shared services/back office functions
- 6. Sharing Chief Officers and other senior staff
- 7. Voluntary amalgamations between Fire and Rescue Authorities.

These 'savings' are not new. They first appeared in the 1995 Audit Commission Report *In the Line of Fire*' which estimated savings at £65million.

This list was purely speculative, no examples of good practice in other similar organisations were offered. The true nature of the report has revealed over time that it was about cutting funding for the fire and rescue service.

In 2008 the Audit Commission released a further report *Rising to the Challenge*. This reported that fire and rescue authorities had made savings of £185 million since 2004. The Audit Commissioned believed that a further £200 million could be saved, mainly through changes to crewing and shift arrangements, without compromising firefighter safety. Again this was purely speculation and we have seen firefighter safety compromised on a regular bases. Independent reports also indicate that public safety is likely to have been compromised as well.

The Coalition Government has failed to produce evidence that their funding arrangements are robust and they will not compromise public and firefighter safety.

Report *Rising to the Challenge: Improving fire service efficiency* stated a target for *fire services* to save £110 million by 2011 and up to £200 million if *all fire services adopted good practice from pioneering services.* These claims are repeated in an Audit Commission Guide⁵⁹ published in 2011.

Yet the so-called *pioneering* fire and rescue services, that the cuts are based, are having to make around 20% cuts as well.



 ⁵⁸ Rising to the Challenge: Improving fire service efficiency- Community safety National report December 2008 – Audit Commission
 ⁵⁹ Local savings review guide: Improving fire and rescue authority efficiency – Auditors' 2010/11 local value for money audit work- Audit Commission

In 2005 Merseyside and Kent and Medway Fire and Rescue Authority were deemed excellent by the Audit Commission .

Merseyside Fire and Rescue Service are having to cut a further 100 firefighter posts and four stations because of £6.5 million reduction in their budget.

Kent and Medway Fire and Rescue Authority have published a plan to cut £10,000,000 over the next three years from a £76 million revenue budget. They will have to make further cuts post 2016. This is on top of £2.1 million of cuts so far.

The Audit Commission's *In the line of fire* named five fire and rescue services as the most *efficient* in the sector. The Audit Commission stated that efficiency savings of £200 million could be achieved if the rest of the sector followed their *pioneering* approach. These so called *best practice services are*; Greater Manchester; Merseyside; Cleveland; Isle of Wight; and Northumberland;

Of these five;

Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service have to cut a further £7 million in 2014-15 on top of £26 million cuts in the last four years. They will have to make further cuts of 312 million in the two years following.

Merseyside Fire and Rescue Service have to cut 100 firefighter posts and four stations because of £6.5 million reduction in their budget

Cleveland Fire Brigade are cutting 130 wholetime firefighters and closing one fire station because of Government have imposed £5,758 million grant reduction on top of last year's cut of £4 million.

The Isle of Wight Fire and Rescue Service need to cut £1 million from a £7.6 million budget

Northumberland Fire and Rescue Service are having to make further wholetime firefighter cuts because of reductions in their budget

FBU reports that show that the Audit Commission got it wrong.

Fatal accident investigations in **London, Hertfordshire, East Sussex**, and **Warwickshire** have discredited the Audit Commissions process of assuring that delivery of fire and rescue services are safe and effective.

In October 2006 the Audit Commission judged East Sussex Fire Authority to *be performing well* and East Sussex Fire and Rescue Service to be *performing well in all areas of service delivery.* Two months later East Sussex Fire and Rescue Service were in serious breach of their statutory duty of care to two employees killed and a further eleven, firefighters, police officers and a member of the public injured.

The FBU are still waiting for East Sussex to improve on its shocking track record. How are they going to do that when they will have to make 20% reduction in their budget £7,200,000 over five years?

In 2010 the FBU published *Falling to the lowest common denominator – How the Audit Commission got it wrong on the fire service.* This report placed on public record the inadequacies of the Audit Commission inspection regimes and the spurious claims they make about efficiency. The FBU made a number of recommendations in the report that the Government has not challenged.

The model for efficiency that the Audit Commission used had the *fire service* as a cost without a robust process of assessing the financial value of what they do and achieve. The Audit Commissions *pioneering* drive to change duty systems was not based on a robust process of ensuring that new systems were effective and safe. <u>Nor is the Governments cuts agenda</u>

There is now plenty of evidence provided by court judgements; public enquiry recommendations; Government Impact Assessments; Coroner Rule 43 letters, HSE reports and improvement notices that show that the <u>Audit Commission had got it wrong</u> with fire and rescue services.

Other organisations have also warned Government..

In 2009 the ABI reported year on year record fire losses;

Fire damage claims in the first half of 2009 cost £639 million - £3.6 million each day. This follows on from the £1.3 billion fire losses in 2008, a 16% rise on 2007 and the most expensive year ever.

Between 2002 and 2008 the cost of the average fire claim for both commercial and domestic fires doubled, to £21,000 and £8,000 respectively.

Arson, which tends to increase during a recession, accounts for half of all commercial fires. Socially deprived areas and schools are especially vulnerable: arson rates are 30 times higher in poorer areas. Twenty schools a week suffer an arson attack, disrupting the education of 90,000 schoolchildren, causing damage costing £65 million.

The latest study on the economic cost of commercial warehouse fires estimates a total direct financial loss to business of £230.2 million per year.

In a statement made in March 2013 CFOA estimated that on top of frontline cuts already made another 4,500 firefighter posts and 150 fire engines would be need be cut because of Government underfunding.

The Local Government Association⁶⁰ estimates that by 2017/18 fire authorities will have £600 million less in the coffers each year compared to 2011/12.

According to analysis by the LGA, Government funding for the fire and rescue service will fall by £300 million from £1 billion in 2011/12 to £700 million in 2017/18. At the same time expenditure is expected to rise from £2.1 billion in 2011/12 to £2.4 billion in 2017/18.

⁶⁰ http://www.local.gov.uk/web/guest/media-releases/-/journal_content/56/10180/3908046/NEWS

As fire authorities must balance their budgets they will, by 2017/18, have to spend 30 per cent less annually compared to 2011/12. This would be equivalent to a reduction of nearly 40 per cent of the workforce.

We believe the Coalition Government are deliberately 'running down' fire and rescue services by underfunding. This will pave the way for mutualisation (North East) and privatisation (Surrey see <u>www.getsurrey.co.uk/news/local-news/firefighters-feel-second-class-private-6711850</u>). Surrey is a flagship Tory Fire and Rescue Authority led by LGA Fire lead Kay Hammond. They have openly stated the "benefits of allocating commercial business to a local employer, the strategy of employing ex-military personnel should represent a large pool of potential candidates as a result of the 20,000 personnel to be made redundant". Dumping large numbers of civil servants into the market will force down wage demands and conditions of employment. An advert placed on jobsearch.direct.gov.uk is evidence of this in fire and rescue⁶¹. As with their approach to floods, fire and rescue services are now reacting to the 2010 spending review and are cutting frontline services rather than looking at back office functions.

It seems incredible to us that the Coalition Government has left; *the Sharing Chief Officers and other senior staff;* and *Voluntary amalgamations between Fire and Rescue Authorities* to the very people who will lose their positions if they go ahead!

This cut in funding has also made fire and rescue authorities reluctant to engage in other work. Brandon Lewis has indicated that many fire and rescue authorities are not keen to take on flooding and water rescue as a statutory requirement. Emergency Medical Survival (EMS), Maritime Response and other specialist rescue are all areas that are likely to be casualties of the Governments cuts in funding.

The last Labour administration attempted to introduce regional fire and rescue services, however there was little public appetite and the appalling mishandling of the Regional Control Project discredited the Government. We do believe that public opinion is changing. People are more aware of the need for resilience and this is also reflected in cross party examination of Blue light services⁶² and the report on Policing⁶³. We have been actively involved in the development of the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service and we believe this will deliver financial benefits to improve frontline delivery. The Scottish Government has invested £25million to generate projected savings of £293 million over 15 years.

⁶¹

 $https://jobsearch.direct.gov.uk/GetJob.aspx?JobID=5084779&JobTitle=Resilience+Firefighters&rad=20&rad_units=miles&pp=25&sort=rv.\\ dt.di&vw=b&re=134&setype=2&tjt=Firefighter&where=&q=&AVSDM=2013-12-11T09\%3a18\%3a00-05\%3a00$

⁶² The All Parliamentary Group on homeland Security Improving Efficiency, Interoperability and Resilience of our Blue Light Services June 2013

⁶³ Policing for a Better Britain –Report of the Independent Police Commission

Fire Brigades Union Assessment

Sufficient reasons have not been be put forward for the proposal to allow intelligent consideration and response. East Sussex Fire Authority has failed to provide sufficient evidence of funding arrangements for fire and rescue services.

We believe it is important that the authority gives the public some perspective to the cost of fire and rescue services. For example:

If Bernie Ecclestone had paid the full amount of tax owed to Her Majesty's revenue, her taxpayers in the UK could have had a year off from paying for their fire and rescue services.

The UK spend on fire and rescue services are equivalent to the amount the UK spends on salty snacks (crisps).

The UK insurance industry manages investments amounting to £1.8 trillion (equivalent to 25% of the UKs total net worth). It employs around 320,000 people in the UK and contributes £10 billion in tax.

The authority has failed to warn its communities of the potential increase in costs indirectly related to its proposals.

In the *Main consultation document* the Chairman of the Fire Authority states that the proposals are driven as a result of austerity measures when they are the result of the Governments misplaced 'efficiency' savings.

This timescale gave the authority the opportunity to raise additional funding through local taxes and time to challenge the government's spending review for fire and rescue.

We recommend that the authority publically challenges the Governments spending review for fire and rescue services.

Of the seven potential efficiency savings the proposed *Flexible staffing arrangements* have not been subjected to robust assessment and testing. Capital costs have not been included in the proposals. *Improved sickness management, Pay restraint and recruitment freezes* have been delivered, the authorities proposals for *Improved procurement* appear to have resulted in addition costs of £50k

This leaves *Shared services/back office functions, Sharing Chief Officers and other senior staff, and Voluntary amalgamations between Fire and Rescue Authorities.* We believe that to deliver the level of 'efficiency' savings expected by the coalition government which maintain effective fire and rescue services , the nine fire and rescue services in the south east will need to amalgamate. The Fire Brigades Union South East and Southern Regions are working together to see if amalgamation of the nine services within these regions will offer the same benefits and be acceptable to FBU members.

We recommend that the authority advises Government that *amalgamations between Fire and Rescue Authorities* will require intervention by the state.

END



Here is a brief history of Worst Case Planning Scenarios

Work to change to a risk based approach started back in the early 1980's with the release of two research documents;

- Task Analysis for incidents on the Fireground The Scientific Research and Development Branch, Publication 62/83, "Fireground Working Patterns: The Evaluation of the Trials", (G H Dessent, 1983) and;
- The Scientific Research and Development Branch, Publication 22/83, "Fireground Working Patterns: A description of the Trials", (G H Dessent, 1983).

In 1993, new health and safety regulations required employers to formalise their methods of assessing the safety of their work practices (six pack reg's).

In 1995, the move to a risk based approach for fire and rescue service planning began in earnest in 1995 with the publication of 'In the Line of fire' by the Audit Commission. The review contained numerous suggestions for ways the Audit Commission considered would make better use of resources which, it was suggested, could result in the saving of lives, suffering and property. It made specific recommendations for action by the Home Office and the Central Fire Brigades Advisory Council (CFBAC) in particular it called for a review of the 1985 Standards of Fire Cover and for a shift in emphasis from firefighting to fire prevention, based on research.

Research was taken forward by the Home Office, steered by a joint committee of the CFBACs for England and Wales, and for Scotland. A Joint Committee on the Audit Commission Report was appointed. Extensive research was carried out to develop a risk based approach to fire and eventually emergency cover. This research established the relationship between fire service response times and fire and road fatalities. This research also established that rates of fire spread in buildings are time related dependant on their level of fire protection.

The key documents produced were:

6/1997 Fire Brigade Response Options - Final report

Produced a comprehensive though not exhaustive list of emergencies typically dealt with by fire brigades (tasks). A critical point was established at which no further specificity was attempted to maintain the generic nature of the list rather than unique emergencies. The report established three types of resource required to deal with emergencies and these were tactics, personnel and equipment (resources).

This report also confirmed the Health and Safety Executives (HSE) view that circumstances where insufficient personnel were available to maintain safe systems of work should be relatively few and that a risk assessment approach should be taken which will enable those precautions that can be taken to be taken.

Dwelling fire cover risk assessment 1997

This established the relationship between fire and road traffic accident casualties becoming fatalities because of increased response times.

This comprehensive process developed to determine the resources needed to deal with emergencies was called Worst Case Planning Scenarios. In the reviews own words;

In planning the response to a particular risk, the guiding principle is that of the 'Worst Case Planning Scenario': -

"For a particular hazard, this is the worst case selected by a brigade for which FSEC is to be planned. It reflects what is reasonable provision for a particular area, not the worst circumstances which can be imagined."

The key words in this definition are 'reasonable provision'. It would not be reasonable to select a Lockerbie type incident in planning for fires in a housing estate. If the housing estate contains semi-detached houses and bungalows, it would probably be reasonable to plan on the basis of having to make a couple of rescues from the first floor, making access either by ladder or via the stairs. It is important to appreciate that a Worst Case Planning Scenario

(WCPS) is simply a planning tool used to identify the resources required at an incident. It is not intended to be prescriptive in telling brigades how to address a specific incident. There will always be some incidents in a particular area where make-up beyond the WCPS resource levels will be required, and there will be many incidents which are not as severe as the WCPS, requiring similar or fewer resources. In the FSEC system, any Enumeration District may have a number of different risks and each of these will have associated with it a WCPS. If all hazards were present in an enumeration district, then the following maximum number of WCPSs would be required: -

- · 1 Dwellings scenario
- 9 Special Services scenarios
- · 17 Other Buildings societal risk scenarios (day)
- · 17 Other Buildings societal risk scenarios (night)
- · 14 Other Buildings property risk scenarios
- 7 Major Incident scenarios
- · 3 small fire scenarios

6/98 Fire Cover Modelling for Fire Brigades

This reminded the reader that the relationship between response times and insured fire losses had been established in 1970 and confirmed in a 1975 report. In the early nineties this was developed into a computer based model for brigades.

Turn out times were established as the time taken for an appliance to be mobilised from the time the emergency call was received at the station. The default turn out times in the model were:

Whole-time crewing: 1 minute

Day crewing: 1 minute during day shift, and 2.5 minutes at other times Retained crewing : 5 minutes.

The default standards for the software are those of the national guidelines - 3 pumping appliances attend A risk areas, the first two to arrive within 5 minutes and the third to arrive within 8 minutes, and similarly for the other standard risks. There is also space for the user to define their own risk categories, using up to four different appliances.

'Out of the line of fire' the Joint Committee on the Audit Commission Report to the CFBAC July 1998

Governing principles;

- Public protection from fire must be maintained and, if possible, enhanced.
- The safety of firefighters must not be compromised.
- The primary focus of fire cover should more directly address the risk to life. (This represents a shift from the current property-based approach.)
- Recommendations should be cost effective and consistent with the principles of best value for public money

The main conclusion for emergency response was to quote;

"We agree with the Audit Commission that the current prescriptive approach on the type, speed and weight of responses to be provided to various locations on the basis of present risk categories is inflexible. As a result, it does not always provide either the most efficient or the most operationally effective fire cover.

In future, brigades should plan the type, weight and speed of response to be provided to a particular location on the basis of an explicit "worst case planning scenario". This should be decided on the basis of experience and professional judgement.

The firefighter resources and equipment required to intervene adequately and safely in any given scenario should be determined by reference to lists of standard tasks for which staffing levels have been agreed nationally. This can be done by further validation of data collected by our review and the validation work should therefore be taken forward in a series of pathfinder projects."

Special Services Risk Assessment Toolkit 1998

"MANAGEMENT SUMMARY

The extrication of persons trapped in vehicles involved in road traffic accidents (RTAs) and attendance at other special service incidents where there is an imminent threat to the life comprises a very significant part of the fire services "life saving" work. It has been reported by the London Helicopter Emergency Medical Service that, in the 1990s, the fire service are involved in an estimated 7,500 extrications each year of persons from vehicles. Persons are also rescued or released from other high risk situations, such as entrapment in machinery or confined noxious spaces, such as storage vessels. Taking Scotland as an example, 978 persons were reported as rescued from other emergency situations (without fire) in 1994-95, in addition to the release of about 595 persons at road traffic accidents. Thus, the UK fire service is probably involved in the rescue of over 15,000 persons per year from life threatening incidents. The relative importance of "life risk" special services and the rescue of persons from fires can be illustrated by reference to 1995 UK Fire Statistics. It is reported that 4.259 persons were rescued by fire brigades from fires in 1995, compared to the estimated 7,500 extrications of persons from RTAs by the fire service. Clinical research shows that the survival of casualties and the severity of injuries is influenced by both the method of extrication and the speed with which emergency clinical care is rendered to the casualty either in situ or after conveyance to hospital. Where the rendering of emergency medical care is dependent on the fire service facilitating access to the casualty and/or facilitating extrication, the actions of the fire

service will strongly influence whether or not necessary clinical care can be rendered. Against this background, the aim of risk assessment is to ensure that "life risk" special services are accorded an appropriate level of attention within the planning of fire and emergency cover along side other fire and emergency risks. As with other emergency incidents, the aim is to ensure that the disposition and capability of fire service resources is sufficient to reduce the loss of life and injury as low as is reasonably practicable (ALARP). This entails matching the level, type and disposition of fire and emergency resources to the frequency, type and severity of special service incidents within each area. As part of this, the assessment should establish whether "normal" fire cover can achieve an adequate special service response or whether additional provision is required.

Overview of Special Service Risk Assessment Stage 1 - Identify Risk Areas and Assign Special Service Risk Categories

As "life risk" special services comprise a small fraction of all special services, it is important to first discriminate between those special services where there is an imminent or serious risk to life and those where there is no significant risk to life. Consequently, special services have been classified as follows:-

- · Category A Imminent life risk
- · Category B Serious life risk
- · Category C Other special services
- Only Category A and B special services are assessed for fire and emergency cover

purposes in the toolkit. During this first stage, it is necessary for fire brigades to identify risk areas in which the maximum response time (including mobilisation time) to special service incidents is 10 minutes from a single point. These risk areas should be chosen with physical boundaries and historical incident data taken in to account. The risk areas are then each assigned a special services risk category, ranging from very high to very low, based on the number of Category A incidents occurring per annum.

Stage 2 - Assess and Match Fire and Emergency Cover To Special Services Risk Categories

In the next step, brigades should assess for each risk area whether their current fire cover is sufficient to respond to special service incidents within the recommended response times, with the recommended response capabilities and with the recommended rescue times. If the fire and emergency cover performance requirements are not being achieved, then the toolkit contains suggestions on how fire and emergency cover levels could be modified and on incident prevention measures. In some cases it may be concluded that the current level or type of fire and emergency cover is insufficient to achieve the performance requirements and that a different level of fire and emergency cover is required. Guidance on the assessment of the cost effectiveness of various alternatives is provided in the separate Costings toolkit. In this Special Services toolkit, the recommended fire and emergency cover is expressed in terms of recommended response times, rescue times and what the response should be capable of achieving. In addition, the toolkit contains advice on the identification of a Worse Case Planning Scenario (WCPS) for each special services risk area. The Worst Case Planning Scenario (WCPS) is the worst case for which fire and emergency cover is to be planned for a particular risk area, and reflects what is reasonable provision for the risk area. It is not the worst case that can be imagined. Reference should be made to the Brigade Response Options Software (BROS) for guidance on the resources required for the initial fire service response (in terms of personnel, equipment and specialist skills) to each WCPS.

Stage 3 - Monitor and Review Special Service Risk

The ultimate goal is to reduce the loss of life and severity of injuries as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). Therefore, the response performance to special service incidents should be monitored over time to ascertain whether the fire and emergency cover performance is adequate. Where performance is unsatisfactory, a further review should be carried out to discern the reasons for this, such as:

· inadequate training and equipment,

mismatch between disposition of fire and emergency cover and location of incidents.
 The conclusions of this review should be used to identify further improvements in services,

thereby maintaining satisfactory standards of service.

Scope of Application of the Special Services Toolkit

The toolkit provides background information on the procedures and calculations carried out in the Graphical Information System based Brigade Risk Assessment Toolkit Software (GIS BRATS), with regards to special services risk assessment. The toolkit illustrates the approach which can be used to assess "special services" risks for the purpose of determining fire and emergency cover. The type of special service risks addressed here are those where there is an imminent threat of fatal or serious injury (in the absence of an emergency intervention) to no more than about five persons, such as:

· road traffic accidents,

· unsafe structures, such as storm damaged houses,

· trapped persons, e.g. in machinery,

· persons trapped in noxious or toxic environments, such as sewers or petrol storage tanks.

Incidents which involve a major loss of life, numerous casualties or widespread damage or disruption are covered by the Major Incident risk assessment toolkit and so should be excluded from this special services assessment.

Other Toolkits and Associated Fire Cover Review Items

The other toolkits that should be used in addition to the Special Services toolkit for the risk assessment of brigade areas during fire cover review are the Dwellings toolkit, Other Buildings toolkit, Major Incidents toolkit and the Costings toolkit

The risk assessment process for special services comprises of the following 3 stages:-

Stage 1 - Identify risk areas and assign special service risk categories

Stage 2 - Assess and match fire and emergency cover to special services risk categories Stage 3 - Monitor and review special service risk

In some cases it may be concluded that the current level or type of fire and emergency cover is insufficient to achieve the performance requirements and that a different level of fire and emergency cover is required. Guidance on the assessment of the costeffectiveness

of various alternatives is provided in the separate Costings toolkit.

In this Special Services toolkit, the recommended fire and emergency cover is expressed in

terms of recommended response times, rescue times and what the response should be capable of achieving. In addition, the toolkit contains advice on the identification of a Worse Case Planning Scenario (WCPS) for each special services risk area. The Worst Case Planning Scenario (WCPS) is the worst case for which fire and emergency cover is to be planned for a particular risk area, and reflects what is reasonable provision for the risk area. It is not the worst case that can be imagined. Reference should be made to the

Brigade Response Options Software (BROS) for guidance on the resources required for the initial fire service response (in terms of personnel, equipment and specialist skills) to each WCPS.

Trials of the proposed new system were run in 11 fire brigades known as the 'Pathfinder trials' and feed back suggested that proposed standards would need to increase emergency response resources by 50% and that further work was needed to validate WCPS.

These additional reports led to;

• FRDG Report 5/2000, "Implementation of the Proposed Fire Service Emergency Cover Planning Process - Interim Report", and this is where twisting of the truth begins. The original 'need to validate WCPS' has become 'fire brigades have little confidence in WCPS'.

WCPS drops off the radar and the fire cover review is buried. It takes a Channel 4 report to bring it to the surface and it reappears as the Fire Cover Review 2002. Response requirements can now be 'offset' by fire prevention work however at this stage this not a retrograde step, fire brigades would have to assess the impact of fire prevention <u>prior to</u> <u>reduction in emergency cover.</u>

The report had this to say about WCPS;

Response requirements

- · WCPS is a useful and valid concept
- · WCPSs has generated an increase in the weight of the response required in rural areas
- · WCPSs should be reviewed to ensure that they are both appropriate and realistic

The report made 32 recommendations (Appendix J) and six were seen as key. Number two on that list was;

"2. Review the responses defined in the WCPSs with a view to ensuring that they are both appropriate and realistic. Also, consider phased attendance times, and the implications for firefighter safety."

Originally their were 35 scenario types, with the other 33 to be developed.

As for the scale of each type of incident, both the 1997 report and the 2002 review recommended a timescale to assemble all resources to deal with an emergency and these were:

- For Other Buildings societal risks, scenarios should plan for sufficient resources to be present to commence multiple rescues within ten minutes of the time of call.
- For all Other Buildings scenarios, all resources must be present within 40 minutes of the time of call.
- For Major Incident scenarios, all resources must be present within 60 minutes of the time of call.

The next piece in the jigsaw is the work that arose out of the Twin Tower attacks in New York.

A Project Team were commissioned by the Fire Research Division of the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister to review the published literature on the physiological capability of firefighters to perform their wide-ranging operational duties, and to provide recommendations for further research to fill the knowledge gaps.

This team produced two reports;

- Operational Physiological Capabilities of Firefighters: Literature Review and Research Recommendations Fire Research Technical Report 1/2005 and;
- Physiological Assessment of Firefighting, Search and Rescue in the Built Environment Fire Research Technical Report 2/2005

Extracts from these reports;

"The drivers for this project emanated from two firefighter special interest groups – the Building Disaster Assessment Group (BDAG) and the New Dimensions Group (NDG). The intended outcomes for this review and any subsequent research are to:

- Reduce risk from work activity of firefighters
- Improve guidance for firefighter operational practices and training
- Improve planned and dynamic risk assessment
- Modify procedures for building design, approval and use
- Elicit improvements to the Building Regulations".

and

"PRIMARY RESEARCH PRIORITIES

Research Project 1: Quantify the Physiological Requirements of Firefighter Key Tasks and Identify the Limiting Factors to Performance

Safety and efficiency are the two major operational concerns of the Fire Service and both require judgement's to be made about the workload that firefighters can undertake in different circumstances. The variables that have to be taken into consideration are:

- tasks (carrying, dragging, lifting, on the level or up or down stairs)
- ambient conditions (primarily heat)
- physical load (equipment, including BA and PPE)
- type of PPE and RPE worn
- stature, body composition, strength and aerobic fitness of firefighters

• gender and age of firefighters

The Incident Commander has to decide how many personnel are required to carry out the necessary tasks and how long they can continue to work safely and efficiently. Currently these judgements are largely based on experience and on the capacity of the BA used and it is to the credit of all of those in positions of responsibility that the UK Fire Service is among the safest and most efficient in the world. There is, however, a need to quantify the impact of the factors listed above on work capacity, partly to support and assist those in command, partly to anticipate how new equipment, responsibilities and techniques will impact on work capacity, and partly to assist in revising building regulations so they are consistent with modern working practices. Currently, both 'normal' and 'extreme' scenarios which firefighters in the UK Fire Service are likely to face are poorly defined. It is not surprising therefore that the workloads firefighters are likely to endure during these scenarios remain to be fully quantified. Of greater concern is the lack of knowledge as to whether firefighters can even perform tasks that might be expected of them, or for how long the tasks can be sustained. Lack of information about the specifications of the scenarios/tasks is compounded by the lack of accurate and detailed knowledge about the fitness and work capacity of firefighters, and also by the gaps in knowledge relating to the thermal and metabolic strain associated with the various configurations of PPE and RPE likely to be employed. An urgent need exists for the Fire Service to define in detailed operational terms, reasonable Worst Case Planning Scenarios, that firefighters are expected to perform under operational conditions. Once these scenarios are defined, Human Factors specialists should determine the workload associated with these tasks, to establish both whether firefighters are likely to be able to carry out their duties in an effective and safe manner, and to identify what the limits to performance are, so that the potential to extend the performance envelope can be explored."

Since this report was produced WCPS have disappeared off the radar. No further research has been done instead we have seen govt' drive to downplay the significance of emergency response in favour of prevention.

Fire Service Circular 69/2008 – Building Disaster Assessment Group – Research Findings makes no mention of the need to further develop WCPS. The last response we have is from Fire Minister Sadiq Khan MP in December 2008, quote;

<u>"Recommendation 2</u> Review the responses defined in the WCPSs with a view to ensuring that they are both appropriate and realistic,

Progress: The deployment of resources is a matter for local Fire and Rescue Services under their Integrated Risk Management Planning process and is reviewed regularly as part of that process."

Conclusions

"Dynamic Risk Assessment on its own does not provide firefighters with a safe system of work and the Fire brigades Union can longer support the current interpretation. The FBU welcome a review, commissioned by CFRA, and we hope the review is treated with urgency.

The FBU welcome development of work practices to a minimum national standard. This will assist FRS's in providing safe and effective work practices for emergency response through Integrated Risk Management Planning.

However, if these are to be effective, development must be organised and funded centrally. Much of this work has already been achieved during the 1990' through the development of Worst Case Planning Scenarios and the 'Pathfinder' trials. The first comprehensive research in to the physiological impact of firefighting was carried out in 2004. Further research was promised by Government.

WCPS is a key element of Governments Fire Service Emergency Cover Toolkit (FSEC). It is clear from comments made by the then Fire Minister Sadiq Khan that government expects FRS's to develop these locally.

The further development of WCPS recommended in 2002 and 2005 and further research promised in 2004 must happen. firefighter safety and effective emergency response will only happen thorough and robust research.

In the absence of central government support, fire and rescue services will have to develop their own WCPS"

Abstract to support

In 2002 the Fire Cover Review made 32 recommendations to Government of which six were considered key. Key recommendation number two was;

"Review the responses defined in the WCPSs with a view to ensuring that they are both appropriate and realistic. Also, consider phased attendance times, and the implications for firefighter safety."

Government has failed to deliver this recommendation. WCPS is a key element of the Fire Service Emergency Cover Toolkit (FSEC) yet the FBU believe this process is flawed because further development of WCPS has not happened.

Further progress was made by the Building Disaster Advisory Group and released as FSC 55/2004.

To support the developments identified above, ODPM will be undertaking further research on:

• Enhancement of heat tolerance. A number of methods are available to enhance heat tolerance. These include ensuring adequate re-hydration, physical cooling of the body or parts of the body via pre-cooling and wearing cooling vests or headgear. Initial research on cooling vests showed that the circumstances where they may provide physiological benefit are yet to be quantified. Furthermore, while the use of cooling vests might provide psychological benefit, it also involves considerable logistical and duration problems.

• Further research is planned in late 2004 to consider which interventions might best serve firefighters engaged in operational procedures.

• Monitoring of core body temperature. Research is also planned for late 2004 to investigate development of an appropriate means of monitoring firefighters' physiological wellbeing in their working environments.

A Project Team were commissioned by the Fire Research Division of the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister to review the published literature on the physiological capability of firefighters to perform their wide-ranging operational duties, and to provide recommendations for further research to fill the knowledge gaps.

This team produced two reports;

- Operational Physiological Capabilities of Firefighters: Literature Review and Research Recommendations Fire Research Technical Report 1/2005 and;
- Physiological Assessment of Firefighting, Search and Rescue in the Built Environment Fire Research Technical Report 2/2005

"The drivers for this project emanated from two firefighter special interest groups – the Building Disaster Assessment Group (BDAG) and the New Dimensions Group (NDG). The intended outcomes for this review and any subsequent research are to:

- Reduce risk from work activity of firefighters
- Improve guidance for firefighter operational practices and training
- Improve planned and dynamic risk assessment
- Modify procedures for building design, approval and use
- Elicit improvements to the Building Regulations".

and

PRIMARY RESEARCH PRIORITIES

Research Project 1: Quantify the Physiological Requirements of Firefighter Key Tasks and Identify the Limiting Factors to Performance

Safety and efficiency are the two major operational concerns of the Fire Service and both require judgements to be made about the workload that firefighters can undertake in different circumstances. The variables that have to be taken into consideration are:

- tasks (carrying, dragging, lifting, on the level or up or down stairs)
- ambient conditions (primarily heat)
- physical load (equipment, including BA and PPE)
- type of PPE and RPE worn
- stature, body composition, strength and aerobic fitness of firefighters

• gender and age of firefighters

The Incident Commander has to decide how many personnel are required to carry out the necessary tasks and how long they can continue to work safely and efficiently. Currently these judgements are largely based on experience and on the capacity of the BA used and it is to the credit of all of those in positions of responsibility that the UK Fire Service is among the safest and most efficient in the world. There is, however, a need to quantify the impact of the factors listed above on work capacity, partly to support and assist those in command, partly to anticipate how new equipment, responsibilities and techniques will impact on work capacity, and partly to assist in revising building regulations so they are consistent with modern working practices. Currently, both 'normal' and 'extreme' scenarios which firefighters in the UK Fire Service are likely to face are poorly defined. It is not surprising therefore that the workloads firefighters are likely to endure during these scenarios remain to be fully quantified. Of greater concern is the lack of knowledge as to whether firefighters can even perform tasks that might be expected of them, or for how long the tasks can be sustained. Lack of information about the specifications of the scenarios/tasks is compounded by the lack of accurate and detailed knowledge about the fitness and work capacity of firefighters, and also by the gaps in knowledge relating to the thermal and metabolic strain associated with the various configurations of PPE and RPE likely to be employed. An urgent need exists for the Fire Service to define in detailed operational terms, reasonable Worst Case Planning Scenarios, that firefighters are expected to perform under operational conditions. Once these scenarios are defined, Human Factors specialists should determine the workload associated with these tasks, to establish both whether firefighters are likely to be able to carry out their duties in an effective and safe manner, and to identify what the limits to performance are, so that the potential to extend the performance envelope can be explored.

- This project is likely to involve the following phases:
- Devise simulations of the scenarios
- Measure performance and monitor firefighters on the scenarios
- Manipulate limiting factors to define and extend the performance envelope
- Analyse and report the findings.

Outcome measures may include for example: success or failure on the task, time to completion, heart rate, core body temperature, skin temperature, energy cost, air usage, perceptions of fatigue and thermal comfort, and other or alternative measures of cardiovascular and thermal stress and strain. This work will be challenging as there are real difficulties faced when attempting to quantify individual and concurrent tasks when they are carried out under operational conditions. Consideration should be given to standardisation of task performance, control over work rate, and individual performance within a team task. Careful selection of methodology is essential given the environmental conditions and physical challenges encountered.

Research Project 2: Determine Appropriateness of Fire Safety Legislation

The appropriateness and relevance of the criteria within the DoE's Design Principles of Fire Safety (1996) and the DETR's Building Regulations (1991) that pertain to the expectations on and operational requirements of firefighters should be reviewed. The

Appendix 1 WORST CASE PLANNING SCENARIOS – A BRIEF HISTORY

basis, for example, for the provision of firefighting shafts and firefighting lifts for buildings, and the specification of a maximum distance from a mains outlet to the limit of the building have no empirical foundation. The legislation needs to be revisited in light of more knowledge about 'normal' scenarios and reasonable Worst Case Planning Scenarios that are expected of firefighters bearing in mind their fitness, the PPE and RPE they are required to wear, the environment in which they are expected to operate, and the speed at which they are required to work. The review of the legislation would logically be conducted following completion of the Research Project 1.

and

SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

1. The physiological load associated with climbing stairs up 28 floors in PPE both with and without EDBA and hose was investigated. When carrying EDBA and hose it took approximately 30 seconds and core temperature rose by approximately 0.02°C, per floor. When climbing unloaded it took approximately 15 seconds and core temperature rose by approximately 0.01°C, per floor.

2. Climbing 28 floors with EDBA and hose resulted in fatigue, heat strain and physical exhaustion to the extent that committing firefighters into a fire compartment would be unwise.

3. Climbing unloaded was less arduous and subsequent commitment to the fire compartment would appear to be tolerable by the majority of firefighters investigated.

4. A predictive model to estimate the combination of maximum vertical and horizontal distances that firefighters could achieve, while remaining within a core temperature limit of 39°C is presented. Assuming 95% confidence in the outcomes, the model suggests that 34m is the maximum distance firefighters should penetrate into a fire compartment to rescue a casualty, where no stair climbing is required to access the point of entry. Having to climb stairs beforehand or undertake other activities reduces the maximum penetration distances proportionally.

Reference documents

In the Line of Fire 1995

6/1997 Fire Brigade Response Options - Final report

ENTEC Dwelling Fire Cover Risk Assessment 1997

6/98 Fire Cover Modelling for Fire Brigades

Special Services Risk Assessment Toolkit 1998

'Out of the line of fire' Modernising the Standards of Fire cover – Report to the CFBAC – Fire and Emergency Planning Directorate – Home Office July 1998

FRDG Report 5/2000, "Implementation of the Proposed Fire Service Emergency Cover Planning Process - Interim Report",

The Fire Cover Review-Report of the Task Group to the Central Fire Brigades Advisory Councils October 2002

"How many firefighters does it take?" article in firefighter 2004

Operational Physiological Capabilities of Firefighters: Literature Review and Research Recommendations - Fire Research Technical Report 1/2005 and;

Physiological Assessment of Firefighting, Search and Rescue in the Built Environment - FSC 55/2004.

Appendix 1 WORST CASE PLANNING SCENARIOS – A BRIEF HISTORY

Fire Research Technical Report 2/2005 Fire Service Circular 69/2008 – Building Disaster Assessment Group – Research Letter - Sadiq Khan MP Dec 2008

Selected contents of OASD reports compiled for the Audit Commission

Fire and	Self	Risk analysis	Protection/prevention	Operational preparedness	Emergency response
rescue	assess				
service	/Audit				
Tyne and Wear	Well Well				59. The use of positive pressure ventilation is embedded within the incident management culture of TWFRA, and the Service is nationally acknowledged as a leader in this field The offensive deployment of PPV is viewed extremely positively by staff especially when dealing with rescue from fire and is seen to deliver a safe system of work for firefighters by improving visibility and reducing heat stress. There is also anecdotal evidence that the use of PPV may be influential in containing the vast majority of all fires to the room of origin, and the low instance of fire fighting related injuries to staff at incidents.
Cleveland	Strongly Strongly				
Durham	Well Well			45. The workplace assessment of flexible duty system (FDS) managers at incidents is not robust. Incident command performance is monitored in a training environment but there are no robust arrangements for either monitoring or sampling FDS managers in the role of incident commander at operational incidents.	 66. Arrangements for audit and review of practices relating to emergency response are not robust. There are examples of monitoring and collation of data but little evidence to illustrate audit of policy, practice and procedure in order to improve performance. 68. Whilst procedures are in place to ensure that any responding appliance is crewed with at least one individual trained in ICS, in some circumstances there is still the potential for an acting RDS crew manager to respond without suitable training.
Northumberl and	Strongly Well			 49. Although NFRA has achieved Investors in People accreditation, which was recently validated in an internal review, some staff expectations of the appraisal system are not being met. Several identified training courses that staff had been nominated for were cancelled, often at the last minute. 50. It is possible that stations who are potentially the first to attend an incident overlook amended risk critical information recorded on the shared drive in this way. 51. There are inconsistent arrangements for the control of documents and policies relating to emergency response and evidence that these arrangements are not embedded. Many documents have 	 73. Some Standard Operational Procedures (SOP) or Generic Risk Assessments (GRA) are not yet in place and are identified in the index of folders held on fire appliances as, "awaiting issue" or "interim guidance", Acetylene procedures are one such example which was issued in 2003 but identified as interim guidance. Operational staff interviewed at stations also lacked knowledge of working at height procedures and, in the absence of training, are guided to undertake a dynamic risk assessment. 74. The current de-brief policy is not producing efficient outcomes. 75. There is a process in place to ensure that personnel undergo suitable training in Incident Command prior to taking up the role of crew manager. However several personnel acknowledged that it is currently possible for an RDS firefighter to act up as Crew Manager without receiving suitable competence based training.

West	Strongly			recently been reviewed or amended but the there was evidence of outdated guidance and missing appendices in some policies.	
Yorkshire	Strongly				
South Yorkshire	Strongly Well	24. Consultation on IRMP found that the South Yorkshire community was unhappy with the risk- based fire cover concept. SYFRS undertook analysis of their performance, based on the Pathfinder research, and set response time targets of six minutes for very high risk areas, ten minutes for high risk areas and fifteen minutes for both medium and low risk areas. The development of the new standards was supported by robust evidence that was independently audited and accepted by the fire authority.	 32. reduced from performing strongly to performing adequately. 42. Fire safety policies and guidance notes do not reflect changes in legislation. 44. The public register (legally required under The Environment & Safety Information Act 1988) is not maintained. When the register was cross checked against premises files it was found that prohibition notices had been withdrawn six years previously or where still valid the premises had not been revisited for a number of years to ensure the prohibition notice was not being breached. 	 51. The FRA has no current overarching strategy and policy documents for workforce development and training. 53. The FRA had difficulty in evidencing the competence of its watch managers as the station based training and operational activity undertaken by watch managers is inadequately recorded. 55. At the time of the review, the accredited firefighter development programme offered to all new wholetime firefighters was not available to newly appointed RDS firefighters at four out of the five RDS stations. 	 69. In response to the removal of the national standards of fire cover, SYFRA are progressively reviewing their standards of response. 73. A significant number of firefighters interviewed from both the wholetime and retained duty systems that were in temporary crew manager roles had not been subject to any formal selection process beyond expressing interest and securing approval of their station manager. 75. The overarching policy for incident command was last updated in 1999 and does not fully reflect current guidance or recent changes in legislation although arrangements for attending over the border incidents are defined in a separate policy which is up to date.
North Yorkshire	Strongly Strongly	28. In some instances it was noted that a minority of site specific plans were not fully updated.		46. There was a lack of consistency in the identification of, inspection and re- inspection of premises that fall under the Section 7 (2) (d) of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004.	66. There is a system for monitoring the availability of retained crewed appliances; however there was one example when the monitoring information was inaccurate. The recording system in use is not robust and on at least one occasion changes in crewing levels had not been recorded and notified to the Control Room. If accurate crewing levels are not advised or recorded additional appliances, to augment the pre-determined attendance, are not mobilised immediately.
Humberside	Well Well			49. Currently only HFRA staff undertaking phase one training participate in "HOT" fire training. Whilst the remaining operational staff are able to observe hot fire	

			phenomena, there are currently no facilities for staff to gain practical experience in a controlled environment. This has been recognised by HFRA who are planning to provide dedicated facilities for <u>compartment fire</u> behaviour training. At present this type of training is currently not available to all operational staff and remains an area for improvement.	
Greater Manchester	Strongly Strongly		 36. Examples were found where the critical risk information provided gave advice that, if followed, could have an impact on effective operations. Operational information requested could not always be located and was sometimes not available on the appliance. It was reported that the system did not provide adequate information in an easily accessible format and was therefore not widely used. 37. The training and development programme provided is not fully meeting the needs of the service. The Personal Development Record (PDR) process used to identify training needs and inform the next years training plan is not effective. Many courses requested within this process have not been provided and staff expressed frustration and a lack of confidence in the system Whilst there are many embedded training activities spread across the service, the deficiencies highlighted above may be leaving some operational staff exposed to risk. 	49. There is limited evidence of effective arrangements being in place to secure the competence of officers especially those in supporting roles Examples were found of officers in a range of roles who have no plan for the maintenance of operational competence, have not received incident command training for 18 months and are not aware of the last time they were monitored at incidents. The outcome of this is that there are a range of officers who are unclear of their operational training needs and have poor records of their maintenance or demonstration of competence. 52. There is evidence that the arrangements to maintain adequate crewing levels at stations identified within the FRAs IRMP are not being achieved. The service has identified that it will maintain crewing levels of five personnel on the first appliance on all occasions but evidence shows that this level is not being attained on an increasing percentage of occasions over the last two years.
Lancashire	Strongly Strongly	27. At the time of the review, evidence of follow up and monitoring activity in relation to the outcomes of specific high-risk HFSCs was not presented.	 48. Although there is a strong consultation process with various stakeholders which takes into account all sections of the community, there is strong opinion expressed by the station based personnel that their opinions and concerns were not being listened to by the authority and that they were only finding out about changes after they had been implemented. 	

Cumbria	Strongly Well			44. Whilst audit and review arrangements across the KLOE are good, CFRA recognise a need to improve the systematic audit and review of the health and safety management systems.	
Merseyside	Excellent (no OASD)				
Cheshire	Strongly Strongly	23. CFRS have introduced a mobilising strategy based on the "Cheshire Standards" (emergency response standards) with specific attendance times linked to risk using isochrones.			73. CFRS have identified a threat of inconsistency with the testing and auditing of operational equipment There have been instances where decommissioned items of equipment have been reintroduced without correct testing, though this did not appear to be a widespread issue.
Nottingham shire	Well Well		35. The Service uses operational crews to carry out "thematic inspections" in relation to technical Fire Safety. These target specific premise types and specific issues to provide a greater volume of inspections. These inspections have been effective, in the main, although isolated cases exist of the crews understanding neither the process nor the rationale for the inspections.	45. Retained Duty System (RDS) staff expressed concern about training courses being cancelled at short notice.	 66. There is little evidence of workplace assessment of command competencies or of a structured training or exercise programme for operational personnel above the level of supervisory officer. 68. There was insufficient evidence shown that the Service made good use of the large amounts of operational data collected from it's debrief procedure to inform reviews of operational procedure.
Derbyshire	Well Adequately			44. The training department is not delivering consistent training to ensure operational competence. The implementation of IPDS is not equal across the Service with one area not having an advisor to support staff development. Refresher training in several areas is behind schedule including, breathing apparatus supervisors/positive pressure ventilation training, emergency fire appliance driving and annual breathing apparatus.	 60. There is limited evidence that the arrangements to train, develop, and maintain the competence of personnel are effective. Many stations have incomplete training materials that do not extend to the full range of incidents There are substantial numbers of operational drivers (78 out of 170 retained drivers and 48 out of 193 wholetime drivers) overdue for emergency fire appliance driver (EFAD) training. 61. Operational policies and procedures are not comprehensive and well managed, these are spread through policy notes, standard operating procedures and operational notes, but do not comprehensively provide policies or procedures for all incident types. 62. There is little evidence that the operational procedures appertaining to the mobilising of appliances to incidents with reduced crews or skills, including breathing apparatus are founded on a comprehensive risk assessment. The policy relating to turnouts and attendances allows, in

Leicestershi re	Well Well			43. There are fire stations without training facilities such as training towers and suitable lecture facilities.	 exceptional circumstances, for RDS crews to mobilise to incidents without sufficient numbers of breathing apparatus (BA) wearers or a qualified pump operator. There is no evidence of a comprehensive risk assessment for this procedure or adequate guidance detailing actions and adequate control measures to be adopted. 59. There is limited evidence that the arrangements in place to secure the competence of personnel are effective in identifying the development needs of non watch based incident managers This means that the Service is unable to comprehensively ensure the competence of their approximation.
Lincolnshire	Well Well			 43. Following an IRMP review of response data using FSEC for the Lincoln City area, action was taken to address unacceptable attendance at key times. Appliances were effectively deployed to a specific area of the city to carry out community safety duties at the critical times of day, ensuring reduced attendance times. 47. LFRS use email for passing risk critical and technical information between fire safety and operational staff. However, the system is not sufficiently robust. During interviews with staff it became apparent that there was a general lack of understanding of the process. 	operational managers. 70. Following a review of the risk critical information held on front line appliances, much of it was found to be out of date. As a consequence the decision was made to remove risk premises folders while detailed updating is carried out. During the interim it was considered that risk cards (detailed above) were sufficiently robust to ensure safe working at incidents. It was clear that operational staff did not understand the reasons behind this action and felt vulnerable as a result. This has resulted in front line appliances in LFRS currently having no risk specific information on premises previously identified as posing a risk.
Northampto nshire	Well Well	29. Various sources confirmed that there are a number of risk assessments being carried out within the Service outside of any formal process.	37. Whilst the Service does have a broad mechanism for training staff within its protection function, this seemed to lack robustness and relied on the ad hoc mentoring by team leaders and the provision of modular courses, but no formal method of monitoring an individuals' progress.	47. There is little evidence of workplace assessment of incident command competencies, as the Training Assessment Plans (TAP's) recording system has no means of recording these command competencies in its present format.	 68. Personnel at various operational levels felt that there was a lack of exercises to test Command structures and operational procedures at local, district or Service levels. There was no evidence offered of a structured exercise programme within the NFRS, 69. Personnel working the RDS expressed concern that the training time available to them, two hours per week, was inadequate to meet the requirements of the Training Assessment Plans (TAP's). 70. There was concern over the short notice cancellation of training courses.
Hereford and Worcester	Strongly Well		40. The system used for enforcement of the FPA was not robust enough to ensure that all premises possessing a high risk to life were managed in their entirety to ensure that all safety measures are adhered to and progressed.	48. The management of the process for gathering and amending operational risk information may need auditing. Whilst the overall system is well constructed, sampled evidence indicated that where watch based crews identify a change in risk at specific premises following a routine visit, or in response to an	 68. The review team found no evidence of any formal arrangements for securing and recording the maintenance of competence of operational personnel at middle manager level. 71. Although a process for debriefing exists, it is not robust with no formal central ownership of issues arising and actions required Watch based personnel reported they had limited confidence in the system, as feedback was minimal. The FRA needs to improve its processes to ensure the entire organisation learns from the outcomes of operational incidents.

			There was a lack of evidence to show that all premises were checked and followed up appropriately.	emergency incident, the subsequent process for triggering a follow up inspection by fire protection specialists was not being actioned effectively at a district level.	72. The active monitoring of operational competence at incidents was found to be in need of attention with no formal mechanism for recording whether safe systems of work had been implemented at incidents.
West Midlands	Well Well		39. Currently no statutory FS inspection work is undertaken by operational staff at stations, and some staff showed a lack of base level knowledge about this area of important work.	 47. Following a review of risk critical knowledge of firefighters in development in such areas as breathing apparatus and RTC procedures, firefighters are now assessed centrally in these areas nine months after completion of phase one learning and development. 52. The team found no evidence of a formal method of ensuring that learning outcomes from post incident debriefs from other services or agencies form part of the review of operational policies or are linked to learning and development strategies. 	74. WMFS have an agreed standard that the maximum number of appliances unavailable for normal response will not exceed 15. The team found evidence that this standard can be breached during the first TRACS timeslot in each day from 08:00 to 11:00 in the morning. During this period additional appliances can be removed from operational availability resulting in a potential total of 18 off the run.
Staffordshir e NB Silos Goodman 1987, Nicolson 1995	Strongly Well			 47. There is little evidence that post incident surveys are carried out and that the results of these are used to improve operational performance. 48. While the Service has a good system to communicate and act upon urgent safety critical information, it is not currently auditable. 	 65. There is evidence that the recording of information about training and maintenance of competence for station based personnel is inconsistent. Some stations visited by the review team had incomplete training records, and there was also limited evidence of their audit. 66. The Service is unable to fully ensure the competence of these managers across the whole range of incident types. There is limited evidence that the arrangements to maintain competence of those operational managers not attached to watches are comprehensive. 67. There are gaps around policy provision and document review arrangements. The review team found that some policy documents had not been reviewed for a considerable time, including the policies on agricultural silos and aircraft incidents.
Warwickshir e	Well Adequately	23. WFRS have experienced some difficulties in fully resourcing FSEC, and it is currently operating with three year old data. As a result, WFRS is yet to develop a full risk profile of Warwickshire and FSEC has not been available to contribute to the IRMP process until recently.	33. A number of documents are out of date. The electronic database containing Fire Safety Guidance Notes could not be accessed by Fire Safety Inspection Officers (FSIOs) working in the office. A hard copy was used instead and, upon examination, contained out of date information.	47. Not all training is being recorded. 49. The monitoring and audit of training activity and assessments of RDS personnel is weak with no central database to demonstrate RDS workforce competence. The	74. Existing arrangements for forecasting RDS appliance and individual availability were found to be limited and only available at a local level.

Shropshire Shropshire Hertfordshir e "The Service has undergone some challenges in recent times"	Strongly Well Well Well	 23. At present the FRA is not able to complete a comprehensive assessment of all risk that exists within the county. 24. The document control system appears to be ineffective with little evidence being provided of a coordinated system to ensure all documents are reviewed and updated as appropriate. 23. The use of geographical mobilising creates a potential risk to crews who attend incidents outside of their normal working area. It was identified that currently, crews may respond to incidents without available risk in formation on site specific risks and therefore may be at risk in the initial stages of an incident. 	37. At the time of the review only a small number of inspections had been carried out against the targets set and this is an area of concern.	 40. The training facilities at a number of stations are considered to be inadequate. This is exemplified by the lack of training towers available at six fire stations. These towers have been decommissioned due to their structural instability. 46. Although there is evidence that Operational Risk Critical Information is disseminated to operational staff, there is no formal audit system in place to ensure that all personnel with an operational responsibly have both received and understand this information. 47. HFRS has had to cease using its 'hot fire' training facility. As a consequence operational some staff expressed their concerns due to the fact that they are no longer able to experience realistic hot fire training. 51. Hydrants are subjected to an annual inspection, however as a result of staff 	 52. There is evidence that the challenging targets set for the recently established emergency response standards contained within the IRMP are not being fully achieved. These performance targets are for both initial response (minimum 5 firefighters) and weight of response (minimum 8 firefighters) for life risk fires and life risk RTCs, and for the attendance of Rescue Tenders at life risk RTCs. The Service is performing well against the previous national standards of fire cover and its current standards for initial response to life risk fires and RTCs 53. There is limited evidence that the arrangements in place to secure the competence of middle and senior managers are effective. The service has identified that its system for recording training and operational competence of officers requires improvement 54. The system to ensure personnel are adequately aware of the risks within their response area has limited effectiveness. 71. HFRS have outsourced their responsibilities with regards to the cleaning and maintenance of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). During visits to stations a number of examples were given whereby personnel who have moved stations due to transfers or promotion, have submitted their PPE for cleaning or maintenance and had experienced difficulties in having it returned to them.
Cambridges hire	Well Well	control measures do exist to mitigate this risk.	45. The basic level fire safety training for operational service	shortages targets are not being met.	76. There is evidence that the process used to determine appliance provision is not delivering the agreed level of resources. Although CFRS
nire			delivery staff on stations is inadequate. Some staff felt that they no longer had the basic skills to identify Fire Safety issues when visiting risk premises due to a lack of formal training.		have plans to address the problem of crewing shortages at RDS stations, on one particular day during the review the team noted that ten front line appliances were not available owing to crewing difficulties. 79. While CFRS introduced interim measures for working at heights in January 2006; there was no evidence of a process to ensure the dissemination of such a policy is consistent and effective.

Bedfordshir e	Well Well	22. BLFRS is one of a few FRAs to use the Fire Brigades Union's (FBU) critical attendance standard (CAST) model in its entirety as part of the risk analysis process. The model determines the initial emergency response to be sent to incidents.		 51. The Service uses a health and safety bulletin to inform staff of urgent safety critical information. This is either sent out electronically or in paper based form and is monitored through an acknowledgement receipt process or an electronic voting button. Examples of recent bulletins were available to view. The process ensures that staff have immediate access to timely and relevant information. 52. Additional training time, over and above the allotted two hour weekly session, is made available to retained duty system personnel. 54. Significant learning from incidents is published across the service 	 79. BLFRS have a suite of policies and procedures covering a wide range of operational incidents. The critical attendance standard (CAST) is used to provide safe systems of work on the incident ground. 80. All operational personnel are subject to a yearly assessment on breathing apparatus competencies, 81. BLFRS have a policy on carrying out exercises at risk premises within the county. 86. Although the Fire Service had historically monitored national standards of fire cover on a monthly basis at its Functional Command Team, the Service has recently ceased this monitoring. 90. There was no evidence that BLFRS have a formal process with regard to coaching and mentoring of all staff engaged within Emergency Response With no formal recording against an individual there is the potential for reoccurring issues to be missed leading to an increased risk for the organisation.
Essex	Strongly Strongly		 37. Whilst the Service has in place a number of training programmes for staff within Fire Safety, there was no clear development record for new entrants to the department. 39. Within the national context, the Service carries out a relatively low number of Home Fire Safety Checks 	47. RDS (Retained Duty System) staff expressed concern about courses being cancelled at short notice and felt that there was insufficient training time available for them to meet all the needs of their training programme.	69. While there was evidence presented that critical training was carried out by personnel, the recording of the training and assessment of equipment and procedures in Personal Development Folders (PDF's) were hard to analyse for proof
Norfolk	Well Well			45. Liaison arrangements for Health and Safety between the Service and Representative Bodies are not working satisfactorily. There are concerns about capacity of existing arrangements, the lack of safety representatives and a meeting structure that is not as effective as it could be. There is also a perception of poor levels of near miss reporting as the figures seem too low to reflect the realistic position.	 64. The team found several examples of recent occasions when the person temporarily in charge of an appliance had not received appropriate ICS learning and development. 65. While risk assessments are usually conducted, examples were found of incident types recognised within the mobilising system for which no supporting generic risk assessment exists. One instance was the recovery of heavy or large medical casualties on behalf of the Ambulance Service.
Suffolk	Adequately Adequately		37. There is no performance data for building control consultations, The Service was unable to provide a definitive answer or produce evidence in order to show how often the Service was meeting	48. Whilst operational High Risk cards exist for risk premises within SFRS area and are available on front line appliances, there is no structured process or procedure for crews to undertake familiarisation visits to these premises apart from the planned inspection process	 68. There is no evidence to show that the majority of incidents attended by SFRS are subjected to any form of debrief. 69. Information relating to hydrant location is not available on front line appliances for immediate use by operational personnel when attending incidents. 70. There was insufficient evidence to substantiate that all stations maintain copies of operational risk critical information such as High Risk

			its target to carry out this function within the prescribed legal timeframes. There is no process to ensure that Home Fire Risk Checks are completed within the target date of 28 days from the date of request.		Cards for risk sites within their station area for use by standby appliances. Ostensibly fire appliances relocated to provide cover at another fire station could be mobilised to an incident at a High Risk premises without having the necessary information to hand to deal safely and effectively with the incident.
London	Strongly Strongly			47. The provision of continuation training (other than incident command training) for competent officers is not currently formalised. Evidence was available to demonstrate training is being carried out within individual command groups but neither the content nor process for recording this is standardised across the Service. As a result the approach to the provision of training for officers is, at times, inconsistent. The Authority has recognised the need for a more formal approach to continuation training and has recently invested £1.75m as part of a series of enhanced operational training proposals.	 67. Health and safety policy is clearly integrated within the Service and supports operational response The active investigation of accident and near miss reports inform policy change and improve working practices. 68. In the course of the review, no areas for improvement were identified.
Kent	Excellent (no OASD)				
Surrey	Well Well			 47. There was evidence of limited training for retained staff with no initial training courses being run for some time even though there are many vacancies. No evidence of a structured training programme for retained staff was found, with one station visited creating their own programme without reference to support officers or the training department. 49. The review team found support for RDS staff to be ineffectively co-ordinated and, on occasion, that adequate supervision and support was not provided. 	67. The maintenance of competence of personnel for emergency response is not robust and could not consistently be demonstrated in some areas. During a station visit, the review team found that no individual training records were kept largely because the Watch Officers and crew found the IPDS system confusing and time consuming.
East Sussex	Strongly Well	26. There is no overarching risk management policy consolidating the assessment of existing		44. The review team found that the process for site specific risk data gathering and planning, was in need of attention It is considered that the inspection criteria and programme on some stations has not	 65. During the field visit, the team was unable to find sufficient evidence that personnel are able to record their training and operational activity to support and demonstrate their competency. 66. There was no evidence found that ESFRS maintain records of the number of exercises and incidents managers attend.

		and potential risk within the communities of East Sussex.		recently been maintained and managed effectively. 47. the review team found that a significant number of middle managers had not attended this training although a programme was in place to address this to support initial ICS training applicable to the role.	68. ESFRS delegate the implementation of action items arising from safety event investigations to the responsible manager for the area in which the event took place. There is evidence that there is no ongoing monitoring by the health and safety department to ensure that these actions are implemented within agreed timescales.
West Sussex	Well Well	23. The Service is still using the old standards of fire cover but anticipate that a new process will be adopted when the 'emergency response standards' project is complete.	28. The review team were provided with limited evidence to support the selection, learning and development and maintenance of competence of personnel engaged in protection work.	 37. There are no current arrangements in place to train wholetime trainee firefighters owing to the Surrey training centre closure. 39. The monitoring of crews and incident commanders with regard to operational effectiveness and personal development is sporadic and uncoordinated. A safety audit is required at incidents with four to six appliances or more, but at smaller incidents personnel are monitored on an informal basis with issues being raised during 'hot' de-briefs. Some personnel were identified as not having been monitored in their role for long periods, some had been monitored due to the presence of an officer but were not sure and received no feedback. 	 52. WSFRS has inadequate arrangements in place to enable operational Crew and Watch managers to demonstrate competence, record training and plan their maintenance of skills. 53. The maintenance of adequate staffing levels at RDS stations to fulfil the needs of WSFRS has been identified as an area for improvement. Ten appliances off the run during the day is not an unusual occurrence, a proportion of which are single appliance RDS stations.
Oxfordshire	Well Well	24. Station plans showing areas of 'high risk' and areas where response standards cannot be met were not available at some of the stations visited and there was insufficient information to identify appliances that do not meet the response standards.	 26. This is further supported by good working relations with the FBU. 37. Whilst policy documents exist for all relevant areas, a number of policy documents viewed had not been reviewed as required by the Services own procedure. This task is made more onerous as in certain cases named individuals have left the Brigade or are in a different role. 	 45. Evidence was found indicating that firefighters have recently undertaken either an acting or temporary promotion without being formally assessed or of newly promoted crew managers not having undertaken ICS development training prior to taking up their appointment. 48. A significant number of policies and procedures relating to operational preparedness have review dates that expired some time ago with some dating back ten or more years. 49. The Review Team found evidence that arrangements for the systematic audit and review of health and safety management 	 58. score which has been reduced from performing strongly to performing adequately. 64. The application of formal structured debriefing of operational incidents was found to be few in number with very limited evidence available to demonstrate actions implemented and learning outcomes being shared across the organisation. 65. However, the Review Team found that the assessment of Crew and Watch Managers is less robust as they are often the most senior person in attendance at incidents so there is no-one to assess their performance. 66. The systematic operational audit or active monitoring of performance on the incident ground appears to have stopped two to three years ago owing to a shortfall in organisational capacity.

			systems within OFRS is an area for development.	
Buckingham shire	Well Well		56. A number of key policy documents are in need of updating to reflect current legislation and guidance These include the policy for Training and Staff Development and the ICS policy 57. BFRS investigate all accidents, and evidence of this was witnessed at the time of the operational assurance review. However, it was not possible to ascertain if recommendations outlined in the investigation report are actioned.	
Royal Berkshire	Strongly Strongly	21. Strongly to adequately 25. RBFRS have introduced new and challenging response standards for dwelling fires and road traffic collisions. The new standard for dwelling fires is based on a response standards planning report, produced by RBFRS in July 2005. The report sets out the rationale for the new standards, which are based upon a wide range of sources including, DCLG fire statistics, research reports from the Central Fire Brigades' Advisory Council and the Fire Research and Development Group and the Fire Brigades' Union's national IRMP document. The standards were implemented in April 2006.	40. Strongly 49. There was clear evidence that RBFRS is operating at significantly below their retained duty system (RDS) establishment. RBFRS' IRMP identifies that the peak time for emergency incidents coincides with the peak of RDS unavailability.	71. During the field visit, the team was unable to find evidence that RBFRS records the competencies of personnel that are not on a development programme against the national occupational standards.

Hampshire	Strongly Strongly	27. there is no overarching risk management policy consolidating the assessment of existing and potential risk within the communities of Hampshire.	44. There is no clear evidence that HFRS adopt a systematic approach to the audit and review of policies.	 61. Lecture packs and learning materials held on the intranet are not subject to systematic audit and review. No evidence was found to suggest information contained within these packs was out of date but a systematic review process would formally assure currency of information. 63. Whilst there is clear evidence that the service has a process for the development of risk assessments and for incorporating the actions and outcomes into plans and procedures both generically and for site hazards the mechanism to ensure these plans are immediately available at the scene of operations was found during a sample on one site visit to be failing. 64. A small number of instances were evident of wholetime and retained duty system firefighters acting up without having received this structured incident command input or assessment. 66. There is a general acceptance amongst a number of officers interviewed that the pressure of non operational work has taken precedence over their attendance at organised exercises. 	101. There was evidence that managers had undertaken incident command training. However there was no evidence that this training is regularly updated or refreshed and that personnel are assessed in non- operational situations. Without this ongoing maintenance of competence is HFRS cannot ensure that incident command procedures are being implemented in accordance with policy. 103. There was no evidence found of any structured debriefs carried out for the medium range of incidents (three to ten pumps) or incidents relating to special services.
Dorset	Strongly Strongly			48. Whilst site specific plans and procedures are in place, there is a minor inconsistency in the inspection and re- inspection of premises that fall under the Section 7 (2) (d) of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004. Some risk information is presented in the Service's old 1.1.d format and there is some minor variation in the level and currency of some information and the frequency of inspection. This area for improvement is being addressed by the Service who have recently produced a revised policy which is in the process of implementation. This still leaves some minor cause for concern as there are slight inconsistencies in the depth and frequency of training for such risks.	

Isle of Wight [NB refer to actual deaths Wixey 1987, Metcalf 1999] Inadequate verdicts	Well Adequate	22. There was no evidence found of the use of station based local response standards or a process to review the speed and weight of operational response.	 31. The document control system for Technical Fire Safety is in hard copy and controlled manually. A formal document control management system is not currently in place and many documents are past prescribed review dates. Staff interviewed involved in policy development demonstrated no knowledge of impact assessments including risk, equality and diversity. 33. No evidence was provided to the team prior to or during the review of a training policy or training strategy for prevention and protection services. 	 37. reduced from performing adequately to performing inadequately. 42. There is no overarching Operational Preparedness Policy/Strategy. In the main, operational procedures are currently under review and have not been updated to reflect changes in guidance and key legislation with many procedures not being reviewed on a systematic basis. On two fire stations the review team visited, risk critical information was not removed from the Fire Appliance 'Dynamic Risk Assessment Aide Memoir' (DRAAM) file leaving operational staff potentially at risk 43. The paper based training recording system was found to be difficult to administer, it has a time consuming process for audit, and many personal records were found to be incomplete. 44. There is considered to be insufficient support for the retained workforce particularly in respect to the provision of training and assessment. 48. The Service has an Incident Command policy however no evidence of training for maintenance of skills for staff at all levels of the Command structure was provided. 	 65. reduced from performing well to performing <u>inadequately</u>. 72. The arrangements to secure the competency of personnel within their role are ineffective in some areas, 73. There is currently a project underway to review the emergency response standards and fire cover for the Service the results of which should be implemented next year. 77. Feedback from incidents is informal with no evidence of formal incident debriefs or the amendment of operational procedures as a result of post incident analysis and feedback. 78. Standard operating procedures are not regularly reviewed with many being past their review date Examples of this include Acetylene procedure and Water Safety procedures.
Avon	Well Well	28. It was found that there was an absence of a service wide system for training and development which resulted in the lack of clarity and uniformity of recording and monitoring.		50. At present there is inconsistancy in the tactical planning of risks identified at station level It was noted at station visits that variations in approach existed. This specifically related to information gathering and reporting which in turn led to inconsistency in risk identification. This had the effect of a lack of understating of high, medium and low risks amongst stations. It also impacted on training protocols at each station and the frequency of training due to training regimes being based on risk. In some instances tactical plans were out of date by some considerable time, they also lacked detail and clarity.	78. The absence of systematic planning and recording procedure for routine training at watch/station level results in an inconsistent approach to the completion of training and the maintenance of core skills and assessment of competence.

Gloucesters hire §80 vs national standards p.17	Well Well	28. there is no overarching risk management policy consolidating the assessment of existing and potential risk within the communities of Gloucestershire.	45. There is no clear evidence that GFRS adopt a systematic approach to the audit and review of policies.	59. Only information for risks within the station area or immediate surrounding area are available to crews. Watches attending incidents off their station ground are not therefore immediately aware of the risks.	
Wiltshire	Well Well	27. Station personnel are required to complete, review and amend risk assessments identified by the FRS within a rolling programme. The review team found that the quality control of these assessments was not as high as required. The lack of consistency leads to the potential for some risks not to be completely managed		39. The debrief and monitoring system developed within the CRR, by the use of operational Quality Audits and Significant Event Investigations, ensures that operational information is fed back into the organisation in order to highlight those areas where further improvements to the Service could be made. Information from both exercises and operational debriefs is made available to all operational personnel. Thus the organisation shows that it learns from its experience and considers ways to improve its service and enhance <u>Firefighter safety</u> .	66. Some Wiltshire FRS personnel expressed the view that there was a lack of exercises to test Command structures and operational procedures at local, district or Service levels.
Somerset	Well Well		44. Staff are trained and development for staff that undertake protection and preventative duties. However, the absence of a service wide system results in some variation in recording and monitoring.	49. In some instances Tactical Plans were out of date, by some considerable time, and lacked detail and clarity. There is a policy that details the re-inspection regime of such plans. There was evidence that some stations did not adhere to this.	79. There is some evidence of training and development of operational staff including those on the RDS. Due to the absence of a service wide system some slight variation in recording and monitoring was observed. 81. Due to staff secondments to special projects, including combination activities, staffing at whole-time crewed stations are occasionally below normal levels. In some instances this impacts on the ability of personnel to carry out training activities.
Devon	Well Well		g	43. There was a lack of consistency in the identification of, inspection and re- inspection of premises that fall under the Section 7 (2) (d) of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004. The inconsistencies included the depth and frequency of training for such risks.	61. Examination of Service Information Documents (SIDs) has revealed that policies relating to emergency response have not been subjected to impact assessments for risk, diversity and equality.
Cornwall	Well Adequate		52. During the field visit the team found no evidence that CCFB adopt a systematic approach to the audit and review of policies and initiatives.	 61. The review team was unable to find clear evidence of how policies are subjected to periodic, planned risk assessment and review. 67. The <u>breathing apparatus</u> and tactical firefighting (TAFF) course attended by 	 101. During the field visit the team found that training is not mapped or assessed in accordance with the fire service role maps and national occupational standards. There is no facility for operational staff to identify and document training needs. 104. During the field visit the team found no evidence that learning and development needs are reviewed regularly and that an audit system is in

	frontline staff every 18 months is not currently assessed for individual competence meaning that whilst crews are refreshed in core skills, they are not formally assessed and may not be competent. 68. The service does not currently have an embedded system in place to identify and record individual training needs.	place to review operational performance.
TOTAL		

Source: Compiled from Freedom of Information communications August 2008

According to the *Fire Service Pay and conditions Agreement 2003* the fire service is responsible for:

- risk reduction and risk management in relation to fires and some other types of hazard or emergency,
- community fire safety and education,
- fire safety enforcement,
- emergency responses to fires and other emergencies where it is best fitted to act as the primary agency responsible for the rescue of people including road traffic accidents, chemical spillages and other large- scale incidents such as transport accidents; and
- emergency preparedness coupled with the capacity and resilience to respond to major incidents of terrorism and other chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear threats.
- The principal components of "firefighting" and "fire control" work are covered by the relevant fire service national role maps. These role maps reflect fire service responsibilities incorporated into local risk management plans in order to:
- apply a risk-based approach to fire cover and to all its activities in deciding how best to use its resources,
- focus on reducing the level of fire and other emergencies,
- develop and maintain effective partnerships with a range of agencies in the public, private and voluntary sectors where these can deliver cost- effective improvements in community safety,
- adopt safe systems of working to secure the health and safety of both its staff and the general public; and
- minimise the impact of the incidents it attends and of its response at those incidents on the environment.
- minimise the impact of the incidents it attends and of its response at those incidents on the environment

These functions are statutory and were made by the *Civil Contingencies Act 2004* and the *Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004.*

Since 2004, 20,283 statutory instruments have been made and for a government that does not like red tape, 6,332 have been made in the last two years alone!

The only instruments that bind the duties of both Acts are:

- The Fire and Rescue Services (National Framework) (England) Order 2004
- The Fire and Rescue Services (National Framework) (England) Order 2006
- The Fire and Rescue Services (National Framework) (England) Order 2008
- The Fire and Rescue Authorities (National Framework) (England) Order 2012

The first *Framework* was published in 2004. The need for compliance is written into the first and subsequent frameworks. The *Introduction* states that:

1 The Government is responsible for setting clear priorities and objectives for the Fire and Rescue Service. The Fire and Rescue National Framework does this by making clear:

- the Government's expectations for the Fire and Rescue Service;
- what Fire and Rescue Authorities are expected to do; and
- what support Government will provide.

The summary of the first *Framework* explains that it is divided into nine chapters which are:

- Chapter 1 fire prevention and risk management
- Chapter 2 working together: regional approach
- Chapter 3 effective response
- Chapter 4 resilience and new dimension
- Chapter 5 fire and rescue staff
- Chapter 6 workforce development
- Chapter 7 finance
- Chapter 8 performance management
- Chapter 9 research

Chapter 1 – fire prevention and risk management states:

The old, national standards of fire cover, which set out the speed and weight of response to fire depending on building density, were insufficiently flexible to allow Fire and Rescue Authorities to respond to the needs

of their communities. They focused exclusively on risk to property rather than risk to life, and did not take account of the serious non-fire incidents to which the Service responds. From April 2003 local Integrated Risk Management Plans (IRMPs) have replaced national standards. All Fire and Rescue Authorities must produce an IRMP.

IRMPs set out each Fire and Rescue Authority's strategy for:

- reducing the number and severity of fires, and in collaboration with other agencies, road traffic accidents and other emergency incidents occurring in the area for which it is responsible;
- reducing the severity of injuries in fires, road traffic accidents and other emergency incidents;
- reducing the commercial, economic and social impact of fires and other emergency incidents;
- safeguarding the environment and heritage (both built and natural); and
- providing value for money.

An IRMP must set out an authority's assessment of local risk to life and, in line with this analysis, how it is going to deploy its resources to tackle these risks and improve the safety of all sections of society. The IRMP should identify the ways in which the authority can work in partnership with neighbouring authorities and other agencies to deliver improved public safety. It should develop these relationships and build upon the lessons learned. It must also set out the targets an authority will set itself and the standards it will apply to meet the specific pattern of local risk. This will be done in the context of its statutory duty to secure continuous improvement and achieve best value for its local council taxpayers. The IRMP itself should be a strategic, forward-looking document with the approach and detail of business and change management plans. Annual action plans, which may be produced separately or integrated with the main plan, will set out what the authority plans to do in the year ahead. Fire and Rescue Authorities should ensure that their IRMPs are both accessible – to the public, business and other stakeholders – and easy to understand

Over 2003/04 authorities drew up their first IRMPs, went out to consultation on them with their local communities over the Autumn and, after taking account of the responses to consultation, started to implement their first year action plans as from 1 April 2004. Authorities should keep their IRMPs under review, and revise them on a regular basis when new evidence or analytical tools become available. (Further guidance on the operational aspects of IRMPs is included in Chapter 3.)

The latest frame work was made by the Fire and Rescue Authorities (National Framework) (England) Order 2012

The Explanatory Note for the Order explains that this instrument gives effect to the Fire and Rescue National Framework prepared by the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government and entitled "The Fire and Rescue National Framework for England". This was published by the Department for Communities and Local Government on 11th July 2012 and shall have effect as a revision of the Fire and Rescue Service National Framework 2008/11

The Fire and Rescue National Framework for England ("the Framework"), published on 11th July 2012, sets out the Government's priorities and objectives for fire and rescue authorities in England and what they should do to achieve them, as required by the Fire and Rescue Service Act 2004.

The Framework takes forward the objectives of the Open Public Services White Paper, and marks a key milestone in resetting the relationship between the Government and fire and rescue authorities; moving away from a prescriptive approach to enable authorities to deliver services in a way that makes sense locally, whilst meeting the wider needs of national resilience. The priorities in the Framework are for fire and rescue authorities to:

- identify and assess the full range of foreseeable fire and rescue related risks their areas face, make provision for prevention and protection activities and respond to incidents appropriately;
- work in partnership with their communities and a wide range of partners locally and nationally to deliver their service; and
- be accountable to communities for the service they provide.

Fire and rescue national framework for England 2012

The FRS Framework contains requirements that must be achieved by fire and rescue authorities. These are key to standardising planning within fire and rescue services

Introduction

3. The priorities in this Framework are for fire and rescue authorities to:

identify and assess the full range of foreseeable fire and rescue related risks their areas face, make provision for prevention and protection activities and respond to incidents appropriately work in partnership with their communities and a wide range of partners locally and nationally to deliver their service be accountable to communities for the service they provide

Identify and assess

1.3 Each fire and rescue authority must produce an integrated risk management plan that identifies and assesses all foreseeable fire and rescue related risks that could affect its community, including those of a cross-border, multi-authority and/or national nature. The plan must have regard to the Community Risk Registers produced by Local Resilience Forums and any other local risk analyses as appropriate3.

Prevent and protect

1.9 Fire and rescue authorities must work with communities to identify and protect them from risk and to prevent incidents from occurring. 1.10 Each fire and rescue authority integrated risk management plan must:

demonstrate how prevention, protection and response activities will best be used to mitigate the impact of risk on communities, through authorities working either individually or collectively, in a cost effective way

set out its management strategy and risk based programme for enforcing the provisions of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 in accordance with the principles of better regulation set out in the Statutory Code of Compliance for Regulators, and the Enforcement Concordat

Respond

1.11 Fire and rescue authorities must make provision to respond to incidents such as fires, road traffic accidents and emergencies within their area and in other areas in line with their mutual aid agreements, and reflect this in their integrated risk management plans7. 1.14 Fire and rescue authorities must have effective business continuity arrangements in place in accordance with their duties under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and to meet the full range of service delivery risks. Business continuity plans should not be developed on the basis of Armed Forces assistance being available.

1.15 Fire and rescue authorities must collaborate with other fire and rescue authorities to deliver interoperability.

1.17 Fire and rescue authorities must collaborate with other fire and rescue authorities, other emergency services, wider Category 1 and 2 responders and Local Resilience Forums to ensure interoperability.

Resilience

Collective engagement

1.26 Fire and rescue authorities must engage with the Fire and Rescue Strategic Resilience Board in order to support discussions and decision making in relation to national resilience.

Gap analysis

1.29 Fire and rescue authorities' risk assessments must include an analysis of any gaps between their existing capability and that needed to ensure national resilience (as defined above).

1.31 As part of their analysis, fire and rescue authorities must highlight to the Department, or the Fire and Rescue Strategic Resilience Board, any capability gaps that they believe cannot be met even when taking into account mutual aid arrangements, pooling and reconfiguration of resources and collective action.

Capability building

1.33 Fire and rescue authorities must work collectively, through the Fire and Rescue Strategic Resilience Board, to agree with the Department whether and/or how to address any capability gaps identified through the gap analysis.

Working in partnership

1.38 In order to meet the requirements of this Framework, fire and rescue authorities must work in partnership with their communities and a wide range of partners locally and nationally.

Communities planning their local fire and rescue service

2.3 Each fire and rescue authority integrated risk management plan must: be easily accessible and publicly available

reflect effective consultation throughout its development and at all review stages with the community, its workforce and representative bodies, and partners

cover at least a three year time span and be reviewed and revised as often as it is necessary to ensure that fire and rescue authorities are able to deliver the requirements set out in this Framework

reflect up to date risk analyses and the evaluation of service delivery outcomes

Scrutiny arrangements transparent to communities

2.4 The fire and rescue authority must hold their Chief Fire Officer/Chief Executive to account for the delivery of the fire and rescue service.

2.5 Fire and rescue authorities must have arrangements in place to ensure that their decisions are open to scrutiny.

Transparent data enables communities to hold service providers to account

2.8 Fire and rescue authorities must make their communities aware of how they can access data and information on their performance.

Assurance

3.2 Fire and rescue authorities must provide assurance on financial, governance and operational matters and show how they have had due regard to the expectations set out in their integrated risk management plan and the requirements included in this Framework. To provide assurance, fire and rescue authorities must publish an annual statement of assurance.

National resilience assurance

3.4 In addition to the assurance arrangements detailed above, fire and rescue authorities must work collectively, and with the Fire and Rescue Strategic Resilience Board, to provide assurance to Government, that:

risks are assessed, plans are in place and any gaps between existing capability and that needed to ensure national resilience are identified

existing specialist national resilience capabilities are fit-for-purpose and resilient any new capabilities that fire and rescue authorities are commissioned to deliver by Government are procured, maintained and managed in the most cost-effective manner that delivers value for money whilst ensuring capabilities are fit-for-purpose and resilient

Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004

The explanatory notes that accompany the *Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 ((the Act)* state that the main purpose of *the Act* is to deliver a modernised Fire and Rescue Service and to give effect to the majority of proposals in the White Paper *Our Fire and Rescue Service,* the government response to *The Independent Review of the Fire Service.*

The notes go on to explain that Section 1 of *the Act* defines what is meant by "fire and rescue authority" and that it can differ in constitution from area to area . The establishment of fire and civil defence authorities is dealt with in section 26 of, and Schedule 11(2) to, the *Local Government Act 1985* (Chapter 51). The London Fire and Civil Defence Authority became the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority under the *Greater London Authority Act 1999* (Chapter 29 section 328).

The notes go on to explain that Section 5 of *the Act* gives combined fire and rescue authorities the powers which are already available to county fire authorities, the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority and metropolitan county fire and civil defence authorities under section 111 of the *Local Government Act 1972*.

The notes go on to explain that Section 9 of *the Act* empowers the Secretary of State, by order following consultation, to place a duty on fire and rescue authorities to respond to particular types of emergency, as defined by order, such as flooding and terrorist incidents.

The Secretary of State can also, by order following consultation, direct fire and rescue authorities as to how they should plan, equip for and respond to such emergencies. This may include, for example, directions as to the deployments of mass decontamination equipment for civil resilience purposes. The intention is to ensure consistency of approach towards emergencies, particularly in response to terrorist incidents.

Section 9 also allows the order to require an authority to respond to an emergency that has arisen outside its own area if, for example, it has more appropriate equipment and training than the authority in whose area the emergency has occurred.

The term "emergency" is defined in section 58.

Section 11 replaces section 3(1)(e) of the Fire Services Act 1947, and provides fire and rescue authorities with discretion to equip and respond to events beyond its core functions provided for elsewhere in the Act. A fire and rescue authority will be free to act where it believes there is a risk to life or the environment. This would allow, for example, a fire and rescue authority to engage in specialist activities such as rope rescue. A fire and rescue authority will be able to exercise the power in support of another fire and rescue authority - for example, under a reinforcement scheme (see sections 13 and 14).

Section 12 provides a fire and rescue authority with the power to agree to the use of its equipment or personnel for any purpose it believes appropriate and wherever it so chooses. For example, a fire and rescue authority may agree to help pump out a pond as a service to its community.

A search revealed forty statutory instruments relating to *the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004.* These can be bracketed into;

- Relating to frameworks (9)
- Improvement plans (3)
- Commencement orders (4)
- Best Value Performance Indicators (2)
- Pensions (1)
- Community right to challenge (1)
- Appointment of inspectors (3)
- Equipment (2)
- Variation (3)

The others are;

- The Fire and Rescue Services (England) Order 2004
- <u>The Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 (Consequential Amendments) (England) Order</u> 2004
- <u>The Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 (Consequential Amendments) (Wales) Order</u> 2005
- The Fire and Rescue Services (Emergencies) (England) Order 2007
- The Fire and Rescue Services (England) (Amendment) Order 2007
- The Fire and Rescue Services (Emergencies) Order (Northern Ireland) 2011

The *Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 (Consequential Amendments) (England) Order 2004* came in to force in December 2004 but does not consider *the CCA*. It only references to statutory instruments related to terrorism and these are;

- Channel Tunnel (Fire Services, Immigration and Prevention of Terrorism) Order 1990
- <u>Civil Defence (General Local Authority Functions) Regulations 1993</u>

The explanatory notes that accompany the *Fire and Rescue Services (Emergencies)(England) Order 2007* explain that the order gives fire and rescue authorities (FRAs) mandatory functions in connection with key types of emergencies: chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear emergences ('CBRN emergencies') and emergencies requiring the freeing of people from collapsed structures or non-road transport wreckages (urban search and rescue, or 'USAR emergencies').

It makes it mandatory for FRAs to:

- make provision for decontaminating people following the release of CBRN substances;
- make provision for freeing people from collapsed structures and non-road transport wreckages;
- use, on request from an affected FRA, specialist CBRN or USAR resources outside their own areas to an extent reasonable for dealing with the CBRN or USAR emergency.

The explanatory note goes to state that; "Giving FRAs mandatory functions by order sends a clear signal that making provision for dealing with CBRN and USAR emergencies is a core activity in the same way as it already is for firefighting and road traffic accidents. This further improves national resilience to such disruptive incidents."

The explanatory note also makes clear why other types of emergency are excluded;

"In addition to CBRN and USAR emergencies, the initial proposals included giving FRAs mandatory functions for incidents involving major flooding, tunnel collapses and major transport incidents involving vessels. Public consultation highlighted the need to look at the available FRA provision and capability for these emergencies before giving each FRA mandatory functions irrespective of their local circumstances."

Civil Contingencies Act 2004

The explanatory notes that accompany the *Civil Contingencies Act 2004* explain that the *Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA)* repeals in their entirety the Civil Defence Act 1948 and the Civil Defence Act (Northern Ireland) 1950. Part 1 of the Act creates a new concept of an "emergency". This term is broadly defined. It includes events which would have engaged the existing civil defence legislation (war or attack by a foreign power). It also includes terrorism which poses a threat of serious damage to the security of the United Kingdom and events which threaten serious damage to human welfare in a place in the United Kingdom or to the environment of a place in the United Kingdom.

CCA imposes a series of duties on local bodies in England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland (to be known as "Category 1 responders"). These duties include the duty to assess the risk of an emergency occurring and to maintain plans for the purposes of responding to an emergency. The range of Category 1 responders is broader than the range of local bodies

which were subject to the previous legislation. It includes certain bodies with functions which relate to health, the Environment Agency and the Secretary of State, in so far as his functions relate to responding to maritime and coastal emergencies.

Part 1 of the *CCA* also enables a Minister of the Crown (or, for certain purposes in Scotland, the Scottish Ministers) to require a Category 1 responder to perform a function for the purposes of preventing an emergency, reducing, controlling or mitigating the effects of an emergency or taking other action in connection with an emergency.

The *CCA* repeals the Emergency Powers Act 1920 and the Emergency Powers Act (Northern Ireland) 1926. It confers a power on Her Majesty (or in certain very limited circumstances, a senior Minister of the Crown) to make regulations if an "emergency" has occurred or is about to occur. "Emergency" is defined broadly to include events and situations which threaten serious damage to human welfare in the United Kingdom, a Part or a region, the environment of the United Kingdom, a Part or a region or war or terrorism which threaten serious damage to the security of the United Kingdom.

The CCA gives further detail as to what provision may (and may not) be included in emergency regulations, including specific safeguards designed to prevent misuse. The CCA expressly allows for emergency powers to have effect in a Part or region of the United Kingdom only. The CCA also makes provision for consultation with, and the conferral of functions on, the devolved administrations.

Subsection (1) defines "emergency" for the purposes of Part 1. Events such as a terrorist attack, disruption of fuel supplies, contamination of land with a chemical matter and an epidemic could satisfy the definition, should they reach the required level of seriousness.

Subsections (2) and (3) specify exhaustively the kinds of event or situation which may threaten damage to human welfare or the environment. In order to satisfy the definition of "emergency", the event or situation must also threaten *serious* damage to human welfare in, or the environment of, *a place in the United Kingdom*. This definition differs from the definition of "emergency" for the purposes of Part 2 of the *CCA* in that, for the purposes of Part 2, the situation must threaten serious damage to human welfare in, or the environment of, the United Kingdom or in a Part or region (rather than a place in the United Kingdom).

Subsection (4) enables a Minister of the Crown (or, in Scotland, the Scottish Ministers) to provide by order that a particular event or situation (or class of event or situation) is to be treated as falling within (or outside) the definition of emergency. This subsection also enables a Minister of the Crown to amend the list of events or situations which may threaten damage to human welfare by providing that in so far as an event or situation involves or causes disruption of a specified supply, system, facility or service, it is (or is not) to be treated as threatening damage to human welfare. This power is designed to ensure that should a new supply, system, facility or service become so essential that the civil protection duties of Category 1 responders should apply in relation to disruption of that supply, system, facility or service, the *CCA* can be amended accordingly. Any orders under subsection (4) are subject to the affirmative procedure.

Subsection (1) imposes a series of duties on Category 1 responders in relation to contingency planning. In broad terms, these duties require Category 1 responders to assess the risk of an emergency occurring, to maintain plans to respond to an emergency, to publish the assessments and plans in so far as this is necessary or desirable to deal with an emergency and to maintain arrangements to warn, inform and advise members of the public in the event of an emergency.

Subsection (2) provides that the duties under subsection (1) only apply in relation to an emergency if the emergency would be likely seriously to obstruct a Category 1 responder in the performance of its functions or the responder would be unable to take action in relation to the emergency without changing the deployment of its resources or acquiring additional responses. One effect of this provision is that whether the contingency planning duties of a Category 1 responder apply in relation to an emergency of a particular kind will depend upon the functions of the particular Category 1 responder and the way in which the responder exercises those functions.

Subsections (3) and (4) enable the Minister of the Crown and, in relation to certain Category 1 responders in Scotland (those listed in Part 2 of Schedule 1 – "Scottish Category 1 responders"), the Scottish Ministers, to make regulations about the extent of a duty under subsection (1) and the manner in which such a duty is to be performed.

Subsection (5) specifies particular provisions which may be included in regulations under subsection (3). The list of provisions is not exhaustive. In particular, the effect of paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (5) is that regulations under subsection (3) may cut back the extent of a duty imposed by subsection (1). Paragraphs (h) and (i) enable regulations to impose duties on Category 2 responders to co-operate with, or to provide information to, Category 1 responders in connection with the performance of a duty under subsection (1). Paragraph (k) enables regulations to be made which require Category 1 responders to have regard to the activities of voluntary organisations when performing their duty to maintain plans.

Subsection (1) defines 'emergency' for the purposes of Part 2. Events such as a terrorist attack, disruption of fuel supplies, contamination of land with a chemical matter and an epidemic could satisfy the definition, should they reach the required level of seriousness.

Subsections (2) and (3) specify exhaustively the kinds of event or situation which may threaten damage to human welfare or the environment. In order to satisfy the definition of "emergency", the event or situation must threaten *serious* damage to human welfare in, or the environment of, *the United Kingdom (or a Part or region)*. This definition differs to the definition of "emergency" for the purposes of Part 1 of the *CCA* in that, for Part 1, the situation must threaten serious damage to human welfare in, or the United Kingdom (rather than in the United Kingdom or in a Part or region).

Subsection (5) enables the Secretary of State to amend the list of events or situations which may threaten damage to human welfare by providing that in so far as an event or situation involves or causes disruption of a specified supply, system, facility or service, it is (or is not)

to be treated as threatening damage to human welfare. This is designed to ensure that should a supply, system, facility, or service become so essential that disruption of it would warrant the exercise of emergency powers, the *CCA* can be amended accordingly. *Subsection (6)* provides that no such order may be made unless a draft has been laid before and approved by each House of Parliament.

"Regions" are those regions specified in Schedule 1 to the Regional Development Agencies Act 1998. There are 9 such regions; East Midlands, Eastern, London, North East, North West, South East, South West, West Midlands and Yorkshire and the Humber.

A search revealed eleven statutory instruments relating to the *CCA*. Four are commencement orders and three are changes to the lists of responders. The other four are;

- The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Contingency Planning)(Scotland) Regulations 2005
- The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Contingency Planning) Regulations 2005
- The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Contingency Planning)(Amendment) Regulations 2011
- The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Contingency Planning)(Amendment) Regulations 2012

The explanatory notes that accompany the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Contingency Planning) Regulations 2005 states that; "Part 1 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 ("the Act") establishes the statutory framework for local civil protection arrangements in the United Kingdom. The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Contingency Planning) Regulations 2005 ("the Regulations") set out the detail of the new regime by cutting back the scope of the duties on the face of the Act and specifying in greater detail how they are to be performed

As enabling legislation, implementation of Part 1 of the Act is heavily dependent on the supporting Regulations and guidance. These Regulations – which are the first use of the powers in sections 2, 4, 6, 12, 15 and 17 of the Act – are crucial to the establishment of the new legislative regime for civil protection at the local level.

The Act received Royal Assent on 18 November 2004. The aim of Part 1 of the Act is to establish a new statutory framework for local civil protection activity in the United Kingdom which is capable of meeting the challenges of the 21st century. The Act will put local civil protection on a sounder long-term footing by:

- Establishing a <u>clear set of roles and responsibilities</u> for organisations with a front line emergency response role, ensuring that they are prepared to deal effectively with the full range of emergencies;
- Delivering <u>areater structure and consistency</u> of civil protection activity at the local *level;*
- Facilitating more systematic co-operation between local responders; and
- Establishing a <u>sound basis for robust performance management</u> of local responders.

The Act divides local responders into two categories, imposing a different set of duties on each. Category 1 responders are those organisations at the core of emergency response (e.g. emergency services, local authorities, NHS bodies). Category 1 responders are subject to the full set of civil protection duties. They will be required to:

• Assess the risk of emergencies occurring and use this to inform emergency planning and business continuity planning;

- Put in place emergency plans;
- Put in place business continuity plans;

• Put in place arrangements to make information available to the public about civil protection matters and maintain arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public in the event of an emergency;

- Share information with other local responders to enhance co-ordination;
- Co-operate with other local responders to enhance co-ordination and efficiency; and

• Provide advice and assistance to businesses and voluntary organisations about business continuity management (local authorities only).

The Regulations establish the scope of the duties and the manner in which they are to be performed. In particular, the Regulations require Category 1 and 2 responders to come together to form Local Resilience Forums (LRFs), which are based on police force areas outside London. LRFs are the principal mechanism for multi- agency co-operation between local responders and will help facilitate better co- ordination, communication and foster a sense of partnership.

A short guide to the Act has been produced by the Cabinet Office and copies have been placed in the libraries of the House. Copies of the draft statutory guidance Emergency Preparedness – which explains what the legislation requires and offers good practice advice on how the duties may be performed – have also been placed in the libraries of the House."

Emergency Readiness revised March 2012 and *Emergency Response and Recovery revised August 2009*

Chapter 19 (the Fit with other Legislation) of Emergency Preparedness Revised August 2009 sets out how the CCA interfaces with other legislation.

Chapter 19 includes a specific section on aligning risk assessment activity with other legislation such as COMAH not covered by the *Civil Contingencies Act.*

Section 19.38 explains the requirement when undertaking emergency planning activity as part of fulfilling duties under the *Civil Contingencies Act*, fire and rescue authorities should consider their duties under the following legislation:

- Human Rights Act 1998
- Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007

- Health and Safety at Work Act 1974
- Working Time Regulations 1998

Human Resources

19.47 In the planning phase for emergencies, unrealistic expectations may be placed on management and personnel. It is important that all Category 1 and Category 2 responders build proper consideration for the welfare of employees into emergency plans. When identifying human resources requirements as part of the emergency response, responders should consider their duties under the Health and safety at Work Act 1974 and Working Time Regulations, 1998

Health and Safety at Work Act 1974

19.48 Employers have a duty to manage risks to their employees that arise from their work. This includes those employees whose work includes responding to emergencies.

19.49 Managing risks means assessing the significant risks to employees (and others who might be affected by their work) and identifying suitable measures to control those risks. Such measures might include setting out safe systems of work which specify appropriate control measures, including the equipment to be used and the competences that workers are required to have. The risk control measures identified as necessary should be put in place. The findings of the assessment, and the control measures implemented, should be communicated to employees.

19.50 Risk assessments do not need to be overly bureaucratic but they should be robust, carefully considered and their findings effectively implemented.

Working Time Regulations 1998 (WTRs) (extract from sections 19.51 - 19.58)

19.51 The WTRs relate to the number of hours that an employee can work during a single week, unless a workforce agreement is sought. During an emergency event, responders may need to make use of the special measures and full flexibilities contained within the WTRs.

19.52 It may be that some of the extra work pressure can be absorbed by inviting relevant groups of workers to enter into an opt-out agreement which would permit the normal weekly minimum working time of 48 hours to be exceeded (permitted under Regulations 4 and 5 of the WTRs). However workers cannot be forced to sign an opt-out. Without any further special measures (as below), this would allow a 78 hour maximum (allowing for 11 hours rest per day x 6 days and weekly rest of 24 hours per week =168 hours-90=78 hours)

19.53 Regulations 21 and 24 of the WTR's give a degree of flexibility where worker's activities are affect by special circumstances.

Regulation21 makes special provisions, generally for less serious situations, allowing the non-application of rights to:

- *Restrictions on length of and protections connected with night work;*
- Daily rest (normally 11 hours per day);
- Weekly rest periods 924 hours per week or 48 hours per fortnight); and
- Rest breaks (at least 20 minutes per six hours)

Chapter 19 does not provide guidance on how the *Civil Contingencies Act* interfaces with the *Fire and Rescue Services Act*.

The Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 and the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 contain no exemptions from other legislation. Fire and rescue authorities must comply with health and safety law; employment Law; human rights law, Industrial relations law and local government law.

A number of Acts controls the legal extent of these activities and the principle ones are;

- *Fire Precautions Act 1971* which made further provision for the protection of persons from fire risks and purposes connected therewith
- *Health and safety at Work Act 1974* this made further provision to secure the health, safety and welfare of persons at work, for protecting others against risks to health or safety in connection with the activities of persons at work, for controlling the keeping and use and preventing unlawful acquisition, possession and use of dangerous substances, and for controlling certain emissions and for making further provision with respect to the employment medical advisory service.
- Industrial Diseases (Notification) Act 1981 which makes further provision for regulations concerning the notification and certification of death and the recording of information relating to industrial disease; and matters relating thereto
- Insurance Companies Act 1981 which amended the law relating to insurance companies
- Taking of Hostages Act 1982 which implemented the International convention against the Taking of Hostages; and for connected purposes
- Aviation Security Act 1982 which consolidated certain enactments relating to aviation security
- Local Government Act 1985 which abolished the GLC and the metropolitan county councils and transfers their functions to local authorities and to other bodies.
- Local Government (Access to Information) Act 1985 which defines access to meetings and documents of certain authorities, committees and sub-committees
- *Territorial Sea Act 1987* which defines the extent of the territorial sea adjacent to the British Islands

- *Channel Tunnel Act 1987* which defines the arrangements for the construction and operation of a tunnel rail link between the United Kingdom and France
- Environment and Safety Information Act 1988 which established public registers of certain notices concerning health, safety and environmental protection; and for related purposes
- *Statutory Sick Pay Act 1991* which reduced the amount of statutory sick pay which employers are entitled to recover
- *Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1995* which provided for the establishment of a scheme for compensation for criminal injuries
- *Employment Rights Act 1996* which consolidated enactments relating to employment rights
- Firearms (Amendment) Act 1997 which amends the Firearms Acts 1968 to 1992
- Employment Rights (dispute resolution) Act 1998 which renames industrial tribunals as Employment Tribunals and amends the law relating to dismissal agreements and other alternative methods of resolving disputes about employment rights
- Audit commission Act 1998 which consolidates Part III of the Local Government Finance Act 1982 relating to the Audit commission for Local Authorities.
- *Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998* which defines the protection of individuals who make certain disclosures of information in the public interest, to allow such individuals to bring action in respect of victimisation; and or connected purposes
- *Human rights Act 1998* which defines further rights and freedoms guaranteed under the European Convention on Human rights
- *Terrorism Act 2000ⁱ* and *2006* which define the legal interpretation of *Terrorism* and offences committed
- *Freedom of Information Act 2000* which defines the provision for the disclosure of information held by public authorities or persons providing services for them.
- Employment Act 2002 which defines provision of further statutory rights to the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 and The Employment Rights Act 1996
- *Fire Services Act 2003* which confers powers on the secretary of State to set or modify conditions of service of members of fire brigades and to give directions to fire authorities.
- *Railways and transport safety Act 2003* which defines the provision about railways, including tramways and transport safety.
- *Employment Relations Act 2004* that amends the law relating to recognition of trades unions under the *Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992*
- Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006 this enables provision to made for the purposes of removing or reducing burdens resulting from legislation and promoting regulatory principles

- Equalities Act 2006 this made provision for the establishment of the Commission for Equality and Human Rights, provision about discrimination on grounds of religion, or belief, sexual orientation, impose duties relating to sex discrimination on persons performing public functions, to amend the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 and for connected purposes
- *Counter-Terrorism Act 2008* which extends to further powers to gather and share information for counter-terrorism. Section 19 *Disclosure and the intelligence services* is explored in *Control Measures* below.
- Third Parties (Acts against Insurers)Act 2010 which defines third parties rights against insurers where the insured is insolvent. This does not define third party rights in acts of *Terrorism*.
- Localism Act 2011ⁱⁱ which extends the powers of fire and rescue authorities
- *Public Services (Social Value) Act 2012* this requires public authorities to have regard to economic, social and environmental well-being in connection with public services contracts; and for connected purposes
- Local Government finance Act 2012 this makes provision about non-domestic rating; about grants to local authorities; council tax

The Local Government (Best Value) Performance Indicators and Performance Standards (England)(Amendment) Order 2007.

The explanatory note for the order contains this advice:

"The Local Government (Best Value) Performance Indicators and Performance Standards (England) Order 2005 (SI 2005/598) (the 2005 Order) set performance indicators by reference to which the performance of certain best value authorities, in exercising their functions, can be measured. The Order also specified performance standards to be met by particular authorities in respect of certain planning functions.

This Order amends the list of specific authorities subject to performance standards for certain planning functions

Part I (best value) of the Local Government Act 1999 (LGA 1999) imposes a general duty on local authorities and other authorities listed in section 1 of the LGA 1999 (collectively referred to as "best value authorities") to make arrangements to secure continuous improvement in the way in which their functions are exercised, having regard to a combination of economy, efficiency and effectiveness.

Section 4(1) of the LGA 1999 confers power on the Secretary of State to specify, by order, factors (best value performance indicators) and standards (best value performance standards) by reference to which a best value authority's performance in exercising its functions can be measured.

Authorities are under a duty (by virtue of section 4(5) of the LGA 1999) to meet best value performance standards ("performance standards"). Where the Secretary of State is satisfied that an authority is failing to comply with the

requirements of Part I of the LGA 1999 (including the duty to meet best value performance standards) she may make various directions under section 15 of the LGA 1999. The powers under section 15 are commonly known as "intervention" powers. The intervention powers are subject to specific consultation requirements set out in the LGA 1999 and in addition the Government has produced a protocol explaining the circumstances in which the powers would be used

http://www.communities.gov.uk/pub/429/AnnexEProtocolPDF39Kb id1136429.pdf

Best Value Performance Indicators (BVPIs) provide a framework against which to measure local authority performance delivery across the key local services covering both national and local priorities. They are designed to:

- enable central Government to monitor progress over a period of time;
- allow authorities to compare their performance against that of their peers; and
- provide residents with information about the performance of their local authority."

So the extent of fire and rescue activities as defined by the *Fire and Rescue Framework for England 2012* is controlled by the requirement to make arrangements to secure continuous improvement in the way in which their functions are exercised, having regard to a combination of economy, efficiency and effectiveness.

Other law such as the *Health and safety at Work Act 1974* also place a duty of 'what is reasonable' and 'costs must not outweigh the benefits'.

Changes to section 2 (in its entirety) – NJC circular 8/08 'Grey Book' 6th Edition (updated 2009) **11** SECTION 3 — ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1. The roles of fire and rescue service employees are those defined within the Integrated Personnel Development System and set out in accredited occupational standards determined by the Emergency Fire Services Vocational Standards Group. The roles used shall be as the fire and rescue authority considers necessary and specific activities within those roles will be determined by the authority to meet the local needs of the service based on risk.

Competence and pay

2. Rates of pay are based on defined stages of development leading to demonstration of competence in the employee's role. These stages are:

Training

For the roles of Firefighter and Firefighter (Control) the training stage is the point at which an employee is in full-time training and is not yet performing the role in its appropriate context. An employee in this position will receive the trainee rate of pay.

Development

The development stage is where an employee is working under supervision in the role and is being assessed against the different functions that make up that role. An employee at this stage, before demonstrating competence in the full requirements of the role, will receive the development rate of pay

Competent

After all applicable functions have been assessed as having been achieved, the employee will have demonstrated "competence" in his or her role and will receive the appropriate competent rate of pay.

3. The time that it will take for an employee to demonstrate competence will depend on the specific requirements of employees, accessibility to assessment and the opportunities available. The basis of the approach is to tailor development to meet individual and organisational needs, so the progress of each individual must be considered in the context of these variables. It can, however, be reasonably expected that the majority of employees on any duty system should demonstrate competence within the following timescales: Firefighter Three years from entry to the service All other roles Eighteen months from entering the programme

4. The defined roles of employees are: Firefighter Firefighter (Control) Crew Manager Crew Manager (Control) Watch Manager Watch Manager (Control) Station Manager Station Manager (Control) Group Manager Group Manager (Control) Area Manager

5. Fire and rescue authorities can use whichever roles they consider necessary. Specific activities within roles will be determined by the authority to meet the local needs of the service based on its Integrated Risk Management Plan. The rates of pay for the training (in the case of Firefighter and Firefighter (Control)), development and competent stages for each role are set out in circulars issued by the NJC.

6. The units of competence that form each of these roles are laid down in the NJC document – *Fire and Rescue Services Rolemaps*. Fire and rescue authorities can require any reasonable activity to be carried out by an individual employee within his or her role map. These role maps reflect fire and rescue service responsibilities incorporated into local Integrated Risk Management Plans in order to: Apply a risk-based approach to fire cover and to all its activities in deciding how best to use its resources. Focus on reducing the level of fire and other emergencies. Develop and maintain effective partnerships with a range of agencies in

the public, private and voluntary sectors where these can deliver cost-effective improvements in community safety. Adopt safe systems of working to secure the health and safety of both its staff and the general public. Minimise the impact of the incidents it attends and of its response at those incidents on the environment.

7. As with all other units in a role map, a fire and rescue authority can require an employee to carry out driving duties. Where the fire and rescue authority does not require an employee to drive or, for genuine reasons, the employee is unable to drive he or she shall be regarded as competent in the role subject to having demonstrated competence in all other applicable functions in the role map. '*Grey Book*' 6th Edition (updated 2009)

<u>The Fire Services (Appointments and Promotion)(England and Wales) Regulations 2004 – (FSC 9/2004)</u>

These introduced Roles, National Occupational Standards and Integrated Personal Development System as a legal requirement for fire and rescue services. the Explanatory Note explained that the regulations prescribe new qualifications for appointments to, and promotions within, the Fire Services following replacement of the previous twelve ranks with seven, now referred to as "roles".

Regulation 2 contains the definitions and these are contained in FSC 9/2002 and are obtainable from the Fire Efficiencies Division of ODPM free of charge.

Interpretation

2. In these regulations—

"appointment" includes appointment on promotion;

"brigade" means a fire brigade maintained in England or Wales under the Fire Services Act 1947;

"IPDS" means the Integrated Personal Development System as described in Fire Service Circular 9/2002 published on 29th July 2002;

"National Occupational Standards" means those levels of knowledge, skills and understanding specified for the roles by the Emergency Fire Services Vocational Council and published in August 2001 and April 2003;

"Permanent appointment" means an appointment for more than twelve months; and "Role" means a rank listed in Schedule 1.

Appointment to roles

3. These regulations prescribe the qualifications for appointment to any of the roles listed in Schedule 1.(**a**) 1947 c. 41; section 18 was amended by section 6 of the Fire Services Act 1959 (c.44).

Qualification for appointment

4. Subject to regulation 7, a person is not eligible for permanent appointment to any role in a brigade unless, at the time of his appointment, he has satisfied the general requirements set out in regulation 5 and the specific requirements for that role set out in regulation 6. 5. Those general requirements are that (a) he is of good character; (b) he has attained the age of 18 years; (c) either— (i) he has attained such qualifications in educational or vocational subjects as the fire authority maintaining the brigade may require, being such qualifications as necessitate a reasonable standard of proficiency in communication and numeracy and such other subjects, if any, as the authority may require; or (ii) the fire authority is satisfied that he is of such educational standard that it is unnecessary for him to attain any such qualification; and (d) a medical practitioner selected by the fire authority is satisfied that his general state of health and fitness is satisfactory to carry out the duties of the role. 6. Those specific requirements are that he has demonstrated to the satisfaction of the authority by whom the brigade is maintained that he meets the National Occupational Standards specified for the role in question or, in the case of a person on his first appointment to a role in a brigade, is likely to meet those standards following initial training and development within IPDS.

Fire and Rescue Role Maps August 2005

The introduction to fire and rescue rolemaps published in 2005 set out the agreed process that must be in place in each fire and rescue service

INTRODUCTION

1. The roles of fire and rescue service employees are those defined within the Integrated Personal Development System and set out in accredited occupational standards determined by the Emergency Fire Rescue and Safety Vocational Standards Group. The roles used shall be as the fire and rescue authority considers necessary and specific activities within those roles will be determined by the authority to meet the local needs of the service based on risk.

2. The defined roles of employees are: Firefighter Firefighter (Control) Crew Manager Crew Manager (Control) Watch Manager Watch Manager (Control) Station Manager Station Manager (Control) Group Manager Group Manager (Control) Area Manager

3. Fire and rescue authorities can use whichever roles they consider necessary. Specific activities within roles will be determined by the authority to meet the local needs of

the service based on its Integrated Risk Management Plan.

- 4. In the case of Group and Area Manager rolemaps there are a number of optional units. Fire and Rescue authorities will determine which of the optional units are required. If any of the optional units are deemed necessary then they should be incorporated into individual job descriptions, as appropriate, and only then would be used in assessment of an employee's competence.
- 5. Fire and rescue authorities can require any reasonable activity to be carried out by an individual employee within his or her role map. These role maps reflect fire and rescue service responsibilities incorporated into local Integrated Risk Management Plans in order to:

Apply a risk-based approach to fire cover and to all its activities in deciding how best to use its resources.

Focus on reducing the level of fire and other emergencies.

Develop and maintain effective partnerships with a range of agencies in the public, private and voluntary sectors where these can deliver cost- effective improvements in community safety.

Adopt safe systems of working to secure the health and safety of both its staff and the general public.

Minimise the impact of the incidents it attends and of its response at those incidents on the environment.

2. As with all other units in a role map, a fire and rescue authority can require an employee to carry out driving duties. Where the Fire and Rescue authority does not require an employee to drive or, for genuine reasons, the employee is unable to drive he or she shall be regarded as competent in the role subject to having demonstrated competence in all other applicable functions in the role map.

IPDS Code of Practice February 2008

In 2008 a Code of Practice was introduced. **FBU Officials must expect this standard of their FRS.**

The Introduction to the ACOP is repeated here;

Introduction

- 1 One of the Governments' aims is to ensure that employers' skills demands are met by providing a quality-assured structure of National Occupational Standards (NOS) and Qualifications. This practice is widely embedded in the commercial world with 25 Sector Skills Councils delivering and maintaining standards for employers across a wide range of businesses and millions of employees working to the standards set.
- 2 The importance of this joined up approach is reinforced by work in December 2007 to develop a framework of NOS in planning for and responding to major incidents which fall under the remit of Civil Contingencies.
- 3 Every business has its own method of utilising NOS and Qualifications. For the Fire and Rescue Service, this is achieved through the Integrated Personal Development System (IPDS) which is embedded in the Fire & Rescue Service Act and subsequent Framework documents. Appendix 1 shows this relationship between the Government and the FRS.
- 4 IPDS provides a structure, based on agreed standards of performance, within which organisations can identify, attract, assess and develop people to fulfil their current and future roles. Integral to this framework is meeting the needs of the Integrated Risk Management Plan (IRMP), the promotion of equality of opportunity for every person and a focus on improving the health and safety of staff.
- 5 This Code of Practice (COP) describes how the component parts of IPDS relate to each other, and to the wider objectives of the Fire and Rescue Service. It supports a more standardised implementation of IPDS.
- 6 Adherence to this COP will demonstrate compliance with the requirements of the National Framework. Fire and Rescue Authorities in England are therefore strongly encouraged to follow this code but it does not have legal force, and cannot prevail over statutory or mandatory external requirements.
- 7 As the name suggests, IPDS is an integrated system. The Code of Practice identifies which parts are mandatory and which are advisory but Fire and Rescue Services will gain the greatest benefit if they implement all of the components. IPDS does not exist

in a vacuum. Fire and Rescue Authorities need a framework of other Human Resource Management (HRM) and Human Resource Development (HRD) processes in addition to the IPDS components. The guidelines contained in this Code of Practice draw on IPDS advice and published guidance available from the Department for Communities and Local Government, and also from best practices followed by a wide range of organisations in both the public and private sectors but it is not an exhaustive list of HRM and HRD practices.

- 8 This document makes reference to the HR strategy published by the Chief Fire Officers Association but this should not be seen as an endorsement of that strategy.
- 9 FRSs should carry out equality impact assessments in relation to any local working practices, selection and progression practices.
- 10 Note that any reference in this document to rolemaps means the NJC agreed rolemaps. Any amendments to these rolemaps must be sanctioned by the NJC.
- 11 The successful management of IPDS should be aligned to four key aims as shown in the diagram below.

	Key Aims	Why	How
1	Define the jobs that need to be done to deliver the IRMP.	standard To support continuous improvement	Job Description National Occupationa Standards (Rolemaps, Person Specification
2	Select the right people to do those jobs.	To deliver the service in a safe, effective and efficient way To maximise productivity To reduce costs	National Firefighter Selection Processes Assessment Development Centres Selection Processes
3	Train and develop them to do their job competently.	To deliver the service in a safe way To help achieve objectives To make the FRS an employer of choice	Development Programmes (perhaps leading to qualifications) Coaching and Mentoring

Ensure that they continue to perform effectively. To deliver the service in a safe and consistent way To help assure quality of service To engender a professional culture Continuous assessment of workplace performance and appraisal Recording systems linked to business objectives Continuing Professional Development Instigate a Performance Management System

FBU Guidance to Officials on using the Integrated Personal Development System Code of *Practice* is available on the FBU website.

SECTION 5 — HEALTH ISSUES

4

PART A - HEALTH, SAFETY AND WELFARE General principles

1. The NJC recognises the importance of health, safety and welfare in the workplace and is committed to achieving standards of excellence in the fire and rescue service. The wide variety of hazards encountered in the service needs to be controlled through appropriate training and the systematic application of preventive and protective measures in a risk assessment framework.

2. Fire and rescue authorities have a duty to comply with legislation governing the health, safety and welfare of employees. This includes the conditions under which employees work, the provision and maintenance of necessary protective clothing and equipment, the communication of relevant health and safety information, and the provision of appropriate facilities, including training, for health and safety representatives. Local policies and procedures should also cover the following issues, on which the NJC has developed guidance: (1) good hygiene practices; (2) first aid; (3) facilities for pregnant women and nursing mothers; (4) headwear; (5) facial hair; (6) HIV/AIDS; (7) needle stick injuries and hepatitis; and (8) management of stress.

3. Employees have a duty to take care of themselves and others affected by their activity at work and to co-operate with the fire and rescue authority's actions, policies and guidance on health, safety, and welfare.

4. Fire and rescue authorities are encouraged to provide appropriate workplace facilities for female employees in line with the Workplace (Health, Safety, and Welfare) Regulations 1992. **Uniform and personal protective equipment**

5. Employees shall be provided free of charge with any appropriate uniform, clothing or equipment, which shall remain the property of the fire and rescue authority. Such provision shall follow an assessment under Regulation 6 of the Personal Protective Equipment at Work Regulations 1992 of any risks to health and safety and shall include the protective clothing and equipment at paragraph 7 of the Guidance to the Regulations and any other items identified by the risk assessment.

6. Fire and rescue authorities shall supply or reimburse the approved cost of spectacles for use on the fireground (see paragraphs 10-13 of Fire Service Circular 9/1996). 7. Fire and rescue authorities have a duty to comply with the Health and Safety (Display Screen Equipment) Regulations 1992 where employees work with display screens. '*Grey Book*' 6th Edition (updated 2009)

1999 No. 3242

HEALTH AND SAFETY

The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999

Made

Laid before Parliament

Coming into force

8th December 1999

3rd December 1999

29th December 1999

The Secretary of State, being a Minister designated(1) for the purposes of section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972(2) in relation to measures relating to employers' obligations in respect of the health and safety of workers and in relation to measures relating to the minimum health and safety requirements for the workplace that relate to fire safety and in exercise of the powers conferred on him by the said section 2 and by sections 15(1), (2), (3)(a), (5), and (9), 47(2), 52(2), and (3), 80(1) and 82(3)(a) of and paragraphs 6(1), 7, 8(1), 10, 14, 15, and 16 of Schedule 3 to, the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974(3) ("the 1974 Act") and of all other powers enabling him in that behalf—

for the purpose of giving effect without modifications to proposals submitted to him by the Health and Safety Commission under section 11(2)(d) of the 1974 Act after the carrying out by the Commission of consultations in accordance with section 50(3) of that Act; and

it appearing to him that the modifications to the Regulations marked with an asterisk in Schedule 2 are expedient and that it also appearing to him not to be appropriate to consult bodies in respect of such modifications in accordance with section 80(4) of the 1974 Act.

hereby makes the following Regulations:

Citation, commencement and interpretation

1.—(1) These Regulations may be cited as the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 and shall come into force on 29th December 1999.

(2) In these Regulations-

"the 1996 Act" means the Employment Rights Act 1996(4);

(a)

(b)

"the assessment" means, in the case of an employer or self-employed person, the assessment made or changed by him in accordance with regulation 3;

"child"-

as respects England and Wales, means a person who is not over compulsory school age, construed in accordance with section 8 of the Education Act 1996(5); and

(a)

(b)

as respects Scotland, means a person who is not over school age, construed in accordance with section 31 of the Education (Scotland) Act 1980(6);

"employment business" means a business (whether or not carried on with a view to profit and whether or not carried on in conjunction with any other business) which supplies persons (other than seafarers) who are employed in it to work for and under the control of other persons in any capacity;

"fixed-term contract of employment" means a contract of employment for a specific term which is fixed in advance or which can be ascertained in advance by reference to some relevant circumstance;

"given birth" means delivered a living child or, after twenty-four weeks of pregnancy, a stillborn child;

"new or expectant mother" means an employee who is pregnant; who has given birth within the previous six months; or who is breastfeeding;

"the preventive and protective measures" means the measures which have been identified by the employer or by the self-employed person in consequence of the assessment as the measures he needs to take to comply with the requirements and prohibitions imposed upon him by or under the relevant statutory provisions and by Part II of the Fire Precautions (Workplace) Regulations 1997(7);

"young person" means any person who has not attained the age of eighteen.

(3) Any reference in these Regulations to-

(a)a numbered regulation or Schedule is a reference to the regulation or Schedule in these Regulations so numbered; or

(b)a numbered paragraph is a reference to the paragraph so numbered in the regulation in which the reference appears.

Disapplication of these Regulations

2.—(1) These Regulations shall not apply to or in relation to the master or crew of a sea-going ship or to the employer of such persons in respect of the normal ship-board activities of a ship's crew under the direction of the master.

(2) Regulations 3(4), (5), 10(2) and 19 shall not apply to occasional work or short-term work involving-

(a)domestic service in a private household; or

(b)work regulated as not being harmful, damaging or dangerous to young people in a family undertaking.

Risk assessment

3.--(1) Every employer shall make a suitable and sufficient assessment of--

(a)the risks to the health and safety of his employees to which they are exposed whilst they are at work; and

(b)the risks to the health and safety of persons not in his employment arising out of or in connection with the conduct by him of his undertaking.

for the purpose of identifying the measures he needs to take to comply with the requirements and prohibitions imposed upon him by or under the relevant statutory provisions and by Part II of the Fire Precautions (Workplace) Regulations 1997.

(2) Every self-employed person shall make a suitable and sufficient assessment of-

(a)the risks to his own health and safety to which he is exposed whilst he is at work; and

(b)the risks to the health and safety of persons not in his employment arising out of or in connection with the conduct by him of his undertaking,

for the purpose of identifying the measures he needs to take to comply with the requirements and prohibitions imposed upon him by or under the relevant statutory provisions.

(3) Any assessment such as is referred to in paragraph (1) or (2) shall be reviewed by the employer or self-employed person who made it if-

(a)there is reason to suspect that it is no longer valid; or

(b)there has been a significant change in the matters to which it relates; and where as a result of any such review changes to an assessment are required, the employer or self-employed person concerned shall make them.

(4) An employer shall not employ a young person unless he has, in relation to risks to the health and safety of young persons, made or reviewed an assessment in accordance with paragraphs (1) and (5).

(5) In making or reviewing the assessment, an employer who employs or is to employ a young person shall take particular account of-

(a)the inexperience, lack of awareness of risks and immaturity of young persons;

(b)the fitting-out and layout of the workplace and the workstation;

(c)the nature, degree and duration of exposure to physical, biological and chemical agents;

(d)the form, range, and use of work equipment and the way in which it is handled;

(e)the organisation of processes and activities;

(f) the extent of the health and safety training provided or to be provided to young persons; and

(g)risks from agents, processes and work listed in the Annex to Council Directive <u>94/33/EC(8)</u> on the protection of young people at work.

(6) Where the employer employs five or more employees, he shall record-

(a)the significant findings of the assessment; and

(b)any group of his employees identified by it as being especially at risk.

Principles of prevention to be applied

4. Where an employer implements any preventive and protective measures he shall do so on the basis of the principles specified in Schedule 1 to these Regulations.

Health and safety arrangements

5.—(1) Every employer shall make and give effect to such arrangements as are appropriate, having regard to the nature of his activities and the size of his undertaking, for the effective planning, organisation, control, monitoring and review of the preventive and protective measures.

(2) Where the employer employs five or more employees, he shall record the arrangements referred to in paragraph (1).

Health surveillance

6. Every employer shall ensure that his employees are provided with such health surveillance as is appropriate having regard to the risks to their health and safety which are identified by the assessment.

Health and safety assistance

7.—(1) Every employer shall, subject to paragraphs (6) and (7), appoint one or more competent persons to assist him in undertaking the measures he needs to take to comply with the requirements and prohibitions imposed upon him by or under the relevant statutory provisions and by Part II of the Fire Precautions (Workplace) Regulations 1997.

(2) Where an employer appoints persons in accordance with paragraph (1), he shall make arrangements for ensuring adequate cooperation between them.

(3) The employer shall ensure that the number of persons appointed under paragraph (1), the time available for them to fulfil their functions and the means at their disposal are adequate having regard to the size of his undertaking, the risks to which his employees are exposed and the distribution of those risks throughout the undertaking.

(4) The employer shall ensure that-

(a) any person appointed by him in accordance with paragraph (1) who is not in his employment-

(i)is informed of the factors known by him to affect, or suspected by him of affecting, the health and safety of any other person who may be affected by the conduct of his undertaking, and

(ii)has access to the information referred to in regulation 10; and

(b)any person appointed by him in accordance with paragraph (1) is given such information about any person working in his undertaking who is—

(i)employed by him under a fixed-term contract of employment, or

(ii) employed in an employment business,

as is necessary to enable that person properly to carry out the function specified in that paragraph.

(5) A person shall be regarded as competent for the purposes of paragraphs (1) and (8) where he has sufficient training and experience or knowledge and other qualities to enable him properly to assist in undertaking the measures referred to in paragraph (1).

(6) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to a self-employed employer who is not in partnership with any other person where he has sufficient training and experience or knowledge and other qualities properly to undertake the measures referred to in that paragraph himself.

(7) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to individuals who are employers and who are together carrying on business in partnership where at least one of the individuals concerned has sufficient training and experience or knowledge and other qualities—

(a)properly to undertake the measures he needs to take to comply with the requirements and prohibitions imposed upon him by or under the relevant statutory provisions; and

(b)properly to assist his fellow partners in undertaking the measures they need to take to comply with the requirements and prohibitions imposed upon them by or under the relevant statutory provisions.

(8) Where there is a competent person in the employer's employment, that person shall be appointed for the purposes of paragraph(1) in preference to a competent person not in his employment.

Procedures for serious and imminent danger and for danger areas

8.--(1) Every employer shall--

(a) establish and where necessary give effect to appropriate procedures to be followed in the event of serious and imminent danger to persons at work in his undertaking;

(b)nominate a sufficient number of competent persons to implement those procedures in so far as they relate to the evacuation from premises of persons at work in his undertaking; and

(c)ensure that none of his employees has access to any area occupied by him to which it is necessary to restrict access on grounds of health and safety unless the employee concerned has received adequate health and safety instruction.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (1)(a), the procedures referred to in that sub-paragraph shall-

(a)so far as is practicable, require any persons at work who are exposed to serious and imminent danger to be informed of the nature of the hazard and of the steps taken or to be taken to protect them from it;

(b)enable the persons concerned (if necessary by taking appropriate steps in the absence of guidance or instruction and in the light of their knowledge and the technical means at their disposal) to stop work and immediately proceed to a place of safety in the event of their being exposed to serious, imminent and unavoidable danger; and

(c)save in exceptional cases for reasons duly substantiated (which cases and reasons shall be specified in those procedures), require the persons concerned to be prevented from resuming work in any situation where there is still a serious and imminent danger.

(3) A person shall be regarded as competent for the purposes of paragraph (1)(b) where he has sufficient training and experience or knowledge and other qualities to enable him properly to implement the evacuation procedures referred to in that sub-paragraph.

Contacts with external services

9. Every employer shall ensure that any necessary contacts with external services are arranged, particularly as regards first-aid, emergency medical care and rescue work.

Information for employees

10.--(1) Every employer shall provide his employees with comprehensible and relevant information on--

(a)the risks to their health and safety identified by the assessment;

(b)the preventive and protective measures;

(c)the procedures referred to in regulation 8(1)(a) and the measures referred to in regulation 4(2)(a) of the Fire Precautions (Workplace) Regulations 1997;

(d)the identity of those persons nominated by him in accordance with regulation 8(1)(b) and regulation 4(2)(b) of the Fire Precautions (Workplace) Regulations 1997; and

(e)the risks notified to him in accordance with regulation 11(1)(c).

(2) Every employer shall, before employing a child, provide a parent of the child with comprehensible and relevant information on-

(a)the risks to his health and safety identified by the assessment;

(b)the preventive and protective measures; and

(c)the risks notified to him in accordance with regulation 11(1)(c).

(3) The reference in paragraph (2) to a parent of the child includes-

(a)in England and Wales, a person who has parental responsibility, within the meaning of section 3 of the Children Act 1989(9), for him; and

(b)in Scotland, a person who has parental rights, within the meaning of section 8 of the Law Reform (Parent and Child) (Scotland) Act 1986(10) for him.

Co-operation and co-ordination

11.—(1) Where two or more employers share a workplace (whether on a temporary or a permanent basis) each such employer shall—

(a)co-operate with the other employers concerned so far as is necessary to enable them to comply with the requirements and prohibitions imposed upon them by or under the relevant statutory provisions and by Part II of the Fire Precautions (Workplace) Regulations 1997;

(b)(taking into account the nature of his activities) take all reasonable steps to co-ordinate the measures he takes to comply with the requirements and prohibitions imposed upon him by or under the relevant statutory provisions and by Part II of the Fire Precautions (Workplace) Regulations 1997 with the measures the other employers concerned are taking to comply with the requirements and prohibitions imposed upon them by that legislation; and

(c)take all reasonable steps to inform the other employers concerned of the risks to their employees' health and safety arising out of or in connection with the conduct by him of his undertaking.

(2) Paragraph (1) (except in so far as it refers to Part II of the Fire Precautions (Workplace) Regulations 1997) shall apply to employers sharing a workplace with self-employed persons and to self-employed persons sharing a workplace with other self-employed persons as it applies to employers sharing a workplace with other employers; and the references in that paragraph to employers and the reference in the said paragraph to their employees shall be construed accordingly.

Persons working in host employers' or self-employed persons' undertakings

12.—(1) Every employer and every self-employed person shall ensure that the employer of any employees from an outside undertaking who are working in his undertaking is provided with comprehensible information on—

(a)the risks to those employees' health and safety arising out of or in connection with the conduct by that first-mentioned employer or by that self-employed person of his undertaking; and

(b)the measures taken by that first-mentioned employer or by that self-employed person in compliance with the requirements and prohibitions imposed upon him by or under the relevant statutory provisions and by Part II of the Fire Precautions (Workplace) Regulations 1997 in so far as the said requirements and prohibitions relate to those employees.

(2) Paragraph (1) (except in so far as it refers to Part II of the Fire Precautions (Workplace) Regulations 1997) shall apply to a selfemployed person who is working in the undertaking of an employer or a self-employed person as it applies to employees from an outside undertaking who are working therein; and the reference in that paragraph to the employer of any employees from an outside undertaking who are working in the undertaking of an employer or a self-employed person and the references in the said paragraph to employees from an outside undertaking who are working in the undertaking of an employer or a self-employed person and the references in the said paragraph to employees from an outside undertaking who are working in the undertaking of an employer or a self-employed person shall be construed accordingly.

(3) Every employer shall ensure that any person working in his undertaking who is not his employee and every self-employed person (not being an employer) shall ensure that any person working in his undertaking is provided with appropriate instructions and comprehensible information regarding any risks to that person's health and safety which arise out of the conduct by that employer or self-employed person of his undertaking.

(4) Every employer shall-

(a)ensure that the employer of any employees from an outside undertaking who are working in his undertaking is provided with sufficient information to enable that second-mentioned employer to identify any person nominated by that first mentioned employer in accordance with regulation 8(1)(b) to implement evacuation procedures as far as those employees are concerned; and

(b)take all reasonable steps to ensure that any employees from an outside undertaking who are working in his undertaking receive sufficient information to enable them to identify any person nominated by him in accordance with regulation 8(1)(b) to implement evacuation procedures as far as they are concerned.

(5) Paragraph (4) shall apply to a self-employed person who is working in an employer's undertaking as it applies to employees from an outside undertaking who are working therein; and the reference in that paragraph to the employer of any employees from an outside

undertaking who are working in an employer's undertaking and the references in the said paragraph to employees from an outside undertaking who are working in an employer's undertaking shall be construed accordingly.

Capabilities and training

13.--(1) Every employer shall, in entrusting tasks to his employees, take into account their capabilities as regards health and safety.

(2) Every employer shall ensure that his employees are provided with adequate health and safety training-

(a)on their being recruited into the employer's undertaking; and

(b)on their being exposed to new or increased risks because of-

(i)their being transferred or given a change of responsibilities within the employer's undertaking,

(ii) the introduction of new work equipment into or a change respecting work equipment already in use within the employer's undertaking,

(iii)the introduction of new technology into the employer's undertaking, or

(iv)the introduction of a new system of work into or a change respecting a system of work already in use within the employer's undertaking.

(3) The training referred to in paragraph (2) shall-

(a)be repeated periodically where appropriate;

(b)be adapted to take account of any new or changed risks to the health and safety of the employees concerned; and

(c)take place during working hours.

Employees' duties

14.—(1) Every employee shall use any machinery, equipment, dangerous substance, transport equipment, means of production or safety device provided to him by his employer in accordance both with any training in the use of the equipment concerned which has been received by him and the instructions respecting that use which have been provided to him by the said employer in compliance with the requirements and prohibitions imposed upon that employer by or under the relevant statutory provisions.

(2) Every employee shall inform his employer or any other employee of that employer with specific responsibility for the health and safety of his fellow employees—

(a) of any work situation which a person with the first-mentioned employee's training and instruction would reasonably consider represented a serious and immediate danger to health and safety; and

(b) of any matter which a person with the first-mentioned employee's training and instruction would reasonably consider represented a shortcoming in the employer's protection arrangements for health and safety,

in so far as that situation or matter either affects the health and safety of that first mentioned employee or arises out of or in connection with his own activities at work, and has not previously been reported to his employer or to any other employee of that employer in accordance with this paragraph.

Temporary workers

15.—(1) Every employer shall provide any person whom he has employed under a fixed-term contract of employment with comprehensible information on—

(a) any special occupational qualifications or skills required to be held by that employee if he is to carry out his work safely; and

(b) any health surveillance required to be provided to that employee by or under any of the relevant statutory provisions,

and shall provide the said information before the employee concerned commences his duties.

(2) Every employer and every self-employed person shall provide any person employed in an employment business who is to carry out work in his undertaking with comprehensible information on—

(a) any special occupational qualifications or skills required to be held by that employee if he is to carry out his work safely; and

(b)health surveillance required to be provided to that employee by or under any of the relevant statutory provisions.

(3) Every employer and every self-employed person shall ensure that every person carrying on an employment business whose employees are to carry out work in his undertaking is provided with comprehensible information on—

(a) any special occupational qualifications or skills required to be held by those employees if they are to carry out their work safely; and

(b)the specific features of the jobs to be filled by those employees (in so far as those features are likely to affect their health and safety);

and the person carrying on the employment business concerned shall ensure that the information so provided is given to the said employees.

Risk assessment in respect of new or expectant mothers

16.-(1) Where-

(a)the persons working in an undertaking include women of child-bearing age; and

(b)the work is of a kind which could involve risk, by reason of her condition, to the health and safety of a new or expectant mother, or to that of her baby, from any processes or working conditions, or physical, biological or chemical agents, including those specified in Annexes I and II of Council Directive <u>92/85/EEC(11)</u> on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding,

the assessment required by regulation 3(1) shall also include an assessment of such risk.

(2) Where, in the case of an individual employee, the taking of any other action the employer is required to take under the relevant statutory provisions would not avoid the risk referred to in paragraph (1) the employer shall, if it is reasonable to do so, and would avoid such risks, alter her working conditions or hours of work.

(3) If it is not reasonable to alter the working conditions or hours of work, or if it would not avoid such risk, the employer shall, subject to section 67 of the 1996 Act suspend the employee from work for so long as is necessary to avoid such risk.

(4) In paragraphs (1) to (3) references to risk, in relation to risk from any infectious or contagious disease, are references to a level of risk at work which is in addition to the level to which a new or expectant mother may be expected to be exposed outside the workplace.

Certificate from registered medical practitioner in respect of new or expectant mothers

17. Where-

(a)a new or expectant mother works at night; and

(b)a certificate from a registered medical practitioner or a registered midwife shows that it is necessary for her health or safety that she should not be at work for any period of such work identified in the certificate,

the employer shall, subject to section 67 of the 1996 Act, suspend her from work for so long as is necessary for her health or safety.

Notification by new or expectant mothers

18.—(1) Nothing in paragraph (2) or (3) of regulation 16 shall require the employer to take any action in relation to an employee until she has notified the employer in writing that she is pregnant, has given birth within the previous six months, or is breastfeeding.

(2) Nothing in paragraph (2) or (3) of regulation 16 or in regulation 17 shall require the employer to maintain action taken in relation to an employee—

(a)in a case-

(i)to which regulation 16(2) or (3) relates; and

(ii)where the employee has notified her employer that she is pregnant, where she has failed, within a reasonable time of being requested to do so in writing by her employer, to produce for the employer's inspection a certificate from a registered medical practitioner or a registered midwife showing that she is pregnant;

(b)once the employer knows that she is no longer a new or expectant mother; or

(c)if the employer cannot establish whether she remains a new or expectant mother.

Protection of young persons

19.—(1) Every employer shall ensure that young persons employed by him are protected at work from any risks to their health or safety which are a consequence of their lack of experience, or absence of awareness of existing or potential risks or the fact that young persons have not yet fully matured.

(2) Subject to paragraph (3), no employer shall employ a young person for work-

(a)which is beyond his physical or psychological capacity;

(b)involving harmful exposure to agents which are toxic or carcinogenic, cause heritable genetic damage or harm to the unborn child or which in any other way chronically affect human health;

(c)involving harmful exposure to radiation;

(d)involving the risk of accidents which it may reasonably be assumed cannot be recognised or avoided by young persons owing to their insufficient attention to safety or lack of experience or training; or

(e)in which there is a risk to health from-

(i)extreme cold or heat;

(ii)noise; or

(iii)vibration,

and in determining whether work will involve harm or risks for the purposes of this paragraph, regard shall be had to the results of the assessment.

(3) Nothing in paragraph (2) shall prevent the employment of a young person who is no longer a child for work-

(a)where it is necessary for his training;

(b)where the young person will be supervised by a competent person; and

(c)where any risk will be reduced to the lowest level that is reasonably practicable.

(4) The provisions contained in this regulation are without prejudice to-

(a)the provisions contained elsewhere in these Regulations; and

(b) any prohibition or restriction, arising otherwise than by this regulation, on the employment of any person.

Exemption certificates

20.—(1) The Secretary of State for Defence may, in the interests of national security, by a certificate in writing exempt—

(a) any of the home forces, any visiting force or any headquarters from those requirements of these Regulations which impose obligations other than those in regulations 16-18 on employers; or

(b)any member of the home forces, any member of a visiting force or any member of a headquarters from the requirements imposed by regulation 14;

and any exemption such as is specified in sub-paragraph (a) or (b) of this paragraph may be granted subject to conditions and to a limit of time and may be revoked by the said Secretary of State by a further certificate in writing at any time.

(2) In this regulation-

(a)"the home forces" has the same meaning as in section 12(1) of the Visiting Forces Act 1952(12);

(b)"headquarters" means a headquarters for the time being specified in Schedule 2 to the Visiting Forces and International Headquarters (Application of Law) Order 1999(<u>13</u>);

(c)"member of a headquarters" has the same meaning as in paragraph 1(1) of the Schedule to the International Headquarters and Defence Organisations Act 1964(14); and

(d)"visiting force" has the same meaning as it does for the purposes of any provision of Part I of the Visiting Forces Act 1952.

Provisions as to liability

21. Nothing in the relevant statutory provisions shall operate so as to afford an employer a defence in any criminal proceedings for a contravention of those provisions by reason of any act or default of—

(a)an employee of his, or

(b)a person appointed by him under regulation 7.

Exclusion of civil liability

22.--(1) Breach of a duty imposed by these Regulations shall not confer a right of action in any civil proceedings.

(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any duty imposed by these Regulations on an employer-

(a)to the extent that it relates to risk referred to in regulation 16(1) to an employee; or

(b)which is contained in regulation 19.

Extension outside Great Britain

23.—(1) These Regulations shall, subject to regulation 2, apply to and in relation to the premises and activities outside Great Britain to which sections 1 to 59 and 80 to 82 of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 apply by virtue of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 (Application Outside Great Britain) Order 1995(15) as they apply within Great Britain.

(2) For the purposes of Part I of the 1974 Act, the meaning of "at work" shall be extended so that an employee or a self-employed person shall be treated as being at work throughout the time that he is present at the premises to and in relation to which these Regulations apply by virtue of paragraph (1); and, in that connection, these Regulations shall have effect subject to the extension effected by this paragraph.

Amendment of the Health and Safety (First-Aid) Regulations 1981

24. Regulation 6 of the Health and Safety (First-Aid) Regulations 1981(16) is hereby revoked.

Amendment of the Offshore Installations and Pipeline Works (First-Aid) Regulations 1989

25.—(1) The Offshore Installations and Pipeline Works (First-Aid) Regulations 1989(<u>17</u>) shall be amended in accordance with the following provisions of this regulation.

(2) In regulation 7(1) for the words "from all or any of the requirements of these Regulations", there shall be substituted the words "from regulation 5(1)(b) and (c) and (2)(a) of these Regulations".

(3) After regulation 7(2) the following paragraph shall be added-

"(3) An exemption granted under paragraph (1) above from the requirements in regulation 5(2)(a) of these Regulations shall be subject to the condition that a person provided under regulation 5(1)(a) of these Regulations shall have undergone adequate training.".

Amendment of the Mines Miscellaneous Health and Safety Provisions Regulations 1995

26.—(1) The Mines Miscellaneous Health and Safety Provisions Regulations 1995(<u>18</u>) shall be amended in accordance with the following provisions of this regulation.

(2) Paragraph (2)(b) of regulation 4 shall be deleted.

(3) After paragraph (4) of regulation 4 there shall be added the following paragraph-

"(5) In relation to fire, the health and safety document prepared pursuant to paragraph (1) shall-

(a)include a fire protection plan detailing the likely sources of fire, and the precautions to be taken to protect against, to detect and combat the outbreak and spread of fire; and

(b)in respect of every part of the mine other than any building on the surface of that mine-

(i)include the designation of persons to implement the plan, ensuring that the number of such persons, their training and the equipment available to them is adequate, taking into account the size of, and the specific hazards involved in the mine concerned; and

(ii)include the arrangements for any necessary contacts with external emergency services, particularly as regards rescue work and firefighting; and

(iii)be adapted to the nature of the activities carried on at that mine, the size of the mine and take account of the persons other than employees who may be present.".

Amendment of the Construction (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations 1996

27.—(1) The Construction (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations 1996(19) shall be amended in accordance with the following provisions of this regulation.

(2) Paragraph (2) of regulation 20 shall be deleted and the following substituted-

"(2) Without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (1), arrangements prepared pursuant to that paragraph shall-

(a) have regard to those matters set out in paragraph (4) of regulation 19;

(b)designate an adequate number of persons who will implement the arrangements; and

(c)include any necessary contacts with external emergency services, particularly as regards rescue work and fire-fighting.".

Regulations to have effect as health and safety regulations

28. Subject to regulation 9 of the Fire Precautions (Workplace) Regulations 1997(20), these Regulations shall, to the extent that they would not otherwise do so, have effect as if they were health and safety regulations within the meaning of Part I of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974.

Revocations and consequential amendments

29.—(1) The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1992(<u>21</u>), the Management of Health and Safety at Work (Amendment) Regulations 1994(<u>22</u>), the Health and Safety (Young Persons) Regulations 1997(<u>23</u>) and Part III of the Fire Precautions (Workplace) Regulations 1997 are hereby revoked.

(2) The instruments specified in column 1 of Schedule 2 shall be amended in accordance with the corresponding provisions in column 3 of that Schedule.

Transitional provision

30. The substitution of provisions in these Regulations for provisions of the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1992 shall not affect the continuity of the law; and accordingly anything done under or for the purposes of such provision of the 1992 Regulations shall have effect as if done under or for the purposes of any corresponding provision of these Regulations.

Signed by authority of the Secretary of State

Whitty,

Parliamentary Under Secretary of State,

Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions

3rd December 1999

STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS

1992 No.3004

HEALTH AND SAFETY

The Workplace (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations 1992

Made

1st December 1992

Laid before Parliament

8th December 1992

Coming into force

The whole Regulations except regulations 5 to 27 and the Schedules, to the extent specified in regulation 1(3)

1st January 1993

Regulations 5 to 27 and the Schedules, to the extent specified in regulation 1(3)

1st January 1996

The Secretary of State, in exercise of the powers conferred on her by sections 15(1), (2), (3)(a) and (5)(b), and 82(3)(a) of, and paragraphs 1(2), 9 and 10 of Schedule 3 to, the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act $1974(\underline{1})$ ("the 1974 Act") and of all other powers enabling her in that behalf and for the purpose of giving effect without modifications to proposals submitted to her by the Health and Safety Commission under section 11(2)(d) of the 1974 Act after the carrying out by the said Commission of consultations in accordance with section 50(3) of that Act, hereby makes the following Regulations:—

Citation and commencement

1.—(1) These Regulations may be cited as the Workplace (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations 1992.

(2) Subject to paragraph (3), these Regulations shall come into force on 1st January 1993.

(3) Regulations 5 to 27 and the Schedules shall come into force on 1st January 1996 with respect to any workplace or part of a workplace which is not—

(a)a new workplace; or

(b)a modification, an extension or a conversion.

Interpretation

2.--(1) In these Regulations, unless the context otherwise requires--

"new workplace" means a workplace used for the first time as a workplace after31st December 1992;

"public road" means (in England and Wales) a highway maintainable at public expense within the meaning of section 329 of the Highways Act 1980(2) and (in Scotland) a public road within the meaning assigned to that term by section 151 of the Roads (Scotland) Act 1984(3);

"traffic route" means a route for pedestrian traffic, vehicles or both and includes any stairs, staircase, fixed ladder, doorway, gateway, loading bay or ramp;

"workplace" means, subject to paragraph (2), any premises or part of premises which are not domestic premises and are made available to any person as a place of work, and includes—

any place within the premises to which such person has access while at work; and

(a)

(b)

any room, lobby, corridor, staircase, road or other place used as a means of access to or egress from that place of work or where facilities are provided for use in connection with the place of work other than a public road;

but shall not include a modification, an extension or a conversion of any of the above until such modification, extension or conversion is completed.

(2) Any reference in these Regulations, except in paragraph (1), to a modification, an extension or a conversion is a reference, as the case may be, to a modification, an extension or a conversion of a workplace started after 31st December 1992.

(3) Any requirement that anything done or provided in pursuance of these Regulations shall be suitable shall be construed to include a requirement that it is suitable for any person in respect of whom such thing is so done or provided.

(4) Any reference in these Regulations to-

(a) a numbered regulation or Schedule is a reference to the regulation in or Schedule to these Regulations so numbered; and

(b)a numbered paragraph is a reference to the paragraph so numbered in the regulation in which the reference appears.

Application of these Regulations

3.—(1) These Regulations apply to every workplace but shall not apply to—

(a) a workplace which is or is in or on a ship within the meaning assigned to that word by regulation 2(1) of the Docks Regulations 1988(<u>4</u>);

(b)a workplace where the only activities being undertaken are building operations or works of engineering construction within, in either case, section 176 of the Factories Act 1961(5) and activities for the purpose of or in connection with the first-mentioned activities;

(c)a workplace where the only activities being undertaken are the exploration for or extraction of mineral resources; or

(d)a workplace which is situated in the immediate vicinity of another workplace or intended workplace where exploration for or extraction of mineral resources is being or will be undertaken, and where the only activities being undertaken are activities preparatory to, for the purposes of, or in connection with such exploration for or extraction of mineral resources at that other workplace.

(2) In their application to temporary work sites, any requirement to ensure a workplace complies with any of regulations 20 to 25 shall have effect as a requirement to so ensure so far as is reasonably practicable.

(3) As respects any workplace which is or is in or on an aircraft, locomotive or rolling stock, trailer or semi-trailer used as a means of transport or a vehicle for which a licence is in force under the Vehicles (Excise) Act 1971(6) or a vehicle exempted from duty under that Act—

(a) regulations 5 to 12 and 14 to 25 shall not apply to any such workplace; and

(b)regulation 13 shall apply to any such workplace only when the aircraft, locomotive or rolling stock, trailer or semi-trailer or vehicle is stationary inside a workplace and, in the case of a vehicle for which a licence is in force under the Vehicles (Excise) Act 1971, is not on a public road.

(4) As respects any workplace which is in fields, woods or other land forming part of an agricultural or forestry undertaking but which is not inside a building and is situated away from the undertaking's main buildings—

(a) regulations 5 to 19 and 23 to 25 shall not apply to any such workplace; and

(b) any requirement to ensure that any such workplace complies with any of regulations 20 to 22 shall have effect as a requirement to so ensure so far as is reasonably practicable.

Requirements under these Regulations

4.—(1) Every employer shall ensure that every workplace, modification, extension or conversion which is under his control and where any of his employees works complies with any requirement of these Regulations which—

(a)applies to that workplace or, as the case may be, to the workplace which contains that modification, extension or conversion; and

(b)is in force in respect of the workplace, modification, extension or conversion.

(2) Subject to paragraph (4), every person who has, to any extent, control of a workplace, modification, extension or conversion shall ensure that such workplace, modification, extension or conversion complies with any requirements of these Regulations which—

(a)applies to that workplace or, as the case may be, to the workplace which contains that modification, extension or conversion;

(b)is in force in respect of the workplace, modification, extension, or conversion; and

(c)relates to matters within that person's control.

(3) Any reference in this regulation to a person having control of any workplace, modification, extension or conversion is a reference to a person having control of the workplace, modification, extension or conversion in connection with the carrying on by him of a trade, business or other undertaking (whether for profit or not).

(4) Paragraph (2) shall not impose any requirement upon a self-employed person in respect of his own work or the work of any partner of his in the undertaking.

(5) Every person who is deemed to be the occupier of a factory by virtue of section 175(5) of the Factories Act 1961 shall ensure that the premises which are so deemed to be a factory comply with these Regulations.

Maintenance of workplace, and of equipment, devices and systems

5.—(1) The workplace and the equipment, devices and systems to which this regulation applies shall be maintained (including cleaned as appropriate) in an efficient state, in efficient working order and in good repair.

(2) Where appropriate, the equipment, devices and systems to which this regulation applies shall be subject to a suitable system of maintenance.

(3) The equipment, devices and systems to which this regulation applies are-

(a)equipment and devices a fault in which is liable to result in a failure to comply with any of these Regulations; and

(b)mechanical ventilation systems provided pursuant to regulation 6 (whether or not they include equipment or devices within sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph).

Ventilation

6.—(1) Effective and suitable provision shall be made to ensure that every enclosed workplace is ventilated by a sufficient quantity of fresh or purified air.

(2) Any plant used for the purpose of complying with paragraph (1) shall include an effective device to give visible or audible warning of any failure of the plant where necessary for reasons of health or safety.

(3) This regulation shall not apply to any enclosed workplace or part of a workplace which is subject to the provisions of—

(a) section 30 of the Factories Act 1961(7);

(b)regulations 49 to 52 of the Shipbuilding and Ship-Repairing Regulations 1960(8);

(c)regulation 21 of the Construction (General Provisions) Regulations 1961(9);

(d)regulation 18 of the Docks Regulations 1988(10).

Temperature in indoor workplaces

7.—(1) During working hours, the temperature in all workplaces inside buildings shall be reasonable.

(2) A method of heating or cooling shall not be used which results in the escape into a workplace of fumes, gas or vapour of such character and to such extent that they are likely to be injurious or offensive to any person.

(3) A sufficient number of thermometers shall be provided to enable persons at work to determine the temperature in any workplace inside a building.

Lighting

8.—(1) Every workplace shall have suitable and sufficient lighting.

(2) The lighting mentioned in paragraph (1) shall, so far as is reasonably practicable, be by natural light.

(3) Without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (1), suitable and sufficient emergency lighting shall be provided in any room in circumstances in which persons at work are specially exposed to danger in the event of failure of artificial lighting.

Cleanliness and waste materials

9.—(1) Every workplace and the furniture, furnishings and fittings therein shall be kept sufficiently clean.

(2) The surfaces of the floors, walls and ceilings of all workplaces inside buildings shall be capable of being kept sufficiently clean.

(3) So far as is reasonably practicable, waste materials shall not be allowed to accumulate in a workplace except in suitable receptacles.

Room dimensions and space

10.—(1) Every room where persons work shall have sufficient floor area, height and unoccupied space for purposes of health, safety and welfare.

(2) It shall be sufficient compliance with this regulation in a workplace which is not a new workplace, a modification, an extension and which, immediately before this regulation came into force in respect of it, was subject to the provisions of the Factories Act 1961, if the workplace does not contravene the provisions of Part I of Schedule 1.

Workstations and seating

11.—(1) Every workstation shall be so arranged that it is suitable both for any person at work in the workplace who is likely to work at that workstation and for any work of the undertaking which is likely to be done there.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (1), every workstation outdoors shall be so arranged that—

(a)so far as is reasonably practicable, it provides protection from adverse weather;

(b)it enables any person at the workstation to leave it swiftly or, as appropriate, to be assisted in the event of an emergency; and

(c)it ensures that any person at the workstation is not likely to slip or fall.

(3) A suitable seat shall be provided for each person at work in the workplace whose work includes operations of a kind that the work (or a substantial part of it) can or must be done sitting.

(4) A seat shall not be suitable for the purpose of paragraph (3) unless-

(a)it is suitable for the person for whom it is provided as well as for the operations to be performed; and(b)a suitable footrest is also provided where necessary.

Condition of floors and traffic routes

12.—(1) Every floor in a workplace and the surface of every traffic route in a workplace shall be of a construction such that the floor or surface of the traffic route is suitable for the purpose for which it is used.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (1), the requirements in that paragraph shall include requirements that—

(a)the floor, or surface of the traffic route, shall have no hole or slope, or be uneven or slippery so as, in each case, to expose any person to a risk to his health or safety; and

(b)every such floor shall have effective means of drainage where necessary.

(3) So far as is reasonably practicable, every floor in a workplace and the surface of every traffic route in a workplace shall be kept free from obstructions and from any article or substance which may cause a person to slip, trip or fall.

(4) In considering whether for the purposes of paragraph (2)(a) a hole or slope exposes any person to a risk to his health or safety—

(a)no account shall be taken of a hole where adequate measures have been taken to prevent a person falling; and

(b)account shall be taken of any handrail provided in connection with any slope.

(5) Suitable and sufficient handrails and, if appropriate, guards shall be provided on all traffic routes which are staircases except in circumstances in which a handrail can not be provided without obstructing the traffic route.

Falls or falling objects

13.—(1) So far as is reasonably practicable, suitable and effective measures shall be taken to prevent any event specified in paragraph (3).

(2) So far as is reasonably practicable, the measures required by paragraph (1) shall be measures other than the provision of personal protective equipment, information, instruction, training or supervision.

(3) The events specified in this paragraph are:-

(a) any person falling a distance likely to cause personal injury;

(b) any person being struck by a falling object likely to cause personal injury.

(4) Any area where there is a risk to health or safety from any event mentioned in paragraph (3) shall be clearly indicated where appropriate.

(5) So far as is practicable, every tank, pit or structure where there is a risk of a person in the workplace falling into a dangerous substance in the tank, pit or structure, shall be securely covered or fenced.

(6) Every traffic route over, across or in an uncovered tank, pit or structure such as is mentioned in paragraph (5) shall be securely fenced.

(7) In this regulation, "dangerous substance" means-

(a) any substance likely to scald or burn;

(b)any poisonous substance;

(c)any corrosive substance;

(d)any fume, gas or vapour likely to overcome a person; or

(e)any granular or free-flowing solid substance, or any viscous substance which, in any case, is of a nature or quantity which is likely to cause danger to any person.

Windows, and transparent or translucent doors, gates and walls

14.—(1) Every window or other transparent or translucent surface in a wall or partition and every transparent or translucent surface in a door or gate shall, where necessary for reasons of health or safety—

(a)be of safety material or be protected against breakage of the transparent or translucent material; and

(b)be appropriately marked or incorporate features so as, in either case, to make it apparent.

Windows, skylights and ventilators

15.—(1) No window, skylight or ventilator which is capable of being opened shall be likely to be opened, closed or adjusted in a manner which exposes any person performing such operation to a risk to his health or safety.

(2) No window, skylight or ventilator shall be in a position when open which is likely to expose any person in the workplace to a risk to his health or safety.

Ability to clean windows etc. safely

16.—(1) All windows and skylights in a workplace shall be of a design or be so constructed that they may be cleaned safely.

(2) In considering whether a window or skylight is of a design or so constructed as to comply with paragraph (1), account may be taken of equipment used in conjunction with the window or skylight or of devices fitted to the building.

Organisation etc. of traffic routes

17.—(1) Every workplace shall be organised in such a way that pedestrians and vehicles can circulate in a safe manner.

(2) Traffic routes in a workplace shall be suitable for the persons or vehicles using them, sufficient in number, in suitable positions and of sufficient size.

(3) Without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (2), traffic routes shall not satisfy the requirements of that paragraph unless suitable measures are taken to ensure that—

(a)pedestrians or, as the case may be, vehicles may use a traffic route without causing danger to the health or safety of persons at work near it;

(b)there is sufficient separation of any traffic route for vehicles from doors or gates or from traffic routes for pedestrians which lead onto it; and

(c)where vehicles and pedestrians use the same traffic route, there is sufficient separation between them.

(4) All traffic routes shall be suitably indicated where necessary for reasons of health or safety.

(5) Paragraph (2) shall apply so far as is reasonably practicable, to a workplace which is not a new workplace, a modification, an extension or a conversion.

Doors and gates

18.—(1) Doors and gates shall be suitably constructed (including being fitted with any necessary safety devices).

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (1), doors and gates shall not comply with that paragraph unless-

(a) any sliding door or gate has a device to prevent it coming off its track during use;

(b) any upward opening door or gate has a device to prevent it falling back;

(c)any powered door or gate has suitable and effective features to prevent it causing injury by trapping any person;

(d)where necessary for reasons of health or safety, any powered door or gate can be operated manually unless it opens automatically if the power fails; and

(e) any door or gate which is capable of opening by being pushed from either side is of such a construction as to provide, when closed, a clear view of the space close to both sides.

Escalators and moving walkways

19. Escalators and moving walkways shall:-

(a)function safely;

(b)be equipped with any necessary safety devices;

(c)be fitted with one or more emergency stop controls which are easily identifiable and readily accessible.

Sanitary conveniences

20.—(1) Suitable and sufficient sanitary conveniences shall be provided at readily accessible places.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (1), sanitary conveniences shall not be suitable unless-

(a)the rooms containing them are adequately ventilated and lit;

(b)they and the rooms containing them are kept in a clean and orderly condition; and

(c)separate rooms containing conveniences are provided for men and women except where and so far as each convenience is in a separate room the door of which is capable of being secured from inside.

(3) It shall be sufficient compliance with the requirement in paragraph (1) to provide sufficient sanitary conveniences in a workplace which is not a new workplace, a modification, an extension or a conversion and which, immediately before this regulation came into force in respect of it, was subject to the provisions of the Factories Act 1961, if sanitary conveniences are provided in accordance with the provisions of Part II of Schedule 1.

Washing facilities

21.—(1) Suitable and sufficient washing facilities, including showers if required by the nature of the work or for health reasons, shall be provided at readily accessible places.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (1), washing facilities shall not be suitable unless-

(a) they are provided in the immediate vicinity of every sanitary convenience, whether or not provided elsewhere as well;

(b)they are provided in the vicinity of any changing rooms required by these Regulations, whether or not provided elsewhere as well;

(c)they include a supply of clean hot and cold, or warm, water (which shall be running water so far as is practicable);

(d)they include soap or other suitable means of cleaning;

(e)they include towels or other suitable means of drying;

(f) the rooms containing them are sufficiently ventilated and lit;

(g)they and the rooms containing them are kept in a clean and orderly condition; and

(h)separate facilities are provided for men and women, except where and so far as they are provided in a room the door of which is capable of being secured from inside and the facilities in each such room are intended to be used by only one person at a time.

(3) Paragraph (2)(h) shall not apply to facilities which are provided for washing hands, forearms and face only.

Drinking water

22.—(1) An adequate supply of wholesome drinking water shall be provided for all persons at work in the workplace.

(2) Every supply of drinking water required by paragraph (1) shall-

(a)be readily accessible at suitable places; and

(b)be conspicuously marked by an appropriate sign where necessary for reasons of health or safety.

(3) Where a supply of drinking water is required by paragraph (1), there shall also be provided a sufficient number of suitable cups or other drinking vessels unless the supply of drinking water is in a jet from which persons can drink easily.

Accommodation for clothing

23.—(1) Suitable and sufficient accommodation shall be provided—

(a) for the clothing of any person at work which is not worn during working hours; and

(b)for special clothing which is worn by any person at work but which is not taken home.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (1), the accommodation mentioned in that paragraph shall not be suitable unless—

(a)where facilities to change clothing are required by regulation 24, it provides suitable security for the clothing mentioned in paragraph (1)(a);

(b)where necessary to avoid risks to health or damage to the clothing, it includes separate accommodation for clothing worn at work and for other clothing;

(c)so far as is reasonably practicable, it allows or includes facilities for drying clothing; and

(d)it is in a suitable location.

Facilities for changing clothing

24.—(1) Suitable and sufficient facilities shall be provided for any person at work in the workplace to change clothing in all cases where—

(a)the person has to wear special clothing for the purpose of work; and

(b)the person can not, for reasons of health or propriety, be expected to change in another room.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (1), the facilities mentioned in that paragraph shall not be suitable unless they include separate facilities for, or separate use of facilities by, men and women where necessary for reasons of propriety.

Facilities for rest and to eat meals

25.—(1) Suitable and sufficient rest facilities shall be provided at readily accessible places.

(2) Rest facilities provided by virtue of paragraph (1) shall-

(a)where necessary for reasons of health or safety include, in the case of a new workplace, an extension or a conversion, rest facilities provided in one or more rest rooms, or, in other cases, in rest rooms or rest areas;

(b)include suitable facilities to eat meals where food eaten in the workplace would otherwise be likely to become contaminated.

(3) Rest rooms and rest areas shall include suitable arrangements to protect non-smokers from discomfort caused by tobacco smoke.

(4) Suitable facilities shall be provided for any person at work who is a pregnant woman or nursing mother to rest.

(5) Suitable and sufficient facilities shall be provided for persons at work to eat meals where meals are regularly eaten in the workplace.

Exemption certificates

26.—(1) The Secretary of State for Defence may, in the interests of national security, by a certificate in writing exempt any of the home forces, any visiting force or any headquarters from the requirements of these Regulations and any exemption may be granted subject to conditions and to a limit of time and may be revoked by the said Secretary of State by a further certificate in writing at any time.

(2) In this regulation-

(a)"the home forces" has the same meaning as in section 12(1) of the Visiting Forces Act 1952(11);

(b)"headquarters" has the same meaning as in article 3(2) of the Visiting Forces and International Headquarters (Application of Law) Order 1965(12);

(c)"visiting force" has the same meaning as it does for the purposes of any provision of Part I of the Visiting Forces Act 1952.

Repeals, saving and revocations

27.—(1) The enactments mentioned in column 2 of Part I of Schedule 2 are repealed to the extent specified in column 3 of that Part.

(2) Nothing in this regulation shall affect the operation of any provision of the Offices, Shops and Railway Premises Act 1963(13) as that provision has effect by virtue of section 90(4) of that Act.

(3) The instruments mentioned in column 1 of Part II of Schedule 2 are revoked to the extent specified in column 3 of that Part.

Signed by order of the Secretary of State.

Patrick McLoughlin Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Department of Employment

1st December 1992

Regulations 10 and 20

SCHEDULE 1PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO FACTORIES WHICH ARE NOT NEW WORKPLACES, MODIFICATIONS, EXTENSIONS OR CONVERSIONS

PART ISPACE

1. No room in the workplace shall be so overcrowded as to cause risk to the health or safety of persons at work in it.

2. Without prejudice to the generality of paragraph 1, the number of persons employed at atime in any workroom shall not be such that the amount of cubic space allowed for each is less than 11 cubic metres.

3. In calculating for the purposes of this Part of this Schedule the amount of cubic space in any room no space more than 4.2 metres from the floor shall be taken into account and, where a room contains a gallery, the gallery shall be treated for the purposes of this Schedule as if it were partitioned off from the remainder of the room and formed a separate room.

PART IINUMBER OF SANITARY CONVENIENCES

4. In workplaces where females work, there shall be at least one suitable water closet for use by females only for every 25 females.

5. In workplaces where males work, there shall be at least one suitable water closet for use by males only for every 25 males.

6. In calculating the number of males or females who work in any workplace for the purposes of this Part of this Schedule, any number not itself divisible by 25 without fraction or remainder shall be treated as the next number higher than it which is so divisible.

Regulation 27

EXPLANATORY NOTE

(This note is not part of the Regulations)

1. These Regulations impose requirements with respect to the health, safety and welfare of persons in a "workplace", defined in regulation 2(1).

2. Except to the extent specified below, the Regulations give effect as respects Great Britain to Council Directive <u>89/654/EEC</u> (OJ L. 393, 30.12.89, p.1) concerning the minimum safety and health requirements for the workplace ("the Directive").

3. The Regulations do not apply to a workplace which is or is in or on a ship (regulation 3(1)(a)). Nor do they impose requirements with respect to—

(a)stability and solidity (Annex I, point 2; and Annex II, point 2 of the Directive);

(b)electrical installations (Annex I, point 3; and Annex II, point 3 of the Directive);

(c)emergency routes and exits (Annex I, point 4; and Annex II, point 4 of the Directive);

(d)fire detection and fire fighting (Annex I, point 5; and Annex II, point 5 of the Directive);

(e)thermal insulation (Annex I, point 9.1, second paragraph, of the Directive); and

(f) first aid rooms or equipment (Annex I, point 19; and Annex II, point 14 of the Directive).

4. The Regulations are disapplied in relation to construction sites and sites where mineral exploration or extraction is undertaken. The application of specified regulations is modified in their application to temporary work sites, specified means of transport and specified parts of agricultural undertakings (regulation 3).

5. Requirements are imposed upon employers, persons who have, to any extent, control of a workplace, and persons who are deemed to be the occupiers of factories for the purposes of section 175(5) of the Factories Act <u>1961 (c. 54)</u> (regulation 4).

6. The Regulations impose requirements with respect to-

(a)maintenance (regulation 5);

(b)ventilation of enclosed workplaces (regulation 6);

(c)temperature indoors and the provision of thermometers (regulation 7);

(d)lighting (including emergency lighting) (regulation 8);

(e)cleanliness of the workplace, furniture, furnishings and fittings; the ability to clean the surface of floors, walls and ceilings; and the accumulation of waste materials (regulation 9);

(f)room dimensions and unoccupied space (regulation 10 and Schedule 1, Part I);

(g)the suitability of workstations (including workstations outdoors) and the provision of suitable seats (regulation 11);

(h)the condition of floors (regulation 12);

(i) the condition and arrangement of routes for pedestrians or vehicles (regulations 12 and 17);

(j)protection from falling objects and from persons falling from a height or falling into a dangerous substance (regulation 13);

(k)the material or protection of windows and other transparent or translucent walls, doors or gates and to them being apparent (regulation 14);

(I)the way in which windows, skylights or ventilators are opened and the position they are left in when open (regulation 15);

(m)the ability to clean windows and skylights (regulation 16);

(n)the construction of doors and gates (including the fitting of necessary safety devices) (regulation 18);

(o)escalators and moving walkways (regulation 19);

(p)the provision of suitable sanitary conveniences (regulation 20 and Schedule 1,Part II);

(q)the provision of suitable washing facilities (regulation 21);

(r)the provision of a supply of drinking water and of cups or other drinking vessels (regulation 22);

(s)the provision of suitable accommodation for clothing and of facilities for changing clothing (regulations 23 and 24); and

(t) the provision of suitable facilities for rest and to eat meals (regulation 25).

7. The Secretary of State for Defence may grant exemption from the requirements of the Regulations in the interests of national security (regulation 26).

8. Provisions replaced by the Regulations are repealed or revoked. There is a saving for provisions of the Offices, Shops and Railway Premises Act <u>1963 (c. 41)</u> in specified circumstances (regulation 27 and Schedule 2).

1992 No. 2792

HEALTH AND SAFETY

The Health and Safety (Display Screen Equipment) Regulations 1992

Made

Laid before Parliament

5th November 1992

16th November 1992

Coming into force

1st January 1993

The Secretary of State, in exercise of the powers conferred on her by sections 15(1), (2), (5)(b) and (9) and 82(3)(a) of, and paragraphs 1(1)(a) and (c) and (2), 7, 8(1), 9 and 14 of Schedule 3 to, the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974(<u>1</u>) and of all other powers enabling her in that behalf and for the purpose of giving effect without modifications to proposals submitted to her by the Health and Safety Commission under section 11(2)(d) of the said Act after the carrying out by the said Commission of consultations in accordance with section 50(3) of that Act, hereby makes the following Regulations:

Citation, commencement, interpretation and application

1.—(1) These Regulations may be cited as the Health and Safety (Display Screen Equipment) Regulations 1992 and shall come into force on 1st January 1993.

(2) In these Regulations-

(a)"display screen equipment" means any alphanumeric or graphic display screen, regardless of the display process involved;

(b)"operator" means a self-employed person who habitually uses display screen equipment as a significant part of his normal work;

(c)"use" means use for or in connection with work;

(d)"user" means an employee who habitually uses display screen equipment as a significant part of his normal work; and

(e)"workstation" means an assembly comprising-

(i)display screen equipment (whether provided with software determining the interface between the equipment and its operator or user, a keyboard or any other input device),

(ii) any optional accessories to the display screen equipment,

(iii)any disk drive, telephone, modem, printer, document holder, work chair, work desk, work surface or other item peripheral to the display screen equipment, and

(iv)the immediate work environment around the display screen equipment.

(3) Any reference in these Regulations to-

(a)a numbered regulation is a reference to the regulation in these Regulations so numbered; or

(b)a numbered paragraph is a reference to the paragraph so numbered in the regulation in which the reference appears.

(4) Nothing in these Regulations shall apply to or in relation to-

(a)drivers' cabs or control cabs for vehicles or machinery;

(b)display screen equipment on board a means of transport;

(c)display screen equipment mainly intended for public operation;

(d)portable systems not in prolonged use;

(e)calculators, cash registers or any equipment having a small data or measurement display required for direct use of the equipment; or

(f)window typewriters.

Analysis of workstations

2.--(1) Every employer shall perform a suitable and sufficient analysis of those workstations which-

(a)(regardless of who has provided them) are used for the purposes of his undertaking by users; or

(b)have been provided by him and are used for the purposes of his undertaking by operators,

for the purpose of assessing the health and safety risks to which those persons are exposed in consequence of that use.

(2) Any assessment made by an employer in pursuance of paragraph (1) shall be reviewed by him if-

(a)there is reason to suspect that it is no longer valid; or

(b)there has been a significant change in the matters to which it relates;

and where as a result of any such review changes to an assessment are required, the employer concerned shall make them.

(3) The employer shall reduce the risks identified in consequence of an assessment to the lowest extent reasonably practicable.

(4) The reference in paragraph (3) to "an assessment" is a reference to an assessment made by the employer concerned in pursuance of paragraph (1) and changed by him where necessary in pursuance of paragraph (2).

Requirements for workstations

3.—(1) Every employer shall ensure that any workstation first put into service on or after 1st January 1993 which–

(a)(regardless of who has provided it) may be used for the purposes of his undertaking by users; or

(b)has been provided by him and may be used for the purposes of his undertaking by operators,

meets the requirements laid down in the Schedule to these Regulations to the extent specified in paragraph 1 thereof.

(2) Every employer shall ensure that any workstation first put into service on or before 31st December 1992 which-

(a)(regardless of who provided it) may be used for the purposes of his undertaking by users; or

(b)was provided by him and may be used for the purposes of his undertaking by operators,

meets the requirements laid down in the Schedule to these Regulations to the extent specified in paragraph 1 thereof not later than 31st December 1996.

Daily work routine of users

4. Every employer shall so plan the activities of users at work in his undertaking that their daily work on display screen equipment is periodically interrupted by such breaks or changes of activity as reduce their workload at that equipment.

Eyes and eyesight

5.--(1) Where a person-

(a)is already a user on the date of coming into force of these Regulations; or

(b)is an employee who does not habitually use display screen equipment as a significant part of his normal work but is to become a user in the undertaking in which he is already employed,

his employer shall ensure that he is provided at his request with an appropriate eye and eyesight test, any such test to be carried out by a competent person.

(2) Any eye and eyesight test provided in accordance with paragraph (1) shall-

(a)in any case to which sub-paragraph (a) of that paragraph applies, be carried out as soon as practicable after being requested by the user concerned; and

(b)in any case to which sub-paragraph (b) of that paragraph applies, be carried out before the employee concerned becomes a user.

(3) At regular intervals after an employee has been provided with an eye and eyesight test in accordance with paragraphs (1) and (2), his employer shall, subject to paragraph (6), ensure that he is provided with a further eye and eyesight test of an appropriate nature, any such test to be carried out by a competent person.

(4) Where a user experiences visual difficulties which may reasonably be considered to be caused by work on display screen equipment, his employer shall ensure that he is provided at his request with an appropriate eye and eyesight test, any such test to be carried out by a competent person as soon as practicable after being requested as aforesaid.

(5) Every employer shall ensure that each user employed by him is provided with special corrective appliances appropriate for the work being done by the user concerned where-

(a)normal corrective appliances cannot be used; and

(b)the result of any eye and eyesight test which the user has been given in accordance with this regulation shows such provision to be necessary.

(6) Nothing in paragraph (3) shall require an employer to provide any employee with an eye and eyesight test against that employee's will.

Provision of training

6.--(1) Where a person-

(a)is already a user on the date of coming into force of these Regulations; or

(b)is an employee who does not habitually use display screen equipment as a significant part of his normal work but is to become a user in the undertaking in which he is already employed,

his employer shall ensure that he is provided with adequate health and safety training in the use of any workstation upon which he may be required to work.

(2) Every employer shall ensure that each user at work in his undertaking is provided with adequate health and safety training whenever the organisation of any workstation in that undertaking upon which he may be required to work is substantially modified.

Provision of information

7.—(1) Every employer shall ensure that operators and users at work in his undertaking are provided with adequate information about–

(a)all aspects of health and safety relating to their workstations; and

(b)such measures taken by him in compliance with his duties under regulations 2 and 3 as relate to them and their work.

(2) Every employer shall ensure that users at work in his undertaking are provided with adequate information about such measures taken by him in compliance with his duties under regulations 4 and 6(2) as relate to them and their work.

(3) Every employer shall ensure that users employed by him are provided with adequate information about such measures taken by him in compliance with his duties under regulations 5 and 6(1) as relate to them and their work.

Exemption certificates

8.—(1) The Secretary of State for Defence may, in the interests of national security, exempt any of the home forces, any visiting force or any headquarters from any of the requirements imposed by these Regulations.

(2) Any exemption such as is specified in paragraph (1) may be granted subject to conditions and to a limit of time and may be revoked by the Secretary of State for Defence by a further certificate in writing at any time.

(3) In this regulation-

(a)"the home forces" has the same meaning as in section 12(1) of the Visiting Forces Act 1952(2);

(b)"headquarters" has the same meaning as in article 3(2) of the Visiting Forces and International Headquarters (Application of Law) Order 1965(3); and

(c)"visiting force" has the same meaning as it does for the purposes of any provision of Part I of the Visiting Forces Act 1952.

Extension outside Great Britain

9. These Regulations shall, subject to regulation 1(4), apply to and in relation to the premises and activities outside Great Britain to which sections 1 to 59 and 80 to 82 of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 apply by virtue of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 (Application Outside Great Britain) Order 1989(<u>4</u>) as they apply within Great Britain.

Signed by order of the Secretary of State.

Patrick McLoughlin

Parliamentary Under Secretary of State,

Department of Employment

5th November 1992

Regulation 3

THE SCHEDULE(WHICH SETS OUT THE MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR WORKSTATIONS WHICH ARE CONTAINED IN THE ANNEX TO COUNCIL DIRECTIVE <u>90/270/EEC</u> ON THE MINIMUM SAFETY AND HEALTH REQUIREMENTS FOR WORK WITH DISPLAY SCREEN EQUIPMENT(5))

1. Extent to which employers must ensure that workstations meet the requirements laid down in this schedules

An employer shall ensure that a workstation meets the requirements laid down in this Schedule to the extent that-

(a)those requirements relate to a component which is present in the workstation concerned;

(b)those requirements have effect with a view to securing the health, safety and welfare of persons at work; and

(c)the inherent characteristics of a given task make compliance with those requirements appropriate as respects the workstation concerned.

2. Equipment

(a) General comment

The use as such of the equipment must not be a source of risk for operators or users.

(b) Display screen

The characters on the screen shall be well-defined and clearly formed, of adequate size and with adequate spacing between the characters and lines.

- The image on the screen should be stable, with no flickering or other forms of instability.
- The brightness and the contrast between the characters and the background shall be easily adjustable by the operator or user, and also be easily adjustable to ambient conditions.
- The screen must swivel and tilt easily and freely to suit the needs of the operator or user.
- It shall be possible to use a separate base for the screen or an adjustable table.
- The screen shall be free of reflective glare and reflections liable to cause discomfort to the operator or user.

(c) Keyboard

The keyboard shall be tiltable and separate from the screen so as to allow the operator or user to find a comfortable working position avoiding fatigue in the arms or hands.

- The space in front of the keyboard shall be sufficient to provide support for the hands and arms of the operator or user.
- The keyboard shall have a matt surface to avoid reflective glare.
- The arrangement of the keyboard and the characteristics of the keys shall be such as to facilitate the use of the keyboard.
- The symbols on the keys shall be adequately contrasted and legible from the design working position.

(d) Work desk or work surface

The work desk or work surface shall have a sufficiently large, low-reflectance surface and allow a flexible arrangement of the screen, keyboard, documents and related equipment.

• The document holder shall be stable and adjustable and shall be positioned so as to minimise the need for uncomfortable head and eye

movements.

• There shall be adequate space for operators or users to find a comfortable position.

(e) Work chair

The work chair shall be stable and allow the operator or user easy freedom of movement and a comfortable position.

- The seat shall be adjustable in height.
- The seat back shall be adjustable in both height and tilt.
- A footrest shall be made available to any operator or user who wishes one.

3. Environment

(a) Space requirements

The workstation shall be dimensioned and designed so as to provide sufficient space for the operator or user to change position and vary movements.

(b) Lighting

Any room lighting or task lighting provided shall ensure satisfactory lighting conditions and an appropriate contrast between the screen and the ckground environment, taking into account the type of work and the vision requirements of the operator or user.

• Possible disturbing glare and reflections on the screen or other equipment shall be prevented by co-ordinating workplace and

workstation layout with the positioning and technical characteristics of the artificial light sources.

(c) Reflections and glare

Workstations shall be so designed that sources of light, such as windows and other openings, transparent or translucid walls, and brightly coloured fixtures or walls cause no direct glare and no distracting reflections on the screen.

• Windows shall be fitted with a suitable system of adjustable covering to attenuate the daylight that falls on the workstation.

(d) Noise

Noise emitted by equipment belonging to any workstation shall be taken into account when a workstation is being equipped, with a view in particular to ensuring that attention is not distracted and speech is not disturbed.

(e) Heat

Equipment belonging to any workstation shall not produce excess heat which could cause discomfort to operators or users.

(f) Radiation

All radiation with the exception of the visible part of the electromagnetic spectrum shall be reduced to negligible levels from the point of view of the protection of operators' or users' health and safety.

(g) Humidity

An adequate level of humidity shall be established and maintained.

4. Interface between computer and operator/user

In designing, selecting, commissioning and modifying software, and in designing tasks using display screen equipment, the employer shall take into account the following principles:

(a)software must be suitable for the task;

(b)software must be easy to use and, where appropriate, adaptable to the level of knowledge or experience of the operator or user; no quantitative or qualitative checking facility may be used without the knowledge of the operators or users;

(c)systems must provide feedback to operators or users on the performance of those systems;

(d)systems must display information in a format and at a pace which are adapted to operators or users;

(e)the principles of software ergonomics must be applied, in particular to human data processing.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

(This note is not part of the Regulations)

1. Subject to the exception specified in paragraph 2 below, these Regulations give effect as respects Great Britain to the substantive provisions of Council Directive <u>90/270/EEC</u> on the minimum safety and health requirements for work with display screen equipment (OJNo. L156, 21.6.90, p.14)

2. These Regulations do not purport to give effect to paragraphs 2 and 4 of article 9 of the Directive specified in paragraph 1 above.

3. Regulation 2 requires each employer-

(a)to make a suitable and sufficient analysis of those workstations which-

(i)(regardless of who has provided them) are used for the purposes of his undertaking by users, or

(ii)have been provided by him and are used for the purposes of his undertaking by operators;

(b)to assess the health and safety risks to which those operators or users are exposed in consequence of that use;

(c)to reduce those risks to the lowest extent reasonably practicable; and

(d)in the circumstances specified in paragraph (2) of that regulation, to review (and where necessary change) any assessment such as is referred to in sub-paragraph (b) above.

4. Regulation 1(2) defines not only the words "operator", "user" and "workstation", but also the phrase "display screen equipment".

5. Regulation 3 requires each employer to ensure that any workstation which-

(a)(regardless of who has provided it) may be used for the purposes of his undertaking by users; or

(b)has been provided by him and may be used for the purposes of his undertaking by operators,

meets the requirements laid down in the Schedule to these Regulations. In the case of workstations first put into service on or before 31st December 1992, the employer has until 31st December 1996 to ensure compliance with the above-mentioned requirements.

6. Regulation 4 requires each employer to plan the activities of users at work in his undertaking in such a way that their daily work on display screen equipment is periodically interrupted by such breaks or changes of activity as reduce their workload at that equipment.

7. Regulation 5 requires each employer to ensure that users employed by him are provided-

(a) with initial eye and eyesight tests on request;

(b)at regular intervals thereafter and with the consent of the users concerned, with subsequent eye and eyesight tests;

(c)with additional eye and eyesight tests on request, where the users concerned are experiencing visual difficulties which might reasonably be considered to be caused by work on display screen equipment; and

(d)with appropriate special corrective appliances, where normal corrective appliances cannot be used and any eye and eyesight tests carried out on the users concerned in accordance with regulation 5 show such provision to be necessary.

8. Regulation 6 requires each employer to ensure that-

(a)users employed by him are provided with adequate health and safety training in the use of their workstations; and

(b)users at work in his undertaking are provided with adequate health and safety training whenever their workstations are substantially modified.

9. Regulation 7 requires each employer to ensure that operators and users at work in his undertaking are provided with adequate health and safety information, both about their workstations and about such measurements taken by him to comply with regulations 2 to 6 of these Regulations as relate to them and their work.

10. Regulation 8 enables the Secretary of State for Defence to grant certificates of exemption from these Regulations in the interests of national security.

11. Regulation 9 extends the application of these Regulations to and in relation to certain premises and activities outside Great Britain.

ⁱ The Terrorism Act 2000 section 1

ⁱⁱ The Localism Act 2011; Chapter 2 Fire and Rescue Authorities; Section 9 and 10